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1. INTRODUCTION 
“The typical dilemma faced in international business relationships is that trust is 
particularly important and, at the same time, particularly difficult to achieve when 
the partners come from different cultures” (Möllering & Stache 2010:205). 
“When I am at our sales subsidiaries outside Denmark, I act and behave in the same 
way as when I am at Headquarters. And I am wondering: How do they [sales 
personnel of Turkish ethnicity] perceive this? Would they rather have had me act 
[lead] differently? What [leadership] do they want? With this culture it is really 
difficult to simply tell me: “I think it was wrong of you to behave like this. Why don’t 
you do it like this?” I don’t think you can make them say this; if anything, it’s really 
difficult. You should have worked together with them in for a really, really long time 
before they say such things. (Interview with head of sales, November 11, 2014. 
Timestamp: 0:51.20.6 - 0:52.42.0). 
 
This study aims to explore, describe and explain the phenomenon of trusting as a 
situated relational process in multicultural leadership. With a sample of multicultural 
leader-employee relations embedded in the context of an Ethnic Sales Department at 
a Danish SME which I named “ESAG”, the purpose of this longitudinal case study 
is to discover the leaders’ and employees’ interpretations and experiences of trusting 
alongside their perceptions of why and how their trusting changed through time. I 
expected that the understandings gained from this research would lead to new 
knowledge which could inform theories on multicultural trust as well as 
multicultural leadership practices. In this research, I employed an overall 
hermeneutical approach on a qualitative embedded case study to elucidate the 
phenomenon to be researched. This case study focuses on 6 purposefully selected 
multicultural leader-employee relations in their diverse contexts. 
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What follows is an outline of the background framing this study. Thereafter, I 
present the problem formulation and the statement of purpose and corresponding 
research questions. Subsequently, I briefly present and discuss the approach taken to 
this research, as well as my perspectives and assumptions as researcher. I close the 
introductory chapter with a presentation and discussion of the motivation and 
anticipated impact of this research study. Finally, I present an overview on this 
thesis’ structure. 
 
1.1 Background 
Research on organizational trust indicates that trust-based work relations lead to a 
variety of beneficial outcomes for both the employees, leaders, and the organization 
at large. Drawing on studies by Whitney (1994), Mayer & Davis (1999), and Dirks 
& Ferrin (2002), Searle & Skinner (2011:3) point out that trust directly influences 
organizational effectiveness, efficiency and performance. At the level of leader-
employee interactions, trust is said to be valuable for the quality of communication 
and problem solving, organizational citizenship behavior, organizational 
commitment, team performance, and employee turn-over rate (Gillespie & Mann 
2004:588) as well as knowledge sharing (Newell et al. 2007:158).  
While scholarly work on trust points to the beneficial outcome of trust, the question 
as to how trust is built still occupies organizational scholars. Research suggests that 
achieving a trusting relationship seems to depend on a variety of factors, such as 
rational judgements (Coleman 1990; Gambetta 1988; Sztompka 1999), feelings of 
competence to make the right assessment on the trustworthiness of others (Barbalet 
1996), and one’s upbringing and moral norms prevalent in a certain community and 
cultural context (Delhey & Newton 2005). Principally, trust research focuses on 
either of the aforementioned factors with a dominant view on interpersonal trust 
(e.g., McAllister 1995; Six 2005, Zand 1972) and a tendency to neglect the 
processual and contextual aspects of trust (see e.g., Möllering 2006; Wright & 
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Ehnert 2010). The quotes at the beginning of this section, however, seem to point to 
culture and process as playing an influential role in trust building. Yet, quite 
surprisingly, research on the influence of cultural factors on trust is still very scarce 
(Saunders et al., 2010) despite the fact that globalization has led to an intensification 
of intercultural work relations across business size. 
Existing studies aiming at understanding the influence of culture on trust building 
indicate that trust is understood and built differently across cultures (Zaheer & 
Zaheer 2006, Saunders et al. 2010).Thus, trust may have universal key aspects such 
as perceived risk and vulnerability (see e.g. Möllering 2006) but it seems to be 
enacted and conceptualized in very different ways (see e.g. Mizrachi et al. 2007) 
Additionally, research on the societal level shows that trust itself as a kind of ‘trust-
culture’ (Fukuyama 1995; Sztompka 1999) or institutionalized trust (Kroeger 2013) 
can lay the conceptual ground for interpersonal trust building. What is more, only 
very few studies have addressed trust as a process (Khodyakov 2007; Möllering 
2006; Nooteboom & Six 2003) let alone a situated relational process (Frederiksen 
2014) in which trusting as a situated relational practice is simultaneously influenced 
by individual agency, the organizational, societal and cultural structures, and the 
situated relationship. In general, research on small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) is scarce, even though they comprise “the overwhelming majority (99.8%) 
of enterprises active within the EU-28’s non-financial business economy (…). More 
than two thirds (67.1 %) of the EU-28’s non-financial business economy workforce 
was active in an SME in 2012, some 89.7 million persons” 
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained; economy size class analysis). 
Considering the relatively scarce knowledge on leadership and trust processes in 
general and in SMEs in particular in light of the hitherto established positive 
implications of trusting for organizational performance and leader-employee 
collaborations, this study aims at enhancing the understanding of micro-processes of 
trust building in the context of multicultural leadership. In order to do so, this 
research addresses the interplay of structure and agency (Bourdieu 1994; Emirbayer 
& Mische 1998) as underlying yet overlapping causes for the process of situated 
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relational trusting between Danish leaders and their employees with ethnic minority 
Turkish backgrounds in one Austrian and two German sales subsidiaries of ESAG. 
According to its internal newsmagazine (ESAG News, no. 4; Dec. 2014), sales at 
ESAG is “going outstanding with new customers constantly approaching us.” 
ESAG’s economic growth made the company the second most influential ethnic 
food retailer on the German ethnic food market (Interview HR manager, December 
2012). Yet, as presented in the second quote at the beginning of this section, trust in 
leader-employee interactions at times seems also to be under pressure in some of the 
case company’s multicultural leader-employee relationships. Since 1999, the case 
company has had sales activities in the Austrian and German market for ethnic food. 
In 2012, a fourth sales subsidiary was established in the south-western part of 
Germany (DE-W) aiming at further strengthening their presence in one of the main 
markets for ethnic food products within Europe. In order to reach the key customer 
group of ethnic foods, i.e. Austrians and Germans of Turkish, Syrian, Bulgarian or 
Romanian origin, the company decided to employ sales personnel of Turkish 
ethnicity who either were born in Austria or Germany or moved to these countries at 
an early age. Thus, all sales personnel at the Austrian and German subsidiaries had 
Turkish and Austrian/German backgrounds, shifting their cultural identities on 
various occasions. According to the Federal Statistical Office in Germany 
(https://www.destatis.de 2013), 16,5 million people (20,5%) currently living in 
Germany have a minority ethnic background; 12,8% of them are of Turkish origin of 
whom many hold a German passport and were born in Germany. A similar situation 
is stated by the Statistical Office in Austria (http://www.statistik.at 2012) where 18.9 
% of Austria’s inhabitants have a minority ethnic background with about 14 % 
having Turkish roots (http://www.zukunfteuropa.at/site/7216/default.aspx). Despite 
the growing number of citizens with dual citizenship and bicultural backgrounds 
living in Europe, there seems to be hardly any research on trust building in the 
context of leadership that addresses trust in the light of cultural complexity and 
shifting cultural identities. While there is consensus across trust researchers that 
organizations, leaders and followers benefit from trusting relationships, and while 
there is an understanding that culture influences trust, empirical research on trust 
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building processes between leaders and their employees with bicultural backgrounds 
seems to be nonexistent. 
In addition, empirical research on trust has often been conducted in laboratory 
settings (Wright & Ehnert, 2010) or by the use of so-called Trust-Games (Möllering 
et al., 2004:562) based on Social Exchange Theory (Takahashi et al., 2008). 
Whereas researchers can find a variety of instruments for measuring trust, such as an 
inventory for assessing conditions of trust (Butler 1991), ‘The Organizational Trust 
Inventory’ (OTI) by Cummings & Bromiley (1996), or the so-called ‘Behavioral 
Trust Inventory’ developed by Gillespie (2003), qualitative research on trust is 
relatively scarce, at least in the field of Organization Science. Experimental and 
survey studies on trust, however ,have severe limitations, at least when studying 
interpersonal trust as a relational practice (Möllering 2006, Frederiksen 2012) where 
the individuals’ reasonable actions are in focus. Möllering (2006, 2012) argues for 
more interpretative studies which hitherto have been extremely under-represented in 
trust research. Following this call, this research took a longitudinal interpretative 
case study approach to trust building between leaders and employees in the context 
of multicultural leadership.  This study aims to enhance our understanding of trust 
building in leader-employee relationships situated in real organizational contexts 
and influenced by their situated interactions, cultural backgrounds and 
understandings, past experiences and present sense-making.  
 
1.2 Problem statement, purpose and research questions 
Seeing that the majority of interpersonal trust research is concerned with the 
individual’s dispositions to trust, the influence of systems on trust or the influence of 
judgements of trustworthiness on trust, little is known about these aspects’ 
interconnectedness in regard to trust. Furthermore, there is a scarcity of information 
as to how culture may relate to this ‘interconnectedness’ of structure, practice and a 
13 
 
given relation as well as little is known about how leaders and employees at SME’s 
maneuver in this complexity. 
From a theoretical perspective, the aim of this study is to further our understanding 
of the complexities of trusting by empirically examining interpersonal processes of 
trust by addressing the focusing on the influence of socio-cultural structures, here 
understood as socio-cultural frames sedimented in individual dispositions, on 
situated relational trust building between leaders and their employees. 
Therefore, this study investigates how and when trust emerges from multicultural 
leader-employee relations and its situated processes over time. I aim to investigate 
what the relationships look like; what the bases for trust are in these relationships 
and if/how they change over time. How did trust build up or break down in these 
very relations? How did the situation contribute to trusting? How did culture 
influence the situated formation of perception and understanding (practical sense) of 
social actors from which trusting emerges (or not)? And how do changes in 
identities – fluctuations, fluidity of identity – influence the processes of trusting, and 
how do these, in turn, alter the identities and relationships over time? This is not to 
say that I understand culture or identities to predict behavior but rather to influence 
an actor’s perception and understanding of a relational situation (including its 
contexts). In terms of trust, it seems to be essential to find out how familiar 
(Luhmann 1988) or risky a certain situation is perceived to be. It should be noted 
that the influence of cultural aspects on the development of perception is understood 
to be a combination of emotional, tacit and cognitive processes (Solomon & Flores 
2001), thus referring to aspects of practical sense (Bourdieu 1994) and reflexivity 
(Emirbayer & Mische 1998). 
The objective of my research is thus to obtain a better understanding of the 
complexity and dynamics of trusting in the context of cultural complexity in 
organizational settings through discovering and discussing underlying conditions for 
trust, processes of learning, subjective sense-making, and shifting cultural 
identifications (Möllering 2011, 2013). In order to grasp this complex interplay of 
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aforesaid processes in trusting, I employ an overall theoretical framework inspired 
by Bourdieu’s (1994) practice theory, Emirbayer & Mische’s (1998) notion of 
reflexivity and Frederiksen’s (2012, 2014) ideas of situated relational trust as the 
interrelationship between subjective sense-making of the Other and the situation, 
dispositions in form of socialized structures, and embodied practice and practical 
sense. These works inspired me to formulate the following three research questions: 
1. How did this study’s interactants1 interpret and experience their 
organizational context and role at ESAG’s Department of Ethnic Sales? 
2. How did this study’s interactants interpret and experience trust in their 
respective leader-employee relations? 
3. Which factors did this study’s interactants perceive as helpful, which as 
hampering, and which as critical to trusting 
To answer these questions, the study was conducted as an embedded case study of 
situated leader-employee relations and their ‘practices’ of trust building in the 
context of multicultural leadership in a SME headquartered in Denmark. The main 
attention was on three Danish leaders (IDK1; IDK2; IDK3) and their relationships 
with various employees/subordinates
2
, most of whom had Turkish backgrounds. 
Hence the focus was predominantly on trust-building between individuals (Danish 
leaders and their predominantly none-Danish bicultural employees) which however 
also cut across the subsidiary and departmental level at HQs. Nonetheless, at times 
this study reached beyond these levels as processes of cultural identifications and 
                                                          
1
 Considering that this study is based on qualitative interviews and observations, I 
decided to call this study’s ‘participants’ or ‘interviewees’ for ‘interactants’ seeing 
that all empirical material provided to me should be understood as an outcome of 
‘interactions’ between the so-called ‘participants’ and me, the researcher (see 
Chapter 4 for further explanations). 
2
 The wording of ‘follower/subordinate’ does not indicate that the so-called 
‘followers’ follow the leader blindly, nor does it indicate that they at all times are 
subordinate to the leader. Rather, this wording signals that most of the time, leader-
follower relationships are characterized by unequal power relations with the leaders 
being more powerful and resourceful especially when it comes to decision-making 
and information seeking. 
15 
 
“Othering” (Rawls & David 2006) seemingly referred to national levels and even 
international political discourses. 
1.3 Assumptions 
Based on my work and internship experiences in MNCs and SMEs and my 
academic knowledge on intercultural leadership, I made the following assumptions 
in regard to this study. First, in general, SMEs neither have the resources in terms of 
manpower, nor the knowledge to develop and implement processes of diversity 
management. This assumption is based on research on Diversity Management in 
Europe which indicates that European companies in general do not pay attention to 
cultural differences in their workforce (Wrench 2009). Second, Danish SMEs are 
primarily comprised of Danish employees who are used to working within the 
confines of “Freedom with Responsibility” which fosters or even represents trust. 
The notion of “Freedom with Responsibility” represents a kind of Danish work 
philosophy (Casey 2014) which implies that employees should be self-motivated 
and proactive while having a certain degree of freedom to take responsibility for 
their work. Third, people with an ethnic minority background are more prone to 
unemployment and underemployment than persons representing a given country’s 
ethnic majority which means that, in general, ethnic minority employees would be 
rather careful to not lose their current position. This assumption is guided by 
Kahanec et al.’s (2010) research on ethnic minorities in Europe which shows that the 
unemployment rates for ethnic minorities within the EU are in general much higher 
than for these countries’ respective majority populations3. This could suggest that 
ethnic minorities in general are more cautious about their practices at work. Fourth, 
because (mis)trust is a rather sensitive issue, companies and their workforce may be 
reluctant to provide me access and to share their experiences with me. This 
assumption rests on my experiences as master student where it showed to be 
                                                          
3
 The unemployment rates in % relevant for this study’s national contexts are as 
follows (majority population vs. ethnic minorities): Austria 3.44 vs. 10.09; 
Denmark: 3.76 vs. 11.74; Germany: 8.13 vs. 19.24 
(Source: Kahanec et al. 2010:32) 
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difficult to find suitable case companies for qualitative studies pertaining to 
somewhat sensitive subjects such as cultural awareness in leadership. 
1.4 Thesis Structure  
In this thesis, all chapters relate to each other. Inspired by Bourdieu’s (1994) Theory 
of Practice, this thesis investigates the interrelationship and interconnectedness of 
agency (the part) and the overall structure (the whole) for situated relational trust in 
the context of multicultural leadership by applying a hermeneutic approach 
(Gadamer 2004), which is further elaborated in Chapter 4. The empirical part of the 
thesis consists of six interrelated sections (Chapter 5.1-5.6) which in their unity 
explicate how individuals’ perceptions and actions of trust are interwoven with their 
specific capital portfolio and their position in certain fields (for example the field of 
ESAG and the broader societal field). At the theoretical level, the dissertation 
contributes by discussing how Bourdieu’s tools (field, habitus, and capital) can be 
employed in organizational trust research focusing on leader-employee relations. 
The thesis is comprised of six chapters.   
Chapter Two: Left with fragments: A journey into understandings of ‘culture’, 
‘intercultural leadership’ and ‘trust’. This chapter presents the concepts relevant for 
this study on trust in multicultural leadership as presented in the respective bodies of 
literature on culture, leadership and trust. This presentation includes arguments for 
looking at each concept as a construction simultaneously influenced by individual 
agency and a given overall structure.  These arguments point to the usefulness of 
this thesis’ overall framework inspired by Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice.  
Chapter Three: Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice as theoretical framework for the 
understanding of trust in the context of multicultural leadership. In this chapter I 
present an adapted form of Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice and his main concepts of 
habitus, field and capital.  In addition, this chapter discusses the implications and 
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limitations of using a framework inspired by Bourdieu for conceptualizing and 
researching trust in multicultural leadership. 
Chapter Four: Methodology. In this chapter, I describe the overall framework as a 
combination of a hermeneutical approach to an adapted Bourdieusian practice 
theory. In so doing, I describe and discuss the appropriateness of a longitudinal 
qualitative case study design for the collection of empirical material on trusting. 
Next, the case company is presented and it is argued for the choice of this specific 
case and the leader-employee relations studied within it. Then, the methods of data 
collection are deliberated upon. In addition, I discuss my approach of 
operationalizing trust in a qualitative study taking a hermeneutic approach. Then, the 
method of data analysis is presented in which I argue for the choice of a hermeneutic 
approach to longitudinal research and the selection of an altered form of Bourdieu’s 
field analysis (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). In addition, this chapter addresses the 
ethical considerations of doing qualitative research in regard to this study. To 
conclude, issues of reliability and validity are discussed pointing to the limitations of 
this study. 
Chapter Five: Findings: Conditions, interpretations and experiences of trust in and 
beyond ESAG. This chapter presents the empirical analysis. The empirical material 
consisting of exploratory interviews, semi-structured interviews, qualitative 
observations and secondary data (company website and printed internal magazine) is 
analyzed in a hermeneutic process. The theories outlined in Chapter 2 and 3 
informed data collection while the continuous analysis of the data collected 
informed the theoretical framework of this thesis. This hermeneutical approach 
resulted in four interrelated findings that account for the conditions for trust 
(Sections 5.1 and 5.2) and the influence of leadership practices on interpretations 
and experiences of trust (Sections 5.3 and 5.4). Together, these sections describe and 
analyze the leaders’ and employees’ interpretations and experiences of trusting 
alongside their perceptions of why and how their trusting changed over time. This 
chapter concludes with a contextual analysis (Section 5.5) inspired by Bourdieu’s 
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field analysis which ‘summarizes’ the main findings as an interplay of agency and 
structure within and beyond the case company. 
Chapter Six: Discussion and Conclusion: The interplay of conditions, interpretations 
and experiences of trust in and beyond ESAG. In this chapter, I discuss the findings 
in light of relevant literature and research on trust in the context of multicultural 
leadership. Throughout the discussion I highlight literature supporting my findings 
as well as highlight new insights into the ways trusting in leader-employee relations 
is influenced by the interplay of agency and structure. Following the discussion is 
the conclusion in which I respond to the research questions and problem formulation 
presented in the introduction. To conclude, suggestions for further research followed 
by practical recommendations for trust building and maintenance in multicultural 
leadership I present. 
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2. LEFT WITH FRAGMENTS: A JOURNEY 
INTO UNDERSTANDINGS OF ‘CULTURE’, 
‘INTERCULTURAL LEADERSHIP’ AND 
‘TRUST’ 
Meeting new people, seeing unknown places, and experiencing other cultures has 
always been a great interest of mine and has both expanded my horizons and shaped 
and re-shaped my worldviews. The same is true for my academic journey and thus 
my understanding of certain concepts and theories. As a person, lecturer, and 
researcher in the broad field of ‘organizational leadership’, I have been and still am 
engaged with issues of culture, leadership and trust, all of which – so I learned – can 
be understood and researched in various ways. In the following, I provide a brief 
overview of how these concepts have been conceptualized, how they have been 
researched, the main questions that have been the focus of researchers and, lastly, 
the results of their research when the abovementioned concepts have been applied in 
their studies on organizations. However, this brief journey through the vast body of 
predominantly organizational literature pertaining to ‘culture’, ‘leadership’, and 
‘trust’ is not meant to result in an in-depth literature review; its aim is rather to 
present the growing complexities, ambiguities, and fragmentation of each concept 
over time. Thus, this chapter describes why I deemed it necessary to turn to practice 
theory as the main analytical tool for making sense of my empirical material on trust 
building in the context of intercultural leadership, as I will discuss in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
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2.1 Meanings of ‘culture’ 
Research on culture within organizational settings has predominantly drawn on 
Geert Hofstede’s (1994, 2001) conceptualization of culture as comprising five 
dimensions which are said to strongly influence employees’ work-related values, 
orientation towards their work, and a company’s preferred leadership style, to name 
but a few (Gesteland 2006; Harris et al. 2004; Hickson & Pugh 1995; Hooker 2003; 
Yukl 2013). According to Hofstede (1994, 2006), these dimensions describe any 
culture, which he defines as “the collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one group or category from another” (Hofstede 
1994:5). In Hofstede’s view, culture is constructed in onion-like layers with core 
values and assumptions at the center and rituals, heroes and symbols representing 
the outer layers. Even though Hofstede’s conceptualization derives from and is 
predominantly employed in organizational research, his concept of culture refers 
primarily to national culture, which he understands as ‘overruling’ organizational 
culture and identity (Guthey & Jackson 2011:167). Similar to Hofstede, 
Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner (1997), Hall (1990) and Schwartz (1999) 
conceptualize culture as comprising several dimensions and constructed as an onion-
like structure. This overall functionalistic understanding of culture, which Osland et 
al. (2000) call “sophisticated stereotyping”, provides researchers with a tool with 
which to measure and compare different national cultures. In her often cited work on 
culture, Smircich (1983:343) classifies this approach to culture as one seeing culture 
as the independent variable leading to “comparative management studies, [in which] 
culture is considered to be a background factor (almost synonymous with country), 
an explanatory variable (...) or a broad framework (...) influencing the development 
and reinforcement of beliefs.” Thus, metaphorically speaking, a given company’s 
employees ‘convey their (national) culture into the company where it influences 
practices, understandings and beliefs. In other words, a given national culture 
directly influences a given organization, including its members. According to 
Smircich, research taking this approach to culture aims to describe the differences 
and similarities among cultures, which is then used to provide companies with 
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suggestions as to how they can heighten their organizational effectiveness; this is 
exactly what the online resource GlobeSmart is about which is often used by global 
companies to predict culture-related challenges in cross-cultural collaborations. 
A different, yet somewhat related, view of culture is understanding culture as an 
internal variable (Smircich 1983:344), meaning that even though organizations or 
other groups are embedded in a wider cultural context, they do construct their own 
characteristic culture and cultural identity, which arguably visualized in its 
“distinctive cultural artifacts such as rituals, legends and ceremonies.” Smircich 
argues that this approach understands culture to be the “social or normative glue” 
(ibid.) binding the organizational system and sub-systems and thus fostering system 
stability. In summary, culture in this sense is understood to be constructed by the 
organization itself, i.e. by its members, especially its managers and leaders. 
Research employing such an approach to culture is mainly interested in how 
organizations and groups build their characteristic culture from within. Even though 
research taking this approach acknowledges the organizational members’ 
“subjective interpretative processes”, it is primarily concerned with how managers 
can build and change an organization’s particular corporate culture (Kotter & 
Heskett 1992; Schein 2010). In this respect, Schein (2010) argues that the inner 
layers of culture, i.e. the basic assumptions (norms, taken-for-granted beliefs, 
unwritten rules), are harder to change than the outer ones, such as observable 
artifacts (objects, visible structures and activities), and the espoused values 
(strategies, goals and philosophies). While scholars such as Kotter and Schein 
embrace the idea of a ‘strong corporate culture’ as a means of organizational 
success, other scholars question the mere existence of such a concept as ‘corporate 
culture’, let alone the possibility of managing it. For example, Sackmann (1992) 
contests the idea of a homogenous corporate culture in her empirical study on the 
existence and formation of sub-cultures at a medium sized company. In her study, 
Sackmann found that several sub-cultures existed at the company with some 
research participants belonging to several of these simultaneously. Consequently, 
Sackmann argues that culture is a rather heterogeneous concept. Similar notions can 
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be found in later works by, for example, Alvesson (2002), Chao & Moon (2005), 
and Søderberg & Holden (2002), all of which understand organizations not to have a 
certain culture or cultures, but rather to be a culture. 
Following this understanding, the subsequent conceptualizations of ‘culture’ refer to 
culture as a root metaphor and draw from modern anthropology, thus leaving 
“greater room for ambiguity because of culture’s nonconcrete status” (Smircich 
1983:347).  
Following the branch of cognitive anthropology, culture is broadly speaking 
understood as a cognitive scheme, i.e. “a system of shared cognitions or a system of 
knowledge and beliefs” (Smircich 1983:348). These systems are understood to be 
built upon what appear to be rules for behavior, but which are actually “networks of 
subjective meanings or shared frames of reference that organization members share 
to varying degrees and which, to an external observer, appear to function in a rule-
like, or grammar-like manner” (Smircich 1983:349). The notion of a network which 
functions in a grammar-like manner, referring to the understandings of language, 
seems to indicate that even though there appear to be certain underlying rules for 
how shared frames of reference guide sense-making and social actions, there is at 
the same time a great variety of possibilities as to how behavior is generated within 
this ‘grammar’ or these ‘frames of reference’. Hence, I claim that cognitive ‘rules’ 
or ‘cultural scripts’ can be understood as influencing social actions, including sense-
making processes, which in relation to this study are processes of trusting alongside 
processes of leadership (see Section 2.2 for a discussion of leadership processes). 
However, these so-called ‘rules’ or ‘scripts’ do not predict certain behaviors. As I 
will discuss in detail (see Chapter 3), I understand social practices, including ‘doing 
culture’, to be far more complex than suggested in this cognitive approach. 
Researchers taking the cognitive approach to culture are concerned with the 
understanding of the “rules and scripts that guide action” (Smircich 1983:350), 
which according to Gibson et al. (2009:50) dominates organizational research. 
Organizational scholars employing this perspective not only aim to understand 
underlying ‘scripts’ for actions, but also suggest ways of altering them, which 
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assumes a central part in research on (multicultural) leadership, as I will discuss in 
Section 2.2. 
Yet another conceptualization of culture is that of culture as a system of shared 
symbols and meanings rather than ‘rules’, which is why Smircich (1983:350) calls 
this approach to culture the symbolic perspective. The most prominent scholar taking 
this approach is Geertz (1973), who in his research tried to interpret the “themes” of 
culture shaping social actors’ behaviors. Referring to Opler (1945:198), Smircich 
(ibid.) understands these “themes” as “those postulates or understandings, declared 
or implicit, tacitly approved or openly prompted, that orient and stimulate social 
activity.” Following the symbolic approach to culture, Alvesson (2002:4) 
understands culture to exist between social actors’ heads as it is a constructive 
process of meaning interpretation: 
Culture is not primarily ‘inside’ people’s heads, but somewhere ‘between’ the heads 
of a group of people where symbols and meanings are publicly expressed (...).  
This notion indicates that a shared frame for the understanding and interpretation of 
symbols, situations, and objects is generated through social interactions and is thus 
arguably an outcome of relational social practices. Furthermore, this approach 
suggests that social actors are simultaneously influenced by and creators of diverse 
cultures, i.e. shared meaning systems. Scholars taking the symbolic approach to 
culture focus on the analysis of “how individuals interpret and understand their 
experience and how these interpretations and understandings relate to action” 
(Smircich 1983:351). A prominent scholar working with this exact issue is Weick 
(1995, 2001), whose theory of ‘sense-making’ has been widely used by other 
scholars working within the field of organization studies.  
Lastly, Smircich (1983:351) mentions the structuralist or psychodynamic approach 
to culture, which understands culture to be an “expression of unconscious 
psychological processes”. These processes include emotions, such as desire, but also 
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faiths that emerge when expressed in a certain culture. According to Smircich 
(1983:352), this approach to culture has been hardly used in organization studies.  
In light of these diverse approaches to culture, it is not surprising that scholars reach 
different conclusions in terms of to what extent culture influences social actors’ 
sense-making and behaviors, i.e. how they make sense of culture in the context of 
leadership practices or how these are related to the understandings and processes of 
trust. However, it seems reasonable to conclude that culture partly influences social 
actors’ sense-making and behaviors. Regarding this dissertation, culture may 
influence what social actors understand under ‘leadership’ and ‘trust’ and what they 
perceive as ‘good leadership’ and ‘trustworthy actions’, originating both from 
themselves and from others (Zaheer & Zaheer 2006). However, culture does not 
determine behavior, as partly suggested by the cognitive approach to culture. How 
social actors behave is rather an outcome of a variety of influences which, according 
to Gibson et al. (2009:46-52), play out on the individual level, group level and the 
wider situational level. Thus, I conclude that culture can be understood as a 
multilevel concept which influences social actors in various ways and which social 
actors draw from, both tacitly and consciously (Swidler 1986), in order to make 
sense of and react to certain situations, interactions, and objects. At the same time, 
by doing so social actors take part in the very creation of culture. Moreover, in line 
with social identity theory (Tajfel 1974), Chao & Moon (2005) argue that social 
actors have a variety of cultural memberships, i.e. that they can identify with various 
groups simultaneously. Chao & Moon’s approach seems to be promising for my 
dissertation as they not only show that social actors belong to several cultural ‘tiles’, 
as they call them (e.g. belonging to a certain age, gender, ethnicity, nationality; born 
or living in certain areas such as urban/rural or coastal/inland locations; choosing to 
belong to certain religious or political groups), they also highlight that these ‘tiles’ 
may self-organize into a hybrid identity. The latter is very much the case in my 
study, where many of my informants understand themselves to be German-Turks or 
Austro-Turks, which according to Chao & Moon can be understood as its own 
culture. On the other hand, Chao & Moon state that culture ‘tiles’ may also act 
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independently, which they call a ‘compartmentalized identity’. For example, in my 
case study some of the German-Turks understand themselves as and behave more 
like Germans at work and Turks at home. Thus, cultural identity could be perceived 
as a ‘cultural mosaic’ in which ‘tiles’ change in their dominance and composition 
over time while new ‘tiles’ may emerge. In other words, culture and cultural identity 
seem to be rather dynamic, fluent, and highly contextual multifaceted and 
fragmented concepts. The same can be said about the concept of leadership, to 
which I will turn now. 
 
2.2 Understandings of ‘intercultural leadership’ 
As hinted at in Section 2.1, culture is understood to partly influence practices and 
thus also leadership. However, before I discuss the understandings and issues of 
cross-cultural or intercultural leadership, I will briefly shed some light on the 
concept of leadership itself. 
2.2.1 Understandings of leadership 
Leadership is understood in several ways, and at times scholars use the expressions 
‘leadership’ and ‘management’ interchangeably, which prompts the question of what 
the differences between these two concepts are. According to Alvesson (2002), 
Bjerke (1999), and Alvesson & Svenningson (2003), management broadly speaking 
concerns the operation and control of administrative processes, such as planning and 
organizing. Leadership, on the other hand, “is commonly defined as the process of 
influencing others in a manner that enhances their contribution to the realization of 
group goals” (Haslam 2001:58). However, Alvesson (2002:101) perceives 
‘management’ and ‘leadership’ as social constructions and thus as outcomes of 
social interactions combined with situational sense-making processes. Consequently, 
it can be argued that ‘management’, even though it is almost always labeled as such 
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(e.g. HR-manager, sales-manager), can also be understood as leadership since 
“managers affect thinking and feeling in connection to managing specific tasks and 
goals, thus making ‘leadership’ and ‘management’ difficult to differentiate in 
practice” (Alvesson 2002:101). 
Perceiving leadership as a social construct is just one way of conceptualizing 
‘leaders’, their so-called ‘followers’ and leadership itself. The concept of leadership 
is multifaceted, as is the scope of leadership research, which is why a detailed 
account is outside the scope of this dissertation. For an in-depth overview on the 
history and the topics researched within the field of leadership, see e.g. the Sage 
Handbook of Leadership (Bryman et al. 2011). The aim of this chapter is not to give 
an in-depth overview, but rather to point out key understandings and research topics 
and thus to show the current fragmented understanding of the concept of leadership. 
Over time, conceptualizations and labels of leadership have changed in tandem with 
the development of new middle-range theories such as the contingency theory. 
However, as indicated by Day & Antonakis (2012) different ‘schools of leadership’ 
(ibid.:6) dominate research at different times, with one school, the trait approach to 
leadership, being of interest in leadership research at several points in time, which 
Grint (2011:13) explains by the occurrence of political events such as re-emerging 
terrorism, uncertainty, and fundamentalism. 
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Figure 1: Activities of diverse schools of leadership over time (Day & Antonakis 
2012:7) 
Briefly, the trait school of leadership suggests that leaders are born with a rather 
stable combination of personality traits that are understood to foster ‘leadership’ 
such as intelligence, good judgement, and dominance (Day & Antonakis 2012:7; 
Haslam 2001:59).  This approach to leadership, i.e. leaders as “great men”, implies 
that a leader can almost single-handedly manipulate, control, and orchestrate his 
‘followers’ by virtue of his character or charisma (charismatic leadership). This 
approach can be critiqued for several reasons. First, it does not take actions into 
account, neither those of the leader nor those of the followers. Second, it seems to 
entirely neglect the followers’ perceptions and reactions as well as the context and 
situation in which the leadership takes place.  
As the name suggests, the behavioral school of leadership primarily focuses on 
leader behavior and thus on different leadership styles. According to Day & 
Antonakis (2012:8) and Haslam (2001:59), research taking the behavioral 
perspective has identified two core activities of ‘effective’ leaders: Consideration 
and the initiation of structure. 
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Consideration relates to a leader’s willingness to look after the interests and welfare 
of those they lead and also to trust and respect them. Initiation of structure relates to 
the leader’s capacity to define and structure their own and their followers’ roles 
with a view to achieving relevant goals. (Haslam 2001:59) 
Leadership focusing on consideration may be labeled as a ‘supportive, person-
oriented, transformational, or trust-based leadership’, while leadership with a focus 
on structuring may be called ‘directed, or task-oriented leadership’ (Day & 
Antonakis 2012:8). As with the aforementioned approach, the behavioral school also 
neglects aspects of interaction, situation and context, and thus is leader-centered, 
too. Subsequent research on behavioral ‘styles’ of leadership have indicated that 
leaders do not employ one dominant leadership style, but rather that their preferred 
‘styles’ vary across their range of tasks. This research indicated that leaders and 
leadership should rather be understood and researched in their diverse contexts. 
Hence, researchers started to leave the person-centered ‘one-variable approach’ 
(Haslam 2001:60) and turned to contingency theory. 
The contingency school of leadership understands leadership as “an interactive 
product of both personal and situational characteristics” (Haslam 2001:60 referring 
to Gibb 1958). This approach is said to take “leader-member relations, the task 
structure, and the position power of the leader” (Day & Antonakis 2012:9) into 
account. More specifically, Haslam points out that the contingency approach can be 
understood and criticized for its reduction to a “mundane and mechanical matching 
process” (Haslam 2001:63) as implicitly suggested by Fiedler’s (1978) contingency 
model. According to Haslam (2001:62), Fiedler’s research comes to the solution 
that, very broadly speaking, 
task-oriented leaders are most effective when features of the situation are all 
favourable (i.e. when relations are good, the task is structured, and the leader has 
power) or all unfavourable. (...) relationship-oriented leaders are considered more 
effective in situations of intermediate favourableness. 
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Fiedler’s approach and the contingency approach in general were short lived, but 
their initial focus on followers led to another perspective on leadership, the 
relational school of leadership. Since my dissertation also refers to the notion of 
‘relational leadership practices’, I deem it necessary to highlight that the term 
‘relational’ means something very different to me than has been explicated within 
the leadership literature. The understanding of ‘relational’ as put forward within the 
relational approach of leadership should rather be understood as ‘interpersonal’ 
since it concerns leader-employee interactions and relationships. My use of the term 
‘relational’, however, refers to Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice and thus comprises 
many more aspects than ‘interactions in relationships’, as I will outline later (see 
Chapter 3). 
The relational school of leadership focuses on the leader-subordinate relationships 
from which the well-known Leader-Member-Exchange Theory (LMX) emerged. 
Within this body of research, a leader-subordinate relationship built on trust and 
mutual respect is understood to be of high quality, yielding more “positive leader 
outcomes than do lower quality relations, which has been supported empirically” 
(Day & Antonakis 2012:9). Relationships of low quality are understood to be 
primarily based on contract fulfillment. The so-called transactional leadership is a 
prominent example of leadership understood along the lines of relations that 
emphasize the quality aspect of relations between leaders and other organizational 
members. As a kind of side-effect of this approach, organizational researchers 
discovered the “importance of the followers in the leadership process” as these are 
the ones confirming and authorizing the leader (Haslam 2001:63). The 
transformational approach is yet another understanding of leadership which partly 
draws on the idea of the charismatic leader (trait school of leadership) and the 
relational school (placing emphasis on followership), which is why Hollander 
(1995, cited in Haslam 2001:64) sees transformational leadership as “an extension of 
transactional leadership, in which there is greater leader intensity and follower 
arousal.” The task of transformational leadership is to “identify and ultimately 
provide the path for satisfaction of subordinates’ goals, while at the same time 
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ensuring that those goals are compatible with those of the group or organization as a 
whole” (Haslam 2001:64). An important outcome of the research done in light of the 
relational approach is that leadership is as much about the leader as it is about the 
followers and their perception of the leader, which includes the specific situation as 
well as the leader’s and followers’ characteristics, behaviors and relationships. 
Following a social identity approach to leadership, which arguably constitutes a 
new leadership approach (see figure 1), Haslam (2001:65-71) pointed out that 
leadership is a group-process rather than an individual act. Referring to Hogg 
(1992), Haslam (2001:70) argues that effective leadership is only possible if the 
leader is part of a “cohesive and purposeful group [whose] properties are themselves 
largely a product of shared social identity.” Notwithstanding the existence of 
charismatic leaders, Haslam (2001:70; italics in original) furthermore employs 
identity and categorization theory to explain that “[l]eadership is thus conferred by 
followers and charisma is an expression of the leader-group dynamic as perceived 
by those followers in a specific context.” 
Extending the aforementioned approaches, Svenningson et al. (2012:71) embrace 
what I might call a processual approach to leadership or fragmented leadership, 
which they understand to be 
 (...) a complex social process in which the interpretations of what is said and done 
are crucial. Assumptions, values, and norms on a variety of levels – societal, 
organizational, and group – frame and guide both expectations and evaluations of 
what is considered ‘good’ leadership.  
Following Svenningson et al. (2012), leadership is a constant identity work and not a 
coherent process in which leaders adhere to a certain leadership style and followers 
mechanically react to their leader’s actions. Rather, leaders adopt diverse and 
fragmented styles, which could be said to emerge from the complex situated leader-
follower interactions. Certainly, ‘leadership’ then seems to offer a ‘repertoire’ of 
leadership styles, which leaders use either reflexively or habitually while enmeshed 
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in situated relational leadership practices. In this view, leaders and their followers 
co-create leaders, followers, and leadership and thus both contribute “(...) to a shared 
definition of reality within a group (...)” (Svenningson et al. 2012:80). Even though 
leadership positions can be understood to depend on the dynamics of the 
interpersonal interactions and thus may shift, in general, leaders have more influence 
on their followers than vice versa (ibid.). Svenningson et al.’s (2012) notion of 
ambiguity and fragmentation of leadership styles and their conceptualization of 
leadership as a situated relational practice influenced by power asymmetries are 
useful in understanding the various dynamics at play when leaders execute 
leadership in an intercultural context. This is significant in my study for several 
reasons. First, the leader-follower relationship in itself is characterized by the 
unequal distribution of power in terms of their organizational positions and thus the 
resources available to them (Mizrachi et al. 2007; Schweer 2008b). Second, in this 
study the relationships between Danish leaders and their followers with Turkish 
backgrounds take place within a wider web of power relations that goes beyond 
differences in organizational roles as they are also influenced by the leaders’ and 
followers’ ethnicity, religion, language use, level of education, and gender. Third 
and foremost, Svenningson et al.’s conceptualization of leadership implies that 
leadership is not static but emerges in situated interactions and is thus continuously 
shaped and re-shaped as so-called ‘followers’ make sense of certain behaviors in 
light of their cultural frames or dispositions and their settings within the field of 
ethnic sales. Hence, what is understood as ‘good’ leadership or leadership based on 
trust is an identity-based construction of the social actors’ practical sense and 
situated relational sense-making in light of prior experiences, certain dispositions, 
and cultural frames. Following this thought, a leader displaying fragmented and 
diverse leadership styles, such as employing freedom on one hand and exercising 
severe control on the other, can be made sense of in various ways. In other words, 
whether such a fragmented style can be understood as unpredictable or 
untrustworthy leadership, or even leadership at all, is in the eye of the beholder. 
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2.2.2 Understandings of intercultural leadership 
Combining the complex concepts of culture and leadership discussed above leads us 
to understandings of cross-cultural, intercultural or multicultural leadership, which 
differ according to the approaches taken to culture and leadership. If leadership is 
seen as a social activity and an organizational process, then it makes sense to 
suggest that culture may influence this process. Alvesson (2002:101) conceptualizes 
any leadership as cultural: 
[L]eadership is per definition seen as ‘cultural’, that is leadership must be 
understood as taking place in a cultural context and all leadership acts have their 
consequences through the (culturally guided) interpretation of those involved in the 
social process in which leaders, followers and leadership acts are expressed. 
According to Guthey & Jackson (2011:165f), almost all studies within the field of 
cross-cultural leadership aim to describe, understand, and analyze how leaders are 
influenced by the cultural context in which they are immersed. This influence is 
often portrayed rather deterministically with culture constraining leadership actions. 
However, as I have argued earlier, when abandoning the functionalistic 
understanding of culture it can be conceptualized as a type of ‘toolbox’ (Swidler 
1986) from which social actors can draw a variety of cultural tools and thus culture 
may enable actions. Nevertheless, the majority of cross-cultural leadership research 
takes a functionalistic approach to culture (Hofstede) and is thus concerned with the 
measurement of the impact of cultural variables on leadership processes. To some 
extent, the same is true for the well-known and influential study by House et al. 
(1999): the GLOBE project.   
Based partly on Hofstede’s dimensions, Project GLOBE measured 61 nations on 7 
dimensions with the aim of understanding the influence of culture on leadership 
(House et al. 2002). This has become an important issue in conjunction with 
businesses becoming more internationalized and globalized (Adler 2008). The most 
noticeable online ‘leadership tool’ taking advantage of the findings by Hofstede and 
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House et al. is an online resource called GlobeSmart which, according to its website 
(2015), aims to increase the ‘cultural agility’ of its clients. The company states that 
“[m]ore than 140 companies have made GlobeSmart a key component of their cross-
cultural training efforts, including approximately 30% of Fortune 100 companies” 
(http://www.aperianglobal.com/learning-solutions/online-learning-
tools/globesmart/). This statement mirrors the extent to which the functionalistic 
understandings of culture and leadership still dominate organizational thought in 
both practice and academia (Doney et al. 1998; Guthey & Jackson 2011). In line 
with studies such as the GLOBE project, later organizational research tends to 
explain the preferences for leadership styles based on the national dimensions laid 
out by Hofstede, Trompenaars, and House et al. For example, Dickson et al. (2003), 
who based their research on Hofstede’s dimension, argue that Danish leaders favor a 
participative leadership style since Denmark is a nation with a rather low power 
distance, and thus favors egalitarianism. Without jumping to conclusions, I shall 
remark here that the Danish leaders taking part in my study exercise a participative 
leadership style only to some extent, indicating that there is some ‘truth’ in 
Svenningson et al.’s understanding of fragmented leadership. In a more restrained 
form, Muczyk & Holt (2008), taking a contingency approach to leadership, argue 
that an autocratic leadership style is more often found in countries representing a 
high power distance, such as in Turkey.  
The issue of how culture may influence leadership practices leads to research on 
expatriates, and thus also to leadership in culturally foreign contexts. Taking 
Hofstede’s dimensions or House et al.’s findings as a point of departure, a great 
proportion of cross-cultural leadership studies has been concerned with how leaders 
can adjust to foreign contexts. As mentioned earlier, culture can be understood as a 
cognitive scheme or cultural script. This implies that once scripts have been 
identified, social actors can adapt to them or at least modify their own behavior 
accordingly; in other words, they can attempt to go ‘local’. How leaders can adapt to 
foreign cultures is a key question for organizational scholars working with issues of 
cultural adaptation or acculturation. Partially referring to Weick’s (1995) sense-
35 
 
making theory, they suggest that leaders develop intercultural competencies (Aarup 
Jensen 1995; Byram et al. 2001), a global mindset (Gupta & Govindarajan 2002; 
Levy et al. 2007), or cultural intelligence (Ang et al. 2006; Ang et al. 2007; Early 
2002; Earley & Ang 2003; Earley & Mosakowski 2004; Earley & Peterson 2004; 
Earley et al. 2006; Plum 2008; Thomas 2006; Thomas et al. 2008). The majority of 
this research draws on cognitive and leader centered approaches to intercultural 
leadership, and thus to some extent neglects the followers’ reactions to the leaders’ 
acculturation or adaptation, let alone the situational and wider contextual 
circumstances. Reacting to this and in line with the relational approach to leadership, 
Thomas (2008:162) points out that a leader cannot expect to be successful simply by 
adapting his or her leadership style to a certain cultural context. Rather, the leader’s 
ability to influence others depends on how the subordinates make sense of the 
leader’s behavior and whether or not they perceive the actions to be genuine.  
Guthey & Jackson (2011:172-176) furthermore critique the vast body of cross-
cultural leadership research for its ‘etic’ approach to culture, as it is almost always 
conducted using self-reported survey studies. They argue, however, that this 
approach cannot do justice to globalization since it perceives culture to be a rather 
stable and static concept which restrains leadership practices. In order to understand 
the influence of globalization on leadership and culture, Guthey & Jackson point out 
that more emic research built on ethnographic approaches (see e.g. Ailon-Souday & 
Kunda 2003) is needed to better understand the concepts of culture and leadership, 
including the complexity of its relationship. Thus, sense can be made of how leaders 
and followers together are shaped and shape culture in all its forms, including 
through ‘creolization’ and ‘hybrid’ cultures. 
The phenomenon of creolization, the story of cultural polyglot leaders (...) and the 
insights of the sort provided by Galit Ailon (...) all demonstrate emphatically why 
research on leadership and culture needs to move beyond the quantitative models 
provided by Geert Hofstede and the GLOBE project (...) [as such, research] can 
construct a vocabulary to help leaders and followers understand and participate in 
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the dialectical process whereby they shape the culture that shapes them, and so on. 
(Guthey & Jackson 2011:175)   
In summary, the vast body of literature on cross-cultural, intercultural and/or 
multicultural leadership is concerned with how leaders can influence others with 
various cultural backgrounds in such a way that they work together towards an 
overall organizational goal in the most effective and efficient way possible. This 
issue is dealt with in different ways, which include attempts at cultural integration, 
segregation, adaptation, utilization, and inclusion. However, even though 
organizational scholars employ a variety of approaches to the concepts of culture 
and leadership, as discussed in both this and the previous chapters, the majority of 
research within the field of cross-cultural leadership is still conducted against the 
backdrop of a functionalistic paradigm, which arguably fails to embrace the 
complexities and ambiguities inherent to the concepts of culture and leadership and 
their relationship with each other. A somewhat similar picture can be depicted 
within the body of trust research, which I will turn to now. 
2.3 Conceptualizations of ‘trust’  
According to the body of literature on leadership and organizational trust, trust 
building and maintenance is a key issue in leadership practices, including 
intercultural leadership (see e.g. Gillespie & Mann 2004; Javidan et al. 2010; Li 
2013). Not surprisingly, the literature on trust is as diverse as the writings on culture 
and leadership discussed above, and scholars of trust research have so far favored 
understanding trust as a concept which can be measured in leaders using survey 
data. Cross-cultural research on trust in organizations thus often relies on Hofstede’s 
conceptual framework of national culture in order to suggest how leader ‘A’ from 
cultural context ‘X’ can best build trust with employee ‘B’ from cultural context 
‘Y’.  In other words, empirical trust research taking an emic and processual 
approach to culture and leadership is scarce, with some exceptions such as Mizrachi 
et al. (2007), Möllering & Stache (2010), and Perry (2012).  
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In general, the literature on interpersonal trust is highly dominated by scholarly 
work on propensities to trust and justifications for trust, which in turn are based on 
perceived familiarity. Key works addressing these issues are presented in the 
following sections. 
 
2.3.1 Justifications for trust: Trust as a rational choice 
Trust as based on rational choice (Coleman 1982, 1990; Dasgupta 1988; Gambetta 
1988; Sztompka 1999; Hardin 2002) and exchange theory (Blau 1964; Yamagishi et 
al. 1998) are still the most prominent approaches to understanding trust. 
Conceptualizing trust as being based on reason, in short, implies that the trustor is 
able to decide whether or not a trustee is trustworthy. Hence, trust is understood as a 
predominantly rational and cognitive phenomenon; thus, it is enacted in a conscious 
manner and only when the calculated risks are smaller than the expected benefits. In 
other words, the trustor’s decision to bestow trust on another person is primarily 
based upon the trustor’s aims and the information regarding the trustee and the given 
situation. An important aspect of this information is the notion of ‘subjective 
probability’. According to Gambetta (1988b), we trust, or judge to be trustworthy, 
those who are least likely to betray our trust. The question then becomes what the 
signs of perceived trustworthiness are. 
In the literature, a variety of antecedents and signals of trust has been discussed. 
Three potential antecedents of interpersonal trustworthiness have been continuously 
suggested throughout the Western literature: ability, benevolence, and integrity 
(Mayer et al. 1995). Even though trust researchers have variously named these 
concepts , they all refer to Mayer et al.’s concepts of ability, benevolence, and 
integrity (McKnight & Chervany 2001-2002; Renn & Levine 1991). 
In terms of antecedents of trust, Mayer et al. (1995) point to the notion of 
‘trustworthiness beliefs’ regarding the trustee. They argue that the trustor’s decision 
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to trust depends on how the trustor perceives the trustee’s abilities (skills, 
competencies, and characteristics), benevolence (the perception of a positive 
orientation of the trustee towards the trustor, and an expression of genuine concern 
and care), and integrity (the perception that the trustee adheres consistently to a set 
of principles acceptable to the trustor, such as honesty and fairness). However, since 
people have different perceptions regarding what signifies integrity and 
benevolence, a potential trustee could be judged as trustworthy by one person and 
untrustworthy by another. A similar notion can be found in Schweer’s theory 
(2008a; 2010); arguably, his concept of an ‘implicit theory of trust’ mirrors an 
individual’s mental frame that guides the sense-making of situated interactions and 
trustworthiness beliefs. Making rational judgments about whether a trustee is to be 
trusted or not seems to be even more challenging when the interaction takes place in 
an unfamiliar context, for instance in intercultural situations. Möllering (2008:99) 
posits that in such situations, the trustees’ intentions, interests, and trustworthiness 
are even less clear or predictable than in a situation familiar to the trustor. 
 
2.3.2 Justifications for trust: Trust as ‘modus operandi’ 
In contrast to trust as a cognitive- and/or affect-based trust, in which information 
and, to some extent, emotion processing play a vital role, trust may also be 
understood as ‘a habit’ or an ‘automatic program’. According to Möllering (2006: 
52), “the main point is that the routine is performed without questioning its 
underlying assumptions, without assessing alternatives and without giving 
justifications every time.” Nevertheless, trust can still be reasonable and make sense 
to a certain trustor; it is just based on habitual actions. Arguably, ‘regular behavior’ 
is grounded in the situational knowledge of what can be expected in a certain 
context. In other words, since individuals are social beings, and thus belong to a 
variety of social groups, trust could be understood as an “unconscious” action based 
on individual repertoires and their practical sense, which embrace cognitive, 
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affective and bodily repeated and affirmed performances (Bourdieu 1977). Thus, 
social groups contain routines for actions which influence group members, but 
which are also influenced by these members. In organizations, for example, routines 
for actions – including trusting – may be framed by ‘stable’ systems, such as rules, 
regulations or the organizational culture, which may provide a sense of ‘how we do 
things around here’ (Alvesson 2002). Moreover, employees fulfill certain roles, and 
in a given system we may expect the employee to enact his or her role/profession 
competently. An example of this is ‘swift trust’, which has been researched in 
temporary systems including project groups. Meyerson, Weick & Kramer (1996) 
found that when employees interact primarily according to their roles (tasks and 
specialties), and not their personalities, then swift trust can be established quite 
easily. Thus, if organizations are viewed as being comprised by ‘role performing 
employees’ they may be perceived as less complex and more predictable. As 
indicated, stable systems seem to enable predictability, and thus trust, as long as they 
feature familiarity and continuity (Becker 2005, as cited in Möllering 2006:53). 
Following this thought, systems such as organizations may assist in trust building 
between social actors, while at the same time also turning into entities of trust. 
Hence, social actors may feel that they are able to predict each other’s actions based 
on the rules present at their common workplace and, therefore, may enact a ‘taken-
for-granted’ trust. Möllering (2006:70), however, points to the limits of trust based 
on perceived structural stability when arguing that “rules, roles and routines are 
bases for trust in so far as they represent taken-for-granted expectations that give 
meaning to, but cannot guarantee, their fulfilment in action.” 
Since social actions cannot be predicted even though they are embedded in rules, 
roles and routines, what happens if the system loses its stability, reliability or 
reputation, or the trustor has to face unfamiliar contexts in which he or she does not 
know what can be taken for granted? Arguably, in these cases the social actor has to 
become ‘active’ and work on developing a familiarity with the new context in order 
to test whom to trust with what, how to trust (i.e. testing whether incorporated 
routines of trust still lead to a favorable outcome), and to what extent to trust. 
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2.3.3 Trust as relationship 
Trust as a relationship, broadly speaking, understands that social actors and structure 
mutually influence each other. In general, the literature on interpersonal trust with a 
relational perspective is scarce; however, Wright & Ehnert (2010), Seligman (1997), 
Möllering (2006, 2012), and Frederiksen (2012, 2014), for example, refer to trust as 
emerging from relationships and thus, to some extent, understand trust to be a 
situated relational process. For example, Frederiksen (2014:179) posits that trust 
emerges from the process of the situated aligning of practical sense as understood in 
Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice. According to Frederiksen (ibid.) “[a]ligning means 
that the practical sense of each of the interacting parties adapts and takes the other 
parties and their conceptions of the situation into consideration.” Hence, the process 
of aligning may support trust building as it is assumed that social actors create trust 
from a very situated relationship by “bringing into correspondence their conceptions 
of the situation, their purposes and meaningful actions” (ibid. 180). The process of 
aligning as described here seems to resonate with Lewicki & Bunker’s (1996) notion 
of identification based trust (IBT), which I shall return to shortly. In addition, it can 
be argued that literature pertaining to trust from a cultural perspective implicitly 
touches upon the notion of aligning and alignment when highlighting the importance 
of “cultural sensitivity” (Shapiro et al. 2008), “adaptability” (Early et al. 2006), 
“code-switching” (Molinsky 2007), or “reflexivity and creativity” (Möllering 2006) 
in the building of relationships and trust. However, as stressed by Frederiksen 
(2014:180), the idea of trust as a relationship means that trust is an outcome of that 
very relationship and not simply because social actors are willing to “act in the 
interest of the other”, which is arguably the main idea of Hardin’s (2002) notion of 
“encapsulated interest”. In summary, I understand trust to be a situated relational 
process that emerges during the process of relationship building, in which 
individuals strive to co-create a shared understanding of the situation in which they 
find themselves. This understanding, methodologically speaking, highlights the 
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importance of empirical studies that take an emic and ethnographic approach to trust 
research in order to grasp the aspects of ongoing situated relational interactions in 
the context of intercultural leadership. 
 
2.3.4 Trust and reflexivity 
If trust has to evolve within a setting without predicated (institutionalized) rules, 
then social actors have to learn to trust each other in a process of interaction in 
which common experiences, knowledge and rules are developed over time 
(Möllering 2006:77f). Thus, trust changes over the course of interactions based on 
reflexivity. According to Möllering (2006: 10), interactions may start off “relatively 
blindly or accidentally, but then there is a possibility that they become self-
reinforcing.” Thus, Möllering claims that trust should be understood as a process 
(Möllering 2006) or a process of processes (Möllering 2013), thus indicating that 
trust is a highly contextual and variable concept (see also Frederiksen 2012). 
Moreover, trust in this sense is concurrently the condition for a relationship, a co-
operation, and a process of interaction as well as the outcome of it, as pointed out by 
Nooteboom (1996). With reference to Giddens’ notion of ‘active trust’ (Giddens 
1994b referred to in Möllering 2006:79), Möllering suggests that trustors can not 
only wait for the right conditions to trust, as argued by Nooteboom, they can also 
work actively on trust, i.e. they can choose to “engage in extensive signaling, 
communication, interaction and interpretation in order to maintain the continuous 
process of trust constitution.” It is important to point out, though, that Möllering 
acknowledges that this process is uncertain and may also lead to undesirable 
outcomes or failures of trust. Thus the process of trusting is characterized by 
alterations, yet is usually considered to grow gradually over time. Throughout this 
process, the trustor can ‘choose’ to play an active role in order to foster trust 
building, while at the same time being unable to absolutely control this very process. 
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Hence, trust building can also be explained as being based on agency and 
reflexivity. Thus, ‘choosing’ to trust and initiating active trust as the first step in the 
aligning process may also originate from conscious choices (see e.g. Mizrachi et al. 
2007; Perry 2012) which are, however, influenced by an individual’s habitus, the 
unfolding relationship and the context/situation. Hence, the relational process of 
trusting cannot be separated from trust as disposition. The existing literature on 
relational trust, however, seldom conceptualizes trust as being influenced by both 
habitus, i.e. dispositions guiding perceptions of familiarity and justifications, and 
practical sense, i.e. relationship processes. Rather, as argued by Frederiksen (2014), 
trust is researched as the individual experience of alignment (Hardin 2002; Misztal 
2011; Sztompka 1999, referred to in Frederiksen 2014) when speaking of “taking 
others’ interests into account” (Hardin 2002), “accepting vulnerability” (Misztal 
2011) or “accepting risk” (Sztompka 1999). 
As mentioned by Frederiksen (2014:185), to date few works exist that treat trust as a 
process emerging from the process of “confidently relying on the generative 
capacity of the relationship.” 
In summary, the main questions posed by trust researchers are how trust can be 
conceptualized, built, maintained and re-built between trustor and trustee, both of 
which can be individuals, groups of people, organizations, institutions, or other 
objects. These questions have been researched within and across the aforementioned 
trustor-trustee relationships, with only a minor yet growing body of literature taking 
a cultural perspective on trust (for an overview, see Saunders et al. 2010). The latter 
body of literature, however, is dominated by a functionalist perspective on trust, 
even though scholars have pointed out that trust changes over time, while one of the 
main questions in trust research addresses the issues of its development. 
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2.3.5 Trust development 
Research suggests that more often than not trust is initiated by so-called “blind 
action”, i.e. unintended or unplanned behavior. Axelrod (1984, in Möllering 2006) 
states that such behavior may lead to desirable interactions which would have been 
difficult to establish when based on conscious actions. In the same vein, Gambetta 
argues that “it can be rewarding to behave as if we trusted, even in unpromising 
situations” (Gambetta 1988d, in Möllering 2006), which leads Möllering (2006) to 
infer that social actors have the ability to learn to trust. Thus, the initial step into a 
trusting relationship seems to be either the outcome of a ‘blind action’ (see Axelrod 
1984) or the active and partly unconscious and non-rational choice of an actor to 
initiate ‘as-if-trust’ (see Hardin 1993). In conclusion, by drawing on Luhmann 
(1979) and Sztompka (1999), Möllering (2006:82f) argues that ‘as-if-trust’ or ‘blind 
trust’ can be understood as irrational in itself, while at the same time the act of 
choosing to trust can be functional and thus a rational way of dealing with 
complexity and uncertainty. 
Once the trust process has been initiated, the common view in the literature is that it 
will continue to grow over time (see e.g. Shapiro et al. 1992, Lewicki & Bunker 
1996, Lewicki et al. 1998). As previously pointed out, ‘as-if-trust’ or ‘blind trust’ 
may initiate the trust building process. The continuation of this process can be 
explained by Luhmann’s notion of the ‘principle of gradualness’ (Luhmann 1979, 
referred to in Möllering 2006), which encapsulates the idea that trustors choose to 
trust step by step, and thus extend their trust in relatively small steps. From a 
Bourdieusian perspective, Luhmann’s notion of ‘gradualness’ can be explained by 
the process of aligning practical sense, which enables trust to emerge from the 
ongoing relationship.  
In general, scholars argue that trust building is mainly based on repeated positive 
experiences (e.g. Schweer 2008b; Zand 1972; Lewicki & Bunker 1996; Zucker 
1986). For instance, Zucker’s (1986) concept of ‘process-based trust’ points to the 
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importance of relational experiences in trust building and thus, to some extent, 
seems to resonate with the notion of alignment. In short, process-based trust can be 
conceptualized as a ‘history of exchange between two social actors’, including the 
expectation of reciprocity. Yet, as stated in Möllering (2006:88f), Zucker found that 
in modern societies ‘process-based trust’ has been replaced by ‘institution-based 
trust’ since recurring face-to-face interactions which facilitate ‘process-based trust’ 
no longer dominate modern societies characterized by socially and geographically 
dispersed actors. The same seems to be true for organizational members and, thus, 
for trust building between leaders and their (dispersed) followers. At the same time, 
Zucker points to the importance of ‘process-based trust’ as a significant mode of 
trust building. Building on Zucker’s and Lewicki & Bunker’s models of trust, 
Nooteboom (2003) claims that trust can be learned in ongoing interactions by 
developing empathy and identification, i.e. that emotional elements of trust are 
understood as being essential to trust building (see also Lewis & Weigert 1985).  
Lewicki & Bunker (1996) presented the most prominent model of trust 
development, which seems to combine the aforementioned ideas of trust as a 
process. Based on Shapiro et al.’s (1992) model, they propose a model of trust 
development in interpersonal work relationships in which higher levels of trust are 
reached over time by successively running through three different yet overlapping 
stages or variants of trust (see figure 2): First, calculus-based trust (CBT), then 
knowledge-based trust (KBT) and, lastly, identification-based trust (IBT).  
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Figure 2: Graphic representation of the development-based model (Lewicki & 
Bunker 1996), including Child’s (1998) version of trust evolution in brackets  
According to Lewicki & Bunker, calculus-based trust is important in the earliest 
stages of relationship building. During the initial encounters, social actors 
familiarize themselves with each other in terms of their needs, preferred methods of 
communication and behavior, as well as life priorities. This phase of CBT can 
develop into the second stage of trust building, i.e. KBT. In this stage, social actors 
know each other so well that they seem to be able to ‘predict’ each other’s future 
actions. Reaching this stage is the result of getting to know each other through 
frequent interactions. In this sense, Lewicki & Bunker’s conceptualization of KBT 
and its development is congruous with Möllering’s concept ‘active trust’, which he 
in turn borrowed from Giddens and Nooteboom, as described earlier. If a 
relationship reaches the state of knowing and understanding each other at a deeper 
level, the stage of IBT can be reached, which, according to Lewicki & Bunker, is the 
highest level of trust in a relationship. However, only some relationships reach this 
stage as some tend to stay at the calculus level and others at the knowledge-based 
level. Möllering (2006:89f) points out that it is important to note that while social 
actors develop trust along the three different stages explained above, their ‘frame’ of 
judging what signals trust and what does not also changes.  
46 
 
According to Möllering (2006:94), all models of trust development seem to have the 
following in common: 
[A]ctors do not need to trust each other fully right from the beginning of a 
relationship, because they can engage experimentally in a kind of as-if trust which 
may gradually produce genuine trust. While such a process may simply emerge, the 
more interesting possibility is that actors may actively produce mutual experiences 
with the aim of testing whether a trust relationship is feasible, but without being 
able to know in advance the associated benefits and risks. 
In other words, trust building may be initiated by taking risks regarding trusting. 
Especially in modern societies, where actors know that not everything can be known 
and that being unfamiliar with individuals, situations, and contexts is the norm rather 
than the exception, showing active unconditional trust may be one way of gaining 
familiarity with a certain situation and thus initiating the aligning process. 
According to Möllering (2006:98), active trust, or ‘as-if’ trust, is one solution for the 
familiarization with the unknown and, according to Luhmann (1988), trusting 
expectations are grounded on familiarity. Thus, I argue that trusting as a situated 
relational interaction combines past experiences with the present situation in order to 
become familiarized with the unknowable future. While familiarization can on one 
hand be enhanced by situated experiences with another person, it can also be 
enhanced by imagining or believing that one shares the same disposition. In both 
instances, a familiarization takes place which can lead to enhanced trust.   
While becoming familiarized with an unknown context and an unknown actor, 
Möllering (2011, 2013) suggests that several processes (trusting as continuing, 
processing, learning, becoming, and constituting) co-construct the overall process of 
trusting, which he conceptualizes to be relational in nature whereby trustors and 
trustees simultaneously draw from structural, situational, and reflexive elements. 
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2.3.6 Trust in a cultural perspective 
In general, the literature on trust in the context of culture suggests that the concept of 
culture must be handled in a reflective manner as this is seen to be the main key to 
fostering trust building across cultures (e.g. Möllering 2006; Mizrachi et al. 2007; 
Möllering & Stache 2007; Yousfi 2010; Wright & Ehnert 2010). The notion of 
reflexivity helps to explain the changes in behavior of actors taking part in an 
intercultural interaction. For example, actors may alter their preferred methods of 
trust building because they try to adjust to the other actor’s perceived cultural 
background (see especially Mizrachi et al. 2007). Based on this understanding, 
Möllering and Stache (2007) suggest that trust is accomplished through interaction 
and communication in which shared meanings are negotiated, an idea that mirrors 
Zucker’s (1986) conceptualization of ‘mutual beliefs’. In other words, intercultural 
trust can be understood as an outcome of successful intercultural interaction in 
which all parties involved construct a broadly shared understanding of how to deal 
with each other’s’ vulnerabilities in the given context, which in turn may constitute a 
more trusting relationship. Shared meanings arguably lead to similar sense-making 
processes of the field one interacts in from which trust can emerge. 
According to the literature, the main aspect of trust building across cultures is that it 
is embedded in the process of interactions between social actors, which is in turn 
influenced by a variety of contextual factors on multiple levels (see e.g. Kühlmann 
2005). Thus, trust emerges from a situated relationship as argued by, for instance, 
Frederiksen (2012, 2014), Möllering (2006) and Schweer (2008a,b). Furthermore, it 
has been suggested that social actors adjust to the contexts in which they find 
themselves (Kühlmann 2004:73). Bachmann & Inkpen (2011) point out that whereas 
social actors may use a certain approach to trust building in their social lives in their 
home country, they may use a very different approach in an organizational setting. 
One reason for this change may be found in the differences between these two social 
systems in terms of how well they support the social process of trusting. 
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In summary, it has been acknowledged that organizational trust seems to be situated 
in and influenced by culture (Saunders et al. 2010), and the meaning of trust seems 
to differ across cultures (Lane & Bachmann 1996; Zaheer & Zaheer 2006). Whereas 
the majority of scholars believe that culture determines a social actor’s behavior 
(e.g. Hofstede) and thus also his or her behavior of trust development (e.g., Doney at 
al. 1998), few (e.g. Mizrachi et al. 2007; Perry 2012) argue that social actors choose 
from a repertoire of trusting behaviors, i.e. that actions should be understood as the 
outcome of conscious decisions taken by the trustor (ibid.). Situated between the 
deterministic and the agency-approach in terms of the influence of culture on trust, 
Möllering (2006) and Saunders et al. (2010) conceptualize trust as profoundly 
interpersonal and thus, to some extent, as a matter of choice for social actors; 
however, there is no ‘free choice’ as indicated by Mizrachi et al. (2007) because, 
according to Wright & Ehnert (2010:109), trust is “(...) always shaped by contexts, 
histories and other actants (both human and non-human)(...)”, while Saunders et al. 
(2010:9) suggest that “some of the strongest influences are cultural in origin.”  
These relatively divergent understandings of the influence of culture on trust are to a 
great extent based on the scholars’ different epistemological and ontological 
perspectives, and thus their different conceptualizations of culture and trust, as well 
as the chosen methods for investigating trust. In order to provide an overview of 
trust research taking a cultural perspective, Saunders et al. (2010) edited a book 
called ‘Organizational Trust: A Cultural Perspective’, which according to the editors 
“reports the current state of our knowledge about cross-cultural trust building (...)” 
(p. xix). Based on their information and other trust research taking a cultural 
perspective, the following suggestions are made in order to build and sustain trust 
across borders, all of which seem to mirror ‘reflexivity’ and aligning in one way or 
another: 
 Encouraging interaction and communication in which shared meanings are 
negotiated (Möllering & Stache 2007)  
 “[T]rust development across cultures should be incorporated in the way 
actors conceive of as ‘good cooperation’.” (Yousfi 2010:249) 
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 Use of ‘a common language’ which fosters ‘in-group development’ 
(Henderson 2010) 
 Encouraging ‘code switching’ (Molinsky 2007) and ‘adjustment’ to the 
other culture 
 Raising ‘cultural sensitivity’ in order to ‘adapt’ (Shapiro et al. 2008) 
 Fostering ‘reflexivity in relationship building’ (Möllering & Stache 2010) 
 Enhancing the ‘mediating role of the effective line-manager’ (Hope-Haley 
et al. 2010) 
 
The importance of reflexivity has also been mentioned in Li’s (2013) 
conceptualization of intercultural trust, which he connects to notions of adaptive 
learning, thus reiterating Möllering’s process view. 
To date, the existing literature on trust-building across borders suggests three 
different yet overlapping approaches to fostering intercultural trust-development: 
adaptation and adjustment to the other culture by use of code-switching (Molinsky 
2007) and cultural sensitivity (Shapiro et al. 2008); use of ‘a common language’ 
which fosters ‘in-group development’ (Henderson 2010); and shared meaning-
negotiation and reflexivity in relationship-building (Möllering & Stache 2010). The 
declared aim of the latter two approaches is to construct a new shared culture or 
‘bridge-culture’ (see also Li 2013). 
Unsurprisingly, trust-based intercultural leadership is based on the same notions as 
intercultural trust-building, i.e. on the centrality of the creation and communication 
of shared values and purposes (Gillespie & Mann 2004:596). 
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2.4 Concluding thoughts: Fragments as parts of relational social 
practices  
The aforementioned concepts have been understood, employed and discussed in a 
variety of ways. To make sense of the aforementioned fragmentation and 
ambiguities of the concepts of culture, leadership and trust, I turn to theories of 
practice because I consider them to be most helpful in entangling the ‘social mess’ 
of social practices, such as trusting in the context of intercultural leadership.  
The interdependence of ‘being influenced by’ while also ‘influencing’ a certain 
phenomenon lies at the heart of this dissertation. This is crucial not only for the 
understanding of culture, leadership or trust as laid out in this chapter, but also for 
social activities and practices in general (see Chapter 3). Thus, theories addressing 
the relationship between structure and agency may help to better understand the 
meaning of leadership, how it is practiced, and why and how these practices are 
entangled with practices of trust in the context of leader-employee interactions 
taking place across various cultures. 
In organization science, scholars have started to turn to practice theory, including 
Bourdieu (for examples see Miettinen et al. 2009). Quite recently, scholars within 
the field of leadership studies have also advocated the usefulness of practice theories 
(see e.g., Crevani et al. 2010) and most recently, research into trust has turned to 
practice theories (see e.g., Frederiksen 2012; 2014). 
However, turning to practice theory as the overarching framework does not imply 
that I reject the aforementioned theories of culture, leadership and trust. Rather, I 
aim to discover which situated relational leadership practices can express practices 
of trusting in a multicultural work context. Furthermore, I aim to analyze whether 
and in what ways these practices and their sense-making change over time, and what 
could cause these changes to take place (see research questions (RQs)). 
51 
 
Practice theory may also suggest that trust as a practice, i.e. an isolated practice, 
does not exist. From the above, it seems justifiable to suggest that trust, or trusting, 
is always intermeshed with or a ‘by-product’ of other social practices and processes. 
Thus, trusting takes place in combination with other practices that happen in a 
certain context and in relation to a certain Other at a certain point in time, which 
social actors make sense of in a relational, situated process by drawing on past 
experiences in their sense-making (conscious and unconscious) of the present 
situation and their implicit and explicit goals for their future. Regarding my study on 
trust in the context of multicultural leadership, I therefore suggest that leadership 
and trust practices and processes, as well as the processes and practices of cultural 
identification, are entangled with each other in such a way that trust can be 
understood to emerge from a ‘messy’ social reality (Lau 2004) of interlinked social 
practices and thus can only be expressed via social practices other than trusting 
itself. At the very least, my theoretical framework, my empirical data and the 
literature on leadership and trust strongly suggest that trusting as an isolated practice 
does not exist. Rather, it is something that is ‘conjured up’ by social actors in their 
sense-making processes of other practices, such as when speaking with each other. 
Thus, I assume that trust is only ‘practiced’ by social actors in conjunction with 
other sociocultural behaviors. Nevertheless, trust seems to be something very real: 
researchers (including myself) attempt to analyze it; interactants discuss it when 
asked; and many people use it in their daily conversations. 
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3. BOURDIEU’S THEORY OF PRACTICE AS 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
UNDERSTANDING OF TRUST IN THE 
CONTEXT OF MULTICULTURAL 
LEADERSHIP  
In the previous chapter, I introduced this thesis’ research project. This chapter 
concerns the theoretical framework upon which this thesis is based. First, I introduce 
Bourdieu’s main concepts within his Theory of Practice, which form the overall 
framework for my dissertation. As my research is concerned with trust building in 
the context of multicultural leadership, Bourdieu’s concepts are applied to the field 
of study, i.e. leader-employee relations in the field of ethnic sales. Lastly, I critically 
discuss and justify the overall framework employed in this thesis. 
 
3.1 Bridging structure and agency 
As discussed in Chapter 2, in general, organizational, social, and cultural studies as 
well as studies on trust broadly speaking aim to research and explain the influence of 
structure or agency on the phenomenon to be researched. In my dissertation, 
however, the empirical material and the fragmented theoretical research 
phenomenon (trust in the context of intercultural leadership) urged me to turn to 
theories bridging this alleged structure-agency divide, which is why I turned to 
Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice. 
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In this intercultural study, Bourdieu’s theory enables me to view behavior as not 
merely determined by structure, as structuralist research of cultural studies (e.g. 
Hofstede 1980; Trompenaars 1993) or studies on trust (e.g., Doney at al. 1998; 
Johnson & Cullen 2002) would do. Neither does Bourdieu’s approach understand 
behavior to be an outcome of completely free choices, as some of the research on 
trust from a cultural perspective (e.g. Mizrachi et al. 2007; Perry 2012) seems to 
indicate. Rather, Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice enables me to understand trust 
building in the context of multicultural leadership as a practice and a process 
influenced by a complex interplay of agency and structure with neither 
predominating as both are intertwined. In order to understand this interaction, 
Bourdieu introduced three main concepts: Field, capital and habitus. Both these and 
the notion of practical sense are presented and discussed in the following chapters 
as they serve as tools to understand the influence of culture on trust building 
between leaders and their subordinates in the context of multicultural leadership. 
   
3.2 Field, capital, habitus and practical sense: The main 
concepts of Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice 
Building on his empirical studies, Bourdieu conceptualized a theory of practice 
which provides a framework that bridges the separation of structure and agency, 
macro and micro, structuralism and constructivism (Bourdieu 1998a: viii). The main 
concepts helping to bridge these alleged oppositions are field, capital and habitus, all 
of which work interdependently, which is why the following chapters relate to each 
other. Since Bourdieu’s theory emerged from the empirical material he gathered 
over his lifetime, several scholars have pointed out that the conceptualization of the 
theory’s basic concepts has been constantly revised and altered. Thus, what is 
understood by field, capital and habitus is not clear-cut (see e.g. Lau 2004). Despite 
this, Bourdieu’s grand theory of practice can be and has been applied to different 
research areas including organizational studies (see e.g., Lingard & Christie 2003). 
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Recently, Bourdieu’s theory has also been applied to the field of trust research. In 
his work on social relational trust, Frederiksen (2012, 2014) employed Bourdieu’s 
concepts of habitus and practical sense in order to provide a more holistic 
explanation of the interrelationship between structural and agency-related aspects of 
trust. In this dissertation, which deals with trust in the context of multicultural 
leadership, I am inspired by Bourdieu’s practice theory and draw on its four key 
concepts as I understand these to be mutually reinforcing, which is why they cannot 
be understood without referring to each other. However, I will adjust them to my 
field of research. 
  
3.2.1 Struggles, competition and collaboration: Conceptualizing the 
‘field’ 
The social space or world in which social actors interact is composed of a range of 
different social fields. Fields can be understood as social arenas in which social 
actors ‘play’ a field-specific game that can be described as a struggle over certain 
forms of capital and which Bourdieu, according to Thomsen, called “the logic of the 
field” (Thomsen 2012:76). Fields, however, do not refer to physical spaces as such, 
but should rather be conceived of as analytical tools which help to systematize the 
study of social practice (Wilken 2006:46). In Thomson’s (2012:66) view, the three 
analogies of the field as ‘a football field’, a ‘science-fiction force field’, and a 
‘physical force field’ come closest to describing Bourdieu’s concept of a field (le 
champ in French), yet without any of them paralleling Bourdieu’s understanding of 
le champ. Nevertheless, Bourdieu often referred to social life as a football game or 
“an ensemble of relatively autonomous spheres of ‘play’ that cannot be collapsed 
under an overall societal logic” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:16). Hence, in contrast 
to, for example, a football field, social fields can overlap or incorporate each other; 
yet they are often quite independent and can thus be understood as relatively 
separate social arenas (Bourdieu 1994:3; Bourdieu 1996:xi – xii). Since the social 
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world comprises a number of fields, social actors move across various fields on a 
daily basis, which means that they are confronted with different logics and values 
depending on the field they find themselves in or are moving across.  
Within each field a variety of forces exist in the form of “a set of objective power 
relations that impose themselves on all who enter the field” (Bourdieu 1985:724). 
Social actors who enter or are part of a field are faced with a variety of positions 
which are occupied by social agents (persons or institutions) according to their 
habitus in the form of e.g. their skills, education, or upbringing. Hence, how the 
game is played and what actions are possible is limited as the field’s structure and 
power relations impose themselves on the actors as certain rules apply. These rules 
are part of the field’s “logic of practice” and as such work rather implicitly. Hence, it 
can be argued that social agents incorporate these ‘rules’ or logics while being 
immersed in the field and trying to play the game and, thus, embodying the field’s 
structure and rules. In other words, the field’s structures and logics become a part of 
a social agent’s habitus, which he or she then draws upon in order to maneuver 
within the field. Hence, social agents who are partaking in a certain field’s game 
tacitly follow certain rules and logics, and by doing so create a ‘shared meaning’ of 
how to behave in a specific field, what should be brought to the field, and what is 
worth struggling for. Therefore, social agents are able to interact with each other in 
such a way that they can anticipate the others’ future moves in the field. Hence, 
what happens in the field is not arbitrary. On the other hand, interactions cannot be 
predicted since the prevalent rules and the field itself can be challenged and even 
changed. In fact, even though Bourdieu states that ‘fields’ have their specific rules 
and are more or less “autonomous microcosms” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:97), 
their boundaries are not clear-cut, but rather ‘fuzzy’, as Thomson (2012:77) calls it. 
The reason for this ‘fuzziness’ can be found in Bourdieu’s (Bourdieu & Wacquant 
1992:100) assertion that the struggle to define a certain field’s boundaries is one of 
the main struggles that social actors are engaged in. Regarding the question as to 
how one is to determine the borders of a given field, Bourdieu (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant 1992:100) provides the following answer: 
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We may think of a field as a space within which an effect of field is exercised, so that 
what happens to any object that traverses this space cannot be explained solely by 
the intrinsic properties of the object in question. The limits of the field are situated 
at the point where the effects of the field cease. 
Therefore, fields can be distinguished from each other by their different rules and 
logics of practice, which affect social actors in their interactions and their struggles 
to accumulate field-specific capital.  
Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:17; emphasis in original) explains that any 
field is 
simultaneously a space of conflict and competition, (...) in which participants vie to 
establish monopoly over the species of capital effective in it – cultural authority in 
the artistic field, scientific authority in the scientific field, sacerdotal authority in the 
religious field, and so forth – and the power to decree the hierarchy and 
“conversion rates” between all forms of authority in the field of power. 
Hence, fields bear resemblance to ‘battlefields’, and even though they are structured 
in the same way, they have specific logics and thus the aims of the struggles and 
fights differ across fields. For example, only economic capital may be at stake in 
economic fields, whereas struggles in other fields may regard respect and influence. 
Wilken (2011:53) asserts that field analysis is thus about identifying the specific 
logic underlying a given field’s struggles as these relate to how meaning is produced 
in a specific field. 
In his studies, Bourdieu analyzed, for example, the field of education in “The State 
Nobility” (1996a), the field of television and journalism (Bourdieu 1998b) and the 
field of literature (1996b), all of which can have sub-fields and must be examined in 
relation to the meta-field of power as suggested above. Since Bourdieu does not 
define what he understands by the ‘field of power’ but rather points to the existence 
of symbolic power (symbolic capital) and power relations (the dominant and 
dominated field participants) in any given field, I turn to Grenfell et al.’s (1998:169) 
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examples of fields of power. For instance, in relation to the field of education, they 
point to the political and economic systems of society as the field of power since 
these heavily influence “what is expected of education; how it is organized and to 
what ends – in other words, what is valued and legitimate.”  
In this dissertation, the focus lies on ESAG’s Department of Ethnic Sales and more 
precisely 6 leader-employee relations embedded in the Department of Ethnic Sales. 
Inspired by Bourdieu’s (2005:197) notion that “the firm (…) in reality, itself 
functions as a field”, I conceptualized ESAG as a field. In so doing, the field of 
ESAG can be conceptualized as a sub-field of the ‘economic field’, which in turn 
overlaps, or is at least influenced by, the fields of politics, education, and the 
societal field, all of which have their specific logics of practice or rules of the game 
and, therefore, value different sets of capital. On the other hand, the field of ESAG 
itself can be divided into subfields. Without intending to prematurely proceed to the 
analysis, it seems fair to expect that the field of ESAG can be characterized by at 
least two diverse logics of practice: the struggle for economic capital and the 
struggle for cultural capital.   
Since this dissertation regards the field of ESAG, the notion of culture in the sense of 
‘national culture, organizational culture, departmental culture, ethnicity and group 
belongings’ becomes an essential part of the dissertation. However, in his work, 
Bourdieu does not as such refer to ‘culture’ as it is understood in this dissertation. In 
Bourdieu’s world, the cultural field is understood as, for example, the artistic fields 
or the fields of literature and education. Roughly speaking, culture as understood in 
this dissertation refers to a ‘group of people’ who more or less share the same 
‘meanings’ of certain practices, structures and objects; a more thorough 
conceptualization of culture is given below. As mentioned earlier, social actors learn 
to play the social game in certain fields and thereby embody the field’s logic of 
practice. In other words, the specific logics of practice within certain fields become 
part of the social agents’ habitus, which frequently reproduces the field’s logic of 
practice. Following this line of thought, culture as understood in this dissertation is 
part of an agent’s habitus; inspired by Grenfell’s notion of ‘pedagogic habitus’ 
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(Grenfell et al. 1998:169), I call it cultural habitus, which is expressed by for 
example cultural practices such as speaking a certain language and preferring certain 
foods.  
In summary, while playing the game of social life in certain social fields, social 
actors consciously or subconsciously compete with each other for position via 
accruing capitals, and with these, power. By doing so they are influenced by their 
habitus, the prevalent power structures and the acquired capitals they draw upon. 
Hence, Thomson (2012:67) argues that Bourdieu’s approach to studying the social 
world “would bring together an inter-dependent and co-constructed trio – the field, 
capital and habitus – with none of them primary, dominant or causal.” Thus, fields 
include social interactions based on dispositions, practical sense and the perception 
and sense-making of individuals and the situation itself. They also contain rules and 
power structures and a common interest, i.e. gaining more specific forms of capital. 
According to Bourdieu (2005:9), striving to accumulate field-specific capital can be 
understood as the (re)production of a given field’s illusio, i.e., “the fundamental 
belief in the value of the stakes and of the game itself.”  
In other words, fields contain structures of the social world, which at the same time 
limit and foster possibilities for social action (Bourdieu 2000:11). Hence, “[t]he field 
is the locus of relations of force and of struggles aimed at transforming it, and 
therefore of endless change” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:103).  
Even though Bourdieu highlights the actions of struggle and competition in a given 
field, I argue that due to their logics and structure, fields are also characterized by 
relations and a common goal, and thus by “organized striving” as Martin (2003:33) 
calls it:  
Bourdieu goes beyond Fürstenberg in adding that striving in the fields is 
coordinated neither by ‘ideology’ nor by conscious strategy but by the habitus, a 
cultural unconscious, a matrix of dispositions that serves to effectively organize 
perceptions (Bourdieu 1969 [1966], p. 182). Most importantly, habitus is linked to 
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field position (or at least position in social space, in turn related to field position). 
This leads to an ‘ontological complicity’ between the world and our faculties for 
making sense of it. 
This striving may also be goal-directed, and thus involves not only conflicts but also 
cooperation and independence alongside interdependence, the latter being an 
important conceptual criterion for trust.  
In order to understand these changes, a specific field’s dynamics have to be 
accounted for, which is why Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:90) points to the 
importance of history in field analysis: 
(...) we cannot grasp the dynamics of a field if not by a synchronic analysis of its 
structure and, simultaneously, we cannot grasp this structure without a historical, 
that is, genetic analysis of its constitution and of the tensions that exist between 
positions in it, as well as between this field and other fields, and especially the field 
of power.  
Consequently, field analysis is comprised by synchronic (structuralist) and 
diachronic (the history of tension and struggle) perspectives. The question of what is 
at stake, or what is worth fighting for, is one of the core questions in field analysis 
(Wilken 2011:52). In order to identify the ‘struggle’ or ‘tension’, the agents who are 
part of it must also be identified. And since fields are understood to be dynamic in 
nature, their specific history in terms of how they have emerged and developed over 
time must also be analyzed. Moreover, since fields do not emerge in a vacuum, the 
historical conditions under which the field emerged and developed have to be 
investigated as well. Thus, field analysis incorporates aspects of habitus-analysis, 
capital-analysis and the analysis of historical aspects and power issues, both within 
the specific field but also in relation to other fields, particularly the field of power. 
Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:108) asserts that: 
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There is (…) a sort of hermeneutic circle: in order to construct the field, one must 
identify the forms of specific capital that operated within it, and to construct the 
forms of specific capital one must know the specific logic of the field. 
In order to provide a more detailed understanding of positions and struggles in a 
field and the workings of a field in general, I discuss the concept of capital in the 
following.  
3.2.2 Types of capital 
According to Bourdieu (1986:241, cited in Kitchin & Howe 2013:125),” capital is 
accumulated labor (in its materialized form or its ‘incorporated’ form) which when 
appropriated on a private … basis by agents … enables them to appropriate social 
energy in the form of reified or living labor.” Following that line of thought, Wilken 
(2006:46ff) and Thomson (2012:67) point out that capitals are the result of processes 
as well as enabling ‘processes’ in a given field since social actors draw on their 
resources (capitals) to compete in the struggle for more power (or capitals) in a 
given field. It can be argued that those in possession of higher amounts of capital 
occupy a higher hierarchical level and can thus use their accumulated capital to their 
advantage in their further struggle for more capital and, hence, for more dominance 
and power. It should be noted, though, that fields are characterized by those forms of 
capital social actors desire and, therefore, struggle for. For instance, a person with a 
master’s degree, but no sales skills, has more capital in the educational field than 
one with a bachelor degree with a high level of sales skills. Within the field of sales, 
however, the bachelor student has more capital than the person with the master’s 
degree.  
Bourdieu (1986:82; emphasis in original) outlines three forms of capital: 
Capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is 
immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the 
form of  property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible, on certain 
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conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of 
educational qualifications; and as social capital, made up of social obligations 
(‘connections’), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital 
and may be institutionalized in the form of a title of nobility. 
According to Bourdieu (1986), on certain conditions the three types of capital are 
convertible into other types of capital. For instance, in the field of ESAG economic 
capital can be converted into cultural capital (for example in employing ethnic 
minority Turks as sales personnel) and vice versa (for instance, ESAG’s personnel 
are paid according to its educational background and skills set). In possessing 
different types and volumes of capital (a certain capital portfolio), social agents 
distinguish themselves from others which in turn resonates with differences in 
possible positionings in a given field. A given agents’ capital portfolio has been 
accumulated through practice over time and can be understood as signifiers of for 
example an agent’s status or taste.  
As indicated above, cultural capital exists in three forms: embodied cultural capital, 
objectified cultural capital and institutionalized cultural capital. In regard to 
embodied cultural capital, Bourdieu (1986:83) asserts that its accumulation, 
“inculcation and assimilation” takes time and effort which “must be invested 
personally by the investor”. In its embodied state, this form of cultural capital 
becomes an “integral part of the person” (ibid.) and thus, its habitus. Thus, in line 
with habitus (see next section) embodied cultural capital can be conceptualized as a 
“system of schemes of perception, appreciation and action” embodied through 
practices in the course of one’s upbringing” (Bourdieu 2000:138). Bourdieu denotes 
that the acquisition of embodied cultural capital leaves “more or less visible marks 
… (such as the pronunciations characteristics of a class or region) [which] help to 
determine its distinctive value.” Hence, in the case of my research it could be 
expected that certain languages are valued differently depending on the field they 
are used in and the symbolic value (its scarcity and importance) ascribed to them. In 
its objectified state, cultural capital refers to “material objects and media, such as 
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writings, paintings, monuments, instruments, etc.” (Bourdieu 1986:86). 
Institutionalized cultural capital is represented by for example certificates and 
diplomas which officially recognize agents’ educational standard, i.e. their cultural 
knowledge. 
Social capital is defined as: “the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue 
to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu 
1986, cited in Kitchin & Howe 2013:127). As such, social capital refers to an 
agent’s circles of family, friends, groups, memberships and social networks. Social 
capital can be activated in order to access for example knowledge or other resources 
from ones network. Furthermore, by accruing a valued title, social capital can be 
institutionalized.  
The three said types of capital can be transformed to symbolic capital. Symbolic 
capital refers thus to the ability to use the abovementioned forms of capital in order 
to transfer them to some other value such as honor, prestige, recognition or moral 
issues (for instance by donating money or time). Bourdieu (1989:23; cited in Swartz 
2013:102) points out:  
Symbolic capital is a credit; it is the power granted to those who have obtained 
sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition. In this way, the 
power of constitution, a power to make a new group, through mobilization, or to 
make it exist by proxy, by speaking on its behalf as an authorized spokesperson, can 
be obtained only as the outcome of a long process of institutionalization, at the end 
of which a representative is instituted, who receives from the group the power to 
make the group. 
The different forms of capital cannot be ordered per se in terms of their importance 
as the value ascribed to them depends on the social actors that are engaged in a 
struggle within a certain field. Nevertheless, forms of capital that provide social 
actors with access to power in the bigger social system (the multitude of fields) can 
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be said to have a higher status than those that only enhance power or prestige within 
one field. Besides forms of capital Bourdieu also uses the notion of species of 
capital (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:98-100) such as linguistic capital as a species 
of cultural capital. 
 
3.2.3 Habitus 
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus embraces the dynamic processes and relations between 
the individual and the social. According to Wilken (2006:42), these are characterized 
by three sub-processes or relations: 
a) the dispositions of the individual (Jenkins 1992; Swartz 1997, in Wilken 
2006) 
b) embodied experiences (Farnell 2000, in Wilken 2006) and 
c) the individual’s anchorage in the social structures 
Habitus, then, is “[a] structuring structure, which organizes practices and the 
perception of practices, but also a structured structure” (Bourdieu 1984:170). In 
other words, habitus denotes the individual’s disposition, pattern of behavior and 
perception of the social world. Thus, the seemingly external social world is 
incorporated into the individual’s body. Therefore, Bourdieu states that:  
(...) social agents are endowed with habitus, inscribed in their bodies by past 
experiences. These systems of schemes of perception, appreciation and action 
enable them to perform acts of practical knowledge, based on the identification and 
recognition of conditional, conventional stimuli to which they are predisposed to 
react; and without any explicit definition of ends or rational calculation of means, to 
generate appropriate and endlessly renewed strategies, but within the limits of the 
structural constraints of which they are the product and which define them. 
(Bourdieu 2000:138).  
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Thus, habitus influences the agents’ (which not only refers to individuals but also 
other players in a given field, for example companies and institutions) actions and 
construction of the external social world as well as the external influences on the 
individual’s internal world. Hence, the internal and the external are interdependent. 
One key notion may be that habitus is in constant yet slow change as it is an 
outcome of experiences made over time; hence, habitus not only influences 
experiences and practices but is also itself transformed during this very process. 
Another important point is that habitus as a set of socialized structures does not 
predict an individual’s actions, but rather should be understood as constraining the 
range of possible and appropriate actions. Habitus could thus be understood as an 
individual’s dispositions, as his or her “cultural subconscious” in the form of 
“embodied practices”. Wilken (2006:43f) argues that habitus is a result of 
socialization and therefore a concept of the body rather than of the mind. However, I 
challenge this notion. As habitus does refer to dispositions, and thus also to 
cognitive schemata such as cultural frames, it is also a concept of the mind and not 
just of the body. Lau (2004: 374) points to the same notion in his article on 
Bourdieu’s inconsistent conceptualization of habitus. In any case, habitus can be 
understood as the backdrop to and the frame for social practices, while at the same 
time being subject to slow change due to repeated actions and the resulting 
embodiment of new dispositions. Thus, habitus links reality, represented by the 
field, with individual behavior guided by the practical sense. 
 
3.2.4 Practical sense 
According to Bourdieu (2000:139), “the practical sense [is] what enables one to act 
as one ‘should’ (...) without positing or executing a Kantian ‘should’, a rule of 
conduct.” Thus, the individuals’ tacit understanding of the situation they find 
themselves in can be understood as the basis for their actions. This tacit, embodied 
understanding, however, is itself influenced by two interacting processes: the 
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process of internalizing the objective structures and the process of externalizing the 
internalized structures, i.e. acting in a way perceived to be meaningful according to 
one’s cognitive/mental – and thus also cultural - framework, i.e. habitus. This means 
that the repertoire of perceived meaningful actions is played out within the 
constraints of generalized pre-understandings or dispositions enacted as practical 
sense in a field. Hence, actions cannot be predicted as an individual has an ever 
growing repertoire of possible behaviors to ‘choose’ from. Moreover, since 
dispositions are acquired through socialization rather than through cognitive 
learning – although this is also a possibility (Bourdieu 1984:471, 1990a:75, 107; in 
Lau 2004:374) - they are understood as embodied, and thus to some extent 
unconscious or taken-for-granted, understandings of the social world. Nevertheless, 
social actions based on rationality are not excluded from Bourdieu’s framework, but 
are just one type of behavior alongside the aforementioned embodied practical sense 
(Bourdieu 1990:68). 
  
3.2.5 Explaining reflective agency in a Bourdieusian framework  
In line with Emirbayer & Mische (1998:973) I argue that social actors are influenced 
by their habitus, yet that these incorporated structures are flexible – a notion also 
found in Bourdieu’s relational theory. This flexibility is arguably an outcome of 
agency, which Emirbayer & Mische (1998:971) conceptualize as being not only 
automatized but also reflective and essentially relational in nature:  
(...) it [agency] incorporates Mead’s insight that it is the capacity for imaginative 
distancing, as well as for communicative evaluation, in relation to habitual patterns 
of social engagement that drives the development of the reflective intelligence, that 
is, the capacity of actors to critically shape their own responsiveness to problematic 
situations.  
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By drawing on habitus, structure, practical sense and reflexivity, Emirbayer & 
Mische provide an understanding of social practice that could be said to correspond 
with Bourdieu’s framework. However, this does not bring habitus or social and 
cultural structures to the foreground as the main influence on practice, but rather 
treats these as but one influence alongside the impact of (reflexive) agency. 
Moreover, their conceptualization of agency is more complex and includes agency 
in the sense of the tacit replication of structure.  
According to Emirbayer & Mische (1998:971; original emphasis), agency can be 
divided into three interrelated elements, namely:  
1. The iterational element, which they define as “the selective reactivation by 
actors of past patterns of thought and action, as routinely incorporated in 
practical activity, thereby giving stability and order to social universes and 
helping to sustain identities, interactions, and institutions over time.” 
2. The projective element, which according to Emirbayer & Mische 
“encompasses the imaginative generation by actors of possible future 
trajectories of action, in which received structures of thought and action 
may be creatively reconfigured in relation to actors’ hopes, fears, and 
desires for the future.” 
3. And lastly, the practical-evaluative element, which “entails the capacity of 
actors to make practical and normative judgments among alternative 
possible trajectories of action, in response to the emerging demands, 
dilemmas, and ambiguities of presently evolving situations.” 
These elements can also be understood as comprising different interacting phases of 
the trusting process. The first element refers to the past (Emirbayer & Mische 
1998:975), as it refers to the “habitual dimension of action”, and thus to Bourdieu’s 
notion of habitus and disposition. The second element clearly refers to the future and 
as such to the ability of social actors to imagine a future different to that which they 
experienced in the past. Emirbayer & Mische (ibid.:984, emphasis in original) talk 
of “the hypothesization of experience, as actors attempt to reconfigure received 
schemas by generating alternative possible responses to the problematic situations 
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they confront in their lives.” The way in which social actors generate alternatives is 
understood to depend on culture as “the specific culturally embedded ways in which 
people imagine, talk about, negotiate, and make commitments to their futures 
influence their degree of freedom and maneuverability in relation to existing 
structures (i.e. it matters to what degree they understand time as something fixed 
and determinate, or conversely, as something open and negotiable)” (Emirbayer & 
Mische 1998:985). The notion of maneuverability refers to the present, and thus to 
the third element of agency, the element of practical evaluation. In order for social 
actors to make practical evaluations, they have to make judgments about the 
situation in the face of (un)familiarity, a process that   Emirbayer & Mische 
(1998:994) call “contextualization”. This element seems to refer to Bourdieu’s 
notion of practical sense, which derives from the interplay of habitus and situated 
interactions. However, it apparently entails a much stronger focus on reflexivity than 
can be found in Bourdieu’s notion of practical sense; yet, as mentioned earlier, 
Bourdieu & Wacquant (1992) conceptualize practical sense as also holding the 
power of change and creativity. As argued by Emirbayer & Mische (1998:994), 
certain patterns or structures are challenged by social actors by engaging with others 
or themselves in a process of deliberation regarding the existent constraints, a notion 
which Archer termed “internal conversation” (Archer 2003). Emirbayer & Mische 
(1998:994) consider conversation as the most important process in differentiating 
whether social agents tend to engage in “tacit maneuvers” (reproducing social and 
cultural structures through automated actions) or “deliberative decision making”, 
which may challenge existing structures. 
 
Hence, in the context of this study, when returning agency to situated interactions, 
trust building can also be explained as being based on agency and reflexivity. Thus, 
‘choosing’ to trust and initiating active trust as a first step in the aligning process 
may also originate from conscious choices (see e.g. Mizrachi et al. 2007; Perry 
2012) which, however, are influenced by one’s habitus, the unfolding relationship, 
and the context/situation. Hence, the relational process of trusting cannot be 
separated from trust as disposition. The existing literature on relational trust, 
68 
 
however, seldom conceptualizes trust as influenced by both habitus, i.e. perceived 
familiarity and justifications, and practical sense, i.e. relationship processes. Rather, 
as argued by Frederiksen (2014), trust is researched as the individual experience of 
alignment (Hardin 2002; Misztal 2011; Sztompka 1999, referred to in Frederiksen 
2014) when speaking of “taking others’ interests into account” (Hardin 2002), 
“accepting vulnerability” (Misztal 2011) or “accepting risk” (Sztompka 1999). From 
a Bourdieusian perspective, these are individual experiences established in 
interactions and thus have a relational nature.  
As mentioned by Frederiksen (2014), to date only a few works exist that treat trust 
as a situated relational process, meaning that they point to ideas that, from a 
Bourdieusian perspective, could be understood along the lines of ‘aligning practical 
sense’ or, as Frederiksen (2014:185) puts it, “confidently relying on the generative 
capacity of the relationship.” In other words, social actors may trust the other based 
on “faith” (Simmel 1950; Möllering 2006). 
 
3.2.6 Summary: The interconnectedness of field, capital, habitus and 
practical sense 
In summary, Bourdieu’s notion of ‘field’ refers to relationships between social 
actors endowed with diverse capital portfolios who struggle for particular forms of 
capital valued in a given field. Wilken (2006:48) asserts that social actors are 
engaged in a variety of struggles for capital in a variety of fields at the same time; 
“as family member, friend, citizen, customer, CEO, employee, and so forth.” In 
other words, the social actors’ identity and their identification with a certain role, 
social identity or cultural identity seem to shift across fields as for example ‘playing 
the game of a family member’ is probably not in line with the logics of the economic 
field. To be in line with a field’s logic of practice thus requires a given agent to align 
his or her habitus to the given field’s logic. Bourdieu (2006:60, in Grenfell 
2012:107) asserts that only a habitus adapted to a certain field is able to anticipate 
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the potentialities, i.e., a probable future, this field contains. Hence, when habitus and 
the logics of the field align, a probable future can be anticipated and reasonable 
practices can be initiated. In the relation to this study on trusting it could be argued 
that the anticipation of a probable future might reduce uncertainty and thus, may 
foster trusting. 
 
3.3 Applying Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice to the practice of 
trusting in the context of multicultural leadership 
In the previous chapters and sections, I outlined the overall theoretical framework on 
which this dissertation rests. In the following, I will review the relevant literature 
pertaining to my research on trust building in multicultural leadership in light of 
Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice in order to position my research within the existing 
body of literature and to highlight existing gaps, some of which this research will 
address. 
 
3.3.1 Conceptualizing culture through the lens of Bourdieu’s Practice 
Theory 
Since this dissertation concerns the field of ethnic sales, the notion of culture in the 
sense of ‘national culture, organizational culture, departmental culture, ethnicity and 
group belongings’ becomes an essential part of the dissertation. Yet, in his work, 
Bourdieu does not refer to ‘culture’ but instead to cultural fields and cultural capital. 
Moreover, the existing notions of culture cannot be understood as a coherent 
working definition of culture. For example, Bourdieu (1990:29) states that  
[c]ulture is that sort of freely available and all-purpose knowledge that you acquire 
in general at an age when you don’t yet have any questions to ask. You can spend 
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your life increasing it, cultivating it for its own sake. Or else, you can use it as a sort 
of more or less inexhaustible toolbox. 
In this quote, he seems to refer to culture as being a part of a societal field, or the 
social world in general, the structures of which are incorporated by individuals and 
are thus represented in their habitus. The acquisition of ‘culture’ is furthermore 
depicted as a process leading to an unlimited ‘toolbox’ of cultural practices and 
understandings. This notion resembles Swidler’s (1986) conceptualization of 
“culture as a toolbox” or repertoire of “strategies of actions” (Swidler 1986:273). 
In regard to how social agents ‘use’ this ‘toolbox’, i.e. the relationship between 
‘culture’ as incorporated structures and behavior, Bourdieu’s statements seem to be 
somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, he points out that  
the encounter between two disciplines [referring to the dialogue between economists 
and sociologists] is the encounter between two histories, and thus between two 
cultures: each one deciphers what the other says in accordance with his or her own 
code, his or her own culture (Bourdieu 1990:87).  
Here Bourdieu seems to indicate that cultures have their own distinctive codes 
which do more than simply influence social actors’ behavior. On the other hand, 
Bourdieu (2013: 218, n.1) refuses to understand culture or any ‘historical system’ as 
coherent wholes. He asserts: 
In reality these systems remain, like culture as described by Lowie, “things of shreds 
and patches”, even if these patches are constantly undergoing unconscious and 
intentional restructurings and reworking tending to integrate them into the system. 
How then can culture be conceptualized in a Bourdieusian perspective?  
As outlined earlier, Bourdieu understands social actors to act according to a ‘sense’ 
or ‘practical logic’ which emerges in relation to the objective living conditions in 
which the actors find themselves. However, this ‘sense’ is not determined by these 
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conditions, such as through a given system or structure of, for example, an 
organization or a ‘culture’. Rather, individuals are influenced by these structures and 
meaning systems while they ‘use’ them in order to accrue more power. By doing so, 
they reproduce existing meanings and structures but may also produce new 
meanings and, thus, challenge the very meaning system and structure. Hence, when 
applying a Bourdieusian perspective, any meaning system is rendered unstable and 
changeable due to the social actors’ use and interpretation of it. Following this line 
of thought, I argue that ‘culture’ thus cannot be understood as a stable system either; 
it has to be conceptualized as unstable and in flux since it is changeable due to the 
actors’ behaviors within the very system. Culture thus becomes a social 
construction. 
In addition, any system or structure is used in a ‘meaningful’ way: social actors 
enact practices which are ‘meaningful or reasonable’ to them despite the fact that 
they may not know what they are undertaking and why. Thus, actors draw on their 
habitus and their tacit ‘knowledge’ of a given meaning system when producing 
meaningful actions in the context of certain living conditions, situations, fields and 
relationships. As mentioned earlier, social actors move across various fields, 
situations, and relationships throughout their day. Therefore, they find themselves in 
a variety of sub-fields belonging to the overall societal field or socio-cultural areas. 
Hence, social actors draw on certain parts of a system, i.e. the sub-systems or sub-
structures, as only these are experienced as the relevant meaning system in a certain 
situation at a certain point in time. For example, as a PhD student at AAU, I make 
sense of and ‘use’ the educational system in order to accrue educational capital, i.e. 
cultural capital, in order to later transfer it into economic and symbolic capital. On 
the other hand, on a daily basis I am more influenced by the organizational sub-
cultures at AAU, i.e. the overall meaning system of problem based learning, and the 
meaning systems of being a part of a certain institute, department and research 
group, all of which are parts of the overall socio-cultural field. Hence, if one is to 
follow Bourdieu’s conceptual framework, culture as a meaning system should rather 
be understood as being fragmented and embedded in the social. In addition, the 
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above example shows that cultural meaning systems can be transferred and 
acquired by social actors while they are immersed in them, i.e. while interacting 
with the system itself and other social agents of the system. 
In summary, following Bourdieu’s conceptual framework implies that there seems 
to be no coherent or stable coding system underlying a given culture. This line of 
theorizing moreover suggests that behaviors cannot be explained by tracing them 
back to a consistent cultural habitus. In fact, as mentioned earlier, social actions are 
explained by the intertwined interplay of an agent’s habitus and the structures of a 
social field, including the relations between social agents that are part of that given 
field. Since, to my knowledge, Bourdieu did not conceptualize culture explicitly, I 
finally turned to Omar Lizardo (2011), who intensively discussed Bourdieu’s 
implicit understanding of culture by referring to other scholars struggling with 
Bourdieu’s concept of culture (e.g. Grenfell 2004; Swartz 1997; Swidler 1995, in 
Lizardo 2011).  
Referring to Bloch (1986), Lizardo (2011:29) points out that Bourdieu’s notion of 
culture is best portrayed in Bourdieu’s study of the Berber house, which Bourdieu 
himself called “the Kabyle House” (Bourdieu 1990: 271-83). Throughout 
Bourdieu’s description of a particular Kabyle house, the reader is not only presented 
with the exact shapes and sizes of the walls and doors but also with the Kabyle 
expressions for these, which in turn are explained to be metaphors for the entire 
surrounding world and which are related to certain cultural practices that present 
themselves in overall cultural patterns. To say it with Bloch (1986:31, cited in 
Lizardo 2011:29): 
The key point to keep in mind is that for Bourdieu “a child brought up in a Berber 
house by Berber parents picks up Berber notions, just because the material nature of 
the house, as well as the behavior of the people with whom he interacts [itself 
constrained by the material nature of the house] contains in itself the specific 
history of the Berbers”. Therefore, “the [material] environment is not neutral but is 
itself culturally constructed”. 
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Hence, an individual’s sense of culture is generated through practices while being 
immersed in a certain social setting, including its material environment, over a 
longer period of time. In other words, culture is socially constructed, context 
dependent, changeable, and in flux. On the other hand, individuals are altered by a 
given environment over time. Just as habitus and the field stand in a dialectic 
relationship, so do the individual and the concept of culture as an embodied 
knowledge and meaning system; both are intertwined and cannot be considered 
independently.  
Based on these ideas, I conceptualize culture in the light of practice theory as 
relational, highly contextual, socially constructed embodied knowledge and 
“practice mastery” (Ingold 2000:162, cited in Lizardo 2011:32) which is 
fragmented and in constant change. 
Yet, despite conceptualizing culture as in flux, instable, fragmented, socially 
constructed and relational, generalizations of, for example, national culture do exist. 
How can these be explained from a Bourdieusian perspective? 
Two keywords running through Bourdieu’s entire work seem to answer this 
question: relational and practice. Based on the presentation of Bourdieu’s key 
concepts outlined in the previous chapter, I propose that social agents become 
acquainted with and incorporate socio-cultural practices while experiencing a given 
environment, its practices, social agents, power structures and materialism 
throughout an extended period of time. Hence, if a given social actor takes part in an 
environment with predominant practices that are characterized by generalizations 
and stereotypes, it is likely that these become incorporated into the agent’s habitus, 
i.e. his or her disposition and preference regarding “understanding, knowing how, 
and desiring” (Reckwitz 2002:250), all of which impact on the aforementioned 
notion of “practice mastery”. If the same social agent, however, enters a field in 
which he or she is to ‘play the field’s game’ alongside or together with stereotyped 
others, then practices may have to be mastered in a different way because the 
environment has changed. According to practice theory, it can be expected that a 
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social agent’s habitus is altered if the social agent is to spend a prolonged period of 
time in this different environment. Thus, stereotypical understandings may become 
less pronounced. Nevertheless, even though the impact of environments may be 
considered important for the alteration of habitus, I consider the impact of fields to 
be even more influential. As mentioned earlier, fields contain power structures and 
thus they also inhabit social agents who – for the time being - hold the power to 
decide what the game of the field is about, i.e. which capital is strived for and how it 
should be contested. Moreover, it is these powerful agents who fight for the 
prevention of the field’s boundaries, and thus set up rules and regulations as to 
which and how agents are ‘allowed’ to enter the given field. In other words, a given 
field has key actors who, without being aware of it, more or less decide the (tacit) 
rules of conduct and the implicit ‘natural order’ in a given field, i.e. its doxa, which 
Bourdieu also calls “hidden persuasion” or, simply put, the “order of things” 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:167; emphasis in original). Regarding the 
‘internalization’ of this order, Bourdieu (ibid.) explains that: “being born in a social 
world, we accept a whole range of postulates, axioms, which go without saying and 
require no inculcating.” Doxa can be said to be closely related to symbolic power 
and symbolic violence, which Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:167; emphasis 
in original) defines as “the violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his 
or her complicity.” He further explains this statement by referring to the dialectic 
relationship and the ‘fit’ between habitus and the societal field: 
 To say it more rigorously: social agents are knowing agents who, even when they 
are subjected to determinisms, contribute to producing the efficacy of that which 
determines them insofar as they structure what determines them. And it is almost 
always in the ‘fit’ between determinants and the categories of perception that 
constitutes them as such that the effect of domination arises.  
Hence, it can be argued that certain fields exist in which cultural stereotyping is the 
‘norm’ as it is perceived to be a natural part of the game, instilled by those social 
agents who hold the symbolic power to set up the rules of the game. Moreover, the 
use of socio-cultural stereotypes may refer to a ‘natural order’ or ‘hierarchy’ of 
75 
 
‘cultural groups’, thus implicitly or explicitly differentiating between dominant and 
dominated ‘cultural groups’. 
To sum up, I conceptualize culture as relational, highly contextual, socially 
constructed embodied knowledge and “practice mastery” (Ingold 2000:162, as cited 
in Lizardo 2011:32) which is fragmented and in constant change. As argued earlier, 
this understanding does not mean that social actors cannot conceptualize culture in 
terms of generalizing stereotypes, as will become apparent in the analysis part, 
which deals with leader-employee interactions in the field of ESAG. Without 
providing an analysis at this point, I briefly discuss in the following how such a field 
could be conceptualized in light of Bourdieu’s practice theory. 
  
3.3.2 Using Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice in organizational research: 
The field of ESAG 
As mentioned earlier, I conceptualized ESAG as a field seeing that they 
organizations have structures which, according to Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant 
1992:114), can be “understood as a space of objective relations between positions 
defined by their rank in the distribution of competing powers or species of capital.” 
Within this field, certain rules apply which in turn determine the accredited form or 
portfolio of capital employees must have in order to enter the field and, thus, 
organizational members strive to accumulate. In the field of ESAG, this would most 
probably be economic capital (increasing sales or increased salary), social capital 
(establishing long lasting well-functioning company-customer relationships and 
employer-employee relationships) and thus symbolic capital (being the best known 
and preferred company within the specific field of sales or being an important asset 
to the company). As outlined above, fields can be characterized by struggles or 
‘organized striving’. In the case of the field of ESAG, it can be assumed that 
organizational members struggle to either obtain or maintain a certain position, and 
to improve their professional situation (e.g., increased wages and career 
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advancement). In line with field theory, the field of ESAG offers diverse positions 
which are taken according to the agents’ capital portfolio. Thus, their ‘work habitus’ 
must ‘fit’ the field’s demands in terms of the specific capital portfolio. Which 
portfolio is acknowledged is determined by the dominant actors, i.e. by those higher 
up in the hierarchy (the CEO and top management) or those in the ‘field of power’ 
(e.g., regulatory agencies, tax authorities, juridical system of a given nation). 
Conceptualizing ESAG or any organization as a field has implication for the 
conceptualization of leadership. In section 2.2, I presented an overview on scholarly 
approaches to leadership. Employing Bourdieu’s concepts of field, habitus and 
capital suggests yet another conceptualization of leadership. According to Lingard 
and Christie (2003:319f), the use of Bourdieu’s concepts 
enable us to move beyond trait, situational and transformational leadership 
theories, emphasizing instead the recursive relationship between agency (individual 
leader habitus) and structure (field) in the broader social context. Habitus enables 
us to talk about the person of the leader not simply in terms of traits, character and 
personal influence, but also in relation to specific social structures and embodied 
dispositions. Field enables us to talk about the context of leadership, in this case the 
[organization], as ‘structured social space’ with its own properties and power 
relations, overlapping and interrelating with (…) other fields.  
Following Lingard and Christie’s statement, leadership, when conceptualized 
through Bourdieu’s practice theory, renders leaders and their employees as social 
agents who stand in relation to each other, influence each other, and struggle for the 
field-specific form(s) of capital. In order to do so, they must themselves possess an 
organizational specific habitus (Kitchin & Howe 2013:129) which portrays “field-
relevant dispositions to the rules and regularities of the [organizational] field” 
(ibid.). In regard to this study, ESAG’s leaders and employees of diverse cultural 
backgrounds (cultural habitus) are therefore understood to be endowed with diverse 
sets of dispositions seeing that they were embodied in diverse societal fields. In 
addition, leadership at ESAG can be understood as being influenced by other fields 
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which overlap or influence the field of ESAG in two ways: First, the leaders’ and 
employees’ habitus has been shaped by their upbringing in a certain wider socio-
cultural environment, i.e., certain societal structures have been embodied in the 
organizational members’ habitus which influences their understanding of the field of 
ESAG and their positions within the field. Second, the field of ESAG is influenced 
by other fields and thus, leadership at ESAG is affected by these other field’s logics 
of practice. 
 
3.3.3 Trust building in a Bourdieusian perspective 
Applying the aforementioned framework of habitus, field and capital to the existing 
literature on interpersonal trust highlights the interconnectedness of theories on trust 
pertaining to the social sphere, such as work on generalized trust (e.g. Uslaner 2002; 
Delhey & Newton 2005) and systems trust (Luhmann 1980), with work on 
interpersonal trust focusing on individuals and the role of emotions (e.g. Barbalet 
1996; Lewis & Weigert 1985) and reflexivity (e.g., Giddens, 1986, 1990; Möllering 
2001, 2006). At the same time, a Bourdieusian approach to interpersonal trust 
challenges those theories on interpersonal trust constituting trust as a phenomenon 
belonging to solely either the individual or the structure. As outlined in the chapter 
above, taking a relational approach to social practices means that trusting emerges 
from a dialogue between the intertwined phenomena of subjectivity, situations and 
social structure. In other words, social actions, such as trusting, develop from the 
complex interactions of habitus, fields and capitals. As has been mentioned, field 
and habitus co-develop with the field imposing forces on the social agent while, at 
the same time, social agents can change the field by re-distributing the diverse forms 
of capital, which consequently results in changes in the power structures within a 
given field. Due to the understanding that field, habitus, and capital are mutually 
influencing, it can be argued that when an individual’s habitus is well-aligned with 
the social field in which it has developed, the social agent behaves intuitively and 
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with ease and represents a behavior which seems to be based on an individual’s 
practical sense. In contrast, when habitus and field are not in alignment, the 
individual has to maneuver within a representation of social structures, rules and 
power relations with which he or she is not familiar. Hence, actions of aligning are 
required in order to reach a certain level of alignment, which is then likely to 
facilitate smooth collaborations. Regarding trust, the notions of perceived 
‘familiarity’ and ‘aligning’ seem to be important in understanding trust building in 
contexts and relationships characterized by perceived or experienced unfamiliarity, 
either of the situation, the relationship, or the wider social/cultural structure.  
Using the key concepts of Bourdieu and the notion of (un)familiarity and alignment 
as the main contextual and process factors, Frederiksen (2014) presents the 
following model for the trusting process (see figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Analytical phases of the trusting process. (Frederiksen 2014:181) 
This model visualizes how Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and practical sense 
mutually reinforce each other, thus showcasing how trust as disposition (habitus) 
and trust as relationship (practical sense) are self-enforcing. In order to render an 
unfamiliar situation more familiar, adjusting and improvising actions and 
perceptions in a given relationship are vital for the alignment of the conceptions of 
79 
 
the situation, the purposes and the meaningful actions across the social actors taking 
part in a given relationship. As pointed out by Frederiksen (2014:182f), “trust is 
both created in the encounter of agents and drawn from social structure and 
institutions, but these are not separate phenomena, but rather the same phenomenon 
seen with different temporal methodologies. Only in re-integrating these 
perspectives does trust as an on-going practice and process emerge.” This view on 
trust has implications for how trust as a practice and a process can be studied, which 
I shall account for in the methodology chapter. Furthermore, if trust is understood as 
an outcome of aligning practical senses that are co-shaped and re-shaped by habitus 
and experiences, I  argue, in line with Seligman (2011:206), that the emergence of 
trust between social actors who perceive each other to be different can only occur 
through shared embodied experiences. 
As we attempt the construction of a shared social world, we should learn from and 
hence be open to experience – rather than preconceived ideas and abstract forms of 
knowledge. We should enter this process only through a slow, cumulative and not 
always conscious process of straddling the boundaries of our existing and 
developing modes of thought through the challenges of shared action – of embodied 
experience. 
According to Frederiksen, and in light of the presentation of Bourdieu’s key 
concepts as outlined above, interpersonal trusting can be explained by the interplay 
of habitus and practical sense, which is presented in more detail in the sections to 
follow. 
Trust as disposition: 
As mentioned earlier, Bourdieu’s notion of habitus can be understood as a reservoir 
of cognitive schemata and socialized structures which have been internalized and 
embodied during a lifetime of experiences. Hence, habitus refers to the past. On the 
other hand, it is through the lens of habitus that individuals make sense of the 
present situation at hand. In other words, the cognitive schemata in form of 
internalized cultural and social frames or preferences guide the individual’s 
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interpretation and classification processes. Hence, it is predominantly via the aspects 
of habitus that an individual understands a situation or social action to be familiar, 
normal, risky or dangerous. Habitus then guides the justifications for trust, which in 
turn are based on perceptions of familiarity. In addition, habitus plays an important 
role in judging whether trust is appropriate in the first place.  
According to Frederiksen, “[d]isposition concerns how the development of the 
individual way of thinking, acting and perceiving reflects the development and 
constitution of society in general regarding culture, economy and social relations. 
Psychogenesis and sociogenesis intertwine but are neither identical nor in a simple 
causal relation” (Frederiksen 2012:63). Following this line of thought, it can be 
argued that individuals’ belonging to a specific group, organization or nationality 
with its various types of cultural and social structures influences the individuals’ 
habitus, i.e. their repertoire of dispositions and internalized embodied structures, and 
thus their perception of interpersonal relations, such as leader-employee 
relationships. A similar account was found by Geertz (1973), who spoke of a ‘web 
of significances’ in his definition of culture which, arguably, broadly represents 
sociogenesis and the individual’s being in and sense-making of it. This being said, I 
would like to stress that cultural frames, embodied social structures and habitus as 
such do not predict an individual’s actions, but rather guide it as it is through these 
that a situation and relationship is made sense of.  
In general, the literature on interpersonal trust is dominated by scholarly work on 
propensities to trust and justifications for trust, which in turn are based on perceived 
familiarity. Literature pertaining to trust as a rational choice (see section 2.3.1) 
claims that trust is based on reason, i.e. rational calculations based on objective 
evidence. However, when taking a Bourdieusian perspective, the notion of 
categorizing evidence as speaking against or in favor of trust can be challenged. The 
question is not so much about what comprises the signals of trustworthiness, but 
rather regarding the nature of these signals and how they are made sense of. In 
contrast to the literature taking a rational choice approach or referring to the notion 
of ‘encapsulated interest’ (Hardin 2002), the relational approach claims that 
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individuals are always influenced by their social surroundings or rather that the 
social is a part of them at all times, e.g. as their habitus. Thus, the social world is not 
understood to be separate from that of the individual. Consequently, an objective 
observation and interpretation of signals of trustworthiness – whether explicit or 
tacit - is not possible, as any observation and subsequent interpretation are guided by 
habitus and can thus be understood as ‘dispositional interpretation’ (Frederiksen 
2012:65). Hence, any interpretation is a result of a dialog between experiences made 
in the past, deposited in the individual’s habitus, and experiences made in the 
present, i.e. in the immediate situated relational encounter. As mentioned earlier, it 
is through the interplay of habitus and the practical sense that a social actor 
experiences familiarity. In other words, familiarity is not simply understood to be a 
conscious phenomenon but rather to be an ‘embodied familiarity’ (Frederiksen 
2012:66) based on embodied experiences made in the past. As a result, any 
observation is a “partial perspective filled by emotions, sensuality, and 
preconceptions, along with a profound familiarity of use” (Frederiksen 2012:65). As 
such, Frederiksen (2012:66) claims that “familiarity refers to the interpretation of 
that which can be known about a situation.” Therefore, how far social actors can be 
said to build trust based on ‘good reasons’ can be questioned as all reasons are a 
result of subjective interpretation. Hence, in the light of a Bourdieusian approach to 
trust, trust understood along the lines of a rational choice approach does not make 
much sense and –if at all – is merely one explanation for why trust building occurs. 
As mentioned in section 2.3.2, trust has also been conceptualized as ‘modus 
operandi’ or ‘taken for granted’. Frederiksen (2012:62) refers to this kind of trust as 
“intersubjective trust as structural stability”. Following Bourdieu’s framework, 
however, I claim that “intersubjective trust as structural stability” (ibid.) should 
rather be understood as ‘trust due to the alignment of habitus/disposition of trust and 
the actual situation’. In other words, since the situation is implicitly perceived as 
being familiar to the social agent, behavior is enacted without much thought. 
Perhaps one could say that the actor has a ‘feel for’ the situation and/or the other 
actors in the field, and thus actions guided by practical sense are played out 
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effortlessly. Nevertheless, it can be argued that organizational structures can be 
perceived as providing stability, which in turn enables members of this organization 
to have confidence in the structure and its corresponding role expectations. It is then 
only in situations when roles are unclear – or as Seligman argues, when agency 
takes over - that risk can enter the interaction and trust thus becomes important 
(Seligman 1997). This statement, however, can be challenged in two ways when 
employing a relational approach. First, following the above argument of familiarity 
being a decisive factor for trusting, it could be assumed that deviations from role 
expectancies present unfamiliar situations which are made sense of and acted upon 
by use of one’s practical sense, which draws on habitus to give meaning to the role 
deviations and guide one’s further conduct. Second, as argued by Frederiksen 
(2012:62), Seligman seems to assume that the social order, such as an organization’s 
structure, is a social ‘given’, self-acting entity with a structure that is stable and thus 
imposes itself on the social actor. Seen from Bourdieu’s framework, the individual is 
part of the social structure and vice versa. Hence, social structures can be influenced 
and slowly changed by social actors since they interact with and are part of an 
individual’s agency. Consequently, the social and the individual are not two separate 
entities with different logics, but are a, on the one hand unstable but on the other 
hand mutually adapting, continual process of becoming and being. In other words, 
an individual’s sense making processes of deviant role behaviors, for example, is not 
a process that takes place through an observer detached from the very structure he or 
she is observing, but from an individual who is entangled within the structure or his 
or her ‘web of significances’, to use Geertz’ definition of culture. Hence, it can be 
questioned as to how far we can speak of ‘agency’ in the sense of actions taken in a 
conscious manner, built on objective evidence, and being precisely aimed towards a 
well-defined goal. In Bourdieu’s framework, I argue that one would rather speak of 
an ‘implicit situated composition of perception and understanding aiming at 
implicitly rather than explicitly aligning interaction and meaning’; thus, any 
‘agency’ is based on tacit and embodied experiences of the past surfacing in the 
present and directed at the future. Following this line of thought, I argue that trust as 
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a modus operandi is based on a perceived familiarity of the situation, the actors 
and/or their roles in a given context. 
Trust as relationship: 
 From a Bourdieusian perspective, trust is an outcome of the reinforcing influences 
of structure and agency (see figure 3). While trust as dispositions points to the 
influence of structure on trusting, trust as relationship highlights the effect of agency 
on trusting. Within the body of literature on trust as ‘relationship’ agency is often 
connected to reflexivity which even is argued as enabling social actors to ‘choose’ to 
engage in active trust building.  From a Bourdieusian perspective, however, it is 
questionable as to how far a social actor ‘chooses’ to engage in active trust building 
as suggested by Möllering. Rather, it seems more appropriate to speak of embodied 
unconscious actions based on practical sense when a social actor engages in ‘active 
trust building practices’. Nevertheless, the Bourdieusian perspective does not reject 
the idea of social actors reflexively engaging with each other; it is, however, deemed 
to play a ‘subordinate’ role (Bourdieu 1990:91): 
Reflexive attention to action itself, when it occurs (almost invariably only when the 
automatisms have broken down), remains subordinate to the pursuit of the result 
and to the search (not necessarily perceived in this way) for maximum effectiveness 
of the effort expended.  
As it seems, reflexivity may exist in a Bourdieusian framework, though almost 
solely in situations where social actors are challenged by unfamiliarity and 
uncertainties, which is how I interpret the notion of ‘automatism-break-down’ 
mentioned by Bourdieu. In other words, my understanding of Bourdieu’s Logic of 
Practice provides room for agency as I understand social actors to be not merely 
‘internalizing’ and ‘reproducing’ social structure. It is precisely in challenging and 
unfamiliar contexts or fields – as one might interpret Bourdieu – where automatism 
breaks down that reflexivity moves into the foreground and – as I understand it – 
plays a role in the process of aligning practical sense from which trust may emerge. 
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3.3.4 Summary 
Frederiksen (2014) provided some insights into trust as a situated relational process. 
In the current literature, interpersonal trust is often conceptualized as being based on 
justifications for trust. These justifications are constructed against a backdrop of 
familiarity. This is what Frederiksen called “Trust as Disposition”. Somewhat 
contrary to this view of conceptualizing trust, a body of trust literature exists which 
stresses the importance of context and the very interactions taking place in a 
relationship. This literature points to the significance of understanding trust as a 
subjective process which is based on signaling and interpreting cues of 
trustworthiness in a given situation and in a certain context. However, what is 
understood to be a familiar context, situation or person influences the behavior and 
sense-making of a person (tacit and explicit justifications for trust) while being in a 
certain relationship in a given situation and context. Hence, what Frederiksen calls 
“Trust as Disposition” influences what he names “Trust as Relationship”.  Following 
a Bourdieusian perspective suggests that experiences made in regard to trust in a 
given relationship become embodied in a person’s habitus, i.e. their dispositions. 
Hence, Frederiksen (2014:181) argues that these two understandings of trust 
influence each other in an endless circle and that it is this very circle which explains 
trust as a process. 
Hence, the relational process of trusting cannot be separated from trust as 
disposition. The existing literature on relational trust, however, seldom 
conceptualizes trust as influenced by both habitus, i.e. perceived familiarity and 
justifications, and practical sense, i.e. relationship processes. In his paper on 
relational trust, Frederiksen conceptualizes trust as “an anticipation of the 
forthcoming which continues the trust relationship of the present into a set of 
potential, familiar future situations of justified trust” (Frederiksen 2014:182). 
Trusting as situated relational practice thus emerges from the interplay of agency as 
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the interrelated elements of iteration, projectivity, practical evaluation, habitus, and 
practical sense, all of which social actors draw from in different quantities in certain 
fields or contexts with their constraining and enabling power structures. 
This process can be visualized as follows: 
 
Figure 3: Trust as situated relational phenomenon in the context of intercultural 
leadership (adapted from Schweer’s (2008a) “Differential theory of trust shown in a 
dyadic relation” 
The processes of trust take place in certain fields or, as I will show, across certain 
fields, all of which have their distinctive yet changeable and at times contested 
illusio. The illusio refers not only to a taken-for-granted power structure in a certain 
field, but also to its logics of practice. Since social fields hold positions which are 
often taken by social actors fitting the field in terms of their habitus and capital 
portfolio, trust processes which involve social actors from diverse fields may 
arguably be more challenging since the agents’ habitus may differ to some extent. 
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This has relevance in the aforementioned notions of familiarity and justifications for 
trust, which influence the situated perception of and the actual behavior in a given 
relationship taking place in a specific context.  
Hence, understanding the field(s) in which or across which relations interact is 
important for the understanding of when, why and how trusting is understood to be a 
reasonable practice in a given leader-employee relation at a given point in time and 
in a certain contextual setting. 
In the analysis, the notion of justifications for trust, and the familiarity with the 
other, the situation or the practice one engages in, as well as the notion of subjective 
perception and practical sense and reflexivity, will be related to and discussed using 
Bourdieu’s toolbox of ‘field, capital, and habitus’. This also allows sense to be made 
of the aforementioned ‘situational conditions’ influencing trust in situated relational 
leader-employee interactions at ESAG.  
In summary, trust is understood as an individual, interactional and relational 
phenomenon. It can be explained as an interplay between personal experience, the 
unfolding situation and one’s socio-cultural interpretation schemes. It is a dynamic 
and mutually informing process between social agents and the (power) structures of 
the field in which they compete. Thus, trusting in a Bourdieusian perspective 
combines individual change with the changes of the field’s structures. Furthermore, 
trusting as a reasonable practice or experience seems to be always connected to other 
practices, such as those of leadership or culture, which in turn take place in certain 
conditions, are interpreted and experienced, and may change over time. Hence, using 
a Bourdieusian perspective on trust in the context of multicultural leadership renders 
the notions of leading, practicing culture and trusting as interrelated situated 
relational processes. It is this intersection of processes that this dissertation aims to 
illuminate. 
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3.4 A critical discussion of Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice and its 
appropriateness for the study of trust in the context of 
multicultural leadership 
Seeing that Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice represents a so-called “Grand Theory”, it 
could be criticized for being too broad, general and abstract (Mills 2000) which 
allows for the explanation of any social practice. In regard to Bourdieu’s main claim 
of presenting a theory that bridges the alleged opposition of agency and structure, 
several scholars point out that Bourdieu’s Theory of Practices leans towards 
structuralism and thus fails to “transcend the opposition between objectivism and 
subjectivism” (Jenkins 1982:270). Jenkins (ibid.) furthermore points out that 
Bourdieu’s theory “remains essentially deterministic and circular - objective 
structures produce culture, which determines practice, which reproduces those 
objective structures (…)”. A similar criticism is voiced by King (2000) and Lau 
(2004). King (2000:417) for example points out that “[a]lthough Bourdieu believes 
that the habitus is compatible with his practical theory and overcomes the impasse of 
objectivism and subjectivism in social theory, neither claim is the case; the habitus is 
incompatible with his practical theory, and it retreats quickly into objectivism.” Lau 
(2004:370) asserts that “habitus is stricken with inconsistencies and ambiguities”, 
which at times results in misunderstandings of Bourdieu’s concepts (ibid. 374). In 
addition, Lau (2004) points out that Bourdieu’s theory does not reconcile 
phenomenology and structuralism but, as mentioned by King and Jenkins, seems to 
favor structuralism. 
Despite these criticisms, I consider Bourdieu’s social theory as a strong framework 
for researching trust as a situated relational process in multicultural leadership. As 
hinted at in section 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, Bourdieu’s practice theory enables me to see 
leadership and trusting as entangled contextualized processes which are influenced 
by the agents’ diverse dispositions to leadership practices and trusting as well as the 
agents’ ongoing relations. Seeing that this study’s interactants have different 
cultural habitus which they embodied through their diverse life trajectories, it is 
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likely that they differ in their perceptions, justifications and enactments of leadership 
and trust. Hence, Bourdieu’s theory of practice offers the possibility to better 
understand the interplay of structures and agency and thus allows for the generation 
of a more informed understanding of trusting in multicultural leadership. 
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4. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
AND APPLIED METHOD 
With a sample of multicultural leader-employee relations embedded in the context 
of an ethnic sales department of a Danish SME, the purpose of this longitudinal case 
study was to discover the leaders’ and employees’ interpretations and experiences of 
trusting alongside their perceptions of why and how their trusting changed over 
time. I argue that a better understanding of the multifaceted intersections of 
leadership, culture and trust might enhance our understanding of trust as a highly 
contextual and relational process. In order to shed light on this research 
phenomenon, I addressed three research questions: 
1. How did this study’s interactants interpret and experience their 
organizational context and role at ESAG’s Department of Ethnic Sales? 
2. How did this study’s interactants interpret and experience trust in their 
respective leader-employee relations? 
3. What factors did this study’s interactants perceive as helpful, which as 
hampering, and which as critical to trusting? 
In this chapter I describe this study’s research methodology. In so doing, I discuss 
the rationale for employing a hermeneutical approach using a qualitative research 
design. It follows a summary of the information needed and a description of the 
research sample. Thereafter, I discuss methods of data collection and analysis. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of ethical considerations, including issues of 
this study’s trustworthiness and its limitations where I briefly discuss the role of 
trust in qualitative research on trust. 
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4.1 Rationale for a qualitative research design   
The question as to how trust can possibly be researched has led Fergus Lyon, Guido 
Möllering and Mark Saunders to edit a book on this issue, called: “Handbook of 
Research Methods on Trust” (Lyon et al. 2011) which covers a variety of 
quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods approaches to researching trust. 
As has been described earlier (see chapter 2) most of the literature on trust takes a 
rational approach which by means of surveys and experiments aims at identifying, 
measuring, and predicting antecedents or conditions for (mis)trust and 
trustworthiness (e.g., Dasgupta, 1988; Gambetta, 1988; Gambetta & Hamill, 2005; 
Takahashi et al., 2008). Moreover, empirical research on trust has often been 
conducted in laboratory settings (Wright & Ehnert, 2010) or by using so-called 
Trust-Games (Möllering et al., 2004:562) based on Social Exchange Theory 
(Takahashi et al., 2008). Whereas researchers can find a variety of instruments for 
measuring trust, such as an inventory for assessing conditions of trust (Butler 1991), 
‘The Organizational Trust Inventory’ (OTI) by Cummings & Bromiley (1996), or 
the so-called Behavioral Trust Inventory developed by Gillespie (2003), qualitative 
research on trust is relatively scarce, at least in the field of Organization Science. 
Yet, arguably, especially qualitative studies are needed in order to better understand 
cross-cultural trust building as advocated for by several scholars (see e.g., Möllering 
et al. 2004; Zaheer & Zaheer 2006; Wright & Ehnert 2010). 
Seeing that this study focuses on situated relational trust building processes (see 
chapter 3) between leaders and their organizational interactants, I deemed it 
necessary to employ a qualitative approach for a number of reasons: First, it enabled 
me to better understand the processes by which actions take place and thus 
understanding the differences and similarities of trusting in the field of ESAG. 
Second, a qualitative approach assisted me to develop a contextual understanding 
which is an understanding of the field in which trust processes take place. In 
addition, this study of trust aimed at discovering “new systems of relations among 
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the elements” (Bourdieu 1991:14; cited in Özbilgin & Tatli 2005:859) of Bourdieu’s 
Practice Theory, i.e. habitus, field and capital. Thus, in contrast to a purely 
quantitative research approach, a qualitative approach helped to discover and 
describe the interplay of habitus, field and capital for the practice of trust by 
shedding light on the trust processes as influenced and situated in certain fields. To 
understand this interplay, I deemed it necessary to comprehend the interactants 
socio-cultural backgrounds (habitus) and their contextual settings (field) as these 
according to Bourdieu influence the interactants’ perspectives alongside their 
situated relational practices. Seeing that a given field’s rules of the game influence 
which practices are understood as legitimate and which as deviant, an emic approach 
to the research field was necessary in order for me, as the researcher, to get some 
familiarity with the field’s logic of practice and its influence on trusting.  
In order to learn more about trust in the context of multicultural leadership and thus, 
the influence of the socio-cultural context on the process of trusting, this study 
adopted a qualitative case study design following a hermeneutic approach which 
enabled me to investigate the relationship between culture, multicultural leadership 
and trusting in an informing circular movement, thus presenting these concepts as 
interrelated processes. For example, what presented the ‘cultural context’ of trust 
building changed over the course of this research. During my study over the past 4 
years, the case company expanded which resulted in changes to its structure and 
workforce which again influenced their approach to internal communication and to 
some extent their take on multicultural leadership. On the other hand, the 
understanding of what presented and presents the cultural context changed for me as 
a researcher, i.e. my understanding of what makes up the cultural context of the 
social actors taking part in my research, how this context may influence their 
interactions with each other and with me, the researcher, altered over time as I was 
presented with new impressions which either confirmed, changed or improved my 
previous understanding of the role of culture in trust building. Thus, by learning 
more about the parts of the company, their leaders and interactants in the different 
subsidiaries, I became more knowledgeable about the whole, i.e. the immediate 
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contextual influence on trust building between the investigated leaders and their 
employees at a particular time and place, but also the wider context of the 
phenomenon under study over time. This – in a nutshell – is the essence of 
hermeneutics which this entire research is based upon. In other words, no one starts 
understanding the world from a ‘tabula rasa’, as every human being understands the 
world from her particular “meaning-field” (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009:120) which 
holds “preconceptions inherited from the past, preconceived meanings” (ibid.). In 
order for the pre-understandings to not stand in the way for understanding, Alvesson 
& Sköldberg (ibid.) refer to Gadamer (1989:306-307) and advocate for  
 (...) a constant alternation between merging into another world and 
linking back into our own reference system. By means of this movement back and 
forth, we can successively come to an understanding of the unfamiliar reference 
system, something which also leads to the gradual revising and/or enriching of our 
own: there is a ‘fusion of horizons’. 
Thus, by moving back and forth between the worlds of this study’s interactants and 
my own reference system, I continuously enhanced my understanding of the 
influence of habitus, field and leadership practices on the process of trusting; and I 
will continue to do so in the future. Hence, the knowledge presented in this 
dissertation is neither relative nor objective but rather a “provisory rational 
knowledge (...) which is wavering, evasive yet at the same time at least temporarily 
valid” (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009:121).  
The most essential part of the hermeneutical process of understanding is arguably 
the process of interpretation which according to Heidegger (1962; referred to in 
Alvesson & Sködberg 2009:120) is always colored by emotional moods, and which 
in itself “(...) contains the three aspects of time – past, present and future – as 
indissoluble moments” (ibid, 121). 
While this spiral movement, on one hand, enhanced my understanding of the issue at 
hand, it has, on the other hand, had implications for the writing process of this 
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dissertation. Whereas the written product seems to mirror a linear research process, 
the work and writing processes, however, most definitely followed the non-linear 
form of the hermeneutic spiral. As such, throughout the research process, the writing 
presented in this dissertation has been constantly evaluated and re-evaluated, 
reviewed revisited and reviewed again. As a result, this dissertation presents the 
fullest ‘provisory rational knowledge’ on issues of multicultural trust building 
between leaders and their employees within the case of a SME headquartered in 
Denmark. 
By employing the hermeneutical process of understanding and interpretation, I 
aimed at producing a nuanced, yet holistic understanding of multicultural trust 
building which may enhance our knowledge on how Bourdieu’s elements of habitus, 
field and capital influence trust processes in the context of multicultural leadership. 
 
4.2 Qualitative case study research 
In order to acquire some personal in-depth understandings of the complex 
relationship between a person’s dispositions (habitus), their given capital portfolio 
and an organization’s structure (field) for trusting in the context of multicultural 
leadership, I deemed it necessary to choose a method, which allowed me to immerse 
myself as researcher in the different contexts.  
A suitable method for discovering how trust between leaders and their employees 
‘actually happens’ (Watson, 2011) and how it is influenced by an interplay of 
structure and agency I see in the case study strategy. A case study design allows the 
researcher to observe thoroughly how the interactants react to certain events playing 
out the social and organizational fields and how they interpret it. According to 
Hartley (2004:324), the main emphasis of a case study is “on understanding 
processes alongside their (organizational and other) contexts.” Thus, the case study 
design enables me to thoroughly describe how trust is understood, built and 
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maintained between leaders and their employees and how this process is influenced 
by the given contexts over time. 
  
Another reason for choosing the case study approach has to do with the very 
research object. As pointed out earlier, the phenomenon under scrutiny, i.e. trust in 
multicultural leadership interactions across diverse contexts, cannot clearly be 
disconnected from the contexts in which it is enacted. Consequently, a case study 
approach is employed since, according to Yin, a case study is especially useful when 
one wants to study “a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context [and] 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” 
(Yin 1984: 23). Moreover, a case study as research strategy allows me to engage 
with the individual employees and the ‘real-life contexts’ in which certain leadership 
interactions take place. In order to shed light on how and when trust emerges from 
multicultural leader-employee relations and its situated processes over time, this 
exploratory case study investigates intra-organizational multicultural leadership 
interactions and relations. In line with Yin’s conceptualization of case studies, I 
make use of different qualitative methods of data collection, all of which allow for 
close interactions between the researcher, this study’s interactants and the diverse 
‘real-life’ organizational contexts. Methods of data collection are for instance 
interviews, participant observations, informal conversations and interactions 
alongside organizational texts such as the given organization’s website and its 
internal news magazine. 
The interactions under investigation are played out by culturally diverse actors, i.e. 
they can be understood as representing different national cultures, ethnicities, 
organizational culture, professions, gender, religion, and educational systems. 
Nevertheless, all of these diverse actors are employed at one and the same SME, 
headquartered in Denmark. Primarily within this organizational context, this study 
will attempt to enrich our understanding of the influence of context or conditions 
(fields, habitus) on processes of intra-organizational trust by taking a practice 
theoretical perspective. Nevertheless, even though all interactants of this study are 
part of the ‘same’ organizational context, they do have a variety of different socio-
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cultural backgrounds. Moreover, they find themselves and the subsidiaries they 
work in embedded in a certain social context. Thus, the organizational context (the 
field of ESAG) is influenced by the societal context (the social field) in which it is 
embedded. In other words, intra-organizational multicultural processes of trust 
between leaders and their employees are, as outlined in chapter 3, most likely 
influenced by a variety of contextual factors (overlapping fields, agents’ socio-
cultural backgrounds) influencing the agents’ perception of a given situation and 
context and their range of possible actions. Thus, one important contribution of this 
study is to enhance our comprehension of the complexities of contextual influences 
on interpersonal trust relations in organizations. 
  
4.2.1 Choosing the case study 
In order to study trust as a situated relational process in the context of multicultural 
leadership, I needed access to a case company comprised by a diverse workforce in 
terms of ‘culture’. To understand processes of trust relations, I furthermore needed 
the possibility to observe ongoing multicultural leader-employee interactions over a 
longer period of time. Therefore, I made a list over companies which most likely 
would work with multicultural leadership and which belonged to my extended 
network. The latter was important; seeing that research on trust can be understood as 
research on an organizational sensitive topic, I presumed that company gatekeepers 
would need to trust me first before granting me access to their company. Since I had 
been in contact with those companies in my network prior to this study, or I could be 
introduced to them via a third person, I assumed that it would be somewhat easier to 
get access to them than to companies which were not part of my extended network. 
Biased from earlier project collaborations, I firstly contacted bigger global 
companies; yet, after some time, I contacted a SME headquartered in Denmark 
which fulfilled – or even exceeded - the criteria mentioned above as they (due to 
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strategically reasons) employed so-called ‘German-Turks’ and ‘Austro-Turks’ in 
their respective German or Austrian sales-subsidiaries. 
This meant that instead of investigating the influence of culture on trust building 
from a more or less ‘clear-cut’ idea of one leader and one employee from one and 
the same company, yet two diverse cultural backgrounds collaborating with each 
other, I would be studying trust building within the context of multicultural 
leadership in a SME where Danish leaders were to lead so-called ‘followers’ who 
would refer to – at least – two cultural backgrounds in terms of ethnicity. Doing trust 
research at a SME furthermore meant that I could contribute to the rather scarce 
research on leadership and management research in the domain of SMEs (Nilsson et 
al. 2012:265). In regard to trust processes, family-owned SMEs seem to be a rather 
suitable case since “to preserve the organization (…) [they] typically take fewer 
risks than large firms. On the other hand, they are characterized by a stronger 
entrepreneurial influence that involves discovering, evaluating, and exploiting 
opportunities through proactiveness, risk taking, and innovation (…). Following 
Nilsson et al., SMEs seem to draw on their history and conventional ways of actions 
which arguably refrain from risk taking while at the same time taking risks to stay 
competitive or enhance their competitiveness. 
  
4.2.2 Description of case 
As outlined earlier, in December 2012 I was granted fairly broad access to do 
qualitative field work in two German and one Austrian sales subsidiaries and the HQ 
of a privately owned Danish SME which I called ESAG. The case company 
produces and sells food products throughout the world. It was established in 
Denmark in 1984. After the first explorative interview with the head of sales, I 
decided to focus my studies on the ethnic sales department since this comprised all 
aspects necessary to gain more information on trust building in the context of 
multicultural leadership. In particular, when the head of sales, IDK0, said that ‘they 
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have issues with trust’ and, furthermore, that ‘he would like to know what they (the 
non-Danish employees at the sales subsidiaries in Germany and Austria) think of us 
(managers and employees at HQ) (Field notes, December 6, 2012), one of the main 
criterion for a good case of trust research was made explicit: there seemed to be 
multicultural leader-employee relations where trust should have been present but in 
actual fact appeared to be weak. Since 1999, the case company has conducted sales 
activities in the Austrian and German markets. In 2012, a second sales subsidiary 
was established in the south-western part of Germany aimed at strengthening the 
presence in one of the main markets for ethnic food products within Europe. The 
following description of the case company’s HQ and its three sales subsidiaries is 
based on interviews, informal conversations, and observations made at the four 
units. Throughout the field studies I developed a deeper understanding of the 
relationship between these four units and achieved a more holistic insight into the 
diverse leadership interactions taking place both within and across these units. The 
following description of the case company’s HQ and sales subsidiaries is meant to 
provide a broad overview of the structure and context in which the leader-employee 
relationships between the HQ and the sales subsidiaries take place. It is these 
relationships that are the actual cases or units of analysis. In other words, this case 
study is an embedded case study of six leader-employee relationships. However, 
when doing field work at the different sales subsidiaries, I became aware that the 
subsidiaries were quite small with regard to the number of employees, and that the 
experiences made by the local leaders were almost always visible to all employees 
present at the site. Moreover, if one wanted to, it was possible to eavesdrop on 
discussions held over the telephone. Thus, I experienced a kind of ‘spill-over effect’, 
i.e. the local leader openly discussed issues emerging with HQ, and the employees 
seemed to follow their local leader’s sense-making of these very issues to 
considerable lengths. Consequently, the perceived HQ or intermediary leader-
employee relationships mirrored the perceived overall relationship between the 
company’s HQ and its sales subsidiaries and vice versa. Hence, I argue that this case 
study is an embedded case study of six leader-employee relations as well as being a 
case study of HQ-sales subsidiary relationships.  
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At HQ around 120 employees are led by 14 managers, all of which are male Danes, 
with the exception of one female manager (IDK2) holding the position of head of 
sales support. Three of the managers are related to the company’s CEO and, in 
general, the case company understands itself to be a ‘family business’. At HQ there 
are only three formal management levels, four if the local general managers at the 
Austrian and the German sales subsidiaries are included. In regard to leader-
employee relations at HQ relevant to my study, I collected qualitative data on 
interactions between the Danish leader of sales support (IDK2) from HQ and the 
Danish-Turkish trainee (ITR5). Yet, to contextualize trust building processes, 
interviews with the Head of Sales IDK0 and observations at the entire department of 
sales support and ethnic sales were conducted on several occasions (see figure 6 on 
data collection). 
The case company has three sales subsidiaries of which they own 100% and one of 
which they own 52%. Since the latter also figures under the headline ‘sales 
subsidiaries’ (see organizational chart), I started my field work at all four 
subsidiaries, including the department of ethnic sales and sales support at HQ in 
January 2013. However, during my fieldwork I learned that the so-called sales 
subsidiary which only partly belonged to the company was merely a ‘partner’ or just 
a ‘customer’. This new information led me to concentrate my research on those three 
sales subsidiaries which belonged 100% to ESAG and were thus also managed from 
HQ, despite having their own local managers. 
In the following, the subsidiaries and the leader-employee relations connected to 
these subsidiaries are presented: 
a) The Austrian sales subsidiary (henceforth referred to as AT) has 8 
employees, managed by one female local Austro-Turkish manager and 
supported by six Danish managers (located at HQ but undertaking 
infrequent trips to Austria) regarding purchasing, logistics, marketing, 
accounting, HR, and sales. At the Austrian sales subsidiary there are only 
two formal management levels; however, the important decisions with 
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regard to purchasing, marketing, accounting and sales are made by the 
marketing and sales departments at the Danish HQ. Decisions regarding the 
Austrian sales subsidiary’s personnel and logistics are made by the local 
manager. 
In terms of leader-employee relations relevant to my study, I collected 
qualitative data on interactions between the Danish intermediary leader 
(IDK1) from HQ and the Austro-Turkish sales person (ITR2) as well as 
on interactions between the Danish leader of sales support (IDK2) from 
HQ and the Austro Turkish warehouse manager (ITR10)B. However, in 
order to contextualize trust building processes, interviews and observations 
of all the members (with Austrian, German, and Austro-Turkish 
backgrounds) of the Austrian sales subsidiary, including the local Austro-
Turkish manager (ITR3) as well as the Danish-Turkish sales-trainee 
(ITR5), were conducted on several occasions (see figure 6 on data 
collection). 
b) The German sales subsidiary located in the eastern part of Germany 
(henceforth referred to as DE-E) has only 4 employees. Since September 
2012, it has been formally managed by the Danish director of ESAG 
Germany, who is located at HQ in Denmark. Informally, however, a female 
German-Turkish employee functions as the head of office, managing the 
administrative issues of this subsidiary. The main sales person (German 
with a Turkish background), however, more or less managed himself, 
though he is supported by a Danish intermediary leader from HQ who 
spends at least every third week at this sales subsidiary. As is the case with 
the Austrian sales subsidiary, this German subsidiary is supported by 
Danish managers located at HQ regarding purchasing, logistics, marketing, 
accounting, and HR. With the exception of the intermediary leader, the 
other Danish managers visit this subsidiary only a few times each year. At 
this sales subsidiary there are two formal management levels; however, the 
overall decisions regarding this subsidiary are made by the Danish HQ. The 
101 
 
Danish director of ESAG Germany does not seem to influence this process 
decisively even though he officially holds the authority to do so. 
In terms of leader-employee relations relevant to my study, I collected 
qualitative data on interactions between the Danish intermediary leader 
(IDK1) from HQ and a local German-Turkish sales person (ITR1). 
However, in order to contextualize these trust building processes, 
interviews and observations of all the members (all of which had German-
Turkish backgrounds) of this German sales subsidiary were conducted on 
several occasions (see figure 6 regarding data collection). 
c) The German sales subsidiary located in the south-western part of 
Germany (henceforth referred to as DE-W) was established in 2012, has 6 
employees and is managed by one male Danish expatriate manager who is 
responsible for purchasing, logistics, accounting, the administrative work 
and, to some extent, the local HR management. Officially, he is led by the 
director of ESAG Germany, who is located at HQ in Denmark. 
Furthermore, decisions regarding marketing are made at the marketing 
department at HQ. 
 
At this subsidiary, qualitative data on the following leader-employee 
relationships were collected: First, data on the relationship between the 
Danish HR manager/director of ESAG Germany (IDK4) and the local 
Danish manager (IDK3) were collected. Second, the relationships between 
the local Danish manager (IDK3) and the local German-Turkish sales 
persons and warehouse manager (ITR7-9; ITR4) were investigated. 
However, in order to obtain a broader and more holistic understanding of 
trust development in the above-mentioned relationships, interviews and 
observations of all the members of this German sales subsidiary were 
conducted, including with the Danish-Turkish sales-trainee (ITR5). Once 
more, data collection occurred on several occasions (see figure 6 regarding 
data collection). 
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The following chart provides an overview over the leader-employee relations I 
investigated throughout my studies at ESAG. 
 
Figure: 4: Overview on the six embedded leader-employee relations (solid red lines) 
in the department of Ethnic Sales at HQs and its three subsidiaries (DE-W, AT, DE-
E) 
In summary, this case study resembles a cross-level explorative case study of six 
embedded cases as it contains more than one subunit of analysis (Yin 1984), namely 
the aforementioned leader-employee relations. Thus, this case study does not focus 
on the whole unit, i.e. on the entire organization or the entire subsidiary as such. 
Rather, it focuses on contrasting the leader-employee cases within the whole 
organization. However, even though the primary focus is on the six embedded cases, 
the organization as a whole, its culture, structure and history are vital parts of the 
contextual framework in which all six cases are embedded. Therefore, whenever my 
interactants referred to certain contextual factors, such as preferred practices on the 
ethnic food market, as influencing their methods of building trust with their co-
workers or leaders, I deemed it relevant to additionally address and discuss these 
issues in light of the existing literature in order to achieve a more holistic 
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understanding of situated relational trust building in the context of multicultural 
leadership. 
 
4.3 Data collection, processing and feedback 
As highlighted by Saunders (2011:110): “Trust research invariably asks questions 
about sensitive issues, highlighting the need to build rapport and trust between the 
researcher and participant.” Following Saunders, I approached the research field, i.e. 
the case company and this thesis’ interactants in such a way that trust could be 
gained by being open and making my research topic salient to the company and its 
members. In line with Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), I ensured anonymity and 
privacy and explained the aim, process and possible benefits of my research upfront. 
Since most of the interviews took place during scheduled observations, I 
furthermore made sure to engage in informal conversations with the interactants 
before conducting semi-structured in-depths interviews with them. In our small talks 
we often spoke about our families, hobbies and other none-work related aspects and 
thus we got to know each other and learned about things we had in common, which 
almost always was the case. Once some first-hand impressions were gained and I 
had the feeling that some rapport had been established, I scheduled the interviews 
with the interactants in terms of suitable time slots, workdays, and interview 
settings. In the case of the sales personnel, some interviews were held during their 
lunch breaks at some café on their scheduled customer-route and sometimes in their 
car while being on customer visits. Most often, interviews with HQ personnel were 
held in a meeting room at HQs and interviews at the subsidiaries wherever 
convenient, sometimes in the office and sometimes in the warehouse (see pictures 
below for examples of interview settings). 
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Figure 5: Examples of interview settings 
  
Nonetheless, revealing one’s research topic from the onset of the study may bias the 
interactants’ responses to interview questions considering that they might be more 
conscious about their answers as stated by Saunders (2011:111). In order to bridge 
the gap between sensitizing this study’s interactants about my research focus on 
trust, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, not violating the interactants’ right to 
be informed about my study, I introduced them to the study as ‘a research on 
multicultural leadership and collaboration, including trust building’. Arguably, 
seeing trust as one small element of the major subject of leadership and 
collaboration may have turned the interactants’ focus towards these subjects rather 
than the issue of trust. In any case, in light of Alvesson’s critical take on interviews 
(Alvesson 2003), any interview no matter the subject should be approached in a 
reflexive manner as interviews are influenced by a variety of simultaneous processes 
such as “identity work”, “cultural script application”, “moral storytelling”, and 
“political action” (Alvesson 2003:15). Hence, interviewees’ answers are colored by 
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and may express the interviewees’ political stance, cultural background, preferred 
identification, and position and positioning in relation to their loyalty toward the 
company and thus, their understanding of morality. 
In order to ensure the quality of this research, I triangulated qualitative interview 
data with observational data in a longitudinal case study design nested in a 
hermeneutical approach to trust. In the following, I discuss the hermeneutic 
approach, the rationale for a case study design and the data collection methods and 
data analysis. 
 
4.3.1 A hermeneutical approach to trust 
According to Breeman (2011:149), “[hermeneutic] is particularly useful to gain 
insights into the different intentions of all the parties involved. It connects the actual 
human interactions with intentions. The strong asset of the hermeneutic method is 
that it aims not only to understand a specific event, but also to identify general, 
objective patterns of human interaction.” Nested in the paradigm of contemporary 
hermeneutics (Blaikie 2010:81) which draws on Gadamer’s notion of the researcher 
going into dialogue with the ‘text’ to achieve a ‘fusion of horizons’, I understand 
individuals as interpretative social beings who together with other social actors 
shape and re-shape their subjective realities. Thus, conducting observations and 
listening to the leaders’ and employees’ conversations with each other and their co-
workers helped to explore practices of multicultural leadership as they occurred in 
the everyday work life. Since individuals have their own specific ways of sense-
making, the observations made were supplemented with interviews in order to 
discuss what I had perceived during the observations, and vice versa (Kvale 1996). 
Thus, on one hand, the unit of analysis (de Vaus 2002) is the ongoing leader-
employee relation, which means the focus is placed on the individual and the dyad. 
Nevertheless, following the hermeneutic (and for that matter, interpretivist) 
approach, dyads (and the individuals within it) perform within and act in response to 
the groups, subsidiaries, and the overall department they are a part of. Thus, this 
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study focusses on multiple units of analysis, by understanding the dynamics of 
leadership between individuals, within and between groups (local and HQ-based 
sales personnel; sales personnel and sales support), and the department of Ethnic 
Sales as a whole).    
From the very beginning of conducting field work at the case company, I 
experienced that researching trust in and across a diverse workforce would be a 
sensitive and emotional endeavor for both the interactants and me as a researcher 
and human being. Their positions and positionings in the field of ESAG, cultural and 
social identification (habitus) and tacit as well as conscious sense-making (practical 
sense) of the interactants was very often accompanied with the expression of 
emotions. Especially when the interactants started to trust me as a researcher and 
person, their narratives changed from a more “matter-of-fact” style to expressing 
their personal meanings, emotions, attitudes, and potential future actions towards 
certain ways of multicultural leadership. Thus, it became evident that leadership and 
trust in a multicultural context are concepts that involve emotions and personal 
attitudes alongside social and cultural identification processes. As a consequence, 
these experiences led me to choose a theoretical framework which would account 
for the interplay of structures and positions and emotions and subjectivity in trust 
building in the context of multicultural leadership interactions. Hence, pressures 
from the field made me to adjust my theoretical framework accordingly, leading me 
to employ an adapted version of Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice on trust literature 
taking a relational and process perspective.     
Following the hermeneutic approach, throughout the research process I observed 
‘what was happening’ (Watson 2011) in the leader-employee relations within HQs, 
the two German and the Austrian sales subsidiaries and contrasted this with theories 
I had accessed already.  Whenever I encountered issues of which I could not make 
any sense (such as the means of decision making), I retrieved literature that could 
explain these issues from a variety of perspectives. Thus, by using the hermeneutical 
spiral trust building in multicultural leadership could be continually analyzed as a 
whole, but then specific aspects of the six leader-employee relations could also be 
108 
 
investigated, followed by making sense of the HQ-subsidiary relationships, and then 
looking at the whole again. This process was repeated several times which led to a 
quite nuanced and holistic understanding of the context of trust building in 
multicultural leadership at ESAG.  
Even though the overall research took an iterative approach by employing the 
hermeneutic process, data was also collected in a step-by-step way as presented in 
the table below. 
Date Data collected 
Dec. 6, 2012 First meeting with the contact person at the company. Presentation 
of ideas, structure and timeline of my research (Conversation 
time: approx. 2 hrs.) 
Dec. 21, 2012 Meeting with the HR manager at the HQ, who gave a presentation 
on the company’s background and structure. I received a copy of 
the organizational chart, which formed the basis for the discussion 
regarding which leader-employee relationships I could follow. I 
received their contact data and the green light to start my research. 
An oral non-disclosure agreement was made. (Interview time:  1 
hr. 15 min.)  
Jan. 9, 2013 Interview conducted with the head of accounting at HQ (Interview 
time: 1 hr. 20 min.) 
Apr. 8, 2013 Interview with an intermediary sales leader for the ethnic market 
at HQ (Interview time: 1 hr. 19 min.) 
Apr. 9, 2013 Interview with the intermediary sales leader (IDK1) for the ethnic 
market at HQ (Interview time: 1 hr. 22 min.) 
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Apr. 11, 2013 Interview with the head of sales support (IDK2) at HQ (Interview 
time: 2 hrs.) 
May 13-15, 
2013 
Observations at the sales subsidiary in south-western Germany 
(DE-W), including hours of informal conversations with the local 
manager (IDK3) and the sales support (IDK5) 
May 13, 2013 Interview with the local manager (IDK3) of the sales subsidiary in 
south-western Germany (Interview time: 56 min.) 
May 13, 2013 Interview with the storage worker/sales support (ITR4) at the sales 
subsidiary in south-western Germany (Interview time: 25 min.) 
May 14, 2013 Interview with the sales support (IDK5) at the sales subsidiary in 
south-western Germany (Interview time: 55 min.) 
May 15, 2013 Interview with ITR9 a sales person from the sales subsidiary in 
south-western Germany at a restaurant about 70 km away from the 
sales subsidiary (Interview time: 26 min.) 
May 16-17, 
2013 
Observations at the sales subsidiary in Austria (AT), including 
hours of informal conversations with the local manager (ITR3) 
and the sales support (ITR13; IDE1) 
May 16, 2013 Interview with the head of accounting (IAT1) at the sales 
subsidiary in Austria (Interview time: 13 min.)  
May 16, 2013 Interview with the local manager (ITR3) at the sales subsidiary in 
Austria (Interview time: 2 hrs. 22 min.) 
May 16, 2013 Interview with the warehouse and order manager (ITR10) at the 
sales subsidiary in Austria (Interview time: 46 min.) 
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May 16, 2013 Lunch meeting with the local manager (ITR3); later invitation to 
her home 
May 17, 2013 Interview with the local manager (ITR3) at the sales subsidiary in 
Austria (Interview time: 48 min.) 
May 17, 2013 Interview with the sales support (ITR13) at the sales subsidiary in 
Austria (Interview time: 39 min.) 
May 17, 2013 Interview with the sales support (IDE1) at the sales subsidiary in 
Austria (Interview time: 27 min.) 
June 3-5, 2013 Observations at the sales subsidiary in the eastern part of Germany 
(DE-E), including hours of informal conversations with the sales 
support/local admin. manager (ITR6), sales support (ITR14) and 
sales person (ITR1) 
June 4, 2013 Interview with the intermediary leader from HQ (IDK1) during 
his visit to the sales subsidiary in the eastern part of Germany 
(Interview time: 1 hr. 6 min.) 
June 4, 2013 Interview with the sales person (ITR1) at the sales subsidiary in 
the eastern part of Germany (Interview time: 1 hr. 25 min.) 
June 4, 2013 Interview with the sales support/local admin. manager (ITR6) at 
the sales subsidiary in the eastern part of Germany (Interview 
time: 1 hr. 9 min.) 
June 4, 2013 Lunch meeting with the intermediary leader (IDK1) from HQ and 
the main sales person (ITR1) from the sales subsidiary in the 
eastern part of Germany 
June 5, 2013 Interview with the sales support (ITR14) at the sales subsidiary in 
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the eastern part of Germany (Interview time: 1 hr. 10 min.) 
Sept. 25-26, 
2013 
Taped observation of the sales-meeting/evaluation between the 
intermediary leader (IDK1) from HQ with the local manager and 
sales person (ITR2) at the sales subsidiary in Austria (Time: 7 hrs. 
36 min.) 
Sept. 25, 2013 Lunch meeting with the intermediary leader (IDK1) and 
marketing manager from HQ and the local manager (ITR3) and 
sales person (ITR2) from the sales subsidiary in Austria  
Jan. 20, 2014 Presentation and discussion (audio-taped) of the first summary 
report with four members of the sales department at HQ, including 
the sales director (IDK0) (Time: 2 hrs. 12 min.) [at this point the 
final decision was taken to no longer include the 
subsidiary/partner in north-western Germany/NL] 
Feb. 5, 2014 Interview with the export director of ethnic sales at HQ (Interview 
time: 1 hr. 20 min.) 
Apr. 10, 2014 Observation of the first feedback/evaluation of a Turkish sales 
trainee (ITR5) together with the head of sales support (IDK2) and 
the HR manager (IDK4) at HQ (Time: 41 min.)  
Apr. 22-25, 
2014 
Observation of working style at ethnic sales and sales support at 
HQ; including informal conversations over lunch meetings 
Apr. 23, 2014 Interview with the Turkish sales trainee (ITR5) at HQ (Interview 
time: 1 hr. 56 min.) 
Apr. 28 – May 
2, 2014 
Observation of working style and the ‘Monday’-meeting between 
sales persons (ITR7-9) and the local manager (IDK3) at the sales-
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subsidiary in south-western Germany and during customer visits 
Apr. 28, 2014 Interview with the sales person (ITR9) at the sales subsidiary in 
south-western Germany (Interview time: 31 min.) 
Apr. 29, 2014 Interview with the sales person (ITR8) at the sales subsidiary in 
south-western Germany (Interview time: 30 min.) 
Apr. 29, 2014 Interview with the sales person (ITR7) from the sales subsidiary in 
south-western Germany in his car on the way to meet customers 
(Interview time: 44 min.) 
May 1, 2014 Interview with the sales support (IDK5) at the sales subsidiary in 
south-western Germany (Interview time: 30 min.) 
May 2, 2014 Interview with the local manager (IDK3) from the sales subsidiary 
in south-western Germany at FRA Airport (Interview time: 37 
min.) 
June 10-13, 
2014 
Observation of working style at the sales subsidiary in the eastern 
part of Germany, including observational data on the HR 
manager’s (IDK4) visit of this subsidiary (Partly audio-taped) 
June 12, 2014 Interview with the HR manager (IDK4) from HQ (but present in 
the function as director of ESAG Germany) at the sales subsidiary 
in the eastern part of Germany (Interview time: 2 hrs.) 
June 13, 2014 Interview with the sales support/local admin. manager (ITR6) at 
the sales subsidiary in the eastern part of Germany (Interview 
time: 53 min.) 
June 13, 2014 Observation of the sales person’s (ITR1) daily work with 
customers in the eastern part of Germany 
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June 30, 2014 Observation of the second feedback/evaluation of the Turkish 
sales trainee (ITR5) together with the head of sales support 
(IDK2) and the HR manager (IDK4) at HQ  
Sep. 8 – 11, 
2014 
Observation of a presentation of a new product (Sep. 8) and sales 
course for all sales people of the ethnic sales department (HQ, 
Austrian and German subsidiaries) including the HR-
manager/director of ESAG Germany (IDK4) at a hotel very close 
to the sales subsidiary in south-western Germany 
Sep. 8, 2014 Dyadic interview with the sales support (IDK5) and sales trainee 
(ITR5) at the sales subsidiary in south-western Germany 
(Interview time: 51 min.) 
Sep. 10, 2014 I hold and tape a slide presentation summarizing trust, including a 
discussion with sales personnel on my first impressions of the 
sales course (Instructor of the sales course requested this) (Time: 
23 min.) 
Sep. 10, 2014 Longer informal conversation with the instructor of the sales 
course 
Sep. 10, 2014 Informal audio-taped conversation with the sales person from 
Austria (ITR2) and the sales trainee (ITR5) after the sales course 
(Interview time: 27 min); informal conversation continued on the 
balcony, however this not taped 
Sep. 11, 2014 Dyadic interview with the storage assistant/sales support (ITR4) 
and local manager (IDK3) at the sales subsidiary in south-western 
Germany (Interview time: 1 hr. 39 min.) 
Oct. 15, 2014 Feedback of my impressions regarding the sales course to the HR 
manager/director of ESAG Germany (IDK4) at HQ; later informal 
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conversation with the director of sales at HQ (IDK0) 
Oct. 20, 2014 Feedback from the sales trainee (ITR5) and local manager (M) of 
the sales subsidiary in south-western Germany regarding the sales 
course via a telephone call 
Nov. 11, 2014 Interview with Sales Director (IDK0) at HQ (Interview time: 1 hr. 
36 min.) 
Aug. 25, 2015 Presentation and discussion (audio-taped) of the second summary 
report with members of all sales departments and marketing at 
HQ, including ESAG’s CEO (Time: 2 hrs. 21 min.) 
Figure 6: Overview on the data collected (interviews and observations) 
 
The empirical material was continuously juxtaposed with the existing literature on 
interpersonal, intra-organizational trust in cross-cultural leadership contexts (see 
chapter 2) and this dissertations’ conceptualization of trust from a Bourdieusian 
perspective (see chapter 3) which was adopted after the first cycle of hermeneutic 
procedure during which my preunderstanding of the influence of culture on trusting 
was altered in course of newly found patterns of explanation which led to a new 
understanding of the whole (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009:104). The circle movement 
between a given text (the empirical material gathered during fieldwork), the 
dialogue with the text (interpretation of the text), the sub-interpretation (emerging 
patterns of plausibility for the text at hand), and the pattern of interpretation 
(emerging patterns of plausibility for the whole) can be visualized as a continuous 
movement between preunderstanding and understanding. 
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Figure 6: The hermeneutic circle (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009:104) 
In this process, the enablers, hurdles, and decisive factors for trusting emerged from 
the data. When this happened, the main writing process of this monograph started. 
Its reflections were partially presented at the case company’s HQ and subsidiaries, 
which led to new processes of sense-making through the contrasting and 
substantiating of my understanding of the interactants’ experiences with their own 
sense-making. Hence, in a hermeneutic sense, by discussing my frequently changing 
pre-understandings with my interactants, I attempted to obtain a better 
understanding of the interactants’ reference systems and thus, hoped for a ‘fusion of 
our horizons’ to occur. 
 
4.3.2 Qualitative Interviewing 
Following the theoretical considerations outlined in chapter 3 and based on my 
experiences made in the field, research on trust as a situated relational process 
should describe and analyze a variety of aspects, including their changes and their 
influence on trust through time. These aspects are:  
 The context or situation (the field and its power structures) in which a 
certain relationship takes place: The conditions for trust. 
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 Situated subjective relational sense-making of the situation, the other 
person and the unfolding relationship: The interpretation of trust. 
 Practices of trust in relationship processes: The experiences of trust 
In the theory chapter I stated that trust emerges from relationships as the actors 
involved align their practical senses, a process that I understand to involve the 
aforementioned aspects. Thus, when researching trust as a situated relational process 
embedded in the context of multicultural leadership, I deem it necessary to focus on 
data that provide information on the context, the subjective sense-making and 
understanding of trust and the unfolding relationship. Consequently, I chose to 
conduct a longitudinal interpretative case study in order to capture how contextual 
and situational changes impact trust building and vice versa. Before I outline and 
substantiate the choices made in terms of data collection and analysis, I outline how 
trust is operationalized. 
Not surprisingly, the operationalization of trust depends on one’s definition of trust 
(Lewicki & Brinsfield 2011). In this dissertation, trust has been defined as a situated 
relational practice which emerges from the interplay of perceived familiarity, 
justification processes and the situated relationship a given actor is engaged in. By 
adding Emirbayer & Mische’s (1998) conceptualization of agency to Bourdieu’s 
relational theory, trusting as a situated relational practice emerges from the interplay 
of agency through the interrelated elements of iteration, projectivity, practical 
evaluation, habitus, and practical sense, all of which social actors draw from in 
different quantities in certain fields or contexts with their constraining and enabling 
power structures. 
Hence, trust is understood to be a multifaceted phenomenon. It is conceptualized as 
being a multimodal and multi-spatial subjective practice comprising cognitive, 
affective and behavioral processes (see e.g. Lewis & Weigert 1985; Solomon & 
Flores 2001) and influenced by the individual social actors’ sense-making processes 
(practical sense), which in turn are influenced by the individuals’ prior experiences 
(habitus), the relationship itself (situated relational practices), and the various 
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contexts (fields) these take place in. Hence, trust is not simply a conscious practice, 
but rather influenced by culture and emotions, and as such it is a process which is 
made sense of in hindsight when interactants speak about fairness, openness, 
reliability, and trust in relation to their experiences of multicultural leadership. 
When interactants openly discuss work-related critical incidents, both with each 
other and with me in the role of the researcher, I understand them to exemplify 
trusting behavior towards each other and me. 
In order to tap into the interactants’ understandings of trust as a reasonable practice 
in leader-employee relations, qualitative exploratory and semi-structured interviews 
were conducted (see figure 6). Choosing this mode of data collection meant that the 
interactants were relatively free to talk about their experiences of trust and trust 
building in leadership as it occurred in their daily work life. Yet, in order to research 
the influence of culture on trust building between leaders and their interactants, most 
of the interviews were semi-structured. Thus, interview guides had been prepared 
prior to the interviews. The interview guide was not based on very concrete 
questions but rather contained keywords and subject areas which had to be 
addressed in order to shed light on trust in the context of multicultural leadership. 
The keywords derived from literature on trust, leadership and culture, and were 
furthermore adjusted to the pressures of the field, i.e. information gained from 
continued observations and interviews at ESAG. As a consequence, following the 
hermeneutical approach, the interview guide changed slightly from interview to 
interview as new knowledge about the phenomenon of multicultural trust building 
was gained. For example, when I learned that ESAG’s subsidiary employees with 
Turkish backgrounds actually considered themselves to be bicultural, I asked for 
more detail into their perception of culture and its possible influence on their 
relation with their leaders. At the same time, the theoretical framework was adjusted 
as well. For instance, the aforementioned example led me to read literature on 
biculturalism which resulted in me paying special attention to the interactants’ 
cultural habitus. Additionally, depending on the organizational positions taken by 
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the interviewees, the interview guides were slightly different from each other; yet, in 
all interviews, four broad issues were covered:  
1) The interactants’ professional and personal backgrounds, current role and 
position in ESAG, and their orientation regarding the work and cooperation 
between HQ, intermediary leaders and sales subsidiaries. 
2) Questions addressing the relationships and interactions between leaders and 
their so-called ‘followers’, i.e. with whom, why, how often, how, and 
where these interactions took place and how they have developed over 
time.  
3) Questions related to the topic of culture, including if and how the 
interactants perceived cultural differences and how these influenced their 
interactions with the perceived culturally other. 
4) Questions focusing on the topic of trust, including what is understood by 
trust, what interactions and practices foster or hinder trust and how their 
trust-relationships had developed over time, including questions as to why 
this development happened as it did within the leader-employee 
relationships. 
 
According to Kvale (1996:6), a semi-structured interview is ”(…) an interview 
whose purpose is to obtain descriptions of the life world of the interviewee with 
respect to interpreting the meaning of the described phenomena.” Employing semi-
structured interviews rather than structured interviews, provided me to stay flexible 
in regard to what questions to ask, which follow-up questions to pose, and when to 
ask probing questions to obtain more detail. For example, I asked the HR-manager 
to clarify what it meant by working according to the matrix structure. Besides 
providing flexibility, semi-structured interviews are also a means to make the 
interactant “reflect on the processes leading up to or following from an event” as 
asserted by Bryman (2004: 281). These aspects not only allowed me to gain a better 
understanding of how the interactants of this study interpreted their ‘reality’ at 
ESAG but it also enabled me to follow up on emerging topics for example the issue 
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of internal promotions at ESAG. All interviews were taped; the exploratory 
interviews at the beginning of the study were partly transcribed with parts written as 
summaries and almost all semi-structured interviews were transcribed verbatim. 
Since in this thesis the purpose of transcribing the interviews was to extract meaning 
of the interactants’ statements, rather than a linguistic analysis, I employed a 
relatively basic transcription approach. Yet, in order to stay as close to the spoken 
language as deemed necessary to extract the interactants’ meaning, communicative 
features such as longer pauses and expressions of emotions made along with the 
spoken word were transcribed. The figure below depicts the codes used in the 
transcripts. 
Code used Meaning of code used 
Q The interviewer 
A The interactant 
… Short pause, less than 3 seconds 
[x sec. break] Longer break of x seconds 
[? 45:33] The words spoken at recording time 
45:33 have not been understood 
[A slight laugh] The content of squared brackets explains 
what movements or other audible 
incidents happened during the interview 
Figure 7: Overview on codes used in transcripts 
Seeing that interactants may say one thing and do something entirely different, I 
triangulated interviews with overt participant observations. 
  
120 
 
4.3.3 Qualitative observations  
As mentioned in the introduction and chapter 2.3.6 (conceptualizing intercultural 
trust), the meaning of trust may differ across cultures (Lane & Bachmann, 1996; 
Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006), i.e. the construction of trust may also differ across cultures.  
In other words, there may be a variety of cultural processes which could foster trust; 
yet, they differ between people as their way of making sense of certain interactions 
and contexts differ. The best way to get a deeper understanding of the diverse 
contexts, interactants, and cultural processes is to ask questions about these issues 
but also to experience the settings myself. Thus, I spent time together with the 
interactants and learn about their daily-life environments; in other words, besides 
conducting qualitative interviews, collecting observational data would further 
enhance my understanding of the cultural processes related to situated relational 
trust building. 
As visualized in figure 6 (Overview of data collection), between December 2012 
and December 2014, I spent a total of 42 days at the case company’s department of 
Ethnic Sales. During this time, I moved back and forth between four different sites 
(the company’s headquarters and three of its subsidiaries), and after each field trip I 
left for home. Furthermore, I used all time spent for interviews, to also gather 
observational data and thus, over time, managed to get close to some of the 
interactants; so close that some of them would even invite me to their homes. Thus, 
to a high extent I managed to gain their trust which enabled me to get valuable in-
depth data. 
In sum, this study adds features of ethnography to a case study design. According to 
Smith (Smith, 2005:145), “[t]he ethnographer is the one who’s looking, asking 
questions, wanting to discover what people are doing and how people are putting 
things together.” In other words, observations and interviews are the main methods 
of data collection resulting in thick descriptions aiming at interpreting social life 
from the perspective of the interactants. Using an interpretivist approach to the 
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research, however, meant that I became the primary research instrument of my own 
study. This has had certain implications for the processes of data collection and 
analyses. One of the main consequences has been to reflect on the reflexivity of my 
work. In other words, my own personal, cultural and professional background not 
only influenced how I interacted – and built trust - with the members of the 
researched organization but they also affected how I approached this research. In 
order to tackle the issue of ‘researcher reflexivity’, I choose to work according to 
Alvesson & Sköldberg’s (2011) hermeneutic approach which had certain 
implications for the researcher-researched relationship which is discussed in the 
following section. 
 
4.3.4 The relationship between the researcher and the researched 
A direct consequence of the above mentioned ‘close encounters’ between the 
subjects of investigation and the researcher is that this research has to be understood 
as a constructive process.  This means that as a researcher, I interacted with the 
people and the context to be researched when being in the field. Thus, the process of 
data collection undoubtedly has been tainted by collective sense-making processes 
on both the side of the researcher and the researched. Hence, any data collected in 
this fieldwork has to be understood as a common construction of meanings between 
the researcher and the researched. Consequently, in line with, for example, Perry 
(2012) and Andersen & Andersen (1984:328) who refer to Argyle & Dean (1965), 
and Ickes et al. (1990:732) I use the term ‘interactant’ rather than ‘informant’ to 
refer to all the organizational members I engaged with during my fieldwork. 
Choosing the term ‘interactant’ makes it more clear that all ‘information’ gathered 
was a result of interactions and collaborations in a social context which resulted in 
collective sense-making rather than in a ‘one-way information sharing process’. For 
example, when looking back on experiences made during fieldwork, I had many 
encounters with the organizational members which were not about information 
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gathering as such. I spent, for instance, many hours in informal conversations, either 
during coffee and lunch breaks, at dinner or while traveling together. During these 
informal interactions we primarily would speak about personal experiences made 
outside the work-setting. An important aspect for me throughout these conversations 
was to be as open as possible in regard to information about my person, my past 
experiences and my future aspirations. It can be said that these face-to-face 
encounters helped me to get to know the interactants and vice versa. Thus, informal 
interactions became a tool to foster trusting relationships in which the interactants 
learned about me, and I about them. Hence, the innumerable hours of informal 
interactions characterized by openly giving and taking information seemed to be 
well spent as they nurtured trust between the interactants and me. This trust in turn 
enabled me to get close to the interactants, so close that I even got invited to a 
wedding. 
 
Yet, this two-way communication style was not only present in informal interactions 
but also during sessions of data collection. Especially interviews and observations 
carried out in the second year of my research were clearly characterized by 
interactions and not that much by me getting simply informed by the ‘informants’. 
For instance, during a one-day meeting in September 2013, interactants involved me 
in a discussion on possible changes in their marketing strategy. Moreover, at the end 
of several interviews, interactants made suggestions as to how my findings would 
improve their everyday working life.  What is more, some interactants would speak 
openly about quite challenging work-related encounters which visualized the context 
of their work very well. 
  
In sum, it seems that using the term ‘informant’ for ‘my subjects of research’ does 
not mirror the experiences made in my fieldwork; neither does this expression 
reflect the two-way processes of collective sense-making and meaning construction 
prevalent in the interviews, observations, and analyses carried out in this study. In 
order to signify these processes, I decided to use the expression ‘interactant’ when 
referring to those organizational members I interacted with during my fieldwork. 
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4.3.5 Data analysis 
Following a hermeneutic approach, data collection and data analysis were developed 
together in an iterative process as explicated earlier (see section 4.3.1). Broadly 
speaking, the obtained data was analyzed, i.e. should be made sense of, as soon as 
possible, both in its own right but also in relation to the whole. Therefore, I listened 
and re-listened to the interviews, and read and re-read the interview transcripts and 
field notes in order to understand what issues and topics the interviewees and 
interactants touched on in relation to how they understood and experienced trust 
building at ESAG, the case company. During this early and continuous process of 
data analysis, I worked with manual ad-hoc coding. This coding style fits very well 
with the hermeneutic approach as outlined by Alvesson & Sköldberg (2011) as it 
begins by applying a predetermined list of codes to judge a researcher-generated 
proposition, i.e. my preunderstanding of trust building in the context of 
multicultural leadership. The codes were developed from a theory/prediction 
regarding what would be found in the data. However, this part of first cycle coding 
also included the first steps of causation coding.  According to Miles et al. 
(2013:79), causation coding “discern[s] motives, belief systems, worldviews, 
processes, recent histories, interrelationships, and the complexity of influences and 
effects on human actions and phenomena.” Thus, this coding style extracts attributes 
or causal beliefs about how and why particular outcomes come about, and hence can 
be used to map a process as a CODE 1 > CODE 2 > CODE 3 sequence. 
However, the proper coding of all data collected did not start before the winter of 
2014, i.e. after almost all the data had been gathered. Using NVivo 10, all data were 
once more coded according to the first cycle mentioned above (ad-hoc coding and 
causation coding), while also including attribute coding, i.e. the coding of basic 
descriptive information such as fieldwork setting and participant characteristics. 
Following this first cycle, I aimed to find reoccurring patterns in the codes that had 
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been created so far. In other words, similar codes were clustered together to create a 
smaller number of categories or pattern codes. This step marked the beginning of 
the second cycle of codes. Thereafter, the interrelationships of the categories with 
each other within each case (leader-employee relation) and across all cases (across 
the subsidiaries and HQ) were constructed in order to develop higher level analytic 
meanings for the propositions of obstacles, enablers and critical success factors, and 
thus for changes in situated relational trust building in leader-employee relationships 
over time. 
To achieve this holistic understanding, I adopted the aforementioned hermeneutic 
approach incorporating an adapted version of Bourdieu’s field analysis since “the 
field is a critical mediation between the practices of those who partake of it and the 
surrounding social and economic conditions” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1996:105).  
According to Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1996:104f), a field analysis is 
comprised by the analysis of three interrelated levels of analyses:  
First, one must analyze the position of the field vis-à-vis the field of power. (…) 
Second, one must map out the objective structure of the relations between the 
positions occupied by the agents or institutions who compete for the legitimate form 
of specific authority of which this field is the site. And third, one must analyze the 
habitus of agents, the different systems of dispositions they have acquired by 
internalizing a determinate type of social and economic condition (…).  
In relation to this study on trust, I conceptualized the case company ESAG as a field, 
seeing that according to Bourdieu (2005:197) “the firm (…) in reality, itself 
functions as a field.” In that sense, the first level of analysis can be understood as 
analyzing the relationship between ESAG and the economic and political systems of 
society. In regard to this study, the first level analysis would thus have to explore 
what is expected of this business and how it is organized and what does it aim at; 
thus, this level of analysis would reveal what is valued and legitimate. At the second 
level, the different agents and subfields within the field of ESAG have to be 
analyzed in terms of their position within the entire field of ESAG. The third level of 
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analysis is directed to the individuals’ habitus involved in the field of ESAG. In this 
study on trust, I focused mainly on level 2 and 3 when analyzing how the 
organizational members’ habitus (level 3) influenced their practical sense of trusting 
and their positioning at ESAG (level 2).  Furthermore, the individuals’ habitus were 
linked to the socio-cultural structures of their upbringing on a societal level and the 
legitimate ways of acting within it. The relation between the field of ESAG and the 
powers of the economic and political fields (level 1) were not addressed in depth, 
yet described through the notions made by this study’s interactants.4 
Arguably this study’s analysis of trusting in the field of ESAG inspired by 
Bourdieu’s tools of field analysis fits well with an overall hermeneutic approach. 
Seeing that Bourdieu’s field analysis aims at understanding the interplay of habitus, 
capital, the field and the meta-field of power, the hermeneutical approach seems to 
present a relevant method to gain a better understanding of the relationship between 
these elements in order to understand the possible relationship between what 
Gadamer (2004:189) calls the parts (the individuals’ habitus) and the whole (in this 
case the field of ESAG). 
 
4.4 Ethical Considerations 
Any research faces ethical issues concerning the protection of the given study’s 
interactants (Miles et al. 2013). As mentioned above, interactants of a given study 
should be informed about the research process and its purpose. I ensured this in two 
ways; first, the case company was informed about my research and second, each 
interview was initiated by a presentation of my research during which I also 
promised to respect the interactants’ privacy, anonymity and confidentiality. The 
steps taken to guarantee the protection and rights of this study’s interactants were as 
follows: 
                                                          
4
 Section 5.5 in the analysis chapter presents a field analysis inspired by Bourdieu 
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First, I ensured to get informed consent in writing prior to data collection. Second, I 
informed all interactants about the research and their rights to deny their 
participation at any time during the data collection process. Third, all names of the 
interactants, the company and its products or other identifiers were kept confidential. 
Fourth, I ensured to keep research-related records and data safe and did not make 
them available to any other person. 
 
4.5 The quality and limitations of this study 
This dissertation is based on qualitative empirical data collected in a case study 
design analyzed by employing a hermeneutic approach together with a variety of 
coding styles. According to Guba & Lincoln (1982) a research such as this one 
should strive to be trustworthy, i.e. it should ensure credibility, transferability, 
dependability and confirmability. 
 
4.5.1 Quality criteria 
Guba & Lincoln’s (1982) abovementioned aspects of trustworthiness relate to the 
terms of validity (internal and external validity) and reliability (the consistency of 
measurements over time) used in quantitative inquiries. Due to the characteristics of 
qualitative research outlined above, especially the researcher’s role as the 
‘instrument of data collection’ led me to discuss this study’s quality according to 
Guba & Lincoln’s criteria of trustworthiness which I will deliberate in the following 
sections. 
Credibility 
This criterion of credibility mirrors the criterion of validity in quantitative research. 
Thus, in order to achieve credible research, the findings of this dissertation have to 
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be found credible from the perspective of the researcher, this study’s interactants, 
and the reader. 
In order to enhance this study’s credibility, I took a variety of steps: first, my use of 
data and method triangulation. In combining exploratory, semi-structured interviews 
and observations with secondary data (the organization’s internal News Magazine) 
which I gathered from multiple sources, a more complete and richer portrait of 
trusting in the context of multicultural leadership could be achieved. Second, I 
explained my assumptions in regard to the research phenomenon up front (see 
chapter 1) and clarified the steps taken in the analysis (see this chapter and chapter 
5). In addition, I used the revisits to the different research sites to present the pre-
analyses of the interviews and observations made to the participating interactants. 
Additionally, I held two feedback sessions at HQ. In both instances, interactants had 
the possibility to ‘correct’ my new-preunderstandings. In most of the cases, 
interactants shared my understanding of the phenomenon under research. However, 
in the case of the last feedback to HQ, which in turn also presented a data source, the 
finding of lack of information sharing and its impact on trusting was heavily 
debated. This debate led to a more nuanced view on information sharing issues 
which are discussed in the analysis chapter. Furthermore, the methodological 
approach and the findings were presented and discussed at various PhD workshops 
and the PhD pre-defense. In addition, I discussed my findings with professional 
colleagues in order to ensure that the ‘reality’ of this study’s interactants was 
sufficiently mirrored in the findings.  
Dependability 
The notion of dependability refers to the criterion of reliability used in quantitative 
research. Reliability is ensured if the findings made can be replicated by other 
researchers conducting a similar study. Seeing that this study is based on qualitative 
interviews and observations nested in diverse contexts, reliability is usually 
impossible to achieve. Therefore, Guba & Lincoln (1982) proposed the criteria of 
dependability which is fulfilled if the findings show consistency and are dependable 
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with the empirical material gathered. This is not to say that inconsistency should be 
excluded from the study but rather made sense of in terms of when they occur. Thus, 
the communication and documentation of all steps taken in this research, which 
Lincoln and Guba (1982) termed ‘audit trail’, are important for providing 
transparency of the study and thus enable the reader to follow the process. The 
current chapter is part of the ‘audit trail’ as it accounts for the choices made during 
this study. Furthermore, the codes used were described in detail in the NVivo 
program in order to make coding consistent. Nevertheless, due to this study’s 
contextuality, it most probably cannot be replicated by other researchers; at least the 
conclusions drawn may differ. 
Confirmability 
Lincoln & Guba’s (1982) criterion of confirmability refers to the notion of 
‘objectivity’ in quantitative research. In that sense, this dissertation has to document 
that the findings and conclusions presented are not simply an outcome of my 
subjectivity but rather are drawn from the empirical material and its analysis. 
Toward this end, the abovementioned ‘audit trail’ was communicated as well as this 
study’s field notes and transcripts which can be accessed upon request5 in order to 
judge the findings and conclusions laid out in the subsequent chapters. In addition, 
Guba & Lincoln (1982:248) assert that “one's underlying epistemological 
assumptions, reasons for formulating the study in a particular way, and implicit 
assumptions, biases, or prejudices about the context or problem” should be 
uncovered to establish confirmability, all of which are part of the current chapter. 
Transferability 
Because this study takes an embedded case-study design of 6 leader-employee 
relations in their various contexts, generalizability is neither the intended goal nor a 
feasible quality criterion of this qualitative study. According to Guba & Lincoln’s 
(1982) concept of transferability, it is up to the reader to decide this study’s degree 
                                                          
5
 Due to ethical considerations, research-related records in form of audiotapes, 
transcripts and field notes were not submitted together with this dissertation. 
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of transferability, i.e. whether and to what scope this highly contextual study of 
trusting can be transferred to another specific context. One approach to achieve 
some degree of transferability is the use of thick descriptions in which both the 
interactants’ behaviors and their contextual situations are presented which may 
indicate the relevance of the study in some similar yet broader context. 
4.5.2 Limitations 
Considering that this study follows a qualitative case study design within the 
hermeneutic approach, limiting conditions are partly related to the critique of case 
study designs and qualitative research in general. Thus, as mentioned above, this 
study’s focus has been on a relative small number of embedded cases and their 
specific contexts which makes generalizability rather impossible. Even though this 
research did not aim for generalizability, it addressed Guba & Lincoln’s (1982) 
criterion of transferability via the use of thick descriptions and detailed information 
about the contexts of this study, thereby providing the reader with information and 
knowledge about the study which may assist in judging this study’s applicability in 
other contexts. 
The key limitation, however, can be said to rest on researcher subjectivity which 
limits all qualitative studies. Therefore, the main concern in qualitative studies such 
as this one is the researcher’s bias, seeing that it influences the underlying 
assumptions, interests and perceptions brought to the research. In that sense, a 
central limitation of this study is my potential bias regarding my identification as 
belonging to an ethnic minority myself. 
In order to minimize these limitations, I first took the above measures to ensuring 
the study’s trustworthiness. Second, I tried to limit researcher bias by asking the 
interactants to comment on my pre-findings as also indicated in the above sections. 
Thus, possible bias in the analysis of transcripts could be addressed by the 
interactants thus making me aware of them.  
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5. FINDINGS: CONDITIONS, 
INTERPRETATIONS AND EXPERIENCES 
OF TRUST IN AND BEYOND ESAG 
With a sample of multicultural leader-employee relations embedded in the context 
of an ethnic sales department of a Danish SME, the purpose of this longitudinal case 
study was to discover the leaders’ and employees’ interpretations and experiences of 
trusting alongside their perceptions of why and how their trusting changed over 
time. I argue that a better understanding of the multifaceted intersections of 
leadership, culture and trust might enhance our understanding of trust as a highly 
contextual and relational process. In my theoretical discussion (see Chapter 2) I 
presented and critically discussed academic conceptualizations of trust, culture and 
leadership as well as theoretical scholarly work concerned with the connection of 
culture and/or leadership and trust. As an outcome of this discussion, I suggested 
conceptualizing trust as a situated relational process in order to acknowledge the 
complex interplay of human agency, structuring structures, and the unfolding 
situation. Hence, the concept of trust put forward in this dissertation rests mainly on 
the argument that trust is neither solely based on conscious calculations deprived of 
the influence of the socio-cultural context and structure, nor a predictable outcome 
of a given structure or a certain practice. The notion of trust put forward in this 
dissertation is grounded on the understanding that trusting as a situated relational 
practice is tightly connected with, influenced by and influencing social and 
organizational actors’ daily practices in which, for example, notions of leadership 
and culture are expressed, produced and reproduced. Hence, I conceptualize trust as 
a situated relational process embedded in the interactions of social actors, relations 
of agency and structure, and connections of past, present and future.  
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Therefore, in the following analysis it is vital to explore and describe the 
construction of trust as an ongoing situated relational practice which influences and 
is affected by the social actors’ (tacit) disposition to trust, and their (tacit) perception 
of the context, situation and relationship they find themselves in, including its range 
of possible practices. In order to analyze trust as a situated relational process, I 
explore, describe and analyze the complex and changing relationship between social 
actors’ organizational practices (such as leadership, internal communication, and 
sales practices) and sociocultural (such as group-belonging, ethnicity, culture, 
religion, etc.) as well as organizational structures (such as hierarchy, division of 
power, formal and informal organizational chains of command) as both incorporated 
and ‘objective’ structures. All of these influence trusting between leaders and 
employees within and across their respective subsidiaries and departments as well as 
beyond the company’s boundaries. Using this approach, I identify and explain which 
contextual (sociocultural), situational (interactional) and relational (relationship 
related) factors leaders and their employees perceive as enablers, hindrances or 
critical to trust, as well as how they experienced trust in the past and how they 
presently understand, evoke and practice trust in their organizational setting. As 
outlined in Chapter 3, the notions of human agency, structuring structures and 
specific unfolding relations are highly intertwined and ‘happen’ in certain contexts 
or ‘fields’ with their ‘objective’ structures, (tacit) logics and power relations, which 
offer social agents what they perceive to be reasonable and possible practices. 
Thus, I start the analysis by describing and investigating the interactants’ perception 
of their organizational context in which the respective leader-employee relations are 
embedded. In so doing I provide accounts of the organizational members’ roles and 
positions in regard to their respective organizational units as well as their 
understanding of the company’s overall structure and logics and, thus, their 
conception of what constitutes ‘reasonable and possible practices’ in the given 
organizational context. This implies that I investigate the interactants’ organizational 
‘reality’ as presented to me by ESAG HQ, and as referred to by this study’s 
interactants and observed by me. 
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In the course of analyzing the interactants’ understanding and perception of 
themselves and their relations to the others as members of a certain organizational 
‘reality’, I furthermore explain to what extent and how the interactants understand 
the relationship between their position (and the positioning of others) at ESAG and 
both their and the others’ perceived sociocultural and educational backgrounds. This 
means that I examine practices of positioning in the field of ESAG which influence 
and are influenced by certain power relations as they provide access to certain 
positions and sub-fields. 
As mentioned above and outlined in Chapter 3, trusting as a situated relational 
process is not only influenced by a given organizational context and an unfolding 
relationship, but also by the interactants’ dispositions and ‘sociocultural frames’; 
these tacitly influence justifications for trust as they effect the interactants’ 
experience of familiarity as well as their agency. Therefore, I examine how past 
experiences of trust (and leadership) made by the interactants in this study influence 
their current interpretation and experiences of trust in their respective leader-
employee relationships in particular and other organizational interactions in general.  
The abovementioned sections of analysis, thus, address the conditions for trust, the 
interactants’ interpretations of trust, and both their former and current experiences of 
trust and leadership in their respective leader-employee relations. As mentioned 
above, and outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, the order of the analytical steps is inspired 
by Bourdieu’s approach to field analysis. Although this ordering lends the analysis a 
certain structure and transparency, I highlight that the aforementioned ‘analytical 
aspects’ of trust, i.e. the conditions, the unfolding situation and the interactants’ 
agency, are highly intertwined. Consequently, while the structure of this analysis 
chapter is influenced by these three aspects, the analysis nevertheless aims to 
explore and explain the interdependencies between them. Therefore, the following 
analysis is characterized by references that span the key findings since trust as a 
situated relational practice cannot be understood by analyzing the conditions, the 
unfolding situation and the interactants’ agency in isolation from each other. 
Following the overall hermeneutical approach outlined in Chapter 4, four 
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interrelated key findings emerged from observation of six leader-employee relations 
and their narratives in semi-structured interviews, two focus group-like feedback 
sessions and hours of informal conversations over the course of 2.5 years. These 
findings are:  
 Finding 1: Diverse understandings and recognitions of ESAG’s 
inherent cultural complexity present diverse and changing conditions 
for trust. 
 Finding 2: Struggles over ‘reasonable’ practices can enhance 
familiarity and foster trust. 
 Finding 3: Embodied experiences and mutual identification can enable 
trust: the possible strengths of fragmented leadership styles. 
 Finding 4: Continued misalignment of logics and cultural othering 
present major barriers for trust. 
What follows is a presentation and analysis of these findings in order given above 
which corresponds with the order of the research questions laid out in Chapter 1: 
Findings 1 and 2 mainly address the analytical aspect of ‘conditions for trust’ and 
thus primarily provide answers to research question 1; Finding 3 and 4 address 
mainly the aspects of ‘the unfolding situation’ and ‘the interactants’ agency’ and 
provides answers to research questions 2 and 3 since they address all three analytical 
aspects of trust as a situated relational practice. As mentioned earlier, while the 
suggested structure may imply that the three analytical aspects of trust can be 
viewed in isolation, I will describe and explain their interconnectedness throughout 
the following presentation and analysis of the findings.  
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Figure 8: Structure of Analysis: The connection between Findings, RQs and 
analytical aspects  
 
In order to better understand the reality of the interactants, I draw on tools of “thick 
description” (Denzin 2001) to present a comprehensive array of experiences made 
by this study’s interactants. By employing clarifying quotations from interview 
transcripts and field notes, I aim to let the interactants’ voices be heard and thus 
present the richness and complexity of the research phenomenon. 
To ensure interactant confidentiality, I concealed names by abbreviations consisting 
of the letter “I”, which stands for ‘interactant’, followed by the ISO 2 code for each 
interactant’s national identification (e.g. DK, TR) and a number. As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, this study focuses on six leader-employee relations (IDK1-ITR1; IDK1-
Main analytical aspects 
The unfolding situation & 
interactants’ agency: practices 
between leaders and employees 
based on certain leadership 
conditions in the field of ESAG 
Conditions for trust: Context, 
structure (position), habitus 
135 
 
ITR2; IDK2-ITR5; IDK3-ITR4; IDK4-IDK3; all indicated by a solid red arrow in 
the figure below), yet also draws on interviews, informal conversations and 
observations of employees and leaders of ESAG’s three sales subsidiaries and its 
HQ. The analysis thus rests on empirical material assembled from 22 interactants 
who were located as follows in ESAG’s department of ethnic sales:  
 
Figure: 9: Overview on the six embedded leader-employee relations (solid red lines) 
in the department of Ethnic Sales at HQs and its three subsidiaries (DE-W, AT, DE-
E) 
 
5.1 Diverse and changing conditions for trust: Perceptions of 
ESAG’s cultural complexity against the backdrop of a desire for 
unity  
Even though over time we have learned how to collaborate across cultures, 
it’s still different when you suddenly have them as colleagues; then you have 
to change your mode of thinking thus: they are now a part of our 
organization. (Interview IDK1; April 2013; time stamp: 0:04:15.3-0:05:50.2)  
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ESAG was founded in the early 1980’s in Denmark. Initially, they only had one 
customer in the Middle East, but the company expanded its sales areas to include 
Western Europe and the Balkans, which resulted in a growing workforce at HQ. Due 
to a primary focus on sales activities in foreign markets, many ESAG employees 
within the sales departments have become familiar with “collaborating across 
cultures”, as expressed by IDK1 in the quote above. In order to become a key 
business player on the European food market, especially the ethnic food market, 
ESAG saw the need to establish operations outside Denmark in those countries 
deemed to represent desirable markets. Therefore, in 2000 ESAG acquired an 
Austrian supplier of ethnic food products (AT), including its workforce of primarily 
Turkish ethnic minority employees. In 2005 and 2013, ESAG established a sales 
subsidiary in the eastern (DE-E) and western (DE-W) parts of Germany, 
respectively. In order to fully access the German ethnic food market, ESAG 
employed ethnic minority Turks at these subsidiaries. Thus, as expressed by IDK1, 
“suddenly you have them (employees with a Turkish background) as colleagues”. In 
other words, ESAG’s cultural make-up became increasingly complex, which IDK1 
and others experienced as “not only working across Danish and Turkish cultures, but 
also across Danish, German or Austrian working cultures translated into Turkish” 
(Interview IDK1; April 2013; time stamp: 0:05:59.8 - 0:08:06.8).  
In this section I present Finding 1: Diverse understandings and recognitions of 
ESAG’s inherent cultural complexity present diverse and changing conditions 
for trust. As outlined in Chapter 4 and presented in figure 9 (figure above), ESAG’s 
department of ethnic sales comprises a section at HQ in Denmark and three 
subsidiaries outside Denmark, whereby one is in Austria (AT) and two are in 
Germany (DE-W and DE-E), the latter representing ESAG’s main market for its 
ethnic food products. In order to enhance its competitiveness on the ethnic market, 
ESAG’s top management decided to hire ethnic minority Turks for its sales 
subsidiaries in Austria and Germany, as mentioned above. It seems that this decision 
was understood to be indispensable as an overwhelming number of this study’s 
interactants indicated that any company on the ethnic market would need employees 
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of Turkish origin who had a specific understanding of this particular market and the 
ability to deal with potential Turkish customers to enhance its competitiveness. Both 
a leader from HQ who worked directly within the field of ethnic sales and the sales 
personnel of Turkish origin highlighted this point: 
I think it [having Turkish employees] is the key ingredient. And it has been a 
long process because we initially had the philosophy that we could sell our 
products ourselves since we knew them best. [Yes] and to some extent that’s 
correct. But if you really want to succeed, then you have to have somebody 
who understands the language and understands the culture. Understands the 
food culture, understands how our products are used [yes, yes] somebody to 
whom these things have become second nature, and thus employing Turks 
seemed obvious to us. (Interview IDK1; April 2013: time stamp: 0:04:15.3 - 
0:05:50.2) 
Apparently, ESAG’s business success seems to rest largely on its ethnic minority 
Turkish employees’ incorporated cultural capital and their ability to draw on it, i.e. 
to practice “these things that have become second nature to them”, as indicated in 
the quote above. Following that thought, IDK1 seems to indicate that the logics of 
the ethnic food market differ from other food markets as speaking the minority 
language seemed to be important and valued. In addition, employing ethnic minority 
Turks not only seems to ease the access to the desired market segments but also 
enhances customer satisfaction. 
Speaking Turkish is something our customers demand even though they 
speak German well. That doesn’t play a role, they prefer to be addressed in 
Turkish and I understand that. We are a Turkish business and have Turkish 
products. Well, why is it that we sell our product line under a Turkish name 
even though we are a Danish company? Well, it’s the market that demands it, 
so why not? (Interview ITR1; June 2013; time stamp 0:25:33.8 - 0:26:27.0) 
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In this quote, ITR1 furthermore points out that ESAG’s success is partly based on 
selling its products via a Turkish sounding brand name. Arguably, ESAG’s practices 
of employing sales personnel with Turkish backgrounds, using the Turkish language 
in sales situations, including marketing material and TV spots on Turkish channels, 
and adopting a Turkish brand name enables ESAG to appear Turkish. Not 
surprisingly, many of this study’s ethnic Turkish interactants thought that ESAG’s 
products were of Turkish origin before they joined the company and discovered 
otherwise. It seems that ESAG not only utilized (Bratton & Gold 2007) its ethnic 
Turkish workforce to get access to the European ethnic markets but they also drew 
on Turkish identity in order to position itself on the field of Ethnic Business (Kontos 
2007) which is dominated by companies owned by ethnic minorities.    
Besides having an important influence on customer satisfaction and market access, 
ITR2 pointed out that he is a vital part of the customer network as he is an 
incorporated part of each customer’s reputation, which is extremely important to the 
customers (Informal conversation ITR2; September 2014; time stamp: 0:06:48.5-
0:15:48.8), as they are connected in a more or less tight yet extended family 
network: 
When you see them, you think they could be siblings. They are related to 
each other but they are also each other’s strongest and hardest competitors. 
That is also an advantage to ESAG because when you make one of them buy 
a certain product then the others want it too. (Field notes sales meeting at AT; 
September 2013; page 10)   
Thus, it seems that ESAG’s employees of Turkish origin hold key positions in terms 
of ensuring ESAG’s success on the ethnic food market. Therefore, I argue that 
ESAG’s entire department of ethnic sales is dependent on these employees; hence, 
they seem to hold a rather powerful position at ESAG, despite them being ‘ordinary 
sales persons’. I present this assumption in greater detail in the course of this 
analysis. 
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Although it employs ethnic minority Turks at its sales subsidiaries, ESAG’s 
workforce at the Danish HQ is predominantly ethnic Danish. In addition, within the 
department of ethnic sales, but also throughout the entire company, all leadership 
positions are held by ethnic Danes with the exception of the subsidiary leader in 
Austria, who belongs to the Austrian Turkish ethnic minority. The Austro-Turkish 
subsidiary leader (ITR3) is, furthermore, one of the very few female leaders in the 
entire ESAG group; the other is IDK2, stationed at HQ. As indicated in figure 9, 
almost all leaders of Danish origin are based at HQ, with IDK1 functioning as the 
primary intermediary leader who visits the subsidiaries in Austria (AT) and the 
eastern part of Germany (DE-E) for several days about twice a month. IDK3, the 
leader of the sales subsidiary in the western part of Germany (DE-W), however, 
works as an expatriate in Germany where he is responsible for establishing and 
running DE-W. 
This short description of ESAG’s department of ethnic sales suggests that it is 
divided into an overall ethnic Danish workforce at HQ, with about 250 employees in 
total, and an overall ethnic Turkish workforce of about 20 employees at the sales 
subsidiaries. The HQ workforce appears to hold a greater share of the power since 
they represent about 90 % of the entire workforce of the ESAG group and, in 
addition, hold the vast majority of leadership positions. The subsidiary workforce, 
on the other hand, consists mainly of sales and warehouse personnel, some of whom 
have no educational qualifications as sales persons. Furthermore, some personnel, 
especially those working at the warehouse in Austria, have difficulties speaking their 
official host-country language (Interview IDE1, December 2014; time stamp: 
0:13:33.8-0:19:34.2). The analysis of the empirical material also revealed a number 
of less obvious differences between the HQ and subsidiary personnel as well as 
possible explanations for why the HQ personnel in particular assumed that ESAG 
was a ‘rather homogeneous community or family which works according to the 
same values’. 
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5.1.1 A family business with family values 
An overwhelming number of this study’s interactants presented ESAG as a family 
business and many of the leaders I interacted with had been with ESAG for well 
over 15 years and had actively helped make the company what it is today: A 
successful production and retail company in the ethnic food markets of Europe and 
beyond. Being a family business with family values seemed on one hand to mean 
that key managerial positions at ESAG were taken by family members or close 
acquaintances of ESAG’s founder and current CEO (Field notes/interview summary 
IDK4 December 2012). On the other hand, being a family business is portrayed as 
following so-called family values, as IDK4 pointed out: 
Actually, we are a family; we have family values. And that is true as well for 
some of the cultures we work with: Turks, and especially people from the 
Middle East. We have these family values: respect and collaboration … 
relationships. [Interview IDK4; December 2012: time stamp: 0:36:46.0 – 
0:37:05.2] 
In this quote, IDK4 mentions the values of respect, cooperation and relation 
building as being important family values. He also indicates that these are the values 
of those cultures ESAG cooperates with, i.e. persons and companies from Turkish 
and Middle Eastern cultures. Thus, ESAG, which understands itself to be a ‘Danish 
company’, holds values which, arguably, are also important in ‘Turkish culture’, as 
expressed by IDK4. Thus, embracing and working according to family values seems 
to be presented as an important aspect which HQ and subsidiary personnel 
presumably have in common. This notion was supported by many employees of 
Turkish ethnicity. For example, ITR13, employed at AT, mentioned that leaders or 
employees from HQ would normally ask her about her family and her own well-
being before engaging in business discussions (Interview ITR13, May 2013; time 
stamp: 0:12:53.1-0:13:51.5).  The same behavior was experienced by ITR6, 
employed at DE-E, who pointed out that Danes were far more family-oriented than, 
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for example, Germans and that she had been invited to visit her leader’s home 
during her first visit to Denmark. She noticed that the entire HQ displayed family 
values (Interview ITR6, June 2014; time stamp: 0:21:52.3 - 0:23:03.8). ITR8, 
employed at DE-W, highlighted similar experiences and even mentioned that IDK4 
and IDK1 were not only her superiors but also her “friends” (Interview ITR8, April 
2014; time stamp: 0:14:50.6-0:16:09.3). Therefore, what IDK4 called family values 
could not only be a type of ‘glue’ keeping all employees together, but could also 
function as guiding principles for all employees at ESAG, no matter where they may 
be stationed. IDK4 provided an example of the strengths of knowing and living 
these values when he spoke of his time as an expatriate in an Arabic country: 
I am safe because I know the values, and these are values I am convinced of, 
and it is a huge value-community: Well, what would [name of CEO] have 
done in this situation? He would have acted in such a manner. So, I also dare 
to act like that [Yes]. And it is these values which are a basic part of our 
leadership, and there are strong values in owner-led companies such as this 
one. [That’s right]. (Interview IDK4; June 2014: time stamp: 2:56:19.9-
3:00:30.1) 
 
IDK4 pointed out that knowing, or rather living, the company’s values gave him a 
feeling of safety; he dared to take actions before having to ask a superior for advice. 
The company backed his decisions to quite some extent. In other words, he did not 
run a high risk when taking certain actions; he was allowed, but not expected, to fail 
and he had the feeling that he could trust the company to stand behind him. IDK4’s 
statement arguably refers to the notion of “Freedom with Responsibility”, a concept, 
or even ‘philosophy’, often mentioned in Danish companies (Lotz & Olsen 2005). 
The same impression was given by IDK1 (Interview IDK1; June 2013: time stamp: 
0:55:11.3 - 0:57:49.4) and ITR1 (Interview ITR1 June 2013: time stamp: 0:32:25.1 – 
0:33:37.1). Thus, knowing the values and living the values may have provided a 
sense of security and familiarity within the company. The company culture thus 
arguably represented a form of security net for employees’ actions. In addition, it 
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could be argued that the values are part of the tacit ‘rules of the game’ and thus, 
represent the company’s “collective unconscious”, i.e. the “habitus of the field” 
(Kenway & McLeod 2004:529, cited and referred to in Özbilgin & Tatli 2005:859) 
of ESAG. 
 
5.1.2 Not that homogenous after all: Indications of cultural and 
structural differences 
While the above quotes and references propose that employees across ESAG’s 
diverse units understood themselves as belonging to ESAG’s family business and 
thus, to some extent, identified with the company and its family values, I argue that 
this understanding does not necessarily lead to an exclusive identification with 
ESAG; neither does it indicate that ESAG’s employees make up a homogeneous 
workgroup. Nevertheless, the analysis of my field notes and interview material 
suggests that especially leaders from HQ who only seldom visited or engaged in 
face-to-face communication with ESAG’s subsidiary workforce seemed to perceive 
ESAG as one overly homogeneous unit. During my field work I learnt about a 
variety of incidents which may support this assumption. For example, even though 
IDK4 was aware of the fact that the subsidiary workforce was primarily of Turkish 
origin, he decided to administer the annual personal development meetings/appraisal 
interviews (MUS samtale) in the same manner as he would at HQ with its 
predominantly Danish workforce. However, he needed to realize that the Danish 
version of development meetings could not be applied at the subsidiaries since the 
ethnic minority Turks did not perceive it in the same way as the Danish workforce at 
HQ. According to IDK4, he wondered whether the employees of Turkish origin 
would dare to criticize their superiors, a process understood to be a vital part of the 
so-called MUS interviews. He mentioned that the Turkish understanding of 
hierarchy and their ‘power-difference’ might hinder them in critically and truthfully 
reporting their work situation and their desire for improvement (Interview IDK4, 
December 2012: time stamp: 0:07:51–0:10:07). Hence, these meetings had to be 
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adjusted in order for them to make sense to an ethnic minority Turkish workforce 
(Summary/Interview ITR3, May 2013; time stamp 2:03:27.9-2:22:06.7; page 11f). 
Whereas IDK4 seemed to be convinced of culture being the decisive factor for the 
ethnic Turks having a different understanding of the development interviews 
compared to the ethnic Danes, I argue that the wider contextual circumstances 
probably also had an influence. As the unemployment rate of ethnic minorities 
greatly exceeds that of ethnic majorities (Kahanec et al. (2010)), it seems rather 
irrational for employees to challenge their superior while under the impression that 
this very practice could potentially jeopardize their job. It could be argued that from 
an ethnic minority perspective, being employed in a well-functioning company and 
receiving a decent wage represents financial security that should not be jeopardized 
by indicating discontent with a superior’s leadership style. From the perspective of 
ESAG’s ethnic minority Turkish workforce, doing just that does not present itself as 
a reasonable practice. As expressed by ITR10, it is preferable to be modest and not 
openly judgmental because being a foreigner means having to occasionally cope 
with prejudice which can be extremely distressing. Therefore, an individual learns to 
not treat others as stereotypes, but rather perceives the other as a human being 
instead of as somebody representing a certain culture (Interview ITR10; May 2013; 
time stamp: 0:13:02.9-0:13:36.1).  
Following this line of thought, it could be argued that the majority of ESAG’s ethnic 
Turkish sales personnel prefer not to criticize their work conditions and/or their 
leaders because of the power structure at ESAG and the wider societal field they 
find themselves in, even though this coincides with cultural differences. ESAG’s 
main job criterion for its sales personnel is having a Turkish background, which is 
arguably met by almost all ethnic Turks of employable age. Thus, it is conceivable 
that many of the ethnic minority Turks assume that ESAG would have no problems 
finding a substitute for them should ESAG’s management perceive them as too 
demanding or too difficult to work with. Therefore, many ethnic Turks are unlikely 
to complain about their work situation at ESAG. In other words, due to the 
unemployment structure in Austria and Germany, and ESAG’s rather unspecified 
requirements for sales vacancies, ESAG HQ with its predominantly ethnic majority 
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Danish workforce appears to hold a rather powerful position. As hinted at above, the 
differences in power coincide with the cultural or ethnic differences within ESAG’s 
entire workforce. However, even though ESAG HQ represents the most powerful 
unit at ESAG and almost all leadership positions are taken by ethnic Danish HQ 
employees, this does not mean that the ethnic Turkish minority workforce should be 
considered powerless. As the ethnic Turkish sales personnel paved the way and 
broadened ESAG’s access to the ethnic market due to their ethnic background, their 
knowledge of the market and their vast social network, they probably played a 
decisive role in ESAG’s success. However, few of them seem to be aware of this 
rather powerful position. This may be related to ESAG HQ’s focus on the sales 
persons’ embodied cultural capital and their understanding of the Turkish (food) 
culture, which, as argued earlier, does not seem to represent a scarce or unique 
resource in light of the large pool of unemployed ethnic minority Turks. However, 
in addition to their embodied cultural capital, their institutionalized cultural capital 
and social capital arguably also empower them. The fact that ESAG invests time, 
effort and money in its employees in order to educate them regarding company 
practices and using the firm’s infrastructure suggests that ESAG estimates it to be 
too costly to replace difficult employees. More crucial, however, may be the ethnic 
Turkish minority employees’ social capital in form of their memberships in 
extensive networks. For example, all sales persons indicated that they maintain 
fairly close contact with their customers, who are connected with each other in a 
type of social network. Hence, by knowing one customer, the ethnic Turkish sales 
persons gain access to this customer’s network. Therefore, it could be argued that 
the sales people’s social capital significantly enlarges ESAG’s potential customer 
group and thus may play an important role in extending ESAG’s market share. In 
addition, because the sales persons tend to be immersed in the customer network, 
and the group of ethnic Turks in general, the entire network would probably notice if 
‘one of them’ were to lose his or her job. As mentioned by ITR2, his customers’ 
reputation included him being their supplier (Informal conversation ITR2; 
September 2014; time stamp: 0:06:48.5-0:15:48.8), which could indicate that 
ESAG’s perceived image could be damaged should an ethnic Turkish employee who 
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is perceived as an essential asset of the customer group’s network be laid off. 
However, few of ESAG’s ethnic Turkish employees seemed to be aware of the 
powerful role their social capital lent them. This may be the reason why most of 
them did not directly challenge HQ’s preferred approaches to ethnic sales, but rather 
expressed their discontent to their direct superiors (ITR3; IDK3; IDK1) who, with 
the exception of IDK1, were stationed outside HQ and thus may have been better 
able to relate to their situation. Nevertheless, as I will present in the following 
chapter, a few ethnic Turks did challenge the leaders at HQ directly and thus 
arguably made HQ realize that ESAG did not comprise one overall homogeneous 
workforce. In general, however, the overwhelming majority of ESAG’s workforce 
appeared to unconsciously exclude ESAG’s subsidiary employees from their 
awareness, and thus understood ESAG to be the same as ESAG HQ; consequently, 
they probably thought of the company in terms of a homogeneous group, which may 
have caused them to use the same approaches and practices across its entire 
workforce.  
In addition to the above-mentioned idea of using the same HR tools throughout the 
company, IDK4 employed the same approach towards employee development when 
he initiated a sales course for all sales personnel in ESAG’s department of ethnic 
sales. Yet, as was the case with previous development interviews, the ethnic 
minority Turkish sales personnel struggled with the content of the sales course and 
how it was delivered. In a similar way, IDK2, the leader of sales support at HQ, also 
appeared to expect all employees to work in line with HQ logic. For instance, she 
expected all subsidiaries to wholeheartedly embrace the installation and usage of 
Axapta, a resource planning software. However, she experienced resistance from the 
Austrian subsidiary which she was unable to make sense of (Interview IDK2, April 
2013; time stamp: 0:24:16.2 - 0:24:54.6). On the other hand, IDE1 and IAT1 
explained that they needed an adapted version of the software at AT as they utilized 
an entirely different work practice and had to follow certain Austrian regulations 
(Interview IDE1, May 2013; time stamp: 0:13:32.2 - 0:14:28.4; Interview IAT1, 
May 2013; time stamp: 0:04:28.7-0:07:09.3). Based on these and other examples, 
which I will present in the following section, I suggest that even though an 
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overwhelming amount of this study’s interactants identified with ESAG as a whole, 
they also –often predominantly - identified with their respective units which 
according to the head of sales (IDK0) had to be understood as independent entities. 
In fact, regarding a sense of belonging and familiarity, which is probably based on 
shared values, this study’s empirical material suggests that there was a much 
stronger sense of unity within each of ESAG’s geographical entities than across 
these entities. The strong sense of community and familiarity at ESAG’s diverse 
entities was expressed through the interactants’ behavior at work, especially their 
methods of collaboration and communication. For instance, at all four sites (HQ, 
AT, DE-E, and DE-W) the employees engaged in a variety of informal and almost 
private conversations which often included stories about their families, weekend 
endeavors and plans for vacations. At DE-E and AT, private conversations moreover 
revolved around religious practices and rites, such as circumcision, Ramadan or 
festivities related to Turkish weddings. The working atmosphere was friendly and 
even though at times the interactants seemed to be under time pressure, I perceived 
the overall atmosphere at the offices and warehouses as relaxed. This was probably 
due to the fact that periods of focused work were interrupted by periods of good 
humor and laughter. Due to the similar architectural office design in the department 
of ethnic sales, both at the subsidiaries and HQ, all employees and their leaders were 
able to exchange eye contact during working hours and all could listen to each 
other’s telephone conversations with customers or family members. According to 
interactants at AT, DE-W and HQ, being able to hear the others was indicated as 
being essential to their work in terms of knowledge sharing and the ability to help 
each other (Observation at HQ, April 2014 and January 2015; Observation at DE-W, 
April 2014), which ITR3, the subsidiary leader of AT, explained thus: 
As I told you, we have 10 people here and we communicate all the time with 
each other. We know all about each other right down to our personal lives; 
what our kids are doing at school and so on. And at our place, problems are 
discussed and solved right away, be it personal or business related problems. 
Otherwise you cannot continue your work. And, you see, if somebody is sad 
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or sick then you simply have to act. (Interview ITR3; May 2013; time stamp: 
2:03:27.9-2:22:06.7)  
Helping each other, knowing about each other, and sharing information with each 
other, including personal information, seemed to heighten the sense of community 
among the workforce at HQ and the subsidiaries. The most essential factor for 
enhancing this sense of community seemed to be the mode, frequency and quality of 
communication. Among the workforce at ESAG’s subsidiaries and HQ, employees 
and leaders interacted openly and were friendly with each other. They spent much of 
their working time together and followed an ‘open-door policy’ (e.g. Field notes AT, 
September 2013; Field notes HQ, April 2014). In the cases of AT and DE-W, in 
particular, they often engaged in joint after-work activities such as visiting each 
other, eating out or partying together (Field notes DE-W, May 2014). All these 
activities fostered a group-feeling and enhanced, or at least maintained, a feeling of 
belonging to a certain subsidiary or organizational entity. Not only did these 
employees come to know each other very well, but in doing so they also seemed to 
identify with each other for a variety of reasons:  
a) They shared similar histories: Most of the ethnic minority Turks had grown 
up in the host-country but still lived in predominantly Turkish 
communities. Almost all employees at HQ – representing about 90% of 
ESAG’s entire workforce - seemed to be familiar with each other due to 
their similar background. Almost all of them had grown up in the same 
region and all seemed to share similar interests and an educational 
background that was related to the business sector in some respect. 
b) They shared joint embodied experiences: Employees and leaders at DE-W, 
DE-E and AT, for instance, jointly developed their respective subsidiaries. 
The same can be said for employees with longer tenure at ESAG’s 
department of ethnic sales at HQ.  
c) They shared or created common goals: Employees at DE-W, for example, 
worked towards the goal of being recognized as the sales subsidiary with 
the highest economic growth rate in ESAG. In addition, employees at DE-
148 
 
W and AT were extremely loyal towards each other while sharing a 
somewhat reserved attitude towards HQ, which was articulated in a number 
of similar expressions. 
d) They committed to mutually shared values: For instance, the employees 
and leaders at AT and DE-E shared a common understanding of a high 
level of control and its importance in delivering on time, reducing and 
learning from mistakes, and maintaining or enhancing ESAG’s reputation.  
 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the above mentioned practices and processes seem to be in 
line with Lewicki & Bunker’s (1996) suggestions of practices that strengthen 
identification-based trust or lead to what Child (1998) called ‘bonding’. Thus, 
shared experiences, values and goals have the ability to result in common 
identification and a strong feeling of familiarity, which in turn can present a 
favorable backdrop for trust (see e.g. Luhmann 1979, Möllering 2006, Lewicki & 
Bunker 1996, Frederiksen 2014). These shared experiences, however, seem 
predominantly to be made while being emerged in the same field; thus, it could be 
questioned if internal communication of goals and values would have a similar 
influence on ‘bonding’ as abovementioned shared embodied experiences. 
In summary, on the one hand this study’s interactants indicated feelings of 
belonging to ESAG as a whole, yet on the other hand they also indicated that they 
identified with other cultural groupings. Following Sackmann’s (1997:33f) 
conceptualization of cultural groups and remaining in ESAG’s understanding of 
being a family business, it could be argued that the study’s interactants belonged to 
and identified with a variety of ‘families’ which represented sub-groups of ESAG 
(subsidiary culture), transorganizational groups (professional culture), and 
supraorganizational groups (national and regional cultures such as Danish culture 
and Western and Arabic cultures, or religion). Sackmann (1997) suggests that any 
organization can be viewed as comprising a multiplicity of cultures, which is clearly 
the case with ESAG. However, in the case of ESAG, some of these groupings 
appear to coincide with each other, leaving the impression that ESAG is 
predominantly split into two quite different groups: ESAG HQ and ESAG’s 
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subsidiaries, as indicated in figure 9. The similarities of and differences between 
these two groups seem to follow a variety of aspects, which I will broadly visualize 
(see section 5.5) after the presentation of the four findings as these inform my view 
of how ESAG could be presented via an adapted version of Bourdieu’s field 
concept.  
The notions of perceived similarities, differences, belonging and identification 
outlined above are important to consider when explaining trust. As outlined in 
Chapters 2 and 3, social actors’ perceptions and understandings of situations, 
contexts and practices are always implicitly colored by, for example, their 
sociocultural, ethnic and educational backgrounds (Bourdieu 1977). In addition, the 
agents’ position within a given field influences their sense of what are possibles in 
light of their capital portfolio and the particular field’s doxa.  Therefore, perceptions 
of what presents reasonable actions and/or familiar situations or practices are also 
influenced by the social actors’ backgrounds, positions in a given field, and life 
trajectories. According to Luhmann (1988) and Frederiksen (2012; 2014), the ‘tacit’ 
process of trusting is played out against the backdrop of perceived familiarity 
because justifications for trust are made in light of a perceived familiarity with the 
Other, the situation or a certain practice. Hence, experiences of familiarity foster 
trusting while experiences of perceived senselessness present a critical hurdle for 
trust.  
ESAG’s workforce at HQ, representing about 90 % of ESAG’s entire workforce, 
presented a fairly large homogenous unit consisting of a predominantly ethnic 
Danish workforce whose members had known each other for a fairly long time and 
who understood their positions, responsibilities and the overall rules of conduct at 
ESAG (the logics of practice in the field of ESAG). This arguably heightened the 
employees’ sense of familiarity towards each other and ESAG in general. The 
subsidiaries, on the other hand, consisted of a maximum of 25 employees who were 
predominantly of Turkish heritage. Most of them had not visited HQ and did not 
know many of the HQ personnel in person (e.g. Interview ITR12, ITR13, IDE1, 
ITR14, and ITR4); neither did they know how work and leadership was practiced at 
HQ (e.g. Interview ITR12, ITR3) nor had they been informed that ESAG’s overall 
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structure resembled a matrix structure (Interview ITR3). In general, it seemed that 
employees from the subsidiaries were rather unfamiliar with a variety of aspects at 
HQ and vice versa which could be explained by a lack mutual experiences and 
internal communication. This lack of shared information, it could be said, resulted in 
a number of struggles which I present in the subsequent section together with a more 
detailed description of the aforementioned and further issues. The following section 
additionally describes and analyzes the depicted similarities and differences between 
HQ and the subsidiaries in more detail, thus unfolding ESAG’s cultural complexity 
in more detail and analyzing its influence on the perception of organizational 
practices, including trusting. 
 
5.2 Struggles over ‘reasonable’ practices can enhance familiarity 
and foster trust 
In the past we asked ITR3, ITR2 and ITR6. And if one of them came with a 
certain input, then the other said: that is wrong. (...) But, actually, from a 
professional point of view, yes, we need to know what Turkish customers 
think about a new product and how they experience it from their point of 
view. Well yes, that’s something we can check off the list because we have 
done that together with our Turkish office. But of course, you [hypothetically 
referring to one of ESAG’s ethnic Turkish employees] have not been heard. 
Well, that may be bad, but seen from a professional perspective: What is it 
actually that they can support us with? In fact, we have launched products 
which are now very successful. If we had listened to them, this would never 
have happened. “No way, that simply doesn’t function”. (Head of marketing; 
Feedback HQ, August 2015: time stamp: 0:57.50.1-0:59.59.7)  
In the preceding chapter, I pointed out that ESAG’s HQ workforce represented over 
90% of ESAG’s entire workforce. In addition, as almost all leaders were stationed at 
HQ it was the main hub for decision making. Based on this and the aforementioned 
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findings, ESAG HQ was by far the biggest, possibly most powerful, and longest 
existing unit within the entire ESAG group. Moreover, ESAG HQ had a workforce 
with a relatively long tenure that understood the tacit company policy and worked 
according to it and that was not only part of developing ESAG but, crucially, played 
a proactive role in making ESAG a success. Hence, many of this study’s interactants 
stationed at HQ perceived their working practices to be the best practices to ensure 
ESAG’s continual success. Even though I was not explicitly told that ESAG HQ 
knew best how to increase profit margin and market share, for example, it can be 
inferred from statements such as that above. In that statement, the head of marketing 
pointed out that in the past they had tried to incorporate the ethnic Turks’ opinion of 
certain products in their product development and marketing approach. However, 
they came to realize that the ethnic Turks were unable to assist in the marketing 
process as they seemed to be in conflict over what was right or wrong. Furthermore, 
past experiences had taught them that certain marketing approaches, which the 
ethnic Turkish employees had perceived as unfeasible, later proved to be 
nonetheless very successful. Hence, the head of marketing was under the impression 
that, from a professional perspective, the ethnic Turkish workforce could not assist 
him in questions concerning the marketing of ethnic food products. The above 
statement thus seems to indicate that the ethnic Turkish personnel at the subsidiaries 
was primarily meant to function in their roles as sales persons and were not to 
interfere with decision-making at HQ, a process that was to be conducted by 
professionals with ample experience and the right education, skills and 
competencies. Nevertheless, some ethnic Turkish employees and other subsidiary 
employees tried to have a say in decision-making processes that did not concern 
them ‘professionally’, as expressed by the head of marketing. For example, ITR3, 
IDE1, IDK5, ITR7, ITR8, ITR9 and ITR2 expressed the wish to be heard and 
listened to because they understood themselves to be more knowledgeable and 
experienced with the ethnic food market than HQ personnel. As I will describe and 
discuss in detail below, HQ’s reluctance to acknowledge these employees’ cultural 
and social capital in their decision making processes at times challenged trust, yet 
without negatively influencing ESAG’s overall economic success. 
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These perceived interferences, along with a reluctance to take over or accept certain 
work processes, sometimes led to struggles, such as the unwillingness to conduct 
development interviews in a certain fashion, as mentioned in Section 5.1. In the 
following I will analyze some of the struggles which emerged from the collaboration 
between ESAG HQ personnel in the department of ethnic sales and its sales 
subsidiaries in more detail. In doing so, I present and analyze the interplay between 
the organizational members’ positions with regard to ESAG and the ethnic market, 
the tools (types and species of capital) at their proposal, the perceived and 
communicated organizational culture and code of conduct, and the grounds for trust. 
Thus, in this section I present Finding 2: Struggles over ‘reasonable’ practices 
can enhance familiarity and foster trust. Struggles are understood according to 
Merriam Webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/struggle) as:  
 to try very hard to do, achieve, or deal with something that is difficult or 
that causes problems 
 to move with difficulty or with great effort 
The struggles presented and analyzed in this chapter, however, did not necessarily 
lead to incidents of distrust as they were experienced and resolved in different ways, 
as I will discuss in more detail in Section 5.3. Moreover, some of these emerged 
because they had been supported by trusting relations in the first place and may have 
been triggered by having different understandings of the situation at hand. 
 
5.2.1 Struggles over sales practices on the ethnic market 
The overruling struggle can be observed in the disagreements and discussions over 
how to approach and conduct sales practices in the ethnic market in the best possible 
way. This notion was addressed by an overwhelming majority of the interactants in 
this study, and the quote at the beginning of this chapter is illustrative. All this 
study’s interactants stated that they had the specific knowledge, skills and 
experience required to be successful traders in the ethnic market. However, the 
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overwhelming majority of employees, of both Turkish and Danish ethnicities, 
expressed that their particular approaches would be the most appropriate to enhance 
sales in the ethnic market. Thus, the ‘Turkish’ and ‘Danish’ preferred ways of doing 
business in the ethnic market and their respective approaches to increasing ESAG’s 
economic profit differed significantly. In combination with the aforementioned 
overall differences, this at times resulted in misunderstandings or even open 
struggles over the ‘correct’ and best way of reaching ESAG’s common goal of 
becoming the biggest and most influential player on the ethnic food market. Hence, 
while there was agreement regarding the business goal, there seemed to be quite 
different understandings of how to reach that goal. While the head of marketing, the 
leader of the department of product development and the head of HR embraced a 
more ‘Westernized’ approach to marketing, solicitation, sales, and employee 
development, which had shown to function within the Danish context, the majority 
of sales persons with Turkish backgrounds and a few Danish leaders pointed out that 
they had difficulties in seeing the appropriateness and suitability of these approaches 
regarding the ethnic market with its minority ethnic Turkish owned wholesalers, 
retailers and supermarkets. These different understandings have probably always 
been part of the collaboration between ESAG HQ and its subsidiaries, as also 
indicated in the above quote. However, these differences became apparent during the 
first joint employee development course for the entire sales staff in the department 
of ethnic sales, including their leaders. During the course, held at a hotel close to the 
location of DE-W, ITR5 mentioned that: “When I hear you [people from western 
European countries] talking about Western theories I simply have to laugh because 
they would not work in the Turkish context” (Summary/Transcript informal 
conversation ITR2 and ITR5 at sales course, September 2014, page 1). ITR2, 
another sales person of Turkish origin said: “We do question whether the theories 
work, we do not trust them” (ibid.). Besides sharing their doubts with me in an 
informal conversation, they also addressed the perceived mismatch of theory and 
practice to the entire audience. ITR2, for instance, pointed out: 
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You cannot make any written ‘contracts’ with Turkish supermarkets since 
that’s only in paper and pencil. The supermarket owner will do what he sees 
fit, anyway. The ‘mindset’ of the supermarket has to be changed. You cannot 
dictate what the owner is to do. The only aspect is that the owner can make 
more money by selling our products. (ITR2; Field notes sales course, 
September 2014, page 8) 
Arguably, in clearly stating his critical stance towards the proclaimed ‘best sales 
practices’, ITR2 also revealed that he trusted his leaders not to take advantage of his 
critical attitude. After all, ITR2 did not know any of the HQ staff besides his own 
leader, IDK1, and since HQ seemed to be convinced of their hitherto successful 
business practices, some HQ staff could have perceived ITR2’s statement as 
‘deviant behavior’. However, I argue that ITR2 perceived the sales course as an 
opportunity for knowledge sharing even though it had not been declared as such on 
the invitation e-mail. As ITR2 had been working within the field of ethnic sales for 
over 20 years and had thus accumulated a wealth of experience, he was an ideal 
candidate for sharing his concerns with colleagues. Apparently, ITR2 was not alone 
with his doubts. His leader, IDK1, who described himself as a sales person and who 
had also spent over 10 years selling ESAG’s goods in ethnic markets in Scandinavia, 
the Netherlands, and Germany, supported ITR2’s view while simultaneously trying 
to express the positive aspects of the ongoing sales-course, thus trying to mediate 
between the approaches preferred by both HQ and the subsidiaries: 
The Westernized methods don’t function; we have to be there and always be 
in contact; and see what works in certain places and then try to use it in other 
supermarkets as well. So, the ideas and structures have to be there in order to 
use them right away. (IDK1; Field notes sales course, September 2014, page 
9) 
Following IDK1’s statement, he himself had experienced the shortcomings of 
Westernized methods of sales and marketing when employed in the ethnic food 
market. Seeing that IDK1 held a position as intermediary leader and has had many 
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years of sales experience in the ethnic market (see section 5.3.1 for further details) 
he had learned how to adapt to the logics of doing business in the ethnic food 
markets in Europe. Arguably, HQ personnel seemed to be knowledgeable about the 
ways business was conducted in the ethnic market since they were informed by 
IDK1, IDK3 and ITR3. Yet, HQ personnel seemed to lack the practical sense to 
anticipate which sales practices would be appropriate and successful in the ethnic 
food market. IDK1 however had been working for ESAG in the field of ethnic 
business for more than a decade which is why I assumed that he knew about the 
differences between the logics of ESAG and those in the ethnic food market which 
made him mediating between them. IDK1’s approach to leadership as mainly 
‘translating HQ policies into reality’, as he called it, is described and analyzed in 
section 5.3. 
A similar mediating position was taken by ITR7, who had moved to Germany when 
he was 14 years old. After high school, he started to study marketing; however, he 
had to discontinue his studies due to family issues after he had passed the first 
degree of economics (“Vordiplom in BWL”) (Interview ITR7, April 2014; time 
stamp: 0:00:00.0-0:01:51.4). Therefore, and because he used a substantial amount of 
business terminology during our conversations, I assumed that he had greater 
knowledge of business theories commonly taught and used in the Western context 
compared to the other sales persons of Turkish heritage. On the other hand, he also 
knew the ethnic market because he had worked in ethnic sales prior to his 
employment at ESAG. This may be why his statement is quite neutral and I 
understand it to showcase his knowledge of ‘both worlds’: the mindset of the ethnic 
Turkish supermarket owner in light of ESAG’s sub-ordinate target of ‘having its 
products displayed in the best possible way’. 
The supermarket owner decides how the place is used and not the customer, 
especially because cooling-systems are expensive. When there is a gap on the 
shelf, then the issue is that this gap is re-filled with ESAG products. (ITR7; 
Field notes sales course, Sept. 2014, page 8) 
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Furthermore, it could be argued that the above statement indicates that ITR7’s 
perception of his role at ESAG is that of a mediator between the preferred Danish 
and preferred Turkish business practices. During a so-called Monday staff meeting 
at DE-W, ITR7’s statements demonstrated a similar positioning between what could 
be called ‘a Westernized or Americanized and an Eastern or Turkish business 
mindset’. The main purpose of that particular meeting was to observe the sales 
personnel’s reaction to a TV advertisement. IDK3 told me that he had a negative 
feeling about it and he needed to hear his sales personnel’s opinion. In short, the 
advertisement’s main message was expressed by its ‘headline’: Not 800 grams but 1 
kg! This message was meant to point out that ESAG’s main competitor sold 800 
grams of a certain product in cans that were slightly smaller than ESAG’s cans 
which, however, contained 1 kg of a similar product. Since the competitor’s cans 
contained only 800 grams, their price was considerably lower than ESAG’s 1 kg 
can. Thus, while the competitor’s product seemed to be far cheaper than ESAG’s 
product, this was not actually the case as the kg-price was reasonably similar. In any 
case, ITR8 and ITR9 were affected by the advertisement and said it would portray 
ESAG’s competitors as “imposters” and they, i.e. ESAG, would “make a fool of 
themselves” (Field notes, DE-W, April-May 2014; page 3). When asked for his 
opinion, ITR7 replied: “It’s not our job to test our customers’ intelligence” (ibid.) 
which I interpreted to convey his critique in a very subtle way as he did not directly 
reject the advertisement or frame it as “foolish”, but rather pointed out that he did 
not agree with its aim, which he understood to be ‘teaching ESAG’s ethnic customer 
segment’, while it instead should aim at enhancing sales. Admittedly, my 
understanding of ITR7’s statement could be wrong; however, in contrast to many of 
the other sales persons of Turkish origin, I never observed him opposing HQ’s 
understanding and execution of marketing and sales strategies, nor did he challenge 
any aspects of the aforementioned sales course. While ITR8, the only female course 
participant besides myself, seemed to be rather content with the course, the other 
sales persons had a rather negative experience. It seemed that they viewed the sales 
course itself and its agenda in terms of content and time allotted to the contents a 
result of ‘Westernized thinking’ which did not take the ‘Turkish perspective’ into 
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account. On the second day of the course, this and other issues emerged and the 
struggle over the right way of doing business in the ethnic market emerged:  
In general, the Westernized view of marketing does not seem to work with 
the Turkish segment at all as particularly the male sales persons with Turkish 
backgrounds mentioned that the presented method of product display and the 
logic connected to it are not applicable for the ethnic market. Nevertheless, 
the course instructor continues with his slides and I sort of understand his 
approach since he has no plan B to fall back on. [I wonder if he must have 
gotten the wrong information from HQ on the level of knowledge gathered 
here.]  (Field notes sales course, Sept. 2014, page 6) 
ITR5 wants to know what [name of course instructor] would suggest as a 
possible answer to yet another assignment. ITR5 continues: “So far, this is 
just a sum-up of the knowledge of our sales persons’ knowledge.” The 
instructor replies: “The aim was to heighten the level of sales methods. So, 
perhaps we started at the wrong level, one that was too low.” IDK4 
comments: “This was about knowledge sharing and speaking the same 
language, so we know what we talk about when we say ‘management of 
customer complaints’, for example.” ITR2 says: “But we had the wrong 
expectations. We had a wrong picture about this. And the same is true for 
[name the course instructor].” IDK4 replies: “This is also about finding the 
‘golden nuggets’.” ITR5 turns to all course participants asking: “Did we find 
the golden nugget?” (Field notes sales course, Sept. 2014, page 10) 
Besides giving the impression that HQ’s understanding of a course on sales methods 
differs from what the sales personnel with Turkish backgrounds expected, the last 
quote also indicates that HQ personnel had a different and perhaps somewhat 
incomplete knowledge of ESAG’s employees of Turkish origin in terms of their 
competencies and understanding of sales and marketing practices and the logics of 
the ethnic food market in general as hinted at earlier. Yet, by listing and discussing 
the diverse understandings of what comprises reasonable actions on the ethnic 
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market in terms of sales and marketing practices, the course members had the 
opportunity to learn from each other. Furthermore, seeing that many of the course 
members had never met each other before, this course provided the first opportunity 
to become acquainted on a personal basis. Both of these aspects were highlighted as 
being the main outcome of the course (Field notes sales course, Sept. 2014). Thus, it 
could be argued that the course members became more familiar with each other and 
the others’ approaches to sales and marketing at their respective locations. In fact, 
several course members discussed the feasibility of DE-E’s approach at their 
respective locations (Field notes sales course, Sept. 2014; pages 8f). The Danish 
leaders furthermore achieved an impression of the local ethnic market because the 
course instructor planned assignments on product placement which had to be 
worked on while in the field; thus all course members visited two supermarkets that 
belonged to DE-W’s customer group. Spending two days together in discussion 
arguably enhanced their knowledge of each other, which may have improved the 
grounds for trusting each other. Yet, considering that HQ personnel did not 
experience sales practices in the German or Austrian ethnic food market, they would 
probably have difficulties grasping the logics of this particular field of ethnic 
business and thus might not understand the ethnic Turkish employees’ challenges in 
transferring HQ practices to what would resemble reasonable practices in their 
respective ethnic markets. 
On the other hand, the perceived differences between the ESAG HQ’s and the 
subsidiaries’ understanding of what the sales course should have addressed and what 
it actually addressed could be regarded as problematic for a variety of reasons. 
Firstly, HQ’s leaders could be perceived as uninterested in the sales personnel of 
Turkish origin as long as they reach the agreed volume of sales. Arguably, this 
assumption was substantiated by the subsidiary employees’ mentioning of a lack of 
communication between them and HQ. IDE1, for instance, expressed this lack of 
communication along the lines of “not being listened to and thus not being taken 
seriously” (Interview IDE1, May 2013; time stamp: 0:04:48.2 - 0:05:21.0). 
Furthermore, ITR4 stressed that the lack of communication combined with a lack of 
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face-to-face contact resulted in “the leaders from HQ not knowing the first thing 
about what really goes on down here, and how hard we try to sustain this location”, 
which he then related to trust: “How can I trust them?” (Interview with ITR4 and 
IDK3; September 2014; time stamp: 0:08:15.9-0:09:50.0). While HQ personnel did 
not appear to know about how the subsidiaries perceived and understood the existing 
gap in communication, including that it might cause cynicism and distrust, they 
were, however, aware of its existence. The head of accountancy, for example, 
pointed out that “we are not good at dialogue which would help to get their [the 
subsidiaries] side of the story” (Interview head of accountancy; January 2013; time 
stamp: 24:48 – 25.27.7) and IDK0 told me that “HQ-subsidiary communication 
could be much better if we simply integrated it into our strategy, and I think that 
would bring our subsidiaries much closer to us” (Interview IDK0; September 2014; 
time stamp: 0:13:02.3 – 0:14.30.3). IDK4 expressed a similar notion when pointing 
out that ESAG’s internal communication worked very well at HQ, with every 
employee being informed about the company’s actions and status. However, this 
was not the case in the subsidiaries and he claimed that: “We are not good at 
communicating” (Interview IDK4; December 2012; time stamp: 1:08:57). The 
above statements about ESAG’s internal communication, on the one hand, indicate 
that HQ seemed to be aware of the importance of communication for enhancing a 
sense of belonging and thus, further integrating the subsidiaries into the ESAG 
group. In addition, enhanced internal communication is portrayed as a means of 
information sharing, which arguably would foster a shared understanding of the 
company’s objective structures of the given field, including its genuine rules and 
resources. Yet, at hinted at earlier, enhanced internal communication alone would 
probably not improve the organizational members’ understanding of each other’s 
situated activities (practical sense) and subjective experiences (habitus and reflexive 
agency).  
The lack of communication may have been one reason for the above mentioned 
sales course turning out not to fit the course members’ expectations, i.e. their 
practical sense. Furthermore, I argue that offering a sales course that appeared to 
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address rather basic sales techniques may have expressed HQ’s overall assumption 
that ESAG’s ethnic Turkish personnel were ‘rather uneducated’. Since ESAG’s HR 
department, i.e. IDK4, was theoretically responsible for hiring all sales personnel 
and thus evaluating whether their skill set and competencies would fit the vacant 
position, it could be assumed that he should have known about the sales personnel’s 
level of knowledge (cultural capital). However, during my field work I learned that 
ESAG did not require any particular skill set of its sales personnel of Turkish origin 
besides “speaking Turkish” (Interview IDK4; December 2012; time stamp 25:01–
26:58). Nevertheless, many ethnic Turkish sales persons pointed out that they had 
had some form of sales experience from other companies prior to their employment 
at ESAG. Hence, I assumed that IDK4 must have known about the sales personnel’s 
prior experience, at least to some extent. In any case, the abovementioned struggles 
over the ‘best sales and marketing practices’ appeared to reveal further ‘struggles’ 
related to notions of not being ‘correctly’ recognized or taken seriously, which in 
turn had implications for trust as I will discuss in detail in the subsequent sections. 
  
5.2.2 Struggles over balancing the influence of family, friendship and 
business on sales practices and internal collaboration 
In line with the above quotes, which indicate that Westernized marketing strategies 
would not make much sense to Turkish-run supermarkets and wholesalers, all sales 
persons of Turkish origin and a few leaders of Danish origin pointed out that a close, 
almost family-like contact with their customers is an important aspect to consider 
when intending to heighten ESAG’s impact on the ethnic market. ITR8 mentioned: 
“In Germany you start with doing business and at Turkish places you have to start 
with the personal things. And mentioning Denmark is not a good idea; it’s better to 
leave that out. But, of course, you have to mention our brand” (ITR8; Field notes 
sales course, Sept. 2014, page 5). Concerning the distribution of personal talk and 
business talk, a Danish leader stated that: “The important point is that you have a lot 
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of conversation with the customer about anything, and then you talk about the sales 
for 10 minutes” (IDK1). Talking about personal issues during sales work may seem 
a waste of time from a HQ perspective considering its focus on efficiency which is 
described and analyzed in the subsequent section. Efficiency, for example, seems to 
refer to closing business deals within minutes, which IDK1, based on his prolonged 
experiences made in the ethnic market, explained as rather inappropriate expectation 
of many Danish businessmen: 
I remember reading in a newspaper once, shortly after the fall of the Berlin 
wall, of how Danish businessmen went to Poland to conquer the Polish 
market. And the Danish approach was: Take a flight to Warszawa and on the 
way to the potential customer, you make a business plan on the back of an 
old newspaper. But the Pole is not like that, they take business seriously. 
They have a right to be taken seriously and to be presented with a well 
thought-through business plan. (...) I think, in general, Danes have spent 
many years not paying attention to cultural differences and to human 
interaction, which you have to get a feel for. (IDK1; April 2013; time stamp: 
0:39:05.6 - 0:43:45.0) 
 
In his position as intermediary leader at ESAG’s department of ethnic sales, it seems 
that IDK1 learned to “get a feel for human interaction”, as he put it, which I will 
describe in detail in Section 5.3. Furthermore, while being responsible for 
developing DE-E and functioning as ITR1’s and ITR2’s leader, he seemed to realize 
that personal contact was decisive in building trust with his employees – which I 
will discuss in detail in Section 5.3 – but also in closing a good deal and building 
long lasting relations with the ethnic minority Turkish retailers and supermarket 
owners. In that sense, it could be argued that not only IDK1 but also ESAG HQ in 
general realized that cultural backgrounds affected business practices and thus had to 
be taken into consideration. Apparently, they realized this because they ran into 
problems which they had not anticipated from their Danish perspective. Without 
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going into too much detail, I shall mention two issues that shed some light on the 
darker side of the ethnic market. During an informal conversation, ITR2 told me that 
he had had to collect some money from a customer whose payments were overdue 
and who then turned angry: 
“He really got angry; you could see it in his eyes. You know, we Turks can 
have a very intense gaze.” ITR2 leaned forward in his chair and looked me 
intensely in the eyes. He continued while IDK1 and I listened carefully: “His 
eyes just turned very dark and then he grabbed my shoulders and maneuvered 
me over to his car, opened the backdoors and shoved me into the back seat. 
His brother took the front passenger seat and off we drove. He drove like a 
maniac through the city, all the while shouting and expressing his anger. I 
really started praying like: If I make it out here alive, I will become a better 
person. Well, at some point we stopped in front of a city house. He went up 
to his flat where he pointed to a gym bag in a corner of his living room. It 
was filled with cash. He said: Take it and leave me alone. I grabbed the bag 
and left the flat. I was happy to be alive. So, we got our money.” ITR2 smiled 
and made himself comfortable in his easy chair. I looked at him and, 
somewhat dazed, remarked: “You are kidding me, right? IDK1, he is kidding 
me, this is not true is it?” “Yes, it is”, IDK1 answered and continued: “I did 
tell you about the incident with the customer who had been shot in his office 
and we found him there sitting in his chair by his desk, shot because he 
hadn’t paid his debts in time.” “Yes, you told me in an interview once.” I 
said. ITR2 mentioned that this market was simply crazy. (Field notes Lunch 
meeting at AT; September 2013)
6
 
In light of working in a market which can confront the sales personnel with 
dangerous situations, building close and long lasting relations between traders and 
customers can be crucial. One essential step to building well-functioning 
relationships in the ethnic market seems to be the aforementioned focus on private 
                                                          
6
 For the shooting episode see: Interview IDK1; April 2013; time stamp: 1:01:03.7 - 
1:04:07.7 
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conversations in work related practices, which all sales persons and leaders with a 
close physical presence to the field of ethnic business mentioned as being very 
important. As I will show later, spending ample business time on seemingly 
irrelevant small talk is not in line with ESAG HQ’s work attitude, which aspires to 
be ‘professional, efficient, and fast’ (Field notes; Second Trainee Evaluation; June 
2014). Therefore, ESAG HQ’s preferred methods of doing business must have been 
challenged by the sales personnel of Turkish origin who, as both customers and 
former sales persons at other companies, had actively taken part in the ethnic market 
for many years. In doing so, they presumably learned the rules and practices of sales 
in the ethnic market, which they in their role as sales persons for ESAG tried to 
convey to ESAG’s department of ethnic sales. The Danish workforce, on the other 
hand, probably had to learn these new approaches to sales, in which the most 
essential aspect can be creating a personal or almost friendship-like relationship with 
the customer. Such close relationships arguably have some advantages, such as 
gaining access to the entire network of customers as many of them are connected 
with each other or are even related to each other. Becoming part of their network 
may also function as being part of their ‘safety net’, which is an important aspect to 
consider in light of the market’s ‘darker side’. On the other hand, building a ‘close 
relationship’ with customers might result in more negative consequences as the 
customers may understand the relationship to be more like a friendship than a 
business relationship. Thus, the customer could call upon ESAG’s obligations as a 
‘friend’ rather than as a supplier of ethnic food products. Such a shift in 
identification from the side of the customer could substitute the notion of money 
with that of assistance and understanding when needed. 
The personalities are different and they are very strong in the southern 
regions and so is the solidarity within the family and the circle of friends. 
And therefore where we are, sales to the ethnics, it is also very personal. 
They call if they have a headache. You’re not simply a supplier, you are also 
a friend; you are obliged to listen to him. I could tell you stories all day long. 
I had a customer once who had to go to jail for 6 months and he was allowed 
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one phone call per week and he called me instead of his family. As a man he 
needed this strength; he needed to know that I was thinking about him, if I 
would let him down, because after 6 months he was supposed to do business 
again. Back then, he had only one shop but now he has seven and he is a 
good customer now. (…) The supermarket owners have a certain reputation 
and they do not want to lose that reputation because it’s important for their 
existence and I am an important part of their reputation and they don’t want 
to risk that. (Summary/Transcript informal conversation ITR2 at sales course, 
Sept. 2014, page 2: time stamp: 0:06:48.5-0:15:48.8) 
Thus, on the one hand, spending what might be called ‘private time’ with customers 
seems to be time well spent in order to expand the customer network and thus 
enhance ESAG’s market share. However, a few leaders, one of Danish and one of 
Turkish ethnicity, described the close relationship between sales persons and their 
customers as somewhat problematic. As some customers appeared to assume that 
ESAG’s sales persons understood and identified with them, they may have thought 
that their challenging economic situation was a reasonable excuse for not complying 
with the payment terms set by ESAG; thus, in a manner of speaking, they paid 
whenever they liked, forcing the sales personnel to collect the outstanding debts 
from those customers who were not willing or, for whatever reason, unable to pay 
their debts. ITR1 called this procedure “a hard fight” (Interview ITR1; June 2013: 
time stamp: 0:06:34.0 – 0:07:39.8), as did ITR9 and ITR6. A possible answer to how 
this ‘fight’ could be solved or even circumvented in the first place is not easy to 
find. Nevertheless, ESAG’s primary approach was to show patience and 
understanding for the customer, while also trying to make them pay nearer to the 
agreed deadline. 
IDK2 mentions: “Of course I do understand your [ITR3’s] view: the 
customer should pay on time and that is the view of ESAG, but it is our own 
fault: The job is that we all together should improve this with a lot of 
understanding and patience towards the customers.” ITR3, however, stresses 
that she believes the customer can pay, but that he is cheeky and exploits the 
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situation. ITR2 replies: “Well you should go to the wholesaler and ask about 
the customer and then you might learn that we [ESAG] get the money from 
him much earlier than all the others. I know that the customer makes trouble 
and he troubles me every day, but if we lose this customer then we lose a big 
player with a lot of influence and then we lose the market in [name of town]. 
But I don’t understand why we have to discuss this matter every quarter 
again and again. We do sell goods; it’s not that we stand still.” (Field notes; 
Sales meeting at Sub.AT, September 2013: page 8f) 
Balancing the pros and cons of being closely involved with the customer network 
(social capital) presented one of the major struggles in the relationship between 
IDK1 and ITR2. Yet, as the above quote illustrates, IDK1 approached this and 
similar struggles with an overall compromising attitude that appeared to be part of 
his preferred leadership practices, as I will discuss in more detail in the subsequent 
section (Section 5.3). The above quotes present the ethnic market as a rather harsh 
working place with internal logics that differ from those found in non-ethnic 
business sectors, where MNCs such as Nestlé would be the market leader (Interview 
IDK4; December 2012; time stamp: 1:16:16). While players in the field of non-
ethnic business trade follow signed contracts, and thus in the case of a breach could 
file a suit, trade in the ethnic food market is less restrained as the ethnic minority 
Turkish customers and retailers do not necessarily rely on and follow contracts. 
Although they fear sanctions as a result of a contract breach (not meeting conditions 
of payment or national food laws), they also rely on their tightly-knit network 
(social capital) to help them, as IDK1 experienced several times. He told me a story 
of an ethnic Turkish owner of a supermarket chain who breached the Austrian law 
on statutory shop opening hours and was therefore forced to close down all of his 15 
supermarkets at once. His extended family members also worked within the ethnic 
food business and were normally in fierce competition with each other. However, in 
this situation, they helped out, saved the products with a short BBD (Best Before 
Date) and paid his fine (Interview IDK1; April 2013; time stamp: 0:48:44.2 - 
0:53:10.0). To IDK1 this was an experience that demonstrated how different the 
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ethnic food market functioned in comparison to the non-ethnic food markets he was 
accustomed to working with. In this dissertation, this example, alongside the 
abovementioned quotes and thoughts, leads me to suggest that trust between 
ESAG’s leaders and their employees might be difficult to develop if one has not 
experienced the other’s societal and business contexts (subfields). As hinted at, 
ESAG’s sales personnel need to find a balance between ‘belonging to ESAG and 
belonging to their extended family or network of friends’ on a daily basis (Field 
notes; Sales meeting AT; September 2013; page 9). The sales personnel’s’ constant 
shifting of belonging or identifying seemed to be known to their direct leaders 
(ibid.). Therefore, both partners – the leader and the employee – know that the sales 
persons constantly find themselves in an identification process which, broadly 
speaking, revolves around balancing their belonging to the extended family who 
might need their help and understanding (Summary/Transcript informal 
conversation ITR2 at sales course, September 2014, page 2: time stamp: 0:06:48.5-
0:15:48.8) with being loyal to the company and trying to collect outstanding debts 
despite being very close to the debtors and knowing that they should be fulfilling the 
debtors’ expectations of them as ‘friends and family members’. Therefore, I claim 
that in this special case the conditions or grounds for trust are not that easily framed 
by the organization’s framework, its rules of conduct, or its ‘value set’ as outlined in 
Section 5.1. Considering that the sales persons’ range of actions (reasonable 
practice influenced by the doxa of the field) not only is influenced by the 
organizational structure and the employees’ position within ESAG but also by their 
position in the broader societal context seems to indicate that the ethnic Turkish 
sales personnel had to enact strategies which would secure them their position in the 
field of ESAG as well as in the broader societal field. Hence, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that social agents who find themselves maneuvering across two overlapping 
fields may enact what Emirbayer & Mische (1998:994) called “contextualization” 
which as outlined earlier (see section 3.2.5) entails a rather strong focus on 
“reflexivity” leading to “deliberative decision making” (ibid.). 
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Furthermore, as subsidiary employees do not seem to be familiar with ESAG’s rules 
of conduct and ‘value set’ (i.e., the field’s illusio), I claim that trust-building 
between HQ and subsidiary employees probably does not emerge from common 
conditions for trust in the sense that all organizational members more or less adhere 
to or are socialized into a common organizational logic of ‘how things are done 
around here’. Rather, there appear to be quite diverse understandings of what 
resembles reasonable business practices when working in the field of ethnic sales. 
In other words, I argue that employees at HQs and those at the subsidiaries in 
general committed to a somewhat different illusio, i.e. the tacit belief in a given 
field’s values, its game and its stakes. This probably also led them to assign different 
understandings to the notion and value of ‘efficiency’ which I turn to in the 
following section. 
 
5.2.3 Struggles over the meaning of ‘efficiency’ 
The understanding of what constitutes efficiency and how it should be practiced is 
yet another example of ‘struggle over best practices’. As hinted at, forming close 
connections with customers can be an efficient method of developing a customer 
network which would ultimately enhance ESAG’s growth in the ethnic market, 
although it could and did indeed cause the challenges mentioned above. 
Nevertheless, such a personal and time-consuming approach could represent an 
efficient business practice at least from the perspective of ESAG’s ethnic Turkish 
sales personnel. However, another contrasting interpretation of efficient business 
practices was found to influence internal collaboration which was particularity 
salient in IDK2’s employee relationships. For the only female leader in ESAG’s 
department of ethnic sales, IDK2, efficiency (maintaining and pursuing economic 
capital) is primarily about being a fast multitasking worker and working in a 
transparent and efficient manner, qualities which in her opinion are lacking in many 
employees of Turkish origin. For instance, IDK2 expected all ethnic minority Turks 
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working in sales support functions to reduce paperwork as much as possible and 
instead to learn how to use a modified and adjusted version of Axapta (a resource 
planning software). However, even though she tried to impose or teach them her 
version of ‘efficiency’, she had to discontinue because of what she framed as part of 
the Turkish culture, namely ‘resistance to change’ and ‘perfectionism expressed in 
double-checking and control’: 
Those in the warehouse (...) do, of course, count the number of articles, but 
everything is counted again and checked again by the office personnel. That’s 
another issue I cannot make sense of, but really that is not the way I would 
like to work; but that, uhm, since I work much with efficiency I really think 
they work in totally the wrong way down there [at Sub AT]. But here I am 
also forced to say that this is due to their culture. There are simply things we 
cannot change. (...) That’s simply how they do things. And then, uhm, they 
were supposed to … they should be connected to our Axapta … that’s also 
been a tough job because they, uhm, they do not really like changes, don’t 
like to change things and we had to fight hard against their negative attitudes 
towards that. So, they have ... this has been kind of a hard nut to crack. And 
then I have just been down there again and that’s a kind of follow-up to the 
things they are supposed to do. They still prefer to use paper and pencil and 
such manual things and that is simply ... well, we have left such things behind 
ages ago, right? You simply ought not to do this. So that was to ... to make 
them become more efficient, as efficient as possible when I was down there 
again. [her voice takes on an annoyed tone]. So, uhm, ... but they are very, 
the Turks down there, they are much more controlling, they check 
everything, simply double-check everything. And that is exactly something 
that I calculate will never pay off. There are few mistakes happening. Then 
you have to deal with the mistakes that happen and set them right when they 
appear. There is nothing more to that. But, uhm, .. they have very much the 
attitude that everything has to be perfect. (Interview IDK2; April 2013; time 
stamp: 0:11:49.5-0:15:25.5) 
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Following IDK2, the subsidiary personnel tended to engage in work practices which 
she considered to be rather inefficient. Yet, she also seemed to have realized that she 
could not change all of the work habits practiced at the subsidiaries. Rather than 
engaging in many struggles at the same time, she seemingly managed to choose her 
battles wisely and only engaged in those she found to be important for the 
company’s further economic success. The struggle over the implementation of 
Axapta was for instance one that had to be ‘won’. Concerning the issues mentioned 
by IDK2, the employees of ethnic minority backgrounds pointed out some 
alternative interpretations of the same disputes. In regard to what extent Axapta 
should be used and adapted, IDE1 stated that: 
Last year, we had a major change in our system. We have been, how to say, 
we have been connected to the ESAG-Server (...) Our requirements are 
different from those in, for example, Romania or Denmark (...) and it has 
been hard to explain to them [ESAG HQ] what it is we need and to make 
them understand why we need it. It was always like, uhm, and that really 
annoyed me, that they asked over and over again: Why do you need that, do 
you use it correctly, and do you really need that and so on. I work always 
with it and I need it to do my work, please believe me, it’s true we really 
need it. (...) You cannot, for instance, apply rules - I call them rules - which 
fit the Danish key accounts to my small customers or my detail businesses; 
that doesn’t work. There we, uhm, we needed a lot of changes, and you had 
to justify each and every change, you had to: Why is it they want this and 
why and why and why and why and why, and, how to put it, I simply reached 
my limits. That has been very hard. (Interview IDE1; May 2013: time stamp: 
0:13:32.2- 0:15:11.5) 
 
Regarding IDK2’s observation that the Turkish ethnic minority employees used to 
“double-check” everything, a process she found rather inefficient, ITR1 described 
that strategy as important for two reasons: Not losing any of ESAG’s money 
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(economic capital) and maintaining his and ESAG’s reputation (symbolic capital) as 
an honest company which upholds its promises:   
We have to be sure about our customers and they should also be able to trust 
us. If I promise a customer a certain price and afterwards I realize that I have 
miscalculated it, then it harms us because if I have promised him that price, I 
have to stick to it. Or if I have promised to deliver the goods by tomorrow, 
then the goods have to be there tomorrow because he has promised his 
customers that he will have the merchandise tomorrow. That’s what I mean. 
(Interview ITR1; June 2013: time stamp: 0:53:25.0 - 0:56:53.7) 
 
In combination with ITR2’s earlier notion of the ‘customer network’, it could be 
considered efficient to not lose one’s reputation with a customer, as this ‘mishap’ 
might easily spread across the customer network. On the other hand, IDK2’s 
interpretation is also reasonable since double checking costs time that could be used 
on other tasks. IDK2’s disaffirmation of extensive control and her attitude towards 
mistakes as something you would “set (…) right when they appear” (Interview 
IDK2; April 2013; time stamp: 0:11:49.5-0:15:25.5) indicate that making mistakes is 
something that can happen and which ESAG employees are not ‘punished for’. 
Making mistakes is portrayed as being an expected part of doing business. As stated 
above, most of the subsidiary employees, however, worked towards avoiding any 
mistakes. Making mistakes that could directly affect ESAG’s customers was 
portrayed as potentially damaging the company’s reputation due to the fact that 
ESAG’s customers were tightly connected with each other; thus, these could 
theoretically hear about the ‘mistake’ and then use it ‘against ESAG’ when, for 
example, negotiating prices or extra merchandise. Hence, checking the goods with 
regards to correct labeling, amount, price, packaging, BBD, etc. prior to shipping 
made sense as seen from the subsidiary employees’ perspective.  Thus, it could be 
argued that the subsidiary employees invested time, which arguably represents 
economic capital in order to enhance or at least maintain ESAG’s symbolic capital 
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as well as their own and ESAG’s social capital in form of close customer ties. In 
turn, ESAG’s enhanced symbolic capital in form of its reputation would ensure all 
employees a continuous income, i.e. economic capital. Thus, as is the case in any 
field (see section 3.2.2), different types of capital can be mobilized and converted 
into other valued forms of capital as I will describe in further detail in section 5.3.  
Turning back to the issue of double-checking, it seemed possible that IDK2 
observed this practice when assisting in installing and learning the Axapta software 
at AT. As indicated above, IDK2 seemed to have interpreted this practice as 
resembling close control. This, however, did not seem to be the case. According to 
the interactants at AT, they tended to assist each other and learn from each other 
rather than controlling each other, which ITR10 expressed in the following way: 
Everything I do here I have learnt from my colleagues [at AT]. Without their 
help, I wouldn’t be where I am today. Lastly, you have to learn for yourself 
and find out what’s important and what’s not, but if you are unassisted you 
stand there like a duck in a thunder storm (allein im Wald). (Interview 
ITR10; May 2013; time stamp: 0:35:43.5-0:36:31.1) 
 
Yet, during my field work at AT, I observed a combination of assisting, helping, and 
working independently, but also practices that could be framed as ‘double 
checking’, to use IDK2’s expression. For example, ITR10 in particular would report 
many of his actions to ITR3, the subsidiary leader (Field notes AT; December 2014; 
page 3). While this could be framed as ‘control’, I understand it to be more along the 
lines of a practice that is influenced by a combination of the more pronounced 
hierarchy at AT and ITR3’s diverse roles at this subsidiary. ITR3 not only 
functioned as AT’s subsidiary leader, she also worked as the main sales person for 
AT’s detail business as well being responsible for product procurement. As ITR10 
was responsible for warehouse and order management (Interview ITR10; May 2013; 
time stamp: 0:00:11.6-0:02:46.8), he needed to communicate more often with ITR3 
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to efficiently coordinate the flow of products without having to constantly rearrange 
them in AT’s warehouse. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that especially the ethnic 
minority Turkish employees conveyed a working attitude which IDK1 called “a 
German business behavior translated into Turkish”, i.e. according to IDK1 they 
embraced the notion of “Ordnung muss sein” (Interview IDK1; April 2013; time 
stamp: 0:05:59.8 - 0:08:06.8). It may have been primarily this attitude which caused 
IDK2’s irritation with regards to what she considered inappropriate business 
behaviors, i.e. still using pencil and paper, still making copies and filing them in 
lever arch files, double-checking and not having learned to use the computer 
effectively, to mention a few. Hence, it could be argued that IDK2’s struggles over 
best internal business practices might have, to some extent, been caused by ‘cultural 
differences’ as she claimed. However, especially regarding the notion of ‘double 
checking’ they may also have been caused by AT’s organizational structure and 
small size, which meant that ITR3 held three positions. Most importantly, however, 
with the exception of IDK1, HQ personnel were situated far from the ethnic market 
and were only seldom physically present in that market, i.e. when they visited the 
subsidiaries in person or spent some time with subsidiary personnel at the offices 
and, especially, in the field with the customers. Therefore, I claim that they lacked 
an in-depth understanding of how the subsidiaries’ close position and connections to 
the ethnic market made ‘control’ a rather reasonable and efficient practice. On the 
other hand, since the majority of the subsidiary employees had never been to HQ 
they probably did not understand how and why IDK2 experienced certain practices 
to be more efficient than others. In addition, IDK2 struggled with ITR5’s 
interpretation of ESAG’s approach to balancing private and business related 
practices during work time as well has his, perceived, excessive use of speaking 
Turkish at HQ. Both of these struggles appear to refer to ITR5’s problems of 
learning and adjusting to ESAG’s approach to working within the confines of 
“Freedom with Responsibility”, as I will further discuss in Section 5.4. As ITR5 was 
the first trainee at HQ with Turkish heritage, he struggled to learn ESAG HQ tacit 
rules which, according to IDK4, are not meant to be written down: 
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IDK4 points out that they don’t want to introduce rules on when to do what 
and for how long. Rather, everybody has to find out for themselves based on 
the experiences made at the company. (Field notes: Second Evaluation 
Interview at HQ; June 2014; page 1) 
 
In summary, the struggles above revolved around different understandings of what it 
means to work within the confines of “Freedom with Responsibility” (the field’s 
illusio), how to understand and practice “business efficiency” (economic capital), to 
what extent and in what ways ESAG should employ the software system (Axapta), 
and to what extent and in which situations one should draw on one’s cultural tools 
such as language proficiency and the practicing of customs (embodied cultural 
capital). As mentioned on several occasions, these struggles seem to relate to the 
first finding (see Section 5.1), which presented the perceived differences between 
ESAG HQ and its sales subsidiaries in terms of overall structure, work practices and 
logics. I argued that these differences tend to mirror ESAG’s division into what 
could be called a predominantly ethnic-Danish and a predominantly ethnic-Turkish 
part, which coincide with the subfield ESAG HQ and ESAG sales subsidiaries, 
respectively; the former is embedded in a national Danish context and the latter in 
national Austrian and German contexts. Taking finding 1 into account, the overall 
struggles over best practice as outlined in this section might refer to the key 
challenge of balancing the ethnic Danish and ethnic Turkish preferred ways of doing 
business. In other words, how and to what extent should the logics of the 
predominantly ethnic-Danish and the predominantly ethnic-Turkish part be 
consolidated, if at all? Either way, it could be argued that these struggles emerged 
due to a variety of reasons, and cultural differences could be one of these reasons. 
As indicated above, ESAG’s cultural complexity is expressed in a variety of ways. 
For example, it is mirrored in the subfields’ illusio, the distribution of capital in the 
field of ESAG, the interactants’ perception of reasonable practices, their cultural 
habitus, and their possibilities of access to powerful positions in the field of ESAG, 
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all of which I describe and analyze in the subsequent sections and further discuss in 
chapter 6.  
As mentioned in this chapter, another reason for the analyzed struggles seems to be 
the business units’ position in relation to the ethnic market, i.e. the closer the 
physical proximity and contact, the more the business units seem to have to 
incorporate or at least consider the customers’ mindsets and preferred ways of doing 
business. Broadly speaking, the analysis so far suggests that ESAG HQ has the 
opportunity to function internally similar to any other predominantly Danish 
business unit situated in Denmark. The subsidiaries, however, must balance their 
internal work practices with ESAG HQ demands and expectations, the expectations 
and preferred methods of its customers in the ethnic market and, last but not least, 
the official requirements and laws stipulated by their respective national and supra-
national authorities. Hence, the conditions for trust appear to be dissimilar as many 
leaders and their employees not only have dissimilar roots, backgrounds or 
embodied experiences (habitus), they also have a different understanding of their 
roles and areas of responsibility in ESAG (i.e., they can draw on different forms of 
capital) and seem to follow different work logics. These differences may be based in 
ESAG being a medium sized company that does not provide its (subsidiary) 
members with an overview of the company’s structure, methods of command, role 
expectations in terms of a detailed work contract, explicitly communicated areas of 
responsibility, an overall mission or vision statement, or even something that 
resembles a ‘code of conduct’. Hence, the actions of ESAG’s employees and leaders 
do not seem to be confined by one common organizational structure and logic. 
Rather, ESAG’s employees are meant to experience and learn the organization’s 
logic while being a member. Hence, they are meant to familiarize themselves with 
the company, and thus, hopefully, become part of a shared mindset, i.e. grow 
together with HQ and become part of the ‘ESAG family’. This, however, is difficult 
for the employees in ESAG’s subsidiaries due to the abovementioned reasons. 
Therefore, while stable structures, including outlined roles and rules, may present 
familiarity and thus favorable grounds for trust (Meyerson, Weick & Kramer 1996; 
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Becker 2005, referred to in Möllering 2006), these structures seem to be present 
only at each of ESAG’s units and are missing across ESAG as a whole, which can, 
but must not necessarily, negatively influence trust building between HQ and 
subsidiary employees. In any case, I argue that trusting in this study is not 
understood to be primarily based on similar conditions for trust. As the next sections 
will show, even though trusting in the case of ESAG is influenced by the 
organizational members’ backgrounds (e.g., cultural habitus) and conditions (their 
position in the field of ESAG and the broader societal field), it tends to emerge due 
to the members’ agency and their ongoing relationships, by virtue of which they 
appear to become more familiar with each other and ESAG. Thus, leaders who 
together with their employees dare to immerse themselves in the field of ethnic sales 
may have a better chance of developing and maintaining a trusting relationship. 
Moreover, these leaders and their employees arguably use emerging struggles to 
build awareness of differences, and try to act on and resolve these rather than letting 
them become serious obstacles during collaboration. Nevertheless, in order to act on 
them, they must draw on the tools available to them. Thus, they may draw on a 
combination of their social, cultural, economic and symbolic capital, and the 
material objects the context provides as well as the power structures they find 
themselves in and (re)produce. In other words, any action and leader-employee 
interaction at ESAG can be understood as being relational; it is embedded in a 
certain stable yet changeable structure and underlies tacit and explicit rules, and 
conscious and unconscious sense-making processes of the given context and 
relationship that are made against the backdrop of a certain stable dispositional 
mindset which Bourdieu called the habitus.  
The following analysis of the individual leader-employee relations further identifies 
the challenges related to ESAG’s division into subfields and the influence of other 
overlapping fields on trusting in the context of multicultural leadership. 
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5.3 Embodied experiences and mutual identification as enablers 
of trust: the possible strengths of fragmented leadership styles 
I try to stick to a Danish leadership style, the style I also use in Denmark, as 
much as possible. In Denmark we have the Danish organizational culture; we 
are very open-minded and trusting, at least here at ESAG we gloat about 
being very trusting and very little controlling. But often this is misunderstood 
by others as showing indifference. So, those I work with in Austria and 
Germany, they had a hard time understanding this. “Well, all Danes are 
always so happy, smiling, friendly and considerate. And suddenly you thump 
the table and say: Enough is enough. And we haven’t been warned at all.” 
They are used to much more control because of their upbringing, while we 
here at our place have the saying: ‘no news is good news’. And this is 
something I had to adjust to. I have to remember that I continuously have to 
exercise control and recognition towards them. It’s not enough to have 
Quarterly Meetings. So, in this case I had to adjust my way of holding a 
dialogue and had to realize that this should be an ongoing process: 
continuous reporting and teaching them that we expect them to report back to 
us so that we know where we’re standing. (Interview IDK1; April 2013; time 
stamp: 0:08:23.6 - 0:12:12.5) 
In the preceding chapter, I pointed to the perceived differences between ESAG’s HQ 
and its subsidiaries. Furthermore, I presented struggles between HQ and the 
subsidiary personnel which probably emerged from these perceived differences and 
vice versa. Thus, the emergent struggles might have made employees aware of their 
different understandings. This in turn could pave the ground for discussing and 
explaining these differences, enabling employees to encounter mutual similarities 
while becoming more familiar with each other. In the above quote, IDK1 
highlighted perceived differences between the predominantly ethnic Danish HQ 
personnel and the predominantly ethnic Turkish subsidiary personnel. He 
furthermore indicated that he had incorporated this new knowledge into his 
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leadership toolbox in order to accommodate his employees’ perceived needs 
regarding leadership. In other words, he tried to adjust his leadership style to the 
current situation, context and person which arguably mirrors a reflexive approach. 
This approach to leadership seemingly suggests that IDK1 adopted what 
Svenningson et al. (2012) called ‘fragmented leadership’.  
In this chapter I present Finding 3: Embodied experiences and mutual 
identification as enablers of trust: the possible strengths of fragmented 
leadership styles. From the perspective of the intermediary leader, IDK1, and the 
subsidiary leader, IDK3, this section aims to investigate their leader-employee 
relations, i.e. IDK1’s relationship with ITR1 and ITR2 and IDK3’s relations with 
ITR4, IDK5, and ITR7-9 (indicated by red arrows in the figure below). 
 
Figure: 10: Overview on IDK1’s and IDK3’s embedded leader-employee relations 
(solid red lines) 
By drawing on observational and interview data, this part of the analysis examines 
how IDK1 used a combination of leadership styles to invoke trust in his employees 
while simultaneously fulfilling HQ expectations and structuring these relationships. 
As noted in Chapter 2, scholarly work on leadership is abundant and has resulted in 
a variety of conceptualizations of the term ‘leadership’. Whilst in English speaking 
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countries there is a more or less clear distinction between the expressions 
‘leadership’ and ‘management’, as laid out in chapter 2, this study took place in 
Danish and German speaking contexts where this distinction seems not to be that 
clear, particularly in the Danish context. When speaking about leadership in the 
Danish context, I used the expressions ‘leder/ledelse’, which could be translated as 
‘leader/leadership’ and ‘manager/management’. Therefore, it is up to each person’s 
own interpretation whether they conceptualize ‘leder/ledelse’ along the lines of a 
person who influences and guides others (leader/leadership) or of a person who 
holds a certain position in an organizational hierarchy (manager/management). 
Within the German context, I used the expressions 
‘Vorgesetzte(r)/Führungskraft/Führungsstil/Management’, which could be translated 
as ‘superior/executive/boss/leadership style/management’. Thus, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, the expressions ‘management’ and ‘leadership’ have been used 
interchangeably. In regard to this dissertation’s main phenomenon, i.e. trust/trusting, 
I noted in Chapter 3 that trusting as a situated relational and reasonable practice 
emerges from the interplay of agency as in the interrelated elements of iteration, 
projectivity, practical evaluation, habitus, and practical sense, all of which social 
actors draw from in different quantities in certain fields or contexts with their 
constraining and enabling power structures. When this study’s interactants were 
asked what trust meant to them, many of them highlighted aspects that corresponded 
to the abovementioned elements. 
In addition, in sections 5.3.4 and 5.3.5, I explore the relationship of ESAG’s 
expatriate leader (IDK3) with his employees at ESAG’s sales subsidiary in the 
western part of Germany (DE-W). By drawing on observational and interview data, 
this part of the analysis discovers how IDK3 invested time in becoming familiar 
with his employees in terms of their work abilities, loyalty towards the company but 
also their personal lives. While applying subtle control at the beginning of his 
relationship with ITR4, and ITR7-9, he seemed to mainly draw on his benevolence 
in order to empower his employees, who increasingly opened up. The above seems 
to indicate that this approach resulted in identification based trust, as this section 
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will point out. This study’s empirical material, however, suggests that the trust 
process between IDK3 and his employees was catalyzed by a simultaneous process 
between IDK3 and HQ-leaders: While the entire staff at DE-W, including IDK3, 
increasingly had the impression of being treated unfairly by HQ and their trust in 
HQ arguably faltered, trusting across all members at DE-W seemingly turned into a 
strong identification based trust. 
  
5.3.1 IDK1: Personal, trusting, assisting, controlling and not afraid of 
using perceived Turkish traits 
IDK1 is an intermediary leader of Danish ethnicity who has, according to him 
(interview IDK1, April 2013; time stamp: 0:17:27.2-0:19:34.4), been with ESAG 
since 1996 and has had many different positions at that company over these years.  
 
Figure 11: IDK1’s leader-employee relations 
At the time of this study, IDK1 worked as an intermediary leader/export manager at 
the department of ethnic sales and had been doing so since July 2011 (IDK1’s 
LinkedIn profile). Before July 2011, he worked within the field of ethnic business as 
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well, yet in his role as export director for ESAG from 2007-2011. Prior to 2007 he 
had worked as a sales person for ESAG. Thus, IDK1 has had extensive intercultural 
contact, which he highlighted as being important for him to thrive in his job: 
I have to say that is wonderful, this warmth and straightforwardness you 
encounter when you work with Turks; you’re simply told right away if there 
is something that doesn’t suit them. They like personal relationships; it’s 
important to them that there is a ’good personal chemistry’ which has to be 
attuned. And that’s actually something I like a lot and it makes it fun to be 
here. There are so many facets to working with Turks. (Interview IDK1; 
April 2013: time stamp: 0:46:00.0 - 0:47:52.9) 
According to IDK1, working with ethnic businesses tends to involve the whole 
person as personal relationships seem to be at the core of any business interaction, at 
least with people of Turkish origin. IDK1 talked about notions of ‘warmth and 
straightforwardness”, which he “likes a lot”. During my field work, I myself found 
IDK1 to be ‘straightforward and ‘heartfelt’, characteristics which might have helped 
him in building relationships with ITR1 and ITR2, who he supervised and coached 
in his role as intermediary leader. As the subsequent analysis will show, in addition 
to some of his personal characteristics, IDK1 appeared to use certain cultural tools 
to develop and maintain good relationships with his employees.  
In general, IDK1 perceived trust as something one cannot live without and he 
assumed that trust was the prerequisite for doing business: 
No, you cannot omit trust at any point in time. You always need trust. You 
need to trust those you work with and trust that those whom you work for are 
supporting you all the time. (Interview IDK1; June 2013: time stamp: 
0:55:11.3 - 0:57:49.4) 
As will become apparent during the further analysis, trust seemed be 
institutionalized at ESAG HQ which means it was taken for granted and was 
perceived to supported all organizational activities; in addition it was expected or 
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presumed by HQ personnel and management that this would also be the case at its 
subsidiaries. Hence, trust seems to represent a part of the conditional context in 
which IDK1 was embedded. Following Kroeger’s (2013:270; emphasis added) 
conceptualization of institutionalized trust, “it is evident that trust is institutionalized 
predominantly on an informal plane. Its maintenance over time is largely implicit 
and tacit in nature. Importantly, however, this does not render it any less ‘real’ or 
less consequential (...).” The consequences of an assumed high level of trust at 
ESAG HQ regarding its employees, leaders and practices have many facets, as the 
analysis will show. Perhaps due to his seniority of 26 years at ESAG and his 
upbringing in a society which, according to the OECD (OECD 2011; see also 
Fukuyama 2005) is characterized by a high level of generalized trust, IDK1 posited 
that he himself was a very trusting and trustworthy individual: 
Uhm, yes, I’d say in general I really trust people. I am a really positive and 
open-minded person (…) yes I think in general I am very trusting no matter 
where I am. [Yes] I understand myself also to be a very confidence-inspiring 
and trustworthy [telephone ringing] person [hmm] which means that I am 
often invited by many people (Interview IDK1; June 2013: time stamp: 
0.39:16.7 - 0:40:26.7). 
The above quote indicates that IDK1 presumed that being “open” and “positively 
minded” signifies trustworthiness and inspires confidence in others. This resonates 
with Mayer et al.’s (1995) notions of benevolence as a factor in the perceived 
trustworthiness of a social actor. Being perceived as benevolent and showing good-
will towards others arguably makes IDK1 a well-liked guest and probably assists 
him in building relationships, especially when being ‘open’ and ‘straightforward’ 
appears to be a ‘reasonable practice’ in a given relation, such as relationships with 
employees with Turkish backgrounds (see earlier quote from IDK1). Besides being 
important for relationship-building, IDK1 believed that trust heavily influenced a 
person’s work ability and he even considered collaboration within a company 
unthinkable without trust. Trust itself, however, is hard to define, even though it is 
considered extremely important at ESAG: 
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And this is once again, I would say, this kind of trust which basically lies 
with our CEO that you simply trust each other because we cannot, because if 
we don’t do that there is no reason to work together, if you cannot rely on 
each other you cannot function (…). This is about, how to say it; these 
common human trust issues which one cannot define. But if there’s no trust, 
well, then everything stops [hmm]. And then there is no reason for us to have 
some people who give us something if you don’t trust them to do their best in 
their role as employees in this company [yes] (Interview IDK1; June 2013: 
time stamp: 0:17:12.0 - 0:20:18.5). 
As hinted at, trust at ESAG seems to be institutionalized (this kind of trust which 
basically lies with our CEO that you simply trust each other) and can thus be 
conceived as being a tacit part of ESAG’s organizational culture. IDK1’s statement 
furthermore suggests that trust is a kind of prerequisite for ESAG’s survival (But if 
there’s no trust, well, then everything stops). 
From IDK1’s perspective, it thus seems reasonable to suggest that ESAG’s 
institutionalized trust provides the conditional context for any organizational or 
individual practice within the company. Trust seems to simply ‘be’ there; it is taken 
for granted even though, or perhaps because, it is understood to lie at the core of any 
reasonable cooperation. Given that IDK1 had been working and living in a context 
characterized by a fairly high level of trust, it is not surprising that IDK1 pointed out 
initiating any interaction within, but also outside, the company with a rather high 
level of trust: 
At the private and the professional level I think of trust as a process and an 
experience which you have to build up over time. [Hmm] Uhm, at the 
beginning the level of trust is enormously high because you also have 
enormously high expectations; well, this idea you have that’s the idea [hmm]. 
That’s the right idea [hmm] (Interview with IDK1, June 2013: Timestamp 
0:50:35.7 - 0:54:09.3) 
183 
 
However, he also indicated that trust building takes time, and that the intensity with 
which he trusts may thus change over time. He argued that the reason for putting 
enormous trust in the other was due to the enormous expectations he had in regard 
to, for example, a certain business idea. It seems that the more there was at stake, the 
more he trusted others and himself, while he also expected trust from his superiors 
and subordinates. The following quote provides an example of this approach to and 
understanding of trust in regard to risk taking: 
No, you can never do without trust [okay]. You always have to have trust 
within the equation. [Hmm] You need to trust those whom you work together 
with and those you work for [Hmm] uhm support you all the time. (…) Well 
when I come home and report what I’ve experienced [yes], then they [his 
superiors] must believe me in what I’m saying [yes]. I do expect that. And to 
say it again, this trust enables me to always try my best to push this company 
even further [hmm]. Because if there is no trust in that the risks I run get 
honored somehow, [hmm] well then I would not take any risks. You could 
say that the willingness to take risks is proportional to the trust you’re shown. 
[Yes, yes] Do you understand what I mean? [Yes] If I engage in a business 
(…) which is slightly bigger or different in comparison to those I normally 
handle [hmm] but I trust that our production unit can handle the order [hmm] 
and does handle the order [hmm], well then I know that it also will work out 
next time. And that’s how things are connected and next time I might dare to 
go even a step further [hmm] because I know that’s for our own good. [Yes] 
Well, that’s kind of again [that’s interesting], how to put it, freedom with 
responsibility, that’s what it turns into when you start a relationship which 
expands over time. Then freedom with responsibility is the driving force. 
[hmm] (…) you can do a lot. It’s obvious thought that we have to educate 
each other properly and that we know what we’re talking about. Having said 
that, we trust you to do the best you can wherever you are in the world. 
(Interview IDK1; June 2013: time stamp: 0:55:11.3 - 0:57:49.4) 
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According to IDK1’s account, he expected his superiors to trust him, which enabled 
him to run such business risks as dealing with unknown customers, taking bigger 
orders, or doing business in different and unfamiliar situations. IDK1 indicated that 
successfully managed risks support ESAG in achieving its overall business goals. 
IDK1 furthermore explained that his willingness to take risks was commensurate 
with the perceived and experienced trust placed in him by his superiors.  
Jointly, the above extracts are useful as they seem to illustrate how IDK1 
comprehended trust, its development, and its consequences. Moreover, the quotes 
reveal IDK1’s understanding of ESAG’s corporate culture and business goals, and 
thus what he considered reasonable and expected behavior, which in turn influenced 
his understanding and practice of leadership and trust. IDK1 seems to conceptualize 
trust as “something hard to define”, but nevertheless a part of the contextual 
background for his practices within and outside ESAG. This perceived 
(institutionalized) trust seems to have fostered IDK1’s inclination for risk-taking, 
which he in turn understood as enhancing the company’s competitiveness in the 
ethnic market. In his account, IDK1 furthermore pointed to the concept of “Freedom 
with Responsibility” [frihed under ansvar] as the “driving force of conduct”. Yet, on 
the other hand, IDK1 also pointed to ‘trust’ as the main basis for organizational 
practices at ESAG. Thus, IDK1’s statements seem to indicate that (institutionalized) 
trust and the philosophy of “Freedom with Responsibility” are important and valued 
aspects of ESAG that are probably also interconnected. From a Bourdieusian 
viewpoint, one could argue that social, organizational and interactional structures, 
such as the notion of “working within a framework of Freedom with 
Responsibility”, are produced and reproduced by ESAG’s organizational members 
over time. In the case of ESAG, these structures appear to have become a widely 
shared reality for most of its members, especially its members at HQ. Thus, the 
notion of “Freedom with Responsibility” has probably become a kind of emergent 
blue-print for the rules of interactions at ESAG; these informal rules of interaction 
arguably allow a variety of possible actions (the freedom part) while simultaneously 
restricting other actions (the realm of responsibilities). Hence, ESAG’s 
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organizational members not only have to agree upon the balance between freedom 
and responsibility, they furthermore need to learn about the organizational, and 
perhaps even moral, and social responsibilities expected of them. The ‘educational 
or learning aspect’ was highlighted by IDK1 in his account of ESAG’s employees 
first having to “educate each other properly” and “learn what the company and the 
work is all about” before a leader would have “confidence in you and your 
commitment, wherever you are”. A similar explanation was given by IDK3 and 
IDK4. Thus, at ESAG the relationship between the notion of “Freedom with 
Responsibility” and trusting seems to be thus: Only when there is broad agreement 
on the rules and the common goals of the game  (the illusio of the field of ESAG) and 
the rules of interaction does confidence or trust become possible and leads to 
employee empowerment. In fact, IDK1 explained his role as intermediary leader as 
revolving around “assistance and coaching and making sure that there is a 
connection between the ideas we have here at HQ and how these are translated and 
carried out in reality at our different locations” (Interview IDK1; April 2013; time 
stamp: 0:01:20.5 - 0:02:38.8). Thus, he arguably took an active part in aligning rules 
and ideas about goals across ESAG’s diverse sales subsidiaries. As I will discuss 
later, IDK3’s role as expatriate leader of DE-W could be understood in a similar 
way.  
In short, IDK1 seemed to approach trust from the following circumstances: He 
understood his general trusting approach as a direct result of having grown up in a 
society which he experienced as being built on trust. He also described ESAG, with 
its Danish HQ, as being steeped in trust. As a consequence, his interpretations of 
trust seem to mirror these perceived circumstances, i.e. his habitus had incorporated 
trust as modus operandi. IDK1 spoke of trust being necessary for any meaningful 
interaction and, in fact, as an enabler of interaction and risk taking because without 
knowing that HQ would back his decisions due to their trust in him, he would have 
been unable to function as a successful, risk-taking and self-confident sales person. 
Furthermore, IDK1 interpreted trust as the opposite of control, and thus indirectly 
connected trusting to his Danish leadership style (Interview IDK1; April 2013; time 
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stamp: 0:08:23.6 - 0:12:12.5). Moreover, he interpreted trust as an especially 
rewarding resource when working across borders; on the one hand, trust is employed 
to foster a common understanding but it can also be transferred to mutual familiarity 
and an everyday which functions to everyone’s satisfaction. In that sense, trust 
seems to represent a valued form of capital: 
It can’t be different, because – as mentioned earlier – we work across 
borders, we work outside the realm of control and this trust we show each 
other [hmm] has to be converted into something else; there emerges a 
familiarity and an everyday which functions to both parties’ satisfaction 
[hmm] (IDK1; April 2013; time stamp: 0:20:51.7 - 0:24:33.6) 
In terms of interpretations of trust, IDK1 furthermore stated that trust is a process 
that in his case would start with a high level of trust. This seems to be in contrast to 
Lewicki & Bunker’s model of trust development (1996) which suggests that 
relationships commence from a rather low level of trust which they call calculation-
based trust. Perhaps, it could be argued that institutionalized trust at ESAG has been 
developed based on generalized trust which is argued to build the foundation of 
Danish society. In that sense, the institutionalized trust present at ESAG has 
probably been developed outside the company, yet following Lewicki & Bunker’s 
model. On the other hand, this finding may indicate that once institutionalized trust 
has been developed, it become a taken for granted condition for trusting. Thus, I 
suggest that if institutionalized trust were incorporated into Lewicki & Bunker’s 
model, it either should be situated at the highest level thus following or be part of 
identification-based trust. However, according to the above finding (see also section 
5.5) institutionalized trust could also represent the first level of trust development, 
yet, the following levels would then rather represent the erosion of trust.   The latter 
I will describe and discuss in sections 5.3.4 and 5.3.5. 
By virtue of his position as intermediary leader, IDK1 seemed to be more powerful 
than his sales personnel with Turkish backgrounds, especially because they 
understood their positions along the line of subordinates who, at the end of the day, 
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had to comply with IDK1’s orders. Nevertheless, ITR1 and ITR2 had slightly 
different trajectories regarding their past work experiences and their current situation 
at ESAG, which seemed to have had an influence on their relationships with IDK1. 
 
5.3.2 ITR1: Neither a bird nor a camel, but a loyal, hardworking sales 
person with a Turkish touch 
ITR1 was the main sales person at DE-E, which was established in 2005; thus, at the 
time of my field study at DE-E, ITR1 had known IDK1 for almost 10 years. At the 
age of 22, ITR1 had moved from Turkey to Germany where he worked in 
companies with a multicultural workforce which, according to him, had never been a 
problem because “people are people” (Interview ITR1; June 2013; time stamp: 
0:49:40.9 – 0:50:56.9). Hence, it seems that ITR1 was used to working within 
workforces comprising different people in terms of “place of birth, language, 
religion or name” (ibid.). Since IDK1 was ITR1’s leader, and DE-E was jointly 
developed by them and ITR6, all three had been familiar with each other’s work 
practices for some time. Due to ESAG’s organizational structure, the matrix 
structure, ITR1 could not be considered ITR6’s subordinate even though ITR6 led 
the subsidiary in terms of accountancy, logistics and “being the gofer” (Interview 
ITR6; June 2013; time stamp: 0:06:20.2-0:07:50.4). Hence, ITR1 could be 
conceptualized as being more or less self-managed, which was also explained by his 
role as sales person that meant that he spent approximately 90 % of his working time 
in the field, i.e. in his car visiting existing customers or trying to canvass new ones. 
Since he used a company tablet for order registrations, he was rarely in contact with 
ITR6 or her co-worker ITR14, which I also became aware of during my field trip to 
DE-E. If ITR1 was in need of information, he would call ITR14, but most of the 
time he contacted IDK1 since “he’s always happy to help” (Interview ITR1; June 
2013; time stamp: 0:49:40.9 – 0:50:56.9). 
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In terms of trust, ITR1 mentioned, somewhat between the lines, that people of 
Turkish origin do not trust others as easily as Danes and Germans seem to do. He 
remarked that Danes and Germans were usually too sweet-natured, too nice, too 
trusting towards the Turkish customers. The Turks had a greater chance of getting 
better, i.e. lower, prices from the Danes than from him (Field notes; Sub.DE-East; 
June 2014, page 7). In saying so, ITR1 arguably expressed that, in general, people of 
Turkish heritage were less trusting than Danes and Germans, which also was 
expressed by for example ITR4 (Interview with ITR4 and IDK3; September 2014; 
time stamp: 0:47:29.8-0:47:50.3), ITR2 (Informal Conversation ITR2; September 
2014: page 2); ITR9 (Interview ITR9; May 2015; time stamp: 0:13:00.0-0:15:15.5) 
and ITR14 (Interview ITR14; June 2013; time stamp: 0:14:17-0:14:36). The rather 
cautious approach to trust expressed by some ethnic Turkish employees seems to 
coincide with findings on generalized trust by the OECD (OECD 2011 and 
Fukuyama 2005), which found that the level of generalized trust was very high in 
Denmark, very low in Turkey and on an average level in Germany and Austria. Yet, 
some ethnic minority Turkish employees pointed out to be very trusting towards 
persons they are unfamiliar with (e.g., Interview ITR3; May 2013; time stamp: 
1:08:59.1-1:12:35.2; ITR8; April 2014; time stamp: 0:04:45.4-0:07:25.5; and ITR14; 
June 2013; time stamp: 0:13:34-0:14:04).  
As ITR1 was raised in Turkey and had been living as part of an ethnic Turkish 
minority in Germany (the broader societal field) for about 20 years while being 
employed by ESAG for 10 years arguably indicates that his conditions for 
perception (habitus) and agency differ from IDK1’s conditions outlined earlier. In 
terms of cultural identity (cultural habitus), for example, ITR1 mentioned that he, 
along with other Turks living in Germany, felt as if they were an “ostrich, i.e. 
neither a bird nor a camel”, which means that he felt neither Turkish nor German but 
both at the same time (bi-cultural habitus) and at different levels, depending on the 
circumstances (Field notes; Observation DE-E; June 2014; page 6). The ostrich 
metaphor seems to describe a situation of fluctuating identification between 
arguably rather different ethnicities. However, it seemed that ITR1 had found a 
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solution to his situation of belonging to an ethnic minority in Germany and working 
for a Danish company: In both the business sphere and the private sphere, he chose 
to take on what he considered to portray ‘professionalism’ which arguably depicted 
a none-Turkish trait and combined them with his knowledge of Turkish culture. For 
example, he mentioned that “Turks are far too emotional and it doesn’t need to be 
that way. I think that is a mistake; one should try to be a bit more professional” 
(Interview: June 2013; Timestamp: 1:08.11.8 – 1:08:48.8). Moreover, besides being 
‘less emotional and more professional’ than the ‘Turks’, ITR1 pointed out that, in 
contrast to ITR6, he considered himself to be a “relaxed Muslim” who would drink 
alcohol and had no problems eating in a restaurant serving pork dishes (Field notes; 
Observation DE-E; June 2014; page 6; Field notes Lunch meeting; June 2014). 
These and other differences between ITR1 and ITR6, who considered herself to be 
the ‘office leader’ of DE-E, resulted in trouble, which probably made him avoid 
ITR6 as much as possible. In contrast to the other subsidiary members, ITR1 did not 
spend any non-business hours with ITR6 or ITR14. He pointed out that he, of 
course, would follow certain Turkish traditions and would take part in the ‘Turkish 
baby shower’, for example, but he would not blend business with his private life 
(Interview ITR1; April 2013; time stamp: 0:53.11.3 – 0:53:20.2)  
In terms of trust, ITR1 mentioned that trust building takes time because you “need to 
experience (“ertasten/palpate”) the other before you could trust them” (Interview 
ITR1; April 2013; time stamp: 0:09:38.2 - 0:12:24.4). He continued to tell me that 
trusting requires “knowledge of the human nature”, which is something one acquires 
throughout life. However, he also relied on third party information as he would “get 
help from his wide circle of acquaintances” in order to learn about, for example, 
potential new customers (ibid.). In that sense, belonging to the customer network 
could be a competitive advantage for learning about the perceived trustworthiness of 
potential customers. As mentioned earlier, many of ESAG’s ethnic sales persons 
with Turkish origins seemed to be enmeshed in such a network. Thus, when IDK1 
mentioned that it ‘takes Turks to fully access the ethnic market’, he might not only 
have meant their cultural capital, but also their social capital. 
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When I asked ITR1 to tell me about trust in his own words, he said: 
That is hard to say. Trust is good, control is better, right? Well, trust has to be 
mutual, not one-sided. If a customer has promised me to pay his bill, then this 
has to happen. Of course, there something can always happen that causes a 
delay, but then at least he has to inform me about that. Well, you win the 
other’s trust when you are honest and when you stay honest. This means that 
when I have promised the customer a certain price, which could perhaps be 
wrong, well then I have to stick to that. As I said, trust has to be mutual and it 
takes time but it can be destroyed in no time at all. And I like to be trusted 
and I like to trust, but I also prefer to always choose the safer way. I try to 
minimize our risks. (Interview ITR1; April 2013; time stamp: 0:53.11.3-
0:56:53.7) 
This quote seems to illustrate that ITR1 calculates whom to trust and with what 
based on the perceived risks and his information or knowledge about the other. To 
him, trust thus seems to be a balancing act which is informed by his knowledge of 
human nature and thus by his experiences with others in regard to trust. While IDK1 
suggested that he would engage with others based on trust, ITR1 rather seems to 
take small steps and first calculate the perceived risks. Arguably, ITR1 
predominantly portrays trust as a rational choice (Coleman 1990) based on beliefs of 
trustworthiness (Mayer et al. 1995) such as the customers’ ability to pay for the 
delivered goods but also their benevolence and their willingness to pay for these 
goods. Hence, ITR1 seemed to understand trust more along the lines of a practice to 
be tested in small and cautious steps, while IDK1 portrayed any interaction as being 
based on a rather high initial level of trust. Thus, IDK1 and ITR1 seem to have quite 
different ideas about the terms of their engagement in unfamiliar relationships.  
Experiences of trust between intermediary leader IDK1 and sales person ITR1 
In regards to his relationship with IDK1, ITR1 stated that it took some time to build 
trust. As mentioned above, he took small steps and tested how far he could trust 
IDK1: 
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In the beginning we of course were all skeptical because nobody knew each 
other: they didn’t know us and we didn’t know them. This of course takes 
time and at some point we got to know each other. Knew how we were and 
therefore, we knew a bit better in which ways we could react. (Interview 
IDK1 June 2013: time stamp: 0:44:32.4 - 0:46:23.0) 
I understand this quote to portray several aspects. On the one hand, ITR1 once again 
seems to indicate that trust is a mutual practice based on information and knowledge 
of the other. On the other hand, he suggests that ‘they’ – probably DE-E’s workforce 
– knew IDK1 better after cooperating with him for a while; although they did not 
know him wholly. ITR1 speaks of “knowing a bit better in which ways we can 
react”, which arguably points to viewing interactions as a process as he now seems 
to know how he may react in certain situations, but also how IDK1 might react in 
the same situation. Hence, knowing each other arguably confines his range of 
possible actions in two ways; firstly, it seems to permit practices he would not have 
dared to engage in at the beginning of the relationship. Secondly, knowing each 
other also seems to have restricted ITR1’s repertoire of reasonable behavior as some 
actions or reactions would seem out of place precisely because they know each other 
better which seems to coincide with Möllering’s (2006:89f) notion that the actors’ 
frame of judging what signals trust and what not changes over the course of trust 
building. 
In regard to reasonable practices in his relation with IDK1, ITR1 (Interview 1TR1, 
Interview June 2013: time stamp 0:44:32.4 - 0:46:23.0) stated that “one should know 
one’s boundaries (the field’s doxa) and should know what the superior demands, 
which however would also be part of the work contract. One is supposed to fulfill 
one’s obligations as much as possible and that’s pretty much it.” Arguably, ITR1 
conceptualized and practiced his relationship with IDK1 within the confines of his 
work contract. He seemed to simply fulfill his role as much as possible. His 
reactions at the sales course may support this assumption. While some of his 
colleagues with Turkish roots seemed to question the usefulness of the course (as 
described in Section 5.2), he was the only person of Turkish origin who thrived at 
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the course. For example, he was one of the most active course members and made 
the effort to present his accumulated knowledge whenever an assignment was given, 
thus arguably trying to fulfill HQ’s expectations (Field notes; Sales Course; 
September 2014; e.g., page 6). During our interview, ITR1 furthermore mentioned 
that: 
Working at ESAG, in the ethnic market, presents a challenge and you work 
and fight as well as you can to be successful. And then when you are 
successful, you are happy; both sides are happy, the company and you. And 
this is acknowledged, I think, from the Danish side, right? [ITR1 turns his 
face towards IDK1 who is working at his laptop and doesn’t seem to be 
listening to our conversation. I said: Well, IDK1 can’t hear this.] Okay. 
[Sounding rather disappointed]. (Interview ITR1; April 2013; time stamp: 
0:32:25.1 - 0:33:37.1) 
In addition to giving the impression of being eager to fulfill ESAG HQ’s 
expectations, this quote seems to visualize that acknowledgement and recognition 
play an important role for ITR1. However, as the further analysis will show, 
recognition and acknowledgement appear to be similarly important for other 
subsidiary employees, while a lack of recognition seems to enhance experiences of 
distrust, which I will outline in Section 5.4. Arguably, IDK1 learned about this 
aspect of recognition during his time as intermediary leader, as indicated in the 
quote at the beginning of this chapter. On another occasion, IDK1 also spoke of 
control, which he only used occasionally to reassure himself that his trust in ITR1 
was not misplaced (Interview with IDK1, June 2013: Timestamp 0.25:15.5 - 
0.28:25.5). IDK1 furthermore explained that trust was a form of a good “gut feeling” 
which was enhanced when his employees revealed their mistakes or negative 
customer relationships to him, which he interpreted as ‘being honest and not simply 
telling him what he wants to hear’ (ibid.). In other words, IDK1 assumed that his 
employees did not fear any repercussions in terms of being laid off when making 
mistakes. Instead, together with his employees, IDK1 would try to find a joint 
solution. He remarked: “And perhaps you have to assist each other a bit more, but 
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this patience with each other has always been there and it takes this patience to 
finally be able to say: Our approach to control pays off and now we have employees 
who are able to do their jobs well and who fit in” (Interview with IDK1, June 2013: 
Timestamp 0:20:51.7 - 0:24:33.6). Thus it could be said that IDK1 seems to build 
trust grounded in a combination of ‘active trust’ based on ‘institutionalized trust’ 
and subtle control. A very similar approach is taken by IDK3, the subsidiary leader 
of DE-W, in his relation to his employees, as I will outline in a later section. This 
substantiates the assumption that trust seems to be institutionalized at ESAG. 
However, it seems that in order to start the trust process, IDK1 also requires certain 
amount of openness, suggesting that openness is a main building block for trust: 
“Actually, this openness is the basis for us trusting each other” (Interview with 
IDK1, June 2013: Timestamp 0.36:21.4 - 0.38:27.8). Hence, being open and honest 
could be perceived as both an expression of trust as well as laying the grounds for 
trust. Openness and the ability to express an opinion were also indicated by ITR1 as 
characterizing his relationship with IDK1 (Interview June 2013: Timestamp:  
0:37:18.0 - 0:37:56.6), although he never seemed to have challenged IDK1’s 
position as his leader (Interview ITR1; June 2013; time stamp: 0:40:59.5- 
0:42:16.5). 
As mentioned earlier, ITR1 expressed the intention to behave in a more 
‘professional’ manner, as he in general was less ‘emotional’ and did not combine 
private and business issues. IDK1, however, tended to spend time talking about 
family issues, for example with ITR6 and ITR14, the female subsidiary members at 
DE-E. He would also greet them following Turkish customs, i.e. kissing each cheek 
of ITR6 and ITR14, although this might also have been an expression of their 
‘friendship’, as indicated by ITR6 and ITR14 (Interview ITR6; June 2013; time 
stamp: 0:06:20.2-0:07:50.4; Interview ITR14; June 2013; time stamp: 0:09:18-
0:10:15). In any case, IDK1’s leadership style seems to have resembled a very 
personal, friendly and assisting style, which ITR6 found to be in stark contrast to 
what she had experienced regarding her past superiors, whom she had been afraid of 
(ibid.). 
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In summary, the trust process in IDK1’s relationship with ITR1 and the DE-E staff 
in general could be visualized as follows: 
 
Figure 12: The process of trusting between IDK1 and ITR1 
In short, this process seems to have been initiated by openness, institutionalized trust 
and the employment of subtle yet professional control mechanisms. IDK1 used a 
combination of leadership styles which predominantly seemed to be informed by the 
philosophy of “Freedom with Responsibility”. Therefore, as will become more 
evident in the analysis of his relationship with ITR2, he implemented a more ‘top-
down approach’ when his patience had been overstrained, blended business and 
private spheres when appropriate (drawing on Turkish cultural capital) and 
preferentially used a subtle approach to control (symbolic capital), thus grounding 
his leadership more on trust than on control. 
 
Initial 
skepticism 
but openness 
Coaching and 
‘professional’ 
control which 
ITR1 accepts as 
reasonable 
Joint success 
stories 
Absolute trust 
in each others’ 
motivation to 
continue the 
work relation 
195 
 
5.3.3 ITR2: A real sales person, close to the customers and loyal to 
ESAG  
As mentioned in Section 5.1, in 2000 ESAG acquired an Austrian supplier of ethnic 
food products, including its workforce. As IDK1 was working with ethnic sales at 
ESAG at that point in time, he became partly responsible for the Austrian subsidiary 
and also for ITR2 as he was the primary sales person. In comparison to ITR1, ITR2 
had far greater experience in ethnic sales work as he had had his own company 
before starting as a sales person at the Austrian supply firm. ITR2 worked in a 
similar way to ITR1; both had key accounts and spent most of their working hours 
on the road and with the customers. Since the Austrian subsidiary was situated 
between its dairy and the main market locations, ITR2 only occasionally visited it. 
Hence, his main contact with both IDK1 and the subsidiary personnel was by phone. 
As ITR2 had customers not only in Austria but also in Bavaria, he used excessive 
time for transport, which is why he received a rather comfortable and big company 
car. In contrast to ITR1, ITR2 was not born in Turkey but grew up with his Turkish 
family in Austria. Concerning his working life, ITR2 stated that it would be 
impossible to separate the private sphere from the business sphere (Summary 
Feedback to my presentation at Sales Course; September 2014; page 1). Therefore, 
his main job, i.e. selling ESAG’s products, constituted a small portion of his 
working day because the networking occupied most of his time; nevertheless, the 
latter ensured the further. ITR2 said: “The main issue is actually marginal and the 
minor point is primary” (ibid.). Possibly due to his experience in the ethnic market 
but also his rather ‘philosophical perspective’, he was convinced that 100% trust did 
not exist because we are all humans, and thus the other always has the choice to act 
as he or she sees fit. There is always this freedom for the other (the trustee) which 
represents the risk he would have to take (as the trustor) (ibid., page 2; time stamp: 
0:13:59.7). Hence, freedom and risk seem to be understood as being connected in a 
dialectic relation. In his view, trust was a word which when spoken or thought of 
turns into a good feeling even though one doubts the other’s intentions. He 
furthermore mentioned that one trusts in order to reach one’s goals (ibid.; time 
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stamp: 0:17:49.8). Thus, quite similar to IDK1 he indicated that trust enables actions 
which would otherwise not be possible. Yet, I can only speculate whether he meant 
that trust empowers only the trustor or both actors; the trustor and the trustee. 
However, as ITR2 seemed to be rather reluctant to trust, he may have meant that the 
trustor can use trust as a tool to reach his goals. This argument appears to have been 
reflected in ITR2’s notion of self-confidence, which he understood to be a crucial 
‘weapon’ for sales persons in the ethnic market (Informal conversation; ITR2; 
September 2014; page 3; time stamp: 0:15:48.8-0:24:42.2). 
Similar to ITR2, he connected trust with knowledge of human nature 
(Menschenkenntniss) and thus considered trust a process that takes time. In an 
informal conversation, he used the expression of “throwing a bone to the other and 
seeing how that person reacts” (Informal Conversation ITR2; September 2014: page 
2) as an approach to trust, which seems to resemble ITR1’s approach of small steps 
and testing trust as mentioned above. He furthermore expanded this notion with yet 
another metaphor when he spoke of trust in terms of a construction site: The quality 
and make-up of a piece of land influences the type of house you can build on it, i.e. 
whether a bungalow or a palace. This notion arguably refers back to having certain 
knowledge of the other and knowledge of human nature in general. Arguably, 
ITR2’s understanding of trust coincides primarily with Lewicki & Bunkers’ model 
of trust development, seeing that ITR2 would base is trust on information gathered 
prior to the enactment of calculation-based trust. It seems that he primarily ‘tested’ 
the other’s trustworthiness by “throwing a bone and waiting what happens”. Thus 
his approach seemed to mirror Möllering’s assumption “that actors may actively 
produce mutual experiences with the aim of testing whether a trust relationship is 
feasible, but without being able to know in advance the associated benefits and 
risks” (Möllering 2006:94).  
Experiences of trust between ITR2 and IDK1 
ITR2’s work and life experiences and knowledge arguably made him what IDK1 
called “a real sales person who is able to shift his attitude by 180 degrees, from 
having been absolutely against all of my points to being loyal and hitting the ground 
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running as soon as he leaves his car [in order to visit a customer]” (Interview IDK1; 
April 2013; time stamp 0:12:28.0 - 0:16:30.5). It may be that because ITR2 had been 
working within the field for many years, he had also experienced the more 
dangerous side of the ethnic market, as mentioned earlier. The same is true for 
IDK1, as has already been pointed out, and thus both have made similar experiences 
in the field. In fact, during the quarterly sales meeting at the Austrian subsidiary, I 
observed that they made sense of outstanding payments, reactions on the market and 
the customers’ use of merchandise in similar ways; thus, they seemed to have a 
similar practical sense of what constituted reasonable actions. (Field notes; 
Quarterly Sales Meeting AT; September 2013; e.g. third and last paragraph on page 
6). On the other hand, IDK1 also challenged ITR2’s ideas in regard to best practices 
in the field of ethnic sales. For example, when ITR2 mentioned that he simply 
needed more money to market ESAG’s products on the Austrian market, IDK1 tried 
to explain that this would not be possible because even though he could follow ITR2 
in his arguments, he would also have to explain to HQ why they should invest more 
money in marketing in Austria than they did in Germany (Field notes; Quarterly 
Sales Meeting AT; September 2013; last paragraph on page 14). By explaining his 
situation, IDK1 made it easier for ITR2 to understand his situation, and thus ITR2 
reconsidered and reduced the amount of money he thought he would need. IDK1 
and ITR2 agreed on the new marketing budget following a short discussion. It could 
be argued that IDK1 and ITR2 enhanced their mutual understanding of the other by 
discussing each other’s situation and position in terms of power in the field of EASG. 
When asked about trust in his relationship with IDK1, ITR2 stated that he would 
trust IDK1 the most out of all his co-workers because  
I make more business with IDK1, more intense business and negotiations. 
Therefore I know that he keeps his word, he does that, I know that he doesn’t 
have a second agenda. We collaborate well” (Interview ITR2; September 
2013; time stamp: 0:13:24.7-0:13:24.7). 
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Arguably, his intense negotiations with IDK1 seem to be an important factor in 
testing whether IDK1 keeps his word or not. Thus, it seems that the mutual struggles 
over best sales practices on the ethnic market influence trust building because the 
way in which they are resolved provides ITR2 with indications as to whether IDK1 
is honest and loyal towards him. In contrast to ITR1, who did not challenge IDK1 
and instead followed what he understood to be part of his written work contract, 
ITR2 seemed to draw on his enormous knowledge of the ethnic market when 
discussing certain marketing or sales approaches and seemed to work more 
independently than ITR1. Even during private conversations, IDK1 and ITR2 
challenged each other, although it was in a playful manner and they tended to draw 
on cultural stereotypes (Field notes; Lunch Meeting; September 2013). During these 
conversations I had the impression that they knew and respected each other. In 
general, IDK1 and ITR2 seemed to share a similar embodied experience of being a 
sales person on the ethnic market; they shared the same teasing language and used 
their struggles to position themselves as the more knowledgeable actor in a certain 
area of ethnic sales, or rather to test out or ‘fight over’ their ‘rightful’ positions. 
These struggles seemed to have heightened their knowledge of and respect towards 
each other, which arguably resulted in an overall aligned view on the rules of the 
game. 
In summary, the trusting process in IDK1’s relationship with ITR2 may look as 
follows: 
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Figure 13: The process of trusting between IDK1 and ITR2 
In short, from IDK1’s perspective, this process was initiated by openness, 
institutionalized trust, subtle yet professional control and the use of teasing. Again, 
IDK1 used a combination of leadership styles which predominantly seemed to focus 
on ‘translating HQ’s ideas into reality’. In order to make his voice heard and manage 
the implementation of HQ’s ideas at AT, he engaged in struggles with ITR2 and 
tried to turn them into a win-win situation by appreciating ITR2’s concerns and 
loyalty for ESAG, while at the same time trying to explain ESAG’s demands. ITR2, 
on the other hand, tried to align ESAG’s demands with his customers’ wishes (social 
capital) and preferred behaviors (cultural capital). This left ITR2 somewhere in the 
middle and it may therefore have been important for him to position himself more 
clearly as the ‘more knowledgeable player’ (symbolic capital) on the ethnic market 
in comparison to IDK1. However, IDK1 was more powerful in terms of 
implementing his ideas. Not only did he have the authority as a leader (symbolic 
capital), he also had the advantage of being supported by a trusting head of sales 
(IDK0) and ESAG management in general. This perceived trust enabled IDK1 to 
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make decisions which could be perceived as being not agreed upon by HQ, yet did 
not seem to breach the confines of Freedom with Responsibility. 
 
5.3.4 IDK3: Young, rather inexperienced subsidiary leader who is 
willing to walk many extra miles 
IDK3 started at ESAG in a trainee position after finishing his commercial college 
education and his bachelor of commerce in 2008. Following the traineeship, during 
which he stayed 3 months at DE-E, IDK3 received a fulltime position at ESAG 
leading the sales personnel in the western part of Germany from his desk at HQ. 
Shortly after he became a fulltime employee at ESAG, the company decided in 2012 
to set up a sales subsidiary in the western part of Germany where ESAG’s main part 
of the ethnic food market was located. IDK3 was offered and accepted the position 
as subsidiary leader. In the beginning of 2013, he moved to the western part of 
Germany where he was put in charge of developing a sales subsidiary with an 
adjacent warehouse (ESAG News; no. 8; December 2015:3). In addition to the sales 
persons he had already worked with and had assisted during his trainee-ship while 
stationed in Denmark, he was put in charge of hiring a warehouse manager (ITR4), 
which he did shortly after finding a suitable location (Interview IDK3; May 2013; 
time stamp: 00:15:01-00:15:50). Moreover, his girlfriend (IDK5), who also worked 
at ESAG, followed him to Germany where she took the position of sales support at 
DE-W. Thus, IDK3 managed and led 5 employees at DE-W (see figure 14) while 
being supported by HQ. Seeing that IDK4 held the position as managing director at 
ESAG-Germany, IDK3 considered him to be his superior. The relation between 
IDK3 and IDK4 is analyzed in section 5.3.6. 
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Figure 14: IDK3’s leader-employee relations 
Considering that IDK3 had worked at ESAG HQ for 4 years prior to his time as 
expatriate at DE-W, he had become familiar with ESAG’s organizational culture and 
its practices and tacit logics. It could be argued that his promotion as subsidiary 
leader was a result of him knowing how to maneuver successfully in the field of 
ESAG.  This assumption seems to be supported by IDK1’s notion of “we believe 
that IDK3 has the abilities to fulfill his job” (Interview IDK1; June 2013; time 
stamp: 0:58:18.3 - 0:58:18.3). In his further account, IDK1 explained that ESAG 
was running a risk in employing “a fairly young man (IDK3)” as a subsidiary leader 
who was responsible for a warehouse, cars, and staff. This, so IDK1, showcased 
ESAG’s trust in IDK3 and its confidence in him that he would do his best while 
being supported by HQ. In his further account, IDK1 once again pointed to the role 
of “freedom with responsibility” as the main logic which made it possible for ESAG 
to “run a business like this” (ibid.). IDK3 also pointed to the importance of “now 
that I know the sales persons better and know how they work; I have given them 
more freedom so that they can make decisions at the supermarkets independently 
and without having to ask me first” (Interview IDK3; May 2013; time stamp: 
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00:43.30-00:44.12). Explaining further (ibid.), IDK3 stated that giving one’s 
employees “scope to maneuver” may challenge them but also made them work more 
efficiently and effectively since they could make decisions immediately without 
having to wait for an answer. In line with IDK1 (see Section 5.3.1) and IDK4 (see 
Section 5.1.1), IDK3 seemed to understand the notion of “Freedom with 
Responsibility” as an ‘enabler for action’ which, however, seemed to rest on a 
certain amount of trust, i.e. on the other’s perceived ability and integrity to 
reciprocate the trust placed in them by giving them a certain ‘scope of freedom to 
judge whether certain sales practices are reasonable or not’. In order for his 
employees to know which rules applied and what he expected from his employees, 
he arguably took an ‘involving leadership approach’, as he explained that he 
considered the entire sales subsidiary a team whereby “we have to solve some 
problems and work together (…) and I am going to help you all the way (…) and if 
we cannot solve this issue, it is not you who suffers but it is us. It will harm all of 
us” (Interview IDK3; May 2013; time stamp: 0:17:16-0:18:57). IDK3 furthermore 
pointed out that his approach to the employees could be characterized as being 
“companionable” due to his “daily contact with them over a long period of time” 
(ibid.). According to IDK3, it is “human contact” that enables a “fellowship” in 
which all want “to give a bit more to me”, which IDK3 explained to be a sign of 
“trust” (ibid.). Furthermore, leading the subsidiary in a type of “companionable 
teamwork” resulted in seeing each other as colleagues and not as somebody higher 
or lower in the organizational hierarchy (Interview IDK3; May 2013; time stamp: 
0:46:00-0:47:03). Nevertheless, ESAG has a hierarchy, i.e. there are positions of 
more and of less power, as mentioned in Section 5.1. Having a ‘flat hierarchy’ and 
being ‘tolerant’, which included ‘internal promotions and work opportunities’, was 
portrayed as what I consider part of the field’s illusio which, according to Wilken 
(2006:56), “enables the field’s reproduction”. To some extent, IDK3 seemed to 
reproduce precisely this illusio by referring to his leadership style as a copy of 
ESAG HQ’s approach to leadership. He argued: 
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It’s not like you have a hierarchy or so [at HQ]. Also, if I think about how I 
approach IDK4; I don’t think of him as a boss, he’s more a colleague to me. 
And that’s how I think of all of them with the exception of the CEO.I have 
the impression that you can approach anyone in the company and you will 
get an answer from everybody. And that’s precisely what I try to convey to 
the sales personnel. [Hmm] I mean the way in which .. Neither do I want 
them to see me as their - well, they consider me their boss – but they ought 
not to be afraid of me. I rather like to know if they have back pain, I rather 
like to know that. Well they should not hide these things just because I am 
their boss [hmm]. Yes, honesty; I think that’s important. [Yes] and I do feel it 
present here and I also hope that it will continue to exist from the Danish 
side; that they are open to us and tell us right away if something happens. 
[Yes]. (Interview IDK3; May 2013; time stamp: 0:46:00-0:47:03). 
Following IDK3, he wishes to portray himself as the subsidiary leader whose 
primary role is to assist his employees and secure their well-being. In saying that he 
does not want his employees to hide unpleasant news or even be afraid of him, he 
arguably indicates that his employees were used to a more authoritative leadership 
style. This assumption seems to be supported by ITR8 who mentioned that IDK3 is 
very concerned about her well-being which she was not used to in her prior 
employment (Interview ITR8; April 2014; time stamp: 0:12:10.3-0:14:24.6). 
Furthermore, somewhat in line with ITR8, ITR9 stated that she prior to her position 
at ESAG had been working in Turkish associations (Interview ITR9; May 2013; 
time stamp: 0:05:18.2-0:06:02.2); both there and at her current work as sales person 
she experienced authoritarian leadership which seems to be rather ‘normal’ in the 
Turkish business segment. She said:  
You have to be hard, especially in business. (…) To work with customers, 
that’s simply a man’s job. It’s a man’s world. (…) You have to be strong; 
you simply have to be cool (…) in order to be accepted. You have to be able 
to thumb the table. That’s simply the way it is. (…) You have to prove 
yourself. (Interview ITR9; May 2013; time stamp: 0:22:15.8-0:25:26.8)  
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Following her statement, ethnic Turkish customers seem to expect the sales person 
to be a strong, authoritative negotiator who could push things forward. ITR4, the 
ware-house manager at DE-W, indicated as well that IDK3 employed a rather 
different leadership style from what he was used to. He mentioned that IDK3 would 
be his and the sales persons’ superior and if IDK3 wanted to employ new ideas “he 
does not say “Boom [ITR4 thumbs the table], that’s how we do things.” He 
communicates with them [the sales personnel (ITR7-9)] in a very nice and friendly 
way pointing out that he would like to have this change because it would probably 
excel our sales in the future” (Interview with ITR4 and IDK3; September 2014; time 
stamp: 0:55:30.0-0:57:02.5). The warehouse manager (ITR4) and the two female 
sales persons ITR8 and ITR9 thus framed IDK3 as “nice, positive and caring” 
(Interview ITR9; May 2013; time stamp: 0:06:13.1-0:07:30.6) or “sweet-natured” 
(Interview ITR8; April 2014; time stamp: 0:03:18.0-0:04:45.4). Besides being 
concerned about his employees’ wellbeing and a good working atmosphere, IDK3 is 
also characterized as loyal and hardworking (e.g., Interview ITR7; April 2014; time 
stamp: 0:10:26.1-0:12:24.8; Interview ITR4 and IDK3; September 2014; time 
stamp: 0:48:51.1-0:53:15.9). 
In summary, it seemed that IDK3 achieved his position as subsidiary leader of DE-
W for a variety of interconnected reasons: First, he seemed to have the relevant 
knowledge, skills and competencies (cultural capital) to take on the position of 
subsidiary leader. Second, he knew the logics of the field of ESAG, most importantly 
the ability to understand the work-philosophy of “Freedom with Responsibility”. In 
combination, these aspects seem to indicate that IDK3 knew how to employ his 
cultural capital in such a way that it would make meaning in the field of ESAG, i.e. 
it was recognized as valued form of capital and thus converted into symbolic capital, 
i.e., a leadership position. Third, he could always be certain of support from HQ 
because of the aforementioned philosophy of “Freedom with Responsibility”; and 
fourth, he was trusted to be successful and perform his best at all times, i.e. ESAG 
perceived him to be trustworthy on the grounds of his perceived abilities and his 
integrity. In this sense, it could be suggested that IDK3 found himself in a position 
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to reciprocate the trust bestowed in him by HQ in order to signal that he had the 
abilities and the integrity to attain the position in the first place.  
In the following I exemplify IDK3’s relation to his employees by analyzing ITR4’s 
background and activities as warehouse manager at DE-W. I decided to focus on 
ITR4 because he was newly hired and did not have had any prior experiences with 
IDK3. Nevertheless, as done in the previous paragraphs, the sales personnel’s 
experiences and interpretations of trust will also be incorporated into the following 
sections. 
 
5.3.5 ITR4: Eager, loyal and straight forward bi-cultural ware-house 
manager 
In May 2013 ITR4 started as warehouse manager at DE-W. Prior to that position he 
had been working as a mechanic with the American Air Force (Interview ITR4; May 
2013; time stamp: 0:14:59.3-0:16:42.8) where he had experienced a somewhat 
different working atmosphere than at DE-W. He pointed out that his new position at 
ESAG was ‘less stressful and controlling’ than his prior employment where he felt 
to have much more responsibility. In general, ITR4 gave the impression that he 
understood any occupation primarily as a means of solid income (Interview ITR4; 
May 2013: time stamp: 0:06:28.4-0:07:10.3). Nevertheless, having a good working 
atmosphere and relationship to his superior played an important role to him as well. 
He pointed out that he would get his orders from IDK3 and that he would follow 
them; on the other hand, he also appreciated to have some freedom in his time 
management (ibid: time stamp: 0:08:49.2-0:09:36.3). Even though ITR4 considered 
IDK3 as his superior, he also spoke of him as a colleague (ibid: time stamp: 
0:04:33.5-0:05:02.2), which seems to be in line with IDK3’s statements mentioned 
earlier (see section 5.3.4). When I spoke with ITR4 a year later, he, IDK3 and IDK5 
had become a tight and hardworking team which wanted DE-W to become a success 
(Interview ITR4 and IDK3 September 2014; time stamp: 0:04:07.6-0:05:14.4). 
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As a person, ITR4 described himself as lively and someone who needing challenges 
and not too many routines in life. He told me that he grew up in Germany and his 
strong dialect in his German language signaled his upbringing in a certain region in 
Germany. When I asked him about his cultural background, he stated (Interview 
ITR4; May 2013: time stamp: 0:17:02.3-0:18:10.8) “the way (art) to do this is to 
pick and choose and take the best of both cultures (…) when I combine all these 
aspects something wonderful emerges”, i.e. arguably a hybrid culture made up of 
bits and pieces of Turkish and German culture. This biculturalism influenced ITR4’s 
actions in a tacit way which he explained as follows: 
When you grow up within this culture there is no way of saying: I live just 
like that or like that; no that doesn’t work [hmm]. You also simply stop 
thinking about it; you simply act [hmm]. It’s only if you really sit down and 
think about one’s actions or how one lives, well then you know at once: this 
is more German what I am doing right now, more following my German 
mentality [hmm] or you know, this here is more my Turkish side [hmm], but 
it’s all routine [snatches his fingers three times] it all [yes, you already] is 
deeply ingrained. (Interview ITR4; May 2013; time stamp: 0:18:20.6-
0:18:57.0) 
Following ITR4’s account, his biculturalism has become part of his way of being in 
the world. In other words, his experiences of living as an ethnic minority Turk in 
Germany has become part of his cultural habitus which influences his actions, 
perceptions and tastes. Having a bicultural habitus on the other hand equipped him 
with a certain capital portfolio which he drew from in order to realize his actions. 
For example, through his bicultural background he had the ability to make meaning 
of IDK3’s none-authoritarian leadership style while at the same time pointing out 
how this style would be perceived by ethnic Turkish employees identifying more 
with their Turkishness which I will present at the end of the following section. 
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5.3.6 ITR7, a key account manager who wants to be promoted, and ITR8 
and ITR9 two sales persons who are content with their jobs 
As mentioned in section 5.2.1, ITR7 had moved to Germany in his teens and started 
to study marketing, yet had to give up his studies due to family issues. (Interview 
ITR7, April 2014; time stamp: 0:00:00.0-0:01:51.4). Similar to ITR4, ITR7 spoke 
fluent German, yet without a heavy dialect which arguably signified his higher 
educational level. In contrast to ITR8 and ITR9, explained ITR7 his function at DE-
W in technical terms. He told me to work as key-account manager, dealing with 
“CRM, customer relation management” (ibid: time stamp: 0:01:51.4-0:05:14.7). In 
his view CRM of ethnic Turkish customers or key-accounts would ask for personal 
contact and someone who understands the Turkish business mentality which he 
explains to differ from the Danish. Seeing these differences, ITR7 claimed that 
ESAG’s economic success could to quite some extent be explained by having sales 
personnel of ethnic Turkish origin. He argued: 
 
I am certain that having different cultures is part of the economic success 
[yes]. (…) I heard that already 15,20 years ago ESAG had tried to penetrate 
the German market [hmm] with Danish employees [hmm] and uhm that was 
a flop, that did not work out [yes]. This, I ascribe to cultural differences, uhm 
in comparison to the German, the Dane is straightforward: This is my 
product, this is the price and this is your due date for payment [hmm]: Do 
you want this product for this price? Do you pay on time? Our customer says: 
Yes, till he has received the goods and then it is not paid for or they try to 
influence the price somehow. And I think the Dane is unable to handle that 
[yes], because they are candid, they’ve been brought up like that [hmm]. 2 
and 2 is 4. In the Turkish mindset, however, 2 and 2 does not make 4; 
sometimes it is 3 and sometimes 5. [yes] And here I think that we sales 
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managers, I think [3 sec pause] we play an important role for the company’s 
success. (Interview ITR7; April 2014; time stamp: 0:25:38.6-0:29:13.3) 
Following ITR7’s account, the „Danish“ and the “ethnic Turkish market” seem to 
follow rather different rules of the game in terms of sales strategies and practices. As 
indicated in section 5.2, it seems to take ethnic Turkish personnel to grasp these 
rules and thus to penetrate the ethnic market. In other words, it could be argued that 
ESAG is only as successful as its sales personnel are managing to sell ESAG’s 
goods according to the logics of the field of ethnic business.  
Drawing on his cultural capital and his role and experiences as key-account 
manager, ITR7 pointed to many areas and practices of ESAG which he thought 
could be improved in order to enhance ESAG’s overall economic success. Yet, he 
mentioned that he never was listened to from HQ; on the contrary, he had the 
impression of top-down management. In addition, he pointed out that he did not see 
any chance for him being promoted at ESAG (ibid: 0:30:54.7-0:32:08.9).  
The aforementioned aspects influenced his trust in HQ. In regard to trust, he pointed 
out that he would not understand culture to influence trust; in his view, trust was a 
personal matter. Trust would develop over time and it is portrayed via entrusting 
him with a company car, a free time management without much control, and by 
letting him collect rather big amounts of money from the cash-customers (ibid: 
0:05:27.7-0:06:47.3). This perceived trust was more than often reciprocated by 
ITR7; he pointed out that he would have a high level of conscientiousness which he 
understood to mirror his trust in ESAG (ibid: 0:08:30.1-0:10:12.2). Yet, the trust 
bestowed in him from HQ seemed to have a rather narrow scope, i.e. HQ seemed to 
trust him in having the abilities and tools to fulfill his role as key-account manager. 
ITR7 pointed out that his employer would trust him to do his work as a sales person 
but they would not trust him on his information he would share with them 
concerning the ethnic market (ibid: 0:32:34.7-0:34:18.4).  To be listened to, to be 
taken seriously and to be recognized and awarded for his work seemed to be 
important for ITR7. Since, according to him, HQ did not take him seriously and 
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even broke promises made to him, he lost trust in ESAG HQs which resulted in a 
feeling of demotivation. As mentioned in section 5.2.1, ITR7 left ESAG in 
December 2015. 
ITR8 and ITR9 did not have an academic background but both had many years of 
experience as sales persons in the ethnic market (Interview ITR8; April 2014; time 
span: 0:01:37.0-0:02:32.7). In line with ITR7 they pointed to the importance of 
having ethnic Turkish sales personnel in order to enhance sales. Yet, while ITR9 
stressed the importance of cultural understanding (cultural capital) as means to 
foster ESAG’s success on the ethnic market, (Interview ITR9; May 2013; time 
stamp: 0:08:42.9-0:10:03.3; Interview ITR9; April 2014; time stamp: 0:05:20.0-
0:07:31.0), ITR8 pointed to the importance of her close ties to the customers (social 
capital) as significant for ESAG’s further success. ITR8 emphasized that trust 
between the sales person and customer was essential for the sales person to land a 
new brand in the market seeing that, according to ITR8, the customer would trust the 
new brand because it was she who recommended it (Interview ITR8; April 2014; 
time stamp: 0:01:37.0-0:02:32.7).  
Regarding trust building in general, ITR8 pointed out that she would start any 
relation from a rather high level of trust (0:04:45.4-0:07:25.5) and it would take 
somebody lying to her before she would lose her trust in him or her. Another reason 
for her to withdraw her trust would be if someone had been badmouthing her. 
However, she stressed that she would need proof for this action, simply telling her or 
overhearing this from a third person would not be enough for her to withdraw her 
trust, ITR8 said. Furthermore, ITR8 indicated that she would forgive people in cases 
where she could understand their untrustworthy actions. She said: 
Concerning material things, my trust his hard to breach, if it is about money 
or so, no that doesn’t break my trust. Well, it depends on what is behind this 
action; if there is a good reason for this behavior which doesn’t indicate that 
the person is a bad human being, then that’s okay. Perhaps this person has 
private or business-related issues and does not want to talk about it and that’s 
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why this person acts in this way. I am always tolerant. But if this behavior 
continues in the future then I ask the person if he or she has a problem with 
me. But I don’t put someone down, I always try to speak with them first. 
(Interview ITR8; April 2014; time stamp: 0:08:00.9-0:10:42.2)  
According to ITR8, being lied to destroys trust; yet being cheated for money or 
other material goods seems not automatically lead to her withdrawing her trust. It 
could be argued that trust is not lost when the situation or the ‘power relations in the 
field’ make a good social actor act in a negative way. In that sense, ITR8 seems to 
perceive trust in line with a moral obligation which possibly is confirmed in her 
notion of “I always give a second chance because I am a very religious person and 
God too gives us a second chance” (Interview ITR8; April 2014; time stamp: 
0:17:26.6-0:18:43.2)  
ITR9, on the other hand, seemed to approach trust with more caution. She 
considered trust to be something that has to be built up over time. It would take 
small steps and if one would not experience negative things, trust can be built. 
(Interview ITR9; May 2013; time stamp:  0:13:00.0-0:15:15.5). In her view, trust 
can emerge when a person stays authentic and does not have a “second face”. 
Therefore, according to her, it would not matter if the person would say something 
negative to her in a face-to-face conversation. Yet, similar to ITR8, she would 
consider it a breach of trust if a given person would talk bad about her behind her 
back (Interview ITR9; April 2014; time stamp: 0:10:12.6-0:12:36.5). She mentioned 
that she would consider people to be trustworthy if they had no hidden agenda, no 
‘second face’, would be authentic and not playing a role (ibid: 0:12:44.1 -0:15:55.1). 
In addition, she pointed to the importance of being listened to in order to maintain a 
trust-based relation. Quite similar to ITR7, she pointed out that her experience and 
skills would be important for ESAG and sometimes when HQs did not listen to her, 
it would hurt her, especially when she then could see that a certain decision from 
HQ would harm the company (ibid: 0:26:07.1-0:28:28.3). 
211 
 
In the following section, the sales persons’ and warehouse manager’s experiences of 
trust with their leader IDK3 are analyzed. Seeing that IDK5 is IDK3’s girlfriend, I 
decided to not analyzing her relation with IDK3. 
Experiences of trust in IDK3’s relation with ITR4 and his sales personnel ITR7, 
ITR8 and ITR9 
The abovementioned interpretations of trust showcase the different levels on which 
IDK3 and his employees would start a relation. While ITR8 expressed to commence 
any relation from a trusting perspective, IDK3 seemed to take a similar approach, 
yet, in case of work-relations he mentioned also to administer some control before 
enhancing the scope of freedom with responsibility. In case of his employees he 
explained the trust-building process as something that takes time. Taking ITR4 as an 
example, he stated that in the beginning of a relation, he  
would work closely together with him and would inform him about his work 
tasks and the way we work here. In doing so, trust will emerge. (…) Once 
they [employees in general] can show that they are able to tackle their tasks 
and work independently, well then I will give them more freedom to fulfill 
their tasks in the way they see fit. (…); that’s how trust emerges and also if 
they show they can be relied upon both at work and privately (Interview 
IDK3; FRA May 2014; time stamp: 0:35:29.4-0:35:52.6) 
According to IDK3, he trusts his staff and built this trust over time based on the 
staffs’ actions in regard to working tasks and private issues. Concerning the first and 
following steps of a new relationship with unfamiliar employees, IDK3 stressed that 
he would inform them, assist them and support them. This, so IDK3, should 
however not be experienced as control from the employees’ perspective but rather as 
trust. In relation to ITR4, he mentioned that subtle control rather than “always 
watching the other closely [kigge over nakken]” would make ITR4 feel “more 
respected or being valued” (Interview IDK3; May 2013; time stamp: (0:48:43-
0:49:54) which in turn would also enhance the employees’ motivation (Interview 
IDK3; May 2013; time stamp: 0:44:16-0:44:34).  As mentioned earlier (see section 
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5.3.4), IDK3 arguably followed a leadership style similar to what he was used when 
stationed at ESAG HQ. The main element seemed to be the notion of working and 
leading within the confines of freedom with responsibility which arguably was 
characterized by providing assistance, coaching and support, executing subtle 
control and trusting in the employees’ ability to fulfill their tasks. In order to enable 
the employees to fulfill their tasks, IDK3 provided them with the tools needed. 
Besides providing them with the cars, smart-phones, and so on, he initiated internal 
sales meetings in order for information and knowledge to be shared across the sales 
persons since they would not meet each other very often (Interview IDK3; May 
2013; time stamp: 0:27:13-0:28:23). In addition, he pointed out that his employees’ 
private lives and backgrounds were very different which gave them a different 
outlook on life (Interview IDK3; May 2013; time stamp: 0:24:20-0:25:55). 
Therefore, he would also adjust his leadership style accordingly (Interview IDK3; 
May 2013; time stamp 00.26.09-00.26.52). He stated: 
Of course it is a good thing to have it [educational background as bachelor of 
commerce] all these things. And it’s good enough to know that, but everyday 
life is quite different [yes]. It is rather more knowledge of human nature and 
stuff like that I have to use [hmm] instead of all these technical expressions. 
Those I cannot use for anything. Actually it’s like that over time I have 
gotten to know these sales persons so well that I know she wants to be treated 
like this and he like that. (Interview IDK3; May 2013; time stamp: 0:16:00-
0:16:57) 
Following his account, though he could draw on his academic knowledge to 
establish the sales subsidiary and lead his employees, his reality would influence 
which tools would be feasible to use and how they could be applied. In addition, he 
realized that he had to draw on his knowledge of human nature rather than his 
academic knowledge. It could be argued that relevant institutionalized cultural 
capital provided him with relevant knowledge and the key to get a certain position. 
Yet this form of capital did not really assist him to fulfil his tasks as outlined by HQ. 
Rather he had to draw on his abilities to build up human relations (social capital) 
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and establish trust-based interactions with his employees which he arguably 
managed to do by adjusting his interaction style according to the needs and 
preferences of the individual employee. In that sense, it could be argued that the 
specific relation drives which form and species of capital he can use to establish 
trust. In the following I present how IDK3’s employees perceived their relation to 
IDK3 in terms of trust. 
All employees pointed out that they trusted IDK3. Yet, in their interviews they 
stated different reasons for why they build up a high level of trust in their relation to 
IDK3. ITR8 and ITR9, the two female sales persons, pointed to the notion of IDK3 
being a ‘good human being’ who would be open, listening and caring (ITR8: April 
2014: time stamp: 0:02:41.0-0:03:07.4; Interview ITR9; April 2014; time stamp: 
0:12:44.1 -0:15:55.1). These aspects, ITR8 and ITR9 claimed, could be seen in 
IDK3’s eyes. Both sales persons expressed that they found IDK3’s face, eyes, his 
way of greeting and his entire body language to signal trustworthiness (ibid.). Even 
though ITR9 explained to engage in new relations in a rather skeptical way, she had 
a very positive feeling about IDK3 and “took him to her heart” from the first 
moment they met (Interview ITR9; April 2014; time stamp: 0:12:44.1 -0:15:55.1). 
As indicated earlier, ITR8 and ITR9 understood honesty and continuous positive 
experiences with the other as trust-building and maintaining aspects. In relation to 
IDK3, they pointed out that IDK3 always would keep his word, would be frank and 
honest and not having a second agenda (Interview ITR8; April 2014: time stamp: 
0:11:02.6-0:12:10.3; Interview ITR9; April 2014; time stamp: 0:12:44.1 -0:15:55.1). 
In sum, it could be argued that ITR8 and ITR9 trusted IDK3 because they believed 
in his benevolence.  
Somewhat in contrast to ITR8 and ITR9 did ITR7 and ITR4 build trust in light of 
IDK3’s abilities to ‘fight for the subsidiary’ success’. ITR7 (Interview ITR7; April 
2014; time stamp: 0:10:26.1-0:12:24.8) mentioned that IDK3 and he would “fight to 
get the best out of our goods” which I also could observe at the subsidiary where all 
employees tried to use their social capital, i.e. their family and customer networks to 
sell some chocolate which HQ thought to be sellable which however turned out to 
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not fit the ethnic market in Germany (Field notes: Observation DE-W, April/May 
2014; page 2). In that sense, all employees drew on their social capital to minimize 
ESAG’s finical losses on the ‘chocolate project’.  When asked about his trust in 
IDK3, ITR7 mentioned to have built his trust by fulfilling his role as key-account 
manager in the best possible way. He would be honest, fulfill his duties, and be loyal 
to the company (Interview ITR7; April 2014; time stamp: 0:12:43.6-0:15:32.3). It 
seems that ITR7 primarily built trust based on perceived ability and integrity. An 
important aspect which tightened his trust in IDK3, however, was that he would not 
have to fear any repercussions when he engaged in critical discussions with IDK3. 
ITR7 said: 
I told him in an open and honest manner: That’s how it looks like, this is my 
opinion and perhaps we should do it like this. [hmm] You can sack me now 
because of my opinion, but it’s the truth, well at least what I think is the truth 
[yes, yes]. This kind of frankness, I think, consolidated our trust in each 
other. (Interview ITR7; April 2014; time stamp: 0:12:43.6-0:15:32.3). 
According to ITR7, he dared to engage in a critical discussion with his superior 
despite the chance of losing his employment. Thus, he arguably already must have 
had established some trust in IDK3 which was further consolidated because IDK3 
listened to ITR7 and did not perceive constructive critique as negative. On the 
contrary, as mentioned earlier, IDK3 established internal sales meetings at DE-W in 
order to learn about the ethnic market and build a platform where the sales persons 
could share their ideas and raise concerns. ITR7 furthermore argued that he had a 
“feeling of trust” towards IDK3 and since IDK3 did not breach his trust and would 
be “respectable”, he perceived IDK3 more as a friend which would enhance his trust 
in him even more (Interview ITR7; April 2014; time stamp: 0:12:43.6-0:15:32.3). 
ITR4, the warehouse manager at DE-W, arguably build his trust in quite the same 
way as ITR7. For example, he also pointed to the importance of being listened to 
and being supported as grounds for a good collaboration which would enhance 
mutual respect (Interview ITR4; May 2013; time stamp: 0:05:09.3-0:05:47.1). In 
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line with ITR7, he pointed out that trust could be built by “paying attention” to the 
other and “considering the other’s suggestions and ideas” as well as honoring none-
work-related activities which however would save the company some money 
(Interview ITR4 and IDK3; September 2014; time stamp: 0:10:53.0-0:11:33.6). 
Arguably, these notions point to the importance of being respected and honored in 
some sense which could be said to foster a person’s symbolic capital in form of 
being recognized as a valuable employee who shows organizational commitment. In 
regard to trust building, ITR4 stresses the importance of direct face-to-face contact 
both at and outside work because only in that way one would get to know the ‘whole 
person’ and trust could be reciprocated. ITR4 mentioned: 
Trust is when people know about my good deeds and my bad sides on a 
private basis. [and] I do know IDK3 on a private basis as well, know him as a 
human being (…) and I have seen him performing good deeds and he helped 
me no matter what and that is reciprocal; I do also help him out or IDK5. (…) 
and here you can talk about trust. Between me, IDK3 and IDK5 there is trust. 
We are mutually committed to each other [hmm] at least concerning the work 
[hmm] yes? [ITR4 turns to IDK3 who nods] yes [IDK3: yes]. That’s how I 
see it. (Interview ITR4 and IDK3; September 2014; time stamp: 0:06:31.9-
0:09:50.0) 
Following ITR4’s account, he understands trust only to be possible if one has 
personal and private connections and knowledge about the other. Trust seems to be 
related to knowing about ‘the whole person’ including the good and bad sides. In 
addition trust is understood to be reciprocated. In that sense, being recognized and 
valued for one’s actions is understood to foster trust. A decisive factor for trust 
however was intensified cooperation towards reaching a common goal. According to 
ITR4 he and IDK3 have been struggling together to keep the subsidiary running 
which has resulted in a high level of trust built on mutual identification (Interview 
ITR4 and IDK3 September 2014; time stamp: 0:04:07.6-0:05:14.4). As mentioned 
elsewhere, this mutual identification seemed to be triggered by a raising distrust to 
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HQ which I already hinted at in section 5.1 and 5.2 and therefore only present 
briefly.  
Experiences of trust in IDK3’s and De-W’s relation to HQ 
As mentioned earlier, ITR7 perceived HQ to trust him with his work-related tasks, 
yet, to refuse to trust his knowledge of the ethnic market which he pointed out to 
HQs when sharing information with them regarding the workings of the ethnic 
market. The reluctance of HQ to listen to the subsidiary employees’ information and 
to incorporate their cultural knowledge (cultural capital) in ESAG’s marketing and 
sales strategies became visible during a Monday meeting, which I already presented 
in section 5.2.1. During this meeting, it became apparent that HQ decisions were 
made without taking the sales persons’ information about the market seriously. HQ’s 
reaction resulted in the sales personnel’s’ withdrawal of knowledge sharing and left 
IDK3 in a situation where he felt rather disheartened (Field notes: Observation DE-
W, April/May 2014; page 3-4). During this meeting it became apparent that HQ’s 
reaction was interpreted as caused by a lack of contextual knowledge (ITR9 spoke 
of “they are not looking at us face-to-face”; ibid: page 4, first line). ITR4 made a 
similar notion in regard to HQ not knowing what it would mean to work in a sales 
subsidiary such as DE-W (Interview ITR4 and IDK3 September 2014; time stamp: 
0:04:07.6-0:05:14.4). IDK3 expressed similar concerns when indicating that HQ did 
not grasp their situation (ibid: 0:12:50.4-0:14:01.3). In addition, IDK3 pointed out 
that he would wish for more direct face-to-face contact and interest from HQ in DE-
W (ibid: 0:14:11.3-0:14:55.2). Instead, he felt that he had to tackle tasks which were 
not part of his contract and actually had to be fulfilled by HQ (Interviews: IDK3; 
FRA May 2014; time stamp: Interview 0:34:57.6-0:35:29.4). Yet, perhaps the most 
important factor influencing his trust in HQs negatively was that IDK3 got the 
impression that HQ reneged on its promise to support DE-W in the best possible 
way. In other words, the entire staff at DE-W felt let down and unfairly treated. This 
feeling of ‘injustice’ arguably led to enhanced mutual identification of the entire 
DE-W staff which positioned itself somewhat opposite to HQs at least in regard to 
how they would treat their competitors which ITR9 expressed as “we are not a 
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hostile company. We treat others with respect” (Field notes: Observation DE-W, 
April/May 2014; page 4). Based on the above statements the staff at DE-W seemed 
to have developed identification-based trust. 
In summary, these two mutually reinforcing process of trusting may look as follows: 
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Figure 15: The processes of trusting between IDK3 and his staff at DE-W in 
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In short, openness and honest interest in the other and his/her everyday parred with 
extended mutual experiences in the field of Ethnic Sales seemingly fostered trust 
between IDK3 and his employees at DE-W. This trust was apparently further 
consolidated by some HQ decisions which all members of DE-W perceived as 
‘incorrect and unfair’ and possibly mirroring a disinterest or even ignorance in 
regard to the subsidiary staff’s situation. As argued, the sales person’s and 
subsidiary leader’s perception of ‘not being listened to’ and ‘not being involved’ 
seemed to be perceived as ‘not being recognized as knowledgeable actor on the 
Ethnic market’. Due to perceived malevolence from the side of HQs, IDK3’s 
relation to his employees at DE-W seemingly reached the level of identification-
based trust, while at the same time his trusting relation to HQs with IDK4 as his 
direct superior turned into a relation in which trust was absent and not needed in 
order to continue the collaboration for the sake of the company. 
  
5.4 Continued misalignment of logics and cultural othering as 
hampering trust 
But there is this huge difference between them [the ethnic Turkish 
employees]. ITR10 doesn’t have this proudness at all; it’s not that high as in 
many others of our employees of the same culture. In that sense, he is much 
more Austrian. He himself says that’s because he’s been very sick and close 
to dying, that this changed his perspective; he doesn’t get carried away with 
trivialities; he has a different view of life and this seems to have shuttered his 
proudness, I think. Whereas ITR6 and ITR14 are really proud; as soon as 
they feel that one perhaps doesn’t really understand them, they seal 
themselves off a bit. And there has been a lot going on at DE-E lately with 
internal conflicts and such things, that’s a bit difficult. (Interview IDK1; 
January 2015; time stamp: 0:38:31.5-0:40:13.1) 
220 
 
In the previous sections, I described in what ways IDK1 and IDK3 employed 
leadership to adjust to or bridge the perceived and experienced differences between 
HQ and the sales subsidiaries. I argued that they employed a ‘fragmented leadership 
style’ to convert HQ policies and practices to what they called ‘the reality’, i.e. the 
sales subsidiaries immersed in the field of ethnic sales. In so doing, IDK1 and IDK3 
arguably managed to construct a joint understanding of how HQ’s expectations were 
to be put into practice by the sales personnel. As previously mentioned, while ITR1 
and the sales staff at DE-W generally did accept IDK1’s and IDK3’s suggestions 
and ‘orders’ respectively, ITR2 often took the side of his customers and would thus 
challenge the suggested directives from IDK1. ITR2’s identification with his 
customers seemingly led to a variety of struggles over what could be called best 
practice on the ethnic market or, to follow Bourdieu, they struggled over the rules of 
the game and thus also over their influence in changing these rules. In the case of 
DE-W, the entire staff seemed to struggle over these rules in relation to HQ. While 
DE-W’s struggles led to diminished trust in HQ, IDK1 and ITR2 managed to resolve 
them on both sides by discussing the other’s perspective and thus experienced each 
other’s way of thinking. Arguably, as postulated in Section 5.3, these struggles 
enabled trusting because of their ability to learn from each other’s experiences and 
thus enhance familiarity with each other. As pointed out in section 5.2.3, IDK2 
seemed to struggle with her employees over how to work in the most efficient 
manner, which she expressed along the lines of ‘speaking the same language, using 
IT whenever possible, and not exploiting ESAG’s notion of working within the 
confines of Freedom with Responsibility’. The latter represented a serious struggle 
between her (IDK2) and ITR5, a trainee with Turkish roots who grew up in 
Denmark and started his traineeship at HQ’s department of sales support. Whereas 
IDK1 seemed to manage mediating between ESAG HQ and both his and the sales 
persons’ preferred ways of working towards ESAG’s business goals, IDK2 seemed 
to struggle with this issue, especially when employees with Turkish heritage seemed 
to express ‘pride’ or what she considered to be mirroring a ‘proud attitude’, as 
indicated in the quote above. In that quote, IDK2 also mentioned that ITR10 no 
longer ‘focused on trivialities’, which seems to refer to ‘proudness’. Perhaps IDK2 
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considered ‘showing proudness or being proud’ a ‘triviality’ which was no longer 
important for ITR10. It could be argued that IDK2 may have been implying that 
being ‘proud of oneself’ was a typical cultural trait of ethnic Turkish employees and 
that whenever it is ‘practiced’ cooperation becomes difficult. It could also be argued 
though that what IDK2 understood as ‘proudness’ and seemingly assumed to be a 
cultural trait, could rather be explained as a struggle for recognition; a struggle of 
the ethnic minority Turks to be respected in terms of their culture, education, and 
life experiences. As ESAG’s ethnic Turkish workforce represents an ethnic minority 
not only within ESAG but also within their host country societies, i.e. Austria, 
Germany and Denmark, this struggle for recognition seems to address at least two 
levels: recognition within ESAG and within the Austrian, German and Danish 
societies. I will describe and analyze these and further issues during the presentation 
of Finding 4: Continued misalignment of logics and cultural othering present 
major barriers for trust. 
In this section, I explore the sales support manager’s (IDK2) relationships to two co-
workers with Turkish backgrounds, one of whom worked at the Austrian sales 
subsidiary AT (ITR10) and one employee (ITR5) who started as a trainee in the 
department of sales support at HQ (see figure 16 below). The analysis will show that 
IDK2’s relationships differed greatly in terms of trust and this section identifies 
possible reasons for these differences. I point out how intensive identification with 
the “Other” seems to lead to trust, while shifting attitudes of the same sales support 
manager towards a Danish trainee with a Turkish background seems to have led to 
distrust through episodes of “Othering” (Rawls & David 2006), which arguably 
revolved around the notions of ‘efficiency’ and ‘proudness’. In addition, this section 
points out how aspects of familiarity in terms of language, situation, and 
identification with the “Other” influence trust building. The empirical material 
illustrates how combinations of cultural and organizational structures, including the 
understanding of organizational rules and role-relationships, seem to influence the 
situated identification of the “Other”, which eventually seems to effect trusting. 
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By drawing on observational and interview data, I demonstrate the shift in IDK2’s 
attitude as being influenced by a combination of cross-cultural experiences made in 
the past, an implicit understanding of the company culture, her attitude towards non-
Danes showing ‘proudness’, her own work-related role, and the situated practices 
taking place within the sales support department. During the case study, I met and 
talked with the followers with Turkish backgrounds and the Danish sales support 
manager on several occasions, both in work-related formal meetings and in more 
informal settings. Including both sets of data helps to understand the relationship 
between the Danish leader and her non-Danish followers, while simultaneously 
assisting to identify the broader cultural and situational factors and their influence on 
changes in the foundations of trust as well as changes in the social actors’ identities. 
In addition, the qualitative data demonstrate the linkage between the Danish leader’s 
practices and HQ’s overall implicit directives. Predominantly, the analysis of the 
empirical material from IDK2’s leader-employee relationships suggests an 
underlying aversion towards employees who do not comply with the unwritten rules 
of the company and who fail to ‘fit in’ as they seemingly exercise misplaced pride, 
which in her eyes hampers efficiency. The following figure provides a brief 
overview on the relations in question. 
 
Figure: 16: Overview on IDK2’s leader-employee relations (solid red lines) 
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5.4.1 IDK2: Efficient and professional with a focus on motivation 
At the time of this study, IDK2 was the leader of the so-called sales support 
department at HQ where she was responsible for 15 employees (Interview IDK2; 
April 2013; time stamp: 0:00:45.0 - 0:03:46.1). Prior to that position, she worked in 
several of ESAG’s departments: 9 years in accounting, 9 years in the logistics 
department, 3 years in ethnic sales and the last 2 years in sales support, which she 
developed and which had not previously existed (ibid; 0:35:39.3-0:36:21.8). Thus, 
she has had experience of all sales support tasks during those 21 years at ESAG, 
which she used to re-model the entire structure concerning sales support in 2011. 
Her thoughts on how to make sales support more efficient resulted in the structure I 
observed at the time of this research (ibid; time stamp: 0:06:32.5-0:06:58.1). In 
IDK2’s words, the new structure resulted in more streamlined practices, less 
redundant work, more motivation since all employees had to be able to work with all 
aspects of sales support, less dependency on individual employees and thus the 
erosion of the idea of being indispensable (ibid. time stamp: 0:06:32.5-0:08:47.4). 
An important tool in her work was a software program (Axapta) with which she 
seemed to be extremely familiar and which was why she was the one to instruct the 
subsidiary employees at DE-E and AT in its correct use, i.e. in the same way as at 
HQ. In addition to having been in face-to-face contact during the ‘Axapta-course’, 
she was in contact with all three sales subsidiaries on a daily basis, whereby her 
main contact persons were ITR6 at DE-E and ITR10 at AT (see figure 16). 
IDK2 pointed out that almost all her employees at the subsidiaries were ethnic Turks 
and Muslims; yet, despite that, she had often thought about how different they were 
in terms of collaborating. She explained: 
I often think about how different they are. At DE-E there are ITR6 and 
ITR14 and both are real Muslims, wearing head-scarves and ITR6 prays 
every day and on Fridays at noon she joins the Friday prayer at the local 
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mosque and sometimes it seems that she doesn’t really understand her 
colleagues, who are not that religious as she is. But we really collaborate well 
with each other and I cannot really feel that they have another culture; they 
are so easy to work with; they really accept ESAG and everything is done in 
the right way. They do not question many things and they are not that 
moneygrubbing. But at AT they do a lot of double-checking (...) and they 
have distributed their work tasks and no one wants to work with the others’ 
tasks. That’s a work mode I would not like to work under if I had anything to 
say. And then the issues we had with them in order to link them to Axapta. 
This negative attitudes. (...) There is something going on there which I think 
is related to their culture and religious beliefs. (...)  For example, if we say we 
cannot deliver the goods, they [DE-E] believe us and say, we up here have 
taken the right decision in terms of who should get the produced goods. But 
in Austria there is often a lot of fighting: “Well, how can that be and why?” 
They seem to always be in need of an explanation. (Interview IDK2; April 
2013; time stamp: 0:11:49.5-0:19:45.2 and 0:24:16.2 - 0:24:54) 
In my understanding, this quote not only visualizes in what ways IDK2 perceived 
DE-E to be different from AT but also seems to picture IDK2’s understanding of 
how culture may influence cooperation. During IDK2’s explanation of her 
collaborations with DE-E and AT, she proposed that differences in culture and 
religion did not hamper her collaboration with ITR6 and ITR14 at DE-E. Following 
her account, her good collaboration was founded on ITR6 and ITR14’s attitude of 
not asking too many questions and in general believing in HQ-decisions. In other 
words, employees at DE-E fulfilled the tasks they were given and did not challenge 
IDK2’s or HQ’s directives, which IDK2 arguably experienced as ‘trust’. However, it 
could also be argued that in this case, all employees, including the leaders, accepted 
their positions. IDK2’s experience with regards to DE-E furthermore seems to be 
consistent with IDK1’s experience with ITR1, the main sales person at DE-E (see 
Section 5.3). Nevertheless, even though IDK2’s collaboration with DE-E’s 
employees seems to have been less troublesome than that with AT, IDK2 pointed 
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out that she considered ITR6 and, in fact, all employees of Turkish origin to be 
somewhat “honor-seeking or struggling for self-aggrandizement (ærekær)” 
(Interview IDK2; April 2013; time stamp: 0:36:21.8-0:38:53.4). According to IDK2, 
she had this impression because ITR14 needed to call her repeatedly in order to use 
Axapta correctly because ITR6 had not taught her well enough. IDK2 reckoned that 
ITR14 was not supposed to be as good as ITR6, which according to IDK2 is a 
general issue within Turkish culture. Therefore, IDK2 reasoned that, ultimately, 
Turks are not that good at knowledge-sharing because they want to be irreplaceable. 
Obviously, as mentioned above, such an approach does not harmonize with IDK2’s 
desire for efficiency and her approach of teaching all her employees every function 
of sales support so that they could fill in for each other if necessary. The notion of 
having an honor-seeking attitude seems to be in tune with IDK2’s idea that ethnic 
Turks seem to have a certain ‘proudness’, as mentioned in the quote at the beginning 
of this chapter. This experience seems to be consistent with ITR2’s notion of being 
and showing ‘self-confidence’ (see Section 5.3.3). It could be that what IDK2 
experienced as ‘pride’ or, to use a rather negative expression, ‘self-aggrandizement’ 
refers to the ethnic minority Turks’ situation as employees and residents with a 
migration background living and working in Austria and Germany. As hinted at 
earlier, ethnic minorities seem to struggle for recognition in several ways. Firstly, 
within ESAG they seem to struggle to be fully accepted, i.e. promoted on the same 
terms as their fellow ethnic Danish co-workers. Secondly, they struggle to be 
accepted as a fully-fledged citizen of their host countries.  
In terms of the promotion and employment of ethnic minorities at ESAG, it could 
furthermore be argued that ethnic minority Turks struggle for employment in 
general, considering that their unemployment rate exceeds that of the ethnic 
majorities in Austria and Germany (Kahanec et al. 2010), as mentioned earlier. 
Moreover, as stated by Pütz et al. (2007:501), ethnic minority Turks seem to be 
‘reduced’ to simply being Turks in spite of the fact that many of them identify with 
both their Turkish and host-country cultures simultaneously; thus, their self-
understanding is arguably ‘reduced’ to fit the ethnic majority’s stereotypical 
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conception of a ‘Turk’. In other words, ITR6’s and the other ethnic minority 
employees’ struggles for respect in their roles and/or positions and their fight for not 
being reduced to simply any employee might be triggered by the overall struggle for 
identification and acceptance as a fully-fledged member of society. 
In general, IDK2 perceived culture to not play a critical role in her leadership 
practices as long as her employees followed her lead and worked as expected; this 
notion may arguably mirror efficiency. However, whenever she experienced her 
leadership to be difficult or even resembling a fight she held cultural differences 
responsible for these issues, as mentioned in the quote above. Nevertheless, she 
stated that she would have to accept these struggles because ESAG’s top 
management had decided to hire ‘Turks’ and she would, of course, respect Turkish 
culture even though it caused her some difficulties because: “one shouldn’t simply 
think that we are the right ones and they are wrong” (Interview IDK2; April 2013; 
time stamp: 0:49:36.8-0:50:23.5). Nevertheless, HQ personnel, including IDK2, held 
the power to decide what should be considered ‘right or wrong’. In the case of 
IDK2, any work practice she considered to be inefficient was to be abolished, such 
as the above-mentioned use of pencil and paper. According to IDK2, this did not 
make sense as a computers were available and would furthermore enhance overall 
transparency (Interview IDK2; January 2015; time stamp: 1:38:06.8-1:48:36.3).  
Yet, at the same time she realized that her criticism of ITR6’s preferred working 
style was relevant regarding ITR6’s trust in her, which she claimed had been eroded 
due to unfortunate leadership practices by her, but also by her colleagues. The 
perceived erosion of trust between IDK2 and ITR6 is further analyzed below. 
Following IDK2’s account, misinterpreted yet well-meaning leadership seems to 
have negatively influenced her relationship with ITR6.  
With regards to leadership, IDK2 did not point out exactly how she interacted with 
her employees and what she understood to be her main tasks. Yet, based on my 
observations at the sales support department and the interviews conducted with 
IDK2, it seems that she primarily understood her role as being the advocate for 
‘efficiency at work’, which included the prominent task of ensuring all employees 
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properly and transparently used the Axapta software. As the driving force behind the 
restructuring of sales support functions, she became the company’s Axapta expert. 
In that role, she offered support and assistance to all employees with questions 
related to the program’s functions and proper use. All subsidiary employees stated 
that she assisted them whenever they needed help. Moreover, IDK2 was perceived 
to be friendly and nice, which may mirror her main interests which, according to 
her, are soft values such as “motivation and well-being” (Interview IDK2; January 
2015; time stamp: 1:54:24.6-1:58:41.1). Concerning these ‘soft values’, IDK2 stated 
that she most likely got the job as department leader because she was interested in 
these soft values, although she also had to fight to get them accepted as being 
important at ESAG (ibid.). As she was the only female leader at HQ, she may have 
had the impression that she had to balance the focus on arguably ‘female’ soft values 
with a seemingly more ‘masculine’ focus on efficiency. In any case, she argued that 
the restructuring of sales support resulted in more motivated employees (Interview; 
IDK2; April 2013; time stamp: 0:04:00.8 - 0:06:25.1 and 0:30:36.8-0:33:06.0) and 
enhanced efficiency and transparency. Nevertheless, as mentioned in Section 5.2.3, 
these changes were understood differently at the subsidiary level, leading to some 
struggles. Regarding struggles and conflicts, IDK2 perceived that the leader should 
play a conflict resolving role. However, she also mentioned that if a conflict 
between individual employees should persist, then the leader should withdraw 
because “the parties have to learn that it is their responsibility alone to solve the 
conflict as the aim of any department staff is to work together efficiently” 
(Interview/Field notes; IDK2; January 2015: time stamp: 1:38:06.8-1:48:36.3). This 
implies that IDK2 expected her staff to be loyal to their role as employees at ESAG 
rather than letting their individual characteristics interfere with their work. As 
mentioned in Section 5.1.1, IDK2’s statement seems to substantiate my argument 
that even though ESAG presents itself as a family business with a focus on 
relationships and freedom, it also very much focuses on its employees not letting 
their human side interfere with business and thus their role in the company. This 
arguably shines through in the use of the ‘machine-room’ metaphor, which was used 
in particular regarding IDK2’s department of sales support.  In other words, IDK2’s 
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notion of efficiency seems to imply that she expected her staff to work according to 
their roles and those rules and work practices she deemed most efficient, which in 
turn might have made her employees’ actions more aligned, streamlined and 
predictable. It could be argued that her leadership primarily concerned making the 
parts in her ‘machine-room’ fit each other to enhance their overall functioning, 
which she expressed as also enhancing her staff’s motivation. My observational data 
seem to substantiate this, as IDK2 is very often asked for assistance and she is 
dependent on decisions taken by co-workers, as the following excerpt from my field 
notes illustrates: 
13:40: Four people stand in the office and talk about an order which they 
need to have accounted by 14:00. However, IDK2 still has to wait for a 
decision from IDK1. She goes over to the department of ethnic sales and asks 
them to hurry up. IDK1 says: “Well, yes I still have the people to pay for it.” 
Thus, many practices depend on each other and so do the people working 
with it. The co-worker from accountancy leaves the office again. Co-workers 
speed up, which is visible as they walk much faster now and the typing is 
faster as well. IDK2 still speaks in a very friendly voice. (Field notes; Sales 
Support; January 2015; page 3)   
The above passage not only indicates that practices are intertwined and that 
therefore staff from ethnic sales, accountancy and sales support have to function 
together and depend on each other’s work practices and role fulfillment. It also 
becomes clear that IDK2 and her co-workers do not appear to get easily stressed and 
do not lose their temper, something that IDK2 found especially inappropriate in 
ITR3’s leadership style as it had a negative influence on the staff (Interview IDK2; 
January 2015; time stamp: 1:02:43.8-1:06:15.4). 
Not only work processes were interpreted as being intertwined; IDK2 furthermore 
indicated that she understood some work practices to influence trust processes 
between certain persons, which in turn might influence these persons’ wider 
organizational networks. She described an issue at ESAG’s “detail department”, 
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which deals with detail businesses. Here, some goods could not be sold and so had 
to be destroyed. Instead of having the loss figured at the “detail department” at HQ, 
the head of that department decided that the Austrian subsidiary should take the loss. 
However, this decision was not communicated to them. IDK2 said: 
And then I think: Fine, if that’s what (name of head of “detail department”) 
has decided, then that’s how it is. But then I ask him to communicate this 
decision to them, and this he simply didn’t do. And there is also the issue that 
he doesn’t speak German very well and communicates in English with ITR3. 
And then I think it’s really annoying that one cannot establish a shared 
understanding of this issue. And then I can definitely understand that trust 
erodes. I think this is irritating. (…) This decision has been taken but it is also 
their responsibility to ensure that it is communicated accordingly to maintain 
the trust that is between us. And it seems that there are some up here who do 
not take this seriously enough, which I think is important considering my 
close cooperation with them. If we didn’t have such a close collaboration 
with them and didn’t converse that much, well then: “whatever”. But this is 
really irritating. This is exactly about trust. (Interview IDK2; January 2015; 
time stamp: 1:08:17.0-1:09:35.9) 
Following IDK2’s account, a trusting relationship between her department at HQ 
and the Austrian subsidiary workforce was jeopardized by a HQ leader who did not 
deem it necessary to inform AT about a decision that would negatively affect AT’s 
budget. During IDK2’s explanation, she pointed out that some employees at HQ 
apparently may not understand the importance of proper communication with 
subsidiaries, neither did they seem to understand the relationship between proper 
communication and trust maintenance. It could be argued that some at HQ did not 
consider it crucial to inform the subsidiaries about their decisions as they had the 
position and power to make these decisions in the first place. Perhaps, in line with 
IDK1’s and IDK4’s notions of Turks believing in steep hierarchies (see Section 5.1), 
they might even have drawn on a similar stereotypical understanding of Turkish 
people and thus might have assumed that they were simply used to adhering to 
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hierarchies and therefore did not need to be informed at all. Yet, as mentioned 
earlier, it has been the Austrian subsidiary employees in particular who always 
requested an explanation of HQ’s actions that affected them (Interview IDK2; April 
2013; time stamp: 0:11:49.5-0:19:45.2 and 0:24:16.2 - 0:24:54). However, it was 
mainly IDK2 who was contacted to provide these explanations, even when she was 
not responsible for the given decision. IDK2 stated that:  
Whenever she was at the Austrian subsidiary, she would get all these 
questions and had to tackle the issues ITR3 had with the rest of HQ. And then 
she had to say that this was not her area of responsibility but that she would 
take it to the right person. In some way, IDK2 understood ITR3, but these 
things are still annoying since she would have liked to have that trust-based 
relationship with them in Austria. (Field notes; interview IDK2; January 
2015; time stamp: 1:09:35.9-1:15:00.0) 
IDK2’s accounts demonstrate that restricted knowledge about the others’ needs may 
lead to an erosion of trust when someone, for example, does not provide another 
with the information he or she seeks. As hinted at, stereotyping might also result in 
practices which hinder trust development since they neither take the individual 
(ITR3 and her need for information) nor the context (i.e. the Austrian subsidiary that 
has to make a profit) into account. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that in 
the abovementioned case a combination of interacting factors led to the erosion of 
trust between HQ and AT. The HQ leader did not know the Austrian subsidiary 
workforce as well as IDK2 and therefore might have called upon a somewhat 
stereotypical understanding of how ‘Turks’ would react to ‘top-down decision 
making’, namely that they would simply accept it. Since he did not seem to know 
the subsidiary leader in person, he could not know that this approach was far from 
the truth. Throughout our conversations, ITR3 stressed that she understood ESAG to 
be built on teamwork, communication and information sharing. She stated: 
Communication is an issue. Sometimes people forget to communicate and as 
I said, teamwork only functions if you are able to communicate. It doesn’t 
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matter if we sit there together or not; if I don’t tell you what’s going on, you 
cannot know what’s going on. (…) But I have raised this issue earlier and 
pointed out that there is a lack of communication. And they [HQ] tried many 
things but it’s still far from perfect. (…) But we need to know what’s going 
on. And especially detailed information is missing. For example if somebody 
has developed something new then others could assist and together we could 
perhaps develop the idea even further. And more communication would also 
enhance our feeling of belonging. And that is a human need as well. 
(Interview ITR3; May 2013; time stamp: 2:03:27.9-2:22:06.7) 
Following ITR3’s account, communication seems to be the most essential factor in 
good cooperation, innovation and inclusion. However, communication between HQ 
and the subsidiaries was also identified as one of ESAG’s major weaknesses. As 
communication enhances knowledge and familiarity with each other, i.e. with the 
individual employee instead of the unknown group (the Turks), more frequent and 
informative communication would probably lead to cooperation that is less based on 
stereotypes. Hence, investing time and effort in more reasonable communication 
could be expected to result in improved actions that take the individual and the 
context into account instead of being based on stereotypical understandings and a 
lack of contextual knowledge. 
Whereas IDK2 experienced erosions of trust from the Austrian subsidiary regarding 
HQ, including herself, she expressed that she trusted her co-workers at HQ and the 
subsidiaries as well as her leaders. In a manner similar to yet less pronounced than 
IDK1 (see section 5.3.1), IDK2 pointed out that one simply had to trust co-workers 
and superiors and especially superiors’ decisions (Interview IDK2; April 2013; time 
stamp: 0:24:16.2 - 0:24:54.6). It seems that she, like IDK1, was endowed with a 
rather high level of dispositional trust. Yet, in contrast to IDK1, it appears that 
IDK2’s trust could be easily diminished when the trustees failed to live up to the 
abilities IDK2 perceived them to have. According to IDK2, she did not have much 
trust in those whose tasks finally ended up on her own desk. In other words, she 
perceived these persons as unable to do their work properly. This appears to refer to 
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the notion of efficiency, because some employees are assessed as having the ability 
to fulfill their tasks, but are eventually not able to realize them, which obviously 
diminishes both the company’s and IDK2’s efficiency as she had to take on these 
extra tasks. Thus, it seems that IDK2 interpreted trust along the lines of Mayer et 
al.’s (1995) notion of ‘perceived ability’ and thus assessed the trustees’ skills and 
competencies needed to fulfill certain tasks in order to judge their trustworthiness. 
Yet, as the following analysis of her employee relationships will show, IDK2 also 
seemed to trust based on a perceived identification with the other. 
    
5.4.2 ITR10: A humble warehouse and order manager of Turkish origin  
ITR10 was raised in Austria and, according to him, could think like an Austrian. 
However, he also pointed out that he felt culturally closer to the Turks even though 
he knew and identified with Austrians. He stated that he lived in both cultures and 
that therefore culture did not play a role for him in terms of his work (Interview 
ITR10; December 2014; time stamp: 0:18:19.3-0:22:49.3). He joined the Austrian 
subsidiary in 2009 where he became responsible for warehousing and order 
management (Interview ITR10; May 2013; time stamp: 0:00:11.6-0:02:46.8). Thus, 
he spent about 50% of his working hours at the desk at AT’s office with his female 
colleagues, and the other half in the adjacent warehouse with his male colleagues. 
ITR10 was the most recent employee hired at AT, and he learned his tasks and AT’s 
rules of the game from his female colleagues and his leader ITR3. Besides his daily 
contact with his subsidiary colleagues, he mentioned IDK2 as his main contact 
person at HQ, with whom he spoke on a daily basis (Interview ITR10; May 2013; 
time stamp: 0:11:14.7-0:11:55.2). In addition, the daily telephone calls to HQ he 
used the software program Axapta to keep in contact with HQ or even, as he 
expressed it, to ‘be at ESAG’: 
Now I enter IDK2’s office (…). I can see what the Danes are up to tomorrow 
and vice versa of course as well; they can also have a look at everything and 
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we all use the same server; it’s as if all of us would be sitting in a huge 
company in Denmark. (Interview ITR10; May 2013; time stamp: 0:27:20.3-
0:31:22.4) 
Following ITR10’s statement, the software system and the common server seems to 
establish a feeling of belonging to one common company in Denmark. The system is 
furthermore perceived to establish transparency because one can see what the others 
are doing in terms of sales, orders, profits and so on. Nevertheless, ITR10 stressed 
that personal contact was important in developing a good relationship and feelings 
of togetherness and belonging. Furthermore, he pointed out that personal contact 
also enabled trust building: 
To me, personal contact is extremely important. But you can also easily 
destroy the trust you have built up over 4 years within one conversation in 
which you may make a stupid comment or show a resolute attitude. 
(Interview ITR10; May 2013; time stamp: 0:31:32.9-0:32:52.1) 
According to ITR10, personal contact can thus not only assist trust building but may 
also result in the diminishing of trust, depending on one’s actions. In line with the 
overwhelming majority of this study’s interactants, ITR10 mentioned that trust 
building takes time but that it can be broken within seconds. During his further 
account on the importance of personal contact, he started conceptualizing trust as a 
process in which he would try to read the other persons to know how they were 
doing and then he would take his steps. These steps would, however, have to be 
taken cautiously in order not to act in a way that would destroy the trust built so far. 
For him, successful trust building means establishing a series of positive interactions 
that are not interrupted by conflicts, which do, of course, occur. Nevertheless, 
according to ITR10, the trust building process can be continued with a sincere, 
honest and benevolent attitude. In any relationship one should move with caution, 
ITR10 argued (ibid.). In order for others to trust him, he pointed out that  
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Every company has rules of the game and if you stick to them, then you 
normally do not face any problems. In our business you have to take care of 
or pay attention to a few things: It’s not my father’s money I might lose when 
I make a mistake; and I have to feed my family with the money I earn here. 
Therefore, I am as flexible as I can be; I do my best for the company. 
(Interview ITR10; May 2013; time stamp: 0:33:24.7-0:35:10) 
According to ITR10’s account, in his job there are two issues to which he must pay 
attention: First, he works with money that does not belong to him, and second, he 
needs his wages in order to make ends meet. Thus, he seems to be responsible to 
both his leader and ESAG in general and his family. He understands these two 
worlds to belong together. However, in contrast to the Danish workforce at HQ, who 
arguably follow the illusio of working for ‘fun and self-evolvement’ as hinted at in 
section 5.1, ITR10 works for money in order to make ends meet, or as he put it, “to 
earn my daily bread” (Interview ITR10; May 2013; time stamp: 0:33:24.7-
0:35:10.6). In light of the aforementioned rather high unemployment rate of ethnic 
minorities in Austria, it seems that ITR10 may perhaps struggle to find another job 
should he have to leave the company. Therefore, he always seemed to fully invest 
himself at work, which resonates with Bourdieu’s statement on fields as “a 
meaningful world, a world endowed with sense and value, in which it is worth 
investing one’s energy” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:127). On the other hand, the 
above statement also seems to indicate that ITR10 sees his employment as a tool to 
fulfilling his obligations as head of the family, i.e. providing it with financial 
security. In other words, ITR10 uses his cultural and social capital to transfer it into 
economic capital, which then again can be converted into social capital in the form 
of security. As economic capital is very important to him in order to meet his 
family’s expectations, he has to invest his knowledge and skills in ESAG and 
probably does not dare to risk his employment. Regarding trust, the above quote 
may indicate that as long as ITR10 follows the rules of the game, there is nobody 
who could complain about him and thus endanger his position. Moreover, following 
the rules seems to offer some predictability, or at least some sense of familiarity in 
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the form of having made the experience that people in general follow the rules laid 
out by the company. Thus trusting, or perhaps confidence in the other, seems to be 
enhanced when one follows the rules of the company. These, however, have to be 
learned and experienced, as ITR10 pointed out. But even though rules exist and may 
be known, ITR10 stated that these can be employed in different ways by different 
people. Therefore, one would have to spend time together in order to experience 
how the other reacts in certain situations. Common embodied experiences thus seem 
to be important for ITR10 as they represent stepping stones of trust building, 
especially if these experiences are made in challenging situations: “It’s only in tricky 
and challenging situations that you really get to know the other: How do they react, 
what makes them tick, what are their personal boundaries? If everything goes fine 
and runs normally, it’s really hard to assess people” (Interview ITR10; May 2013; 
time stamp: 0:39:04.7-0:40:32.9). According to ITR10, it is in situations of conflict 
or perceived struggles that one discovers another’s way of acting and thinking. Thus, 
it seems that normal situations do not help in assessing the other. Following this line 
of thought, it could be suggested that employees who follow formal rules are rather 
predictable and thus the risk of them behaving differently is relatively low. 
Consequently, these situations may not need to be built on trust, neither do they 
seem to foster trust. Rather, as mentioned by ITR10, it is the unknown and 
challenging situations that are jointly experienced that demonstrate the reactions 
another is capable of, and thus their perceived trustworthiness can be revealed. This 
notion seems to resonate with Lewicki & Bunker’s (1996) notion of knowledge-
based trust. According to them, trust may be built by going through a series of 
interactions with a certain other. In doing so, one would accumulate knowledge 
about their interaction patterns and thus it would be possible to anticipate the other’s 
actions. However, according to ITR10, it appears to be the challenging situations, 
and not simply any normal situation, in which you gain real knowledge of the other. 
ITR10 explained the process of trusting similar to as outlined by Lewicki & Bunker: 
Trust well [4 sec pause] trust can only emerge over time, yes. [hmm] You can 
get trust in advance [Vertrauensvorschuss] but in the end … you cannot build 
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trust without giving it time. Firstly you have to get to know each other and 
find out how the person reacts or how he reacted earlier [hmm]. And the sum 
of all these experiences is either 100% trust or a feeling of not being sure. 
Therefore, I think trust is like a series which should not be broken. [hmm] As 
I said you can ruin trust within 5 minutes. But from the moment I started here 
4 years ago, I see it as a golden series [hmm] yes. [ITR10 smiles] [yes, yes] 
and uhm … trust is the sum of many experiences made with another human 
being. (…) You need time to be sure; without time there is no trust. 
(Interview ITR10; May 2013; time stamp: 0:40:48.7-0:42:42.8) 
In his further account of trust, he mentioned that trust is something situated in the 
subconscious, which arguably influences how he handles breaches of trust because 
some people may have to disappoint him several times before he trusts them less 
(ibid. time stamp: 0:42:49.4-0:45:52.3). In line with the above quote, this notion 
may indicate that it is not only the personal trajectory through time that influences 
how a person builds trust, but that it may well be influenced by the way one 
identifies with the other. Thus, on the one hand trust building seems to be heavily 
influenced by one’s habitus as it comprises one’s disposition to trust, which is 
developed through experiences of trust. On the other hand, however, identification 
with the other seems to present the trustee with the freedom to not necessarily live 
up to the trust bestowed in him/her. Thus, it could be suggested that identification 
based trust may represent a ‘strong’ form of trust (Maguire & Phillips 2008), which 
could endure some instances of violation of trust.  
Experiences of trust in IDK2’s relation with ITR10 
Regarding her relationship with ITR10, IDK2 pointed out that she has a lot of trust 
in ITR10 due to the conversations she has had with him (Interview IDK2; January 
2015; time stamp: 1:01:04.1-1:02:43.8). Some of these conversations even revolved 
around very personal experiences such as those mentioned in the quote at the 
beginning of Section 5.4. Moreover, IDK2 mentioned that due to her visits to AT, 
she experienced the entire AT staff to be rather trustworthy and that therefore she 
trusted them (ibid.). Hence, unsurprisingly, IDK2 found that regular visits and face-
237 
 
to-face meetings enhanced her understanding of the subsidiary staff, including 
ITR10. However, her trust in ITR10 seemed to be grounded on conditions that were 
different from her trust in the other subsidiary members. IDK2 seemed to feel sorry 
for ITR10’s situation at AT. She said: 
I think they are quite hard on him. He’s the only man down there and he is so 
efficient (…) and we really don’t want see to him leave (…) I wonder if that 
has anything to do with their culture? You know that women are of less value 
than men. Now there are three women and one man. Now they have the 
chance to let off their steam with regards to men. (Interview IDK2; April 
2013; time stamp: 0:15:35.4-0:20:40.5) 
Following IDK2’s account, the perceived inferiority of women in ‘Turkish’ culture 
seems to negatively influence the internal collaboration at the subsidiary. In 
addition, IDK2 seems to assign more power to the female subsidiary workforce than 
to the male, as the men were in the minority. Nevertheless, ITR10 stated that he had 
a good and trusting relationship with his colleagues and especially his superior, 
ITR3 (Interview ITR10; December 2014; time stamp: 0:33:47.3-0:38:17.7). May 
IDK2 have misinterpreted the situation? After all, ITR10 did not directly inform her 
he was feeling unfairly treated; neither did he tell me about it, nor did I observe any 
form of malevolence. Nevertheless, in a later interview, ITR10 pointed out that one 
of his female colleagues appeared to be a bit jealous of him having climbed the 
subsidiary career ladder faster than she had. ITR10 mentioned that she seemed to see 
him as a competitor, which resulted in him having less trust in her than in his other 
(female) colleagues (Interview ITR10; December 2014; time stamp: 0:38:17.7-
0:40:00.5). Arguably, what IDK2 ascribed to being based on culture seemed rather 
to be based on a personal trait and an idiosyncratic reaction to perceived unfairness, 
as said female colleague of ITR10 had been with the company for over 15 years but 
had not been offered a position or tasks that could be considered to represent a 
higher status. Thus, it could be argued that for ITR10 trust was not only related to 
the role of a person or their ability to solve a certain task but also to his or her 
character and behavior, which ITR10 called the “human aspect” (Interview ITR10; 
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December 2014; time stamp: 0:33:47.3-0:38:17.7). As mentioned above, perceived 
benevolence seems to be an important indicator for ITR10 when judging a person’s 
trustworthiness. In fact, in line with Mayer et al. (1995), ITR10 portrayed both 
perceived and experienced benevolence as essential to trust: 
Well, that’s important [yes]. If I feel: Okay, that person envies me, every 
time I am successful he is in a bad mood [hmm] then I don’t trust him. But if 
I see that this person shares my happiness [ITR10 is clapping his hands] 
[hmm] when I am successful, then I think: Okay this person I can trust. He is 
happy where others show greed. And that’s benevolence and that plays a 
huge role in trust building. [ja]“ (Interview ITR10; December 2014; time 
stamp: 0:40:58.9-0:48:34.6) 
According to his account, not being appreciative of another’s success and instead 
showing greed indicated malevolence, which signaled to ITR10 that he could not 
trust that person. Examining ITR10’s justifications for his trust in IDK2, he again 
pointed to the notion of benevolence when he remarked:  
IDK2 is my primary contact in Denmark [yes]. She never says no, she’s 
always positive; she always tries to help even though we [AT] are internal 
customers, it’s always easier to say ‘no’ to internal customers, she [yes] 
always tries to realize things, no matter what I like her to do, she tries to 
support me [hmm] and I trust her a lot. (Interview ITR10; December 2014; 
time stamp: 0:33:47.3-0:38:17.7). 
According to ITR10, he trusted IDK2 because she always appeared to be positive, 
helpful and supportive. He experienced her as truly trying to assist him in his work. 
This seems to point to the notion of benevolence which Mayer et al. (1995) defined 
as the perception of a positive orientation of the trustee towards the trustor, and an 
expression of genuine concern and care. While ITR10’s trust in IDK2 arguably rests 
primarily on the belief in her benevolence, IDK2 seems to justify her trust towards 
ITR10 primarily on the grounds of perceived ability, which she expressed by 
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referring to ITR10 as being “efficient and really good to collaborate with” 
(Interview IDK2; April 2013; time stamp: 0:20:47.9-0:21:34.1). As ITR10 was 
promoted within the subsidiary, it could be argued that he seems to possess the 
ability to fulfill his role at ESAG and can thus live up to IDK2’s expectation of him. 
Furthermore, she mentioned that they simply understood each other due to their 
daily telephone calls (Interview IDK2; January 2015; time stamp: 1:06:15.4-
1:08:17.0) and the many rather private issues she was aware of regarding him, the 
like of which she did not know about any of the other employees at AT (Interview 
IDK2; April 2013; time stamp: 0:43:52.9-0:45:15.3). It seems that non-work related 
conversations led to enhanced trust, and probably to more openness, which is why 
IDK2 may have expected him to have a hard time with his female colleagues. 
Moreover, as mentioned above, IDK2 indicated that she felt pity for ITR10 and that 
she generally had the impression that he would “establish ties with us [sales support 
department at HQ] because he sits down there all on his own” (Interview IDK2; 
April 2013; time stamp: 0:20:47.9-0:21:34.1). According to IDK2, ITR10 seemed to 
identify more with HQ than with his subsidiary because he faced challenging 
working conditions at AT. As mentioned earlier, this only partly seems to have been 
the case. Nevertheless, following IDK2’s accounts, she probably based her trust in 
ITR10 on perceived ability and integrity, as ITR10 seems to have consistently 
adhered to a set of principles acceptable to IDK2, such as always doing his best for 
the company. Moreover, the long lasting process of daily interactions seemingly 
raised each other’s knowledge of the other and thus their level of familiarity. Also, 
IDK2 mentioned feeling sorry for ITR10, suggesting that her trust mirrored an 
‘affect based trust’ (McAllister 1995), which could be argued to coincide with 
Lewicki & Bunker’s notion of ‘identification based trust’. In any case, IDK2’s 
notion of ITR10 identifying with HQ suggests that their mutual trust may also be 
partly based on shared identification. IDK2’s notion of being the only female leader 
at HQ may support this assumption, because she had arguably experienced herself 
how it felt and what it meant to be ‘the only one’ in a certain group. She said: “I 
wish for more [female leaders]. There is a difference between men and women, we 
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all know that, so it’s bad that the other female leader switched to another position” 
(Interview IDK2; January 2015; time stamp: 1:54:24.6-1:58:41.1). 
IDK2’s leadership practices in her relationship with ITR10 were rather subtle and 
seemed to revolve primarily around providing assistance and motivation, as ITR10 
proactively contacted IDK2 on a daily basis and thus conveyed both his needs and 
achievements. In addition, ITR10 and IDK2 were able to monitor all sales-related 
activities at all times using Axapta. 
In summary, the trust process in IDK2’s relationship with ITR10 could be visualized 
as follows: 
 
Figure 17: The process of trusting between IDK2 and ITR10 
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In short, this process seems to have been initiated by believing in each other’s 
abilities to perform in their respective roles at the company. Throughout their 
collaboration, IDK2 and ITR10 confirmed each other’s trustworthiness beliefs in 
regard to having the competencies needed to work efficiently. Over time, their 
conversations included private matters and ITR10 shared sensitive personal 
information (building social capital) with IDK2. They seem to have become more 
familiar with both each other and their work practices during their collaboration. 
The perceived mistreatment of ITR10 seems to then have moved IDK2’s level of 
trust closer to affective trust (McAllister 1995), which seemed to be based on 
benevolence and integrity beliefs and which are part of Lewicki & Bunker’s (1996) 
notion of ‘identification based trust’. In terms of leadership practices, this relation 
suggests that IDK2 seemed to rely on the software program ‘Axapta’, which gave 
her a subtle ‘control’-tool to monitor all sales-related activities throughout ESAG. 
As efficiency appears to have represented her main goal, Axapta was the optimum 
tool for checking her employees’ efficiency in terms of volume of sales and profit 
maximization. When she was asked for help, she enacted her role as assistant and 
motivating leader. Thus, in regard to ITR10, who actively approached her when help 
was required and who portrayed efficiency, I understand her leadership style to be 
very subtle and almost not ‘practiced’ but rather conveyed by her status at the 
company (symbolic capital) and her presumably benevolent behaviors. 
 
5.4.3 ITR5: ESAG’s first ethnic Turkish trainee at HQ 
Prior to his traineeship at ESAG, ITR5 used ESAG as a case company for his final 
thesis, which revolved around sales in the Turkish market (Interview ITR5; April 
2014; time stamp: 1:17:09.1-1:18:12.6). Via this cooperation, he came to know 
IDK4, who could be regarded as his former key person at ESAG. While he knew the 
head of HR (IDK4), he did not know any of the employees at the sales support 
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department at HQ where he started his traineeship in March 2014. ITR5 compared 
his first days of his traineeship with his first days at school: 
A new job, surrounding and a new work place, it’s like the first day at school, 
everybody approaches you: Who is this guy, [yes] who do I have to look into 
the eyes 8 hours a day?” [yes], .. but they’ve all been very nice to me, kind 
and courteous. So, I still feel that I have received a great introduction [hmm]. 
Normally people say it takes a few months before you get adjusted to your 
new everyday; I don’t think I took me longer than 3 days. [Interviewer: 
laughing: “that sounds good”], even though I had to commute 4 hours every 
day for the first two weeks. It’s like that’s … the spirit and desire to get to 
work. (Interview ITR5; April 2014; time stamp: 0:05:48.7-0:07:58.5) 
According to ITR5, the first days and weeks of his traineeship were “fantastic”; he 
felt welcomed and had the impression that he had settled down and gotten used to 
his work soon after he had started, which was much earlier than expected, according 
to him. In addition, he pointed out that he felt such a “desire and enthusiasm” for his 
position that he accepted the daily 4-hour commute for the first two weeks. 
Thereafter, he found a flat closer to the company, reducing his travel time to one 
hour. By pointing out that he was willing to spend 12 hours a day on his traineeship, 
he might have been indicating that he is a ‘hard working and determined young man 
who wants to succeed in life’. This attitude appears to pervade some of his notions 
concerning the future. For example, he pointed out that he would like to work as 
ESAG’s bridge builder, thus facilitating ESAG’s connections with Turkey, while 
being stationed in Istanbul (Interview ITR5; April 2014; time stamp: 1:17:09.1-
1:18:12.6). On the other hand, in the long run he could also imagine a top-
management position at ESAG’s HQ (Interview IDK2; January 2015; time stamp: 
2:11:35.5-2:19:05.1). As ESAG mainly practiced internal promotion, ITR5’s 
perspectives of his future might be somewhat realistic. However, in light of ITR7’s 
notion of not really having a chance of promotion at ESAG as pointed out earlier 
(see Section 5.3.6), ITR5’s chances of attaining a managerial position at ESAG’s 
HQ might be rather slim, even though by then he may possess the relevant 
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educational background, language skills, work experiences (cultural capital) and the 
‘will to win’. Perhaps an essential aspect for being promoted at ESAG is not one’s 
competencies or skills to fulfill a certain position but rather whether or not one 
would ‘fit in’ in terms of tacitly adhering to more or less the same values and 
knowing how to acquit oneself at work. In other words, one has to learn the ‘rules of 
the game at ESAG’ in order to know how to get promoted and be accepted for 
promotion.  
Concerning ESAG’s rules of the game, ITR5 had to learn a variety of do’s and 
don’ts, while some experiences he made apparently surprised him. For instance, he 
seemed to be rather amazed by ESAG’s flat hierarchy and open door policy: 
I didn’t expect that uhm … I found out that it is informal, so, you can actually 
believe that you are on a par with all of them [yes] and the CEO is sitting … 
really close by; he’s in the same location and on the same floor as all the 
others [yes]. Well many thoughts crossed my mind [hmm] and this is a very 
informal organizational structure … and that makes many things so much 
easier for an employee. (Interview ITR5; April 2014; time stamp: 0:08:46.0-
0:11:35.5)  
According to ITR5, being ’allowed’ the opportunity to talk with the CEO in the 
same manner as with any other employee makes a new employee’s working life 
easier. It seems that ITR5 found it advantageous to work at a company with a 
seemingly flat hierarchy and a focus on ‘equality’. Given how much his 
astonishment pervades this quote, it could be argued that he was not used to working 
in a company with such a flat hierarchy and informality as he perceived at ESAG. 
As the overwhelming majority of Danish companies tend to work according to the 
principles of equality, flat hierarchy, and ‘Freedom with Responsibility’, all of 
which resemble the so-called Scandinavian Leadership Style (Bjerke 1999:199; 
Dickson et al. 2003:741), it seems that ITR5 was rather unknowledgeable about 
Danish leadership in general, even though he had grown up and studied in Denmark 
and used ESAG as a case in point for his final thesis at a commercial college in 
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Denmark. However, during this final project he stayed in Istanbul in order to study 
the Turkish food market for ESAG. Therefore, it was clearly not until his traineeship 
at ESAG that he was introduced to so-called “Danish leadership” and the philosophy 
of “Freedom with Responsibility”. Therefore, it seems fair to suggest that ITR5’s 
social, and to some extent educational, life played out in an ethnic minority Turkish 
setting, even though his educational background (institutionalized cultural capital), 
in form of his certificates and diploma, was set in the Danish context. Thus, I claim 
that ITR5’s cultural capital portfolio consists of a rather prominent Turkish and a 
not so prominent Danish part. As hinted at, and as will become more apparent in the 
following paragraphs, ITR5’s habitus seems to be predominantly comprised by his 
embodied cultural capital representing his ethnic minority Turkish background, 
which he acquired from his extended Turkish family during his childhood and which 
furthermore seems to have influenced his social network, as this mainly consists of 
family members, friends and acquaintances of Turkish origin. It could be argued that 
ITR5 had been living in a parallel world, which could be called a ‘world of ethnic 
minorities’; a ‘world’ with its own rules, logics, and power structures which 
influence, restrict and enable its members’ practices and strategies for maximizing 
capital. Which form of capital social agents struggle over depends on the field and it 
seems reasonable to suggest that ethnic minority groups, such as ethnic Turks in 
Denmark, Austria and Germany, seemingly have to struggle for at least two forms of 
capital simultaneously: the form of capital favored in their ‘field of ethnic minority’ 
and that acknowledged in the ‘field of ethnic majority’. In regard to possible 
differences, I have already mentioned that the ‘field’ of ethnic business seems to 
value social capital somewhat higher than economic capital, which arguably 
represents the form of capital acknowledged by social agents in the economic field 
and the field of ESAG. In summary, ITR5 could be characterized as living in two 
worlds at the same time: He is proud to follow Turkish customs and rules of 
collaboration; he has a Danish education and is fluent in Danish; however, he does 
not seem to be very familiar with the rules of neither the ‘Danish business field’ nor 
the larger social field in Denmark. Hence, his primary habitus seems to be Turkish 
while his secondary is Danish. This assumption was further backed up by ITR5’s 
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discussion of cultural identity (Interview ITR5; April 2014; time stamp: 0:22:31.2-
0:25:37.9) during which he pointed out that he loved Denmark but that he could not 
identify as a Dane. Rather, he said, he tried to uphold his Turkish roots, which is 
exactly what made him different from the others and even though this difference 
hurt once in a while and it was nothing he chose consciously (ibid.; time stamp: 
0:20:27.4-0:22:31.2), he did not “want to be assimilated” (Interview ITR5; April 
2014; time stamp: 0:22:31.2-0:25:37.9). He explained: 
We are simply different [hmm]. We see this in the way we sit and we eat, 
when we talk [hmm], when you travel, it doesn’t matter what you do [hmm] 
you are different [hmm]. I often get this, just the other day someone told me: 
Hadn’t we heard your name we would have taken you for a Dane. [hmm] 
And that’s not a compliment. (…) It’s fine to say that my Danish is that good 
that one cannot grasp I am a foreigner (udlænding) right? [hmm] But I don’t 
want to be considered to be Danish. (Interview ITR5; April 2014; time 
stamp: 0:25:37.9-0:26:56.1) 
Following ITR5’s account, he appears to have understood that it is an advantage to 
‘belong to two cultural worlds’. Nevertheless, the Turkish culture, i.e. the cultural 
values his parents brought with them to their new host country, is what he seemed to 
treasure most and what tacitly guided his daily behavior. Arguably, ITR5’s account 
is a good example of a habitus’ mismatch with the societal field in a certain 
“territorial unit” (Bourdieu 2005:126): The daily practices conducted by ITR5 seem 
to be reasonable in the social field occupied by ethnic minority Turks in Denmark, 
yet are regarded as somewhat inappropriate in the work field ‘inhabited’ by ethnic 
majority Danes. Being a social agent in both fields at the same time is arguably 
rather strenuous work. Perhaps, therefore, he decided to settle for one cultural 
identity rather than trying to consider himself a ‘hybrid’, a ‘bicultural’, or someone 
“between: living in the hyphen” (Anne Marie Nakagawa, 2005), an approach chosen 
by ITR4, ITR10, and ITR1. Instead of referring to himself as a ‘Danish-Turk’, for 
example, he decided to identify himself as a Turk born and living in Denmark. I 
deem it necessary to mention though that while it is common to use the hyphen in 
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English and German when referring to citizens with migration backgrounds (e.g. 
‘Turkish-Canadians’ or ‘German-Turks’ (Deutsch-Türken)), this variant is very 
seldom used in Danish. Non-Danish residents are mainly called ‘New-Danes’ 
(Nydansker) in Denmark, thus, arguably expressing ‘assimilation’, which ITR5 said 
was the worst thing that could happen to someone from an ethnic minority 
background (Interview ITR5; April 2014; time stamp: 0:22:31.2-0:25:37.9). ITR5 
could either identify as a Dane, a ‘New Dane’, or a Turk, he chose the latter even 
though he indicated that he drew from both ethnicities. ITR5 seemed to be proud to 
be different and practiced his ‘Turkishness’ not only in his social network but also at 
work where he spoke Turkish with ESAG’s subsidiary employees and where he 
followed Muslim practices such as observing Ramadan. For ESAG’s HR-manager, 
IDK4, ITR5’s religious belief in particular seemed to demonstrate that ITR5 was 
different from all other employees at ESAG HQ. For example IDK4 pointed out 
that: 
Well, we talked about it with you that there are new things for us in having 
somebody like you. [yes, starts laughing] [ITR5: and now you say again 
“somebody like you”, I have the red passport if it’s that what you mean] Well 
it’s …, this morning I thought you have been to Padborg yesterday but we 
offered lunch here. (…) And I talked to [name of a person responsible for 
preparing lunch] and told her that we have to remember that we have a .. yes 
that we have a Muslim as colleague. And we have to have this in the back of 
our heads. (…) And should it happen that a piece of bacon finds its way into 
the buffet, well, then it’s not bad-will, then it’s uhm [IDK2: then there 
happened a mistake]. Then there happened a mistake. [ITR5: we are all 
human beings]. (First evaluation meeting; April 2014; time stamp: 0:25:40-
0:27:16) 
According to IDK4’s account, ESAG had to adjust to ITR5’s religious beliefs as 
eating pork was forbidden by his religion. However, as ESAG’s workforce consisted 
primarily of ethnic Danes, “a mistake could be made”, as mentioned by IDK2; a 
mistake that would not be grounded on bad-will, but rather on the fact that they were 
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not used to having a multicultural workforce at HQ. During IDK4’s account, ITR5 
made attempts to point out that he nevertheless belonged to Danish society at large 
and therefore was not ‘that different’ after all. For example, ITR5 mentioned that “I 
have the red passport”, which obviously refers to the Danish EU-passport. More 
interesting however is his earlier remark “and when you say ‘someone like you’”, 
which could arguably have initiated a discussion of ‘belonging’, seeing that IDK4’s 
use of the word ‘you’ already excluded ITR5 from ESAG’s workforce, which is 
referred to as ‘we’ throughout IDK4’s account. In that sense, ITR5’s notion of “we 
are all humans” seemingly could be interpreted as an attempt to reconstruct a 
community in which he was positioned together with ESAG’s workforce and thus 
belonged to them. In any case, ITR5 gave the impression that he did not want to be 
treated differently because of his Muslim background (ibid: time stamp: 0:27:16-
0:28:25). In general, ITR5 presented himself as being an asset for ESAG due to 
having dual cultural backgrounds that he could switch between depending on the 
context (ibid: time stamp: 0:31.00-0:33:40).  
In summary, ITR5 expressed that he had the right educational background 
(institutionalized cultural capital) for the position as sales trainee at ESAG and, 
furthermore, that he saw his Turkish background (embodied cultural capital) as an 
advantage because ESAG’s main customer group had Turkish roots. However, the 
advantage of his Turkish ethnicity was highlighted as not having been decisive in his 
attaining a trainee position; both ITR5 and IDK4 pointed out that having Turkish 
roots would not mean that ITR5 would predominantly work with customers of 
Turkish origin (see quote below). Perhaps this was why ITR5 was supposed to spend 
his traineeship at ESAG’s various departments and not only at the department of 
ethnic sales. He pointed out that: 
Well I am not told that his is the case. It might of course have had an 
important influence on it [getting the position as trainee] but I hope I sold 
myself via the things I did prior to my employment here, that’s not simply 
because I wrote a project about the ethnic market. But I am told that I got the 
position because they looked at all my qualifications. In order to avoid that 
248 
 
thought I am to continue in the department for Sales in the Middle East and 
Asia. (Interview ITR5; April 2014; time stamp: 0:03:54.7-0:05:33.3) 
 
In addition to his rather unique cultural capital portfolio, ITR5 seemed to have a 
broad social network (social capital) which was, however, predominantly embedded 
in the ethnic minority Turkish societies in Germany, Denmark and Austria. He used 
this network to, for example, find suitable places to stay during his traineeship at 
ESAG’s subsidiaries. It seems that ITR5’s social life primarily took place within this 
‘Turkish’ network since he mentioned having many Turkish friends but only a few 
Danish ones (Interview ITR5; April 2014; time stamp: 1:04:52.9-1:14:58.5). In 
general, he gave the impression of assisting members of his network as they had 
assisted him. In his account of how ethnic Turks support each other and expect to be 
supported, ITR5 arguably seemed to refer to ethnic Turks as one big family with 
similar past experiences; therefore, one knew how the other feels, which in turn 
meant that he felt obliged to help because “one has been walking in similar shoes” 
(Interview ITR5; April 2014; time stamp: 1:04:52.9-1:14:58.5). 
When I asked him whether his assisting attitude towards ethnic minority Turks was 
based on a general disposition to trust people with his background, he pointed out 
that he felt obliged to help ‘likeminded ethnic Turks’ but that only time would tell 
whether it was wise to place such trust in another (ibid.; time stamp: 1:04:52.9-
1:14:58.5). Arguably, ITR5 seemed to have a tendency to more or less 
unconditionally trust those he perceived as ‘likeminded’ due to seemingly similar 
life trajectories or perceived similar cultural or religious backgrounds. In that sense, 
it could be argued that ITR5 considered ethnic minority Turks a rather homogenous 
group consisting of similar persons who understood each other, assisted each other 
and invited other likeminded individuals into their group, thus (re)producing their 
power structures and values, for example. It seems that trusting is easier to practice 
in a group of seemingly likeminded persons, i.e. agents with a similar habitus, who 
in the case of ethnic minority Turks are arguably placed on and have (re)constructed 
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a common social sub-field with practices, such as helping out fellow players, that 
appear reasonable to them.  
When I asked ITR5 to elaborate on his understanding of trust, he highlighted the 
importance of personal traits rather than a person’s cultural or religious background 
as being decisive for trust building. According to ITR5 (Interview ITR5; April 2014; 
time stamp: 1:22:40.2-1:30:27.3), he understands trust as being equal to his 
signature, symbolizing that he engages in a type of contract or relationship with the 
other, thus accepting responsibility for his actions. This, he mentioned, makes him 
actively build trust, yet this trust is mutual. ITR5 seems to indicate that a signed 
contract would approximate ‘ask for trusting’ from the other. On the other hand, the 
signing of a contract could also be understood as an outcome of mutual trust. ITR5’s 
further account may support the latter, as he expressed the desire to initiate 
relationships with people he did not know, in this case with IDK4, from a rather 
sceptic or critical standpoint. In such a case, trust building is, according to ITR5, a 
matter of showing benevolence and acting towards a win-win situation. Arguably, 
ITR5 seems to consider trust an outcome of calculations and rational choices, as for 
instance outlined by Coleman (1988) and Yamagishi et al. (1998). However, as 
ITR5, on the other hand, appears to trust fellow ethnic minority Turks despite not 
knowing them, he may additionally base his trust on perceived similarities in 
‘dispositions’ (Frederiksen 2012:74) as outlined above. Still, both understandings 
seemingly hinge on perceived familiarity with the other. This may be why ITR5 
emphasized the importance of face-to-face contacts for trust building, which he 
called “establishing a relationship with the other” because “knowing the other means 
a lot in my world” (First evolution meeting April 2014; time stamp: 00.10.04-
00.10.54). Here I need to add his mentioning of the war in Syria and his reaction to 
that – drawing parts of national political discourse into the company and his 
perception of DK leadership as ‘always knowing better’. 
Experiences of trust in IDK2’s relation with ITR5 
The relationship between IDK2 and ITR5 appears to have begun with the belief in 
each other’s abilities to fulfill their roles, i.e. ITR5 had the educational background 
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(incorporated cultural capital) to take on a traineeship at ESAG. In her role as 
leader of the sales support department, IDK2 has had several trainees in her 
department, indicating that she has experience in teaching newcomers the rules, 
tools and practices of the game. Moreover, IDK2 was the company’s expert in 
Axapta, the key tool for registering and monitoring all sales-related activities 
throughout ESAG. As a profound knowledge of Axapta was needed in order to 
understand the company’s entire value chain and the processes related thereto, all 
trainees started their traineeship in the sales support department. As the leader of this 
department and, at the same time, the person with the greatest knowledge of the 
Axapta program, IDK2 most likely represented not only the most suitable instructor 
for ITR5 but also seemed to possess a high level of symbolic capital and power. 
ITR5, on the other hand, did not seem to hold any power in relation to IDK2, as he 
had entered the company as a trainee who was not familiar with working at a private 
firm, ESAG’s work processes, its structures and its rules of the game, and who could 
be released from his trainee contract if the company deemed it necessary. However, 
as mentioned above, ITR5 held a cultural capital portfolio that ESAG wanted to 
draw from and further invest in. 
As ITR5 and the entire staff at sales support, including IDK2, did not know each 
other at all, the first weeks and months were spent becoming more familiar with 
each other. During the first evaluation meeting, 3 months after ITR5 had started his 
traineeship, IDK2 summarized her impression of and relationship with ITR5 in the 
following way: 
We are really happy to having him in our department. That’s for sure and it’s 
a win-win situation. Really [ITR5: Hmm absolutely]. (First evaluation 
meeting, April 2014; time stamp: 0:09:04-0:09:27) 
According to IDK2, the first 3 months ran smoothly and there seemed to be no 
issues to report to the head of HR. This impression was also given by ITR5, who 
spoke of his first months as a “pleasure” since he only met “nice, smiling and 
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forthcoming people” (First evaluation meeting; April 2014; time stamp: 0:15:41-
0:18:46). 
The above quotes indicate that all parties learned from each other, making the 
relationship a win-win situation. Based on ITR5’s understanding of trust, such a 
situation should foster trust between him and his leader, IDK2. IDK2 on the other 
hand, seemed to be very open and interested in learning about ITR5’s culture and 
religion. During lunch meetings and whenever there was time during working hours, 
ITR5 and IDK2 could be observed discussing the differences and similarities 
between Islam and Christianity (Field notes; Observation at the Department of 
Ethnic Sales; April 2014; page 2 and 3). ITR5 seemed to be very knowledgeable 
about the Koran and Muslim festivities, which ITR10 pointed out as being a 
relatively rare trait in young men from ethnic Turkish minorities; a trait which ITR5 
should be proud of (Interview ITR10; December 2014; time stamp: 0:22:49.3-
0:28:47.1).  
In general, HQ personnel had to get to know ITR5 and vice versa, and this seemed 
to proceed smoothly on all sides. However, only three months later, IDK2 expressed 
that she struggled with ITR5’s interpretation of ‘reasonable actions’ at work. As 
mentioned earlier, ITR5 was seen as “somebody different”, somebody whom they 
had not worked with before, which IDK4 summarized as being the first Muslim at 
HQ (First evaluation meeting; April 2014; time stamp: 00.30.19-00.31.00). It seems 
that his religious background combined with his very different life trajectory led him 
to behave in ways that were perceived to be inappropriate at work. As indicated in 
Section 5.2.3, ITR5 seemed to struggle with how to balance private and work-
related practices during his traineeship. Furthermore, he apparently used too much 
Turkish at work, meaning that other HQ personnel could not understand him. In the 
second evaluation meeting, IDK2 mentioned that ITR5 was a great addition to the 
company and that he worked in a very thorough way. However, his thoroughness 
took time, which meant that IDK2 perceived his working style to be not as efficient 
as she had hoped for. It could be argued that IDK2’s expectations regarding ITR5’s 
learning abilities were not met since it transpired that ITR5 took more time in 
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solving tasks than the previous trainees had. ITR5 responded that he was confident 
of becoming faster, thus perhaps implicating that he was aware of IDK2’s standards 
and focus on work speed and efficiency. As mentioned above, IDK2 was 
furthermore irritated by ITR5’s extensive use of Turkish. She said that on the one 
hand, it was fine since HQ wanted him to introduce himself to sales people in 
Turkish. On the other hand, however, ITR5 seemed also to make many longer 
private phone calls in Turkish, which she later expressed as a behavior showcasing 
ITR5’s misinterpretation of “Freedom with Responsibility” (Interview IDK2; 
January 2015; time stamp: 1:58:41.1-2:03:28.1). It seems that ITR5 struggled to 
become aware of the tacit rules of the field of ESAG and, while drawing too often 
on his embodied cultural capital, he rendered himself more and more different in the 
face of ESAG’s quite homogeneous workforce. It could be argued that he 
unknowingly enacted his dispositions by practicing his culture, which in turn 
‘singled him out’ and signaled his difference to IDK2 who then explained that these 
struggles were based on ITR5’s cultural background and proudness. Obviously, 
ITR5’s and IDK2’s practical senses did not match as ITR5 seemingly re(created) the 
logics of the social field of ethnic minority Turks, while IDK2 re(produced) the 
logics of the field of ESAG. As outlined in Section 5.3, these fields seem to follow 
rather different logics, which may explain the struggles between ITR5 and IDK2. 
These struggles resulted in a perceived decline and complete erosion of trust. ITR5 
said that IDK2 clearly saw issues that he had not experienced as such; on the 
contrary, both customers and IDK2 herself told him that he was very fast and he 
could therefore not understand why she would say something different during the 
evaluation meeting. According to ITR5, this “changed things from this moment: 
something inside me perished” (Field notes; Observation DE-W; September 2014; 
page 2). IDK2 also expressed a change in her relationship to ITR5, which “started 
fine but then gradually took a turn towards the negative (…) I have not heard from 
him since, but that’s okay; I did what I thought was the right thing” (Interview 
IDK2; January 2015; time stamp: 1:58:41.1-2:03:28.1).  During her account, she 
pointed out that the struggles she had had with ITR5 could be perceived as being 
grounded in “having been really bad at matching expectations right from the start” 
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(ibid., time stamp: 2:04:27.9-2:11:35.5). However, as ESAG’s rules and logics and 
ITR5’s framing dispositions arguably are tacitly embedded in the fields, it would 
seem rather difficult to visualize them and become aware of them. Moreover, on 
several occasions IDK4 pointed out that all employees had to learn ESAG’s rules on 
their own while being part of its field. As pointed out in Section 5.2, it could be 
argued that it takes struggles to become aware of different understandings and thus 
struggles are required in the first place to see the need for matching expectations 
based on the awareness that there seem to be a difference of expectations. In 
summary, it could be argued that trust may seem to be relevant for both ITR5 and 
IDK2, yet it appears to have been challenged by a misalignment of ideas and 
practical sense, resulting in a perception of growing dissimilarity with the other. The 
process of trusting between IDK2 and ITR5 could be visualized in the following 
way (see figure 18). 
 
Figure 18: The process of trusting between IDK2 and ITR5 
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believing in each 
others abilities 
IDK2: Disappointment 
over ITR5's abilities; not 
living up to expectations 
ITR5: restricted in using 
his embodied cultural 
capital 
 
ITR5: felt unfairly treated; 
perceived IDK2 as 
dishonest 
IDK2: felt ITR5 to not fit in 
due to his culture and 
misunderstanding of 
ESAG's approach "Freedom 
with Responsibility" 
Growing perceived 
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leading to 
conversation shut-
down & end of 
relation 
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In short, from IDK2’s perspective ITR5 was continually unable to live up to her 
expectations, thus arguably not fulfilling the perceived abilities. As IDK2 focused 
on increasing ESAG’s efficiency, ITR5’s perceived slowness and misinterpretation 
of ESAG’s rules of the game arguably put her main goal in danger. Over time, IDK2 
increasingly seemed to blame ITR5’s cultural background for not being able to fit in 
and since one’s culture arguably is not easily changed, IDK2 ‘surrendered in her 
attempt to change’ him, which she expressed as “a fight I just couldn’t win” 
(Interview IDK2; January 2015; time stamp: 1:58:41.1-2:03:28.1). ITR5, on the 
other hand, expressed that he had the ability to fulfill his position; he arguably saw 
himself as even exceeding his position’s requirements as he invested his embodied 
cultural capital at work, helping with the understanding of Turkish customs, 
language and food. However, even though his cultural knowledge seemed to be in 
demand, he felt that it was not respected by IDK2 as she criticized his apparent 
‘excessive’ use of Turkish. When IDK2 then seemed to behave unfairly or even 
dishonestly, ITR5 discontinued his relationship with her. As ITR5 treasured his 
cultural background, IDK2’s behavior seemed to have threatened the most important 
part of his identity, namely his Turkish roots. In light of IDK2’s notion of having 
given up in the fight to change ITR5, it could be argued that ITR5, in spite of his 
position as trainee, seemed to have a more powerful standing than IDK2, his leader. 
However, considering that ITR5 had just started his traineeship and that his contract 
could have been terminated at any point in time, he probably had the least powerful 
position in the field of ESAG. On the other hand, while IDK2 appeared to execute 
her leadership in form of coaching and assistance, this did not seem to help ITR5 
understand ESAG’s rules of the game. 
Taking a perspective inspired by Bourdieu, however, highlights that practices cannot 
be understood without analyzing the context and relationship in which they take 
place. Therefore, I deem it necessary to provide a tentative picture of these contexts. 
As hinted at, the aforementioned struggles indicate that ESAG’s employees and 
leaders work across various contexts with diverse logics. Inspired by Bourdieu’s 
notion of the field and his approach to field analysis, I will in the following analyze 
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the different contexts or ‘fields and sub-fields’ in and across which ESAG’s 
employees and leaders interact. A tentative analysis of the field is, furthermore, 
crucial in order to understand the interactants’ interpretations and experiences of 
trust and leadership in light of ESAG’s and the leaders’ practices of consolidating 
the perceived differences between HQ and its subsidiaries, which, as analyzed, could 
enhance trust or at times resulted in further struggles, such as struggles over 
belonging, identification and recognition, which seemed partly to be driven by the 
intersection of the field of ESAG with other fields, such as the broader societal field, 
the educational field and the family field. 
 
5.5 The tentative ‘Field of ESAG’ 
Inspired by Bourdieu’s field analysis (see Chapter 4), this section explores ESAG as 
a field in which the leaders and employees of this study are positioned and in which 
they try to position themselves according to their habitus and capital portfolio. The 
aim is to understand the ‘objective structure’ of the field as well as its logics of 
practice, its illusio, which influences the actors’ range of ‘reasonable’ actions, 
including their leadership practices, which in turn relates to the aforementioned 
notions of ‘recognition, respect, and identification’, all of which the analysis (see 
sections 5.1 – 5.4) has indicated to influence trusting in one way or another. 
Understanding the field of ESAG not only helps to make sense of the actors’ actions 
and their possible actions therein, it also assists in locating the field of ESAG in the 
wider socio-cultural context, and thus furthers our understanding of how other fields 
influence the field of ESAG and, hence, the leader-employee relations submerged in 
it. The point of departure for this section is the description of ESAG’s organizational 
structure and corporate culture as explained by this dissertation’s interactants, as 
well as the interactants’ accounts on their roles, positions and areas of responsibility 
within this structure. In addition, I draw on the leaders’ and employees’ experiences 
of their employment at ESAG in order to describe and analyze the influence of 
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structure on agency and vice versa. In that sense, the following section resembles a 
summary of the earlier sections of Chapter 5. 
  
5.5.1 The Game  
As outlined by Bourdieu, social fields are fairly homogenous as they all encompass 
social actors in a variety of positions - some of which are dominant, others 
subordinate. Fields comprise valued forms of capital and interests as well as 
struggles. The company ESAG can be understood as a field of its own (Bourdieu 
2005:197) since it has its own specific rules and logics of practice, which one would 
‘feel’ upon entering the field. It is these rules and logics of practice that I describe in 
this section.  
ESAG produces and sells its food products to a variety of customers: retail traders, 
discount supermarkets, wholesale businesses, smaller ethnic shops and even kiosks. 
The head of sales and one of the intermediary leaders of ESAG both pointed out that 
their main target group is ethnic minorities in Austria and, particularly, Germany, 
which is why the largest proportion of sales is generated in what ESAG calls the 
“ethnic market”. This market is dominated by minorities of Turkish origin. In the 
case of Germany, which represents ESAGs most important “ethnic market” 
(Interview head of sales, Nov. 2014: time stamp: 0:23:04.01 – 0:25:00.5), the “Turks 
comprise the highest number of entrepreneurs as they are the largest ethnic group” 
(Kontos 2007:425). This group, however, represents not only a large customer group 
for ESAG’s ethnic food products (2.8 million potential customers/Turks living in 
Germany as of 2013 (BAMF), in addition to a growing number of Muslim 
immigrants and refugees), it also stands for around 10,000 Turkish food retail 
businesses (Aygün 2010). According to Danisman (2011), in total there have been 
about 80.000 Turkish enterprises in Germany in which could be said to be part of 
what Kontos (2007) calls the “field of ethnic business”.  
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ESAG aims to penetrate this “field of ethnic business” and increase its market share 
and marginal profits in the “ethnic market” (Interviews with IDK 1-4 and ITR1-6). 
Thus, unsurprisingly, ESAG’s main goal is economic success and the rules of the 
game are to follow certain strategies and reach certain agreed milestones and KPIs, 
for example, as explained by IDK4: 
This is the action plan and that is then broken down into KPI’s (key 
performance indicators) and then further into milestones. KPIs for Germany 
are: Those are figures and mainly the budgets which the sales persons made 
themselves. (Interview IDK4; June 2014: time stamp: 1:53:06.0-2:08:42.2) 
The importance of reaching certain measurable goals is visually presented to all 
employees at HQ in the form of a plastic cylinder which is placed at the entrance to 
the lunch room.  
At the entrance there is a plastic tube in which the number of plastic balls 
indicates which KPIs and milestones have been reached. The white balls 
indicate the KPIs and the red ones the milestones. IDK4 informed me that 
this is called the “sales barometer” and with it standing here all employees 
can see how well the company as a whole is doing in terms of sales. (Field 
notes: HQ April 2014; page 8) 
As IDK4 mentioned in one of our interviews, ESAG pays all the employees’ salaries 
and thus the company must thrive economically (Interview IDK4; June 2014: time 
stamp: 3:00:30.1-3:02:33.9). Using the so-called “sales barometer” not only 
visualizes how well ESAG is playing the economic game but might remind the 
employees of who pays their salaries. Thus, every employee is reminded that they 
must invest all their work-related skills and competencies to the best of their abilities 
in order to secure their own workplace. The importance of delivering one’s best to 
the company was mentioned by all interactants, yet only the employees with Turkish 
backgrounds related their job and the salary directly to securing their livelihood: 
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My employer is the hand that feeds me [Brötchengeber]: he pays my rent, he 
pays my lease, and he pays for my bread and my water. And I have to 
provide some service in return; I have always done it, that’s an automatism. 
(Interview ITR4; April 2014: time stamp: 0:12:43.6-0:15:32.3) 
It takes a lot of energy [because] I earn my bread by talking, with my voice, 
convincing people and bla, bla, bla. And once I am at home I cannot talk 
anymore; I am speechless and tired. I left all my energy at work. (Interview 
ITR1; June 2013: time stamp: 1:11:40.2-1:12:24.5) 
However, this study’s interactants have somewhat different understandings of what 
performing in the best way possible entails. I shall discuss these individual 
understandings in Section 5.2; in the current section, I present and explain ESAG’s 
structures and main rationales as expressed by the interactants from HQ in order to 
shed some light on ESAG’s illusio. Since Bourdieu’s elements of field, habitus, and 
capital are intertwined, some of the aspects of the game mentioned here might also 
represent aspects of habitus, which I identify in the following section (Section 
5.5.2). 
As mentioned, economic success is one of the key goals of ESAG; hence, ESAG as 
a social agent strives to enhance its economic capital in the field of ethnic business 
and, eventually, the broader field of the economy. In order to be competitive and 
win many of the struggles over economic capital, ESAG provides rationales as to 
how the employees should invest their cultural capital in the best possible way. In 
other words, ESAG suggests how the rules of the game, i.e. gaining economic 
capital, could be mastered in the best possible way.  
One of the key approaches to mastering the game is expressed and visualized by the 
department of ethnic sales at HQ. In its section called sales support, the game is 
played best by increasing both the company’s and the employees’ efficiency: 
We work a lot on increasing our efficiency and everything has to be solved 
no matter how many are sick. So, there has always be someone who can take 
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over the other’s tasks. We came a long way already and it functions well. 
(Interview IDK2; April 2013: time stamp: 0:04:00.8 - 0:06:25.1) 
 
However, even though the company’s leaders and employees must work efficiently 
and follow certain performance parameters, all of which are aspects of what 
Bourdieu calls the “economic field”, ESAG combines these economic rationales 
with what it terms a “relational aspect”: 
In one way or another we have a relational approach to doing business with 
Germany or the Turkish segment in Germany, whereas they (Nestlé) take a 
commercial approach – in how many shops do we sell our products, 
processes, marginal return, etc. We are of course also forced to the 
commercial approach, but we have a somewhat different patience. (...) We 
are larger on our deadline. (Interview IDK4; December 2012: time stamp: 
1:16:16) 
 
Embracing the ‘relational’ is just one key value at ESAG that originates from its 
founder and current CEO. Other values seem to be a sense of kindness, adventurism, 
mutual respect and even fun, which appear to make ESAG a nice place to do 
business with, as expressed by IDK1: 
Well in our company there is a good spirit. [hmm] and it is based on an very 
essential understanding of [name of CEO] regarding our cooperation, that he 
actually is a good person and he thinks that we should treat all humans 
decently [hmm]. And this permeates our way of doing business. [hmm] And 
this I think is extremely important [hmm]. This is as I said if you fancy trying 
out something new [hmm], people who for example started in a position s 
accounts do something totally different today [hmm]. If you fancy that, well 
then there is space for that, there has been space for that. It’s obvious, the 
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bigger we get, the more specialized we get as well. [yes]. And then people 
have to take those positions they ought to have and which are needed right 
now, [yes], and then things get a bit harder. (...) Sometimes for those of us 
who have been here a long time this may feel a bit as being under pressure 
but still not more than, well we still can look each other in the eyes and we 
can all meet each other and the doors are ajar throughout the whole company 
[hmm]. And that is comfortable. [hmm] I like to add hat this a owner-driven 
company and there is still huge scope of freedom. [yes] I think that is really 
important. That fits very well with the North-Jutland mentality [hmm]: It’s 
okay to have rules, but rules as such have to be bendable. (Interview with 
IDK1, April 2013 timestamp: 0:03:14.5 - 0:03:14.5) 
Yet, as mentioned by IDK1, ESAG has expanded and the positions in the field of 
ESAG are taken according to the social agent’s skills and competencies 
(institutionalized cultural capital) and no longer because an employee shows interest 
in trying something new. It seems that due to ESAG’s economic growth, which 
could be considered one of the main interests of the field of ESAG, the field itself 
has changed along with its positions. In conjunction with ESAG becoming a more 
powerful and influential player in the wider economic field, it also adjusted its 
illusio to this field. In relation to this change, the specific logics of practice within 
the economic field became part of the social agents’ habitus, which in turn seemed 
to reproduce the field’s logic of practice. To IDK1, this change meant that 
employees were important by virtue of the role they held in the organization, yet the 
human aspect seems to have moved further into the background. He found this 
change or adjustment of logics to be in line with an American or British business 
culture: 
 
And I think that is something which we have been told is important from an 
American point of view. [hmmm]. I think that is very American or English 
business culture, where there is a lot … well, you don’t even know if I’m 
here tomorrow and the company I work for, if that is here. [hmm] it is my job 
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only. Therefore, let’s keep to business only [yes]. The personal part is not 
really important [yes]. (Interview IDK1; April 2013 time stamp: 0:39:05.6 - 
0:43:45.0). 
However, I did not experience ESAG’s culture to be setting aside the human being; 
people laughed with each other, took on small private errands during working time, 
and generally interacted harmoniously with each other. The working atmosphere 
seemed to be relaxed and was also described as such by many interactants in this 
study (e.g., IDK2, IDK1, ITR1, ITR2, ITR4). Moreover, ESAG still seemed to be an 
‘adventurous’ and exiting place to work at, as expressed by IDK2: 
The strategy of the company, i.e. the CEO’s strategy, is to be successful, but 
once the company is making money, he also wants to do some exciting 
things. The company does not stand still but always wants to do something 
new and exciting, which makes it an exciting company to work with. 
(Interview/field notes: IDK2; April 2013; time stamp: 1:29:04.6-1:38:04.6) 
In summary, ESAG’s interest, and thus the field’s illusio, i.e. “the tacit recognition 
of the value of the stakes of the game and [the] practical mastery of its rules” 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:117) seems to be the following: In collaborations with 
your fellow co-workers, be adventurous, show kindness and respect, and have fun in 
proactively and efficiently assisting ESAG in reaching and exceeding its milestones 
and action plans in order to become the most valued and successful food retailer in 
ethnic food markets throughout the world.  
In order to master the game in the field of ESAG, social agents need to align with 
the company’s culture and values, some of which I have already identified in this 
section, which are then translated into a variety of organizational practices. As 
values are a part of a social agent’s habitus, which in turn influences the social 
agent’s perceptions and actions, it can be said that the individuals’, but also the 
company’s, habitus plays a vital role in it being successful in the field of ethnic 
business and the wider economic field. 
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5.5.2 Habitus 
To my knowledge, ESAG is one of the few non-Turkish led ethnic food producers 
and retailers in the ethnic food market in Austria and Germany. How have they 
managed to be that successful?  
When introducing Bourdieu’s tools of analysis, I mentioned that social actors learn 
to play the social game in certain fields and thereby embody the field’s logic of 
practice. At the same time, Bourdieu cautioned that we should understand fields as 
dynamic with changing and fuzzy boundaries; hence, fields have a historical 
dimension which must be considered (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:90) in order to 
understand the field’s logic of practice. 
In this study, all Danish leaders were raised educated in Denmark. They received 
their education at business schools or universities and added leadership courses and 
time abroad to their educational portfolio. It seems fair to assume that they learned 
to play the ‘business’ game according to their education and their backgrounds as 
sales persons or leaders in other Danish companies. Some of the leaders (IDK4, 
IDK1 and IDK3) had also worked as expatriates for ESAG for a couple of years, 
whereby they had, for example, experienced parts of the Arabic world. Yet, 
primarily, they were all familiar with and a product of the logic of practice in the 
field of ESAG. 
In the previous section, I pointed out that ESAG is a successful actor in the ethnic 
market. One important indication of their success could be the fact that one of the 
world’s biggest companies within the food sector, Nestlé, approached ESAG and 
asked them for a collaboration as they themselves were having problems in gaining 
access to the ethnic markets in Europe (Interview IDK2; December 2012: time 
stamp: 0:27:00-0:29:00). 
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Even though this study’s interactants did not explicitly point to the company’s 
success factors, I argue that these were to be found in the company’s habitus (see 
section 3.2.3). As mentioned earlier, Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:126f) 
posited that habitus is  
“the durable and transposable systems of schemata of perception, appreciation, and 
action that result from the institution of the social in the body (or in the biological 
individuals) (...) And when habitus encounters a social world of which it is the 
product, it is like a ‘fish in water’: it does not feel the weight of the water and it 
takes the world about itself for granted.”  
Arguably, a company that considers itself to be successful in its field of operation 
may have a habitus which is in alignment with the field. Furthermore, following 
Bourdieu’s thoughts, I posit that this company as a field in itself has “conditioned” 
the habitus of its employees and leaders over time while these have “contribute[d] to 
constituting the field as a meaningful world, a world endowed with sense and value, 
in which it is worth investing one’s energy” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:127). 
What follows is a company that, generally speaking, thrives as a fish in water; and it 
does so because it has been shaped and conditioned by a set of habitus (employees 
and leaders) which themselves thrive as fish in the water, i.e. in the company as such 
but also in the wider economic field. How then could ESAG be described? What are 
its characteristics that, in the words of Bourdieu, make it a “meaningful world, a 
world endowed with sense and value, in which [employees and leaders like to invest 
their] energy”? 
According to the interactants, a variety of interrelated values and structures at ESAG 
not only make the company a successful player on the field of ethnic business but 
also a highly valued place at which to work. These are:  
 Being a family business with family values 
o Patience, flexibility, and leniency regarding rules’ 
o Dispositional trust 
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o The matrix structure 
 Learning, living and embodying the company values 
 Sales subsidiaries employing persons with Turkish backgrounds 
These main characteristics are outlined and discussed in the following sections. The 
subsequent identification and discussion of ESAG’s values and organizational 
structure is important as these describe the field in which the leaders and employees 
work, interact and take reasonable actions. Thus, practices of leadership are 
influenced by the field of ESAG with its illusio and distribution of positions and 
power structures. When and how trust emerges from leadership practices is also 
influenced by the field in which these interactions take place. Therefore, it is 
necessary to understand the field in more detail. This is not to say that the individual 
social agent is merely a puppet in the field; individual agents have a certain range of 
freedom in ‘choosing’ a reasonable practice. However, this range of ‘freedom’ is 
restricted by the individuals’ habitus, their capital portfolio and their positions in the 
field. 
A family business with family values 
ESAG itself is presented as a family business, a concept that many of the leaders I 
interacted with helped to develop. Being a family business with family values means 
that key managerial positions at ESAG are taken by family members or close 
acquaintances of ESAG’s founder and current CEO (Field notes/interview summary 
IDK4 December 2012). IDK4 pointed out that:  
Actually, we are a family, we have family values. And that is true as well for 
some of the cultures we work together with; Turks and especially people 
from the Middle East. We have this family values: respect and collaboration 
… relations. There ought to be no difference of walking into our warehouse 
in [Sub DE-West] or our dairy in Austria or our office her in [HQs], it should 
be these values you should sense if you enter the place and are a part of it. 
[Interview IDK4; December 2012: time stamp: 0:36:46.0 – 0:37:05.2] 
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In this quote, IDK4 highlights the values of respect, cooperation and relation 
building as important family values. He also indicates that these are values inherent 
to those cultures ESAG cooperates with, i.e. persons and companies from Turkish 
and Middle Eastern cultures. ESAG, which considers itself a ‘Danish company’, has 
values which are also important in ‘Turkish culture’, as expressed by IDK4, and are 
thus also important for ESAG’s sales personnel of Turkish origin. The majority of 
ESAG’s employees are stationed at HQ, they see and converse with each other on a 
daily basis. Most of them have been at ESAG for a number of years and seem to 
know each other quite well. This ‘familiarity’ is underlined as a further strength of 
ESAG. According to IDK4, it leads to faster internal communication and 
information sharing in an informal manner, something that is nowadays called ‘the 
matrix structure’: 
This Danish familiarity [yes] or what do you call it, eh familiarity, we are a 
family here in the company and yes, it might well be that I am higher 
decorated than you are but that doesn’t make me, I think, it doesn’t make me 
a better person [no, no] and that is part of a Danish approach, right? And 
perhaps it is also true for these working in a zig zag which nowadays is 
nicely called for a matrix, it is more like: what is the formal and what is the 
practical way of doing things; well, it might well be that I should take that 
way of command and ask for stuff, but it goes faster in a zig-zag. [yes]. We 
Danes do that all the time [hmm] and as you say yourself, when having a 
coffee at the coffee dispenser and when sitting at the lunch table. (Interview 
IDK4; June 2014: time stamp: 3:12:49.1-3:19:13.6) 
This quote aptly illustrates how ESAG understands itself and in which ways the 
notions of family business, matrix structure and being a Danish company are 
combined to make up ESAG’s organizational culture and tacit rules that should be 
followed when playing the game in the field of ESAG. As I will discuss in more 
detail in the following sections, it could be argued that this feeling of familiarity 
with one another has a variety of causes: First, ESAG is an SME and employs 
around 120 people at HQ. The employees meet at least once a day, i.e. during their 
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lunch breaks. These are often used to discuss work-related issues, thus much 
information is shared via informal conversations. This is possible by virtue of the 
relatively small size of the company. SMEs and small businesses make up over 80 
% of all private businesses in Denmark, which is why IDK4 may link family values 
with Danish values. On the other hand, one could suggest that this familiarity is due 
to having similar backgrounds, as is the case for almost all employees at ESAG’s 
HQ and thus for about 90% of its entire workforce. The vast majority grew up in the 
same region and all seem to share similar interests and an educational background 
that is related to the business sector. Within the literature on trust, a sense of 
familiarity with each other is portrayed as an important enabler for trust building 
(see e.g. Luhmann 1979, Möllering 2006, Lewicki & Bunker 1996, Frederiksen 
2014).  
Trust in each other was also mentioned by many of this study’s interactants as lying 
at the heart of the company, which is why I argue that ESAG and many of its 
employees are endowed with dispositional trust (Interview IDK1; June 2013: time 
stamp: 0:48:02.9 - 0:50:33.1). According to IDK1 (Interview IDK1; June 2013: time 
stamp: 0:48:02.9 - 0:50:33.1), the Danes’ tendency to trust others is based on the 
high level of trust in the Danish society, seeing that one simply can buy vegetables 
at the roadside and the farmer trusts you to pay for the goods by putting money into 
a can. IDK1 furthermore points out that ESAG is a Danish company situated in a 
relatively rural area that is a product of its wider social context and which has been 
and still is characterized by a high level of generalized trust. This account is in line 
with research done on generalized trust. For example, Fukuyama (1995) conducted 
research on so-called “high trust vs. low trust cultures”. Ultimately, Fukuyama 
argued that the ‘circle’ in which each person can quite easily build fairly ‘safe’ trust 
relations is relatively large in so-called ‘high trust cultures’; in contrast, it is rather 
small in so-called ‘low trust cultures’. Consequently, in ‘low trust cultures’ trusting 
relationships are most easily developed between close family members and next of 
kin, whereas it is more difficult to build trust with people outside the ‘family-circle’, 
according to Fukuyama. 
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However, while Fukuyama’s findings suggest that it would be easier and ‘safer’ to 
build trust in high trust societies such as Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands 
and, to some extent, Germany (see social capital/generalized trust scale/OECD 
2011), Frederiksen’s (2012, 2014) work relativizes these statements by arguing that 
even in a so-called ‘high trust culture’ such as Denmark (according to Fukuyama), 
there is a variety of people one would not trust and, moreover, it would depend on 
the object and the actual trust-relationship whether one would even trust one’s next 
of kin.  
These assumptions seem to be backed up by statements made by the ‘German-
Turkish’ interviewees taking part in this study. Almost all of them stated that in 
general there is little trust between Turks; yet they often find it easier to trust their 
next of kin, although this is also not always the case (see interview with ITR5). In 
general, my empirical data suggest that trust building in a ‘Turkish working context’ 
is harder to achieve; one actually has to earn the other’s trust by reciprocating trust 
over a longer period of time – ITR2 speaks of “throwing a bone to the other and 
seeing how the person reacts” (Informal Conversation ITR2; September 2014: page 
2) - whereas trust in a ‘Danish’ or ‘German’ working context is built more easily, 
and perhaps even taken for granted. ESAG’s experiences of misplacing their trust is 
an example of taking trust for granted. ITR1 even points out that many Germans and 
Danes are ‘naïve’ when trusting others ‘out of the blue’, as my field notes indicate: 
Then he [ITR1] tells me about the advantage of being a Turk in this market. 
He says that Danes and Germans would be too sweet-natured, too nice, too 
trusting to the Turkish customers. The Turks would have a higher chance of 
getting better, i.e. lower, prices from the Danes than from him. (Field notes; 
Sub.DE-East; June 2014, page 7) 
Despite the disadvantages of trusting too much, ESAG experiences the high level of 
trust amongst its employees as the prerequisite for doing business; doing business, 
or even living, without trust would be unthinkable, at least for IDK1: 
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No, you cannot omit trust at any point in time. [okay]. You always need trust. 
You need to trust those you work together with and trust that those whom 
you work for are supporting you all the time. (Interview IDK1; June 2013: 
time stamp: 0:55:11.3 - 0:57:49.4) 
In addition to trust and the minimization of hierarchy, another aspect of being a 
family business is related to the employees being both humble and equals, which is 
translated into having the freedom to talk to any other employee in the same manner. 
If an employee at ESAG requires information from a certain person, they simply ask 
that person regardless of their ‘official hierarchical’ position or whether they should 
have followed an ‘official chain of command’. They take the fastest, most practical 
and thus most reasonable approach, which tends to use a type of crisscross style. 
IDK4 suggested that all Danes have almost always worked in a ‘matrix structure’, 
even though they never designate it as such. Until now, many of the interactants at 
the subsidiaries were not aware of ESAG’s organizational structure. Neither was I 
for the first 1.5 years of this study. Working according to the matrix structure is 
simply an approach which ESAG has always used but never communicated; rather, 
it seems to be understood as part of the family values and therefore does not need to 
be communicated. Working within the taken-for-granted and uncommunicated 
matrix structure seems to translate as follows: An employee requests assistance of 
those family members (employees at ESAG’s HQ) who could be considered most 
able to provide it. If this request is phrased politely than the other family member 
will indeed assist with no questions asked. These structures have not been put down 
on paper- yet. However, not knowing these structures can become problematic; even 
more so when there is an official organizational chart which does little to convey 
ESAG’s actual structure, including its methods of ‘command’. For instance, at the 
beginning of my field work, I was introduced to the official organizational chart. 
Since I was unaware of ESAG’s matrix structure, I was especially confused upon 
learning about the way ESAG’s subsidiaries were meant to communicate with HQ. 
The subsidiary leaders were - and possibly still are - as puzzled as I was.  IDK4 even 
called this confusion to cause “frustration for our subsidiary in Austria where ITR3 
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would ask: Who is the subordinate here?” (Interview IDK2 at DE-E; June 2014; 
time stamp: 2:56:19.9-3:00:30.1). 
While the matrix structure is tacitly used by the employees at HQ as they are 
accustomed to it, the employees with Turkish backgrounds do not know about it, 
although they do wonder why they have so many superiors. Whereas the official 
organizational chart pictures one central subordinate for all sales subsidiaries, i.e. the 
head of sales, the informal matrix structure advises reporting to several heads of the 
various departments instead. As mentioned, the Danish employees learned how to 
collaborate in a matrix structure in conjunction with being employed at a growing 
family business. Thus, they embodied ESAG’s values and its way of expressing and 
practicing these values while learning to tacitly appreciate ESAG’s illusio, which I 
identified to be the following in a prior chapter: In collaborations with your fellow 
co-workers, be adventurous, show kindness and respect, and have fun in proactively 
and efficiently assisting ESAG in reaching and exceeding its milestones and action 
plans in order to become the most valued and successful food retailer in the ethnic 
food markets throughout the world. 
To accomplish being in synch with the illusio, the employees are somehow expected 
to ‘learn and incorporate’ the company values. 
Learning, living and embodying the company values 
With the exception of IDK3, all Danish interactants mentioned in my dissertation 
have been working for ESAG for almost two decades. They reproduced and 
transferred their implicit understanding of the field’s logic of practice to those 
departments of ESAG they currently work in. In response to my question of how 
one is to know at ESAG that the company works according to the matrix structure, 
IDK4 provided a good explanation regarding how he learned what rules and values 
apply at ESAG and how he translates them into reasonable actions: 
And those of us who work at [HQs], we are broad up with it and we know it 
[ja]. And this is actually the reason why I say that we do not have any 
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pronounced hierarchy. [hmm] (...) And then we come to that which we can 
call owner-leadership and strong values [hmm] and this I think often about: I 
am safe because I know the values [hmm] and these are values I am 
convinced of and it is a huge value-community: Well, what would [name of 
CEO] have done in this situation? He would have acted like this and that. 
Then I also dare to act like that [hm, yes]. And that’s about these values 
which are a basic part of our leadership and there are strong values in owner-
led companies such as this one. [that’s right]. (Interview IDK4; June 2014: 
time stamp: 2:56:19.9-3:00:30.1) 
The company’s values tell me how to work and therefore I don’t miss a 
visible hierarchy but of course I do have a history in this company. I started 
as a sales person and learnt to take decisions out there in all the countries I 
worked in. And if you take a wrong decision and then come back home to 
HQs then it is discussed but you are not made losing your face, you are not 
forced to call the costumer and tell them: “This did not go well; I cannot do 
this and that”. So you have this security. But this means, that you have to 
know the values and you have to have lived the values. You have to feel 
secure in them, you might say. (Interview IDK4; June 2014: time stamp: 
3:02:33.9-3:12:49.1) 
IDK4 pointed out that knowing or rather living the company’s values gives him a 
feeling of safety; he dares to take actions before having to ask a superior for advice. 
The company backs his decisions. In other words, he does not run a high risk when 
taking certain actions. He can trust the company to stand behind him. The same 
impression has been given by IDK1 and ITR1. (Interview ITR1 June 2013: time 
stamp: 0:32:25.1 – 0:33:37.1) 
Thus, knowing the values and living the values seem to provide a feeling of security 
and familiarity with the company. The company culture as such seems to represent a 
kind of security net for the employees’ actions, that is, as long as the employees 
know and embrace the company’s main values. Not knowing the values may, 
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however, lead to misunderstandings. In his position as head of HR, IDK4, for 
example, changed the sales personnel’s salary from a bonus based salary to a steady 
monthly income. His rationale for doing so was to provide a kind of “financial 
safety net” in times when sales were rather slow, which was the case in 2012 and 
2013. His decision appeared to reflect the company’s family values as this change in 
salary could be interpreted as assisting fellow co-workers. Yet the sales personnel 
with Turkish backgrounds seemed to interpret this step quite differently as they 
protested against the cessation of the bonus-based salary (Interview/Summary IDK4; 
December 2012; page 1). Even though the sales personnel with Turkish backgrounds 
embraced family values, they also embraced the notions of honor and recognition, as 
found in the previous part of the analysis. I assume that IDK4’s approach was 
misunderstood by the sales personnel as being patronizing and not valuing their 
skills in doing business, even in hard times. In light of information received from 
ITR2 during a break in a sales course, IDK4’s well-meant stable monthly income 
might even have been interpreted as in insult. To ITR2, doing business and being 
successful are connected to one’s skills to impress and one’s identity and self-
confidence; and when you prevail, you have won the game of the ‘survival of the 
fittest’:  
ITR2 turns to another subject, telling me that there is a saying in Turkey: 
Dogs don’t bite dogs. A lot of animals fight without really fighting; they 
impress the other with their size or abilities. You need to trust yourself. And 
if you have self-confidence and can impress others, then you are successful, 
also as a sales person. You don’t need to lie to people or outsmart them if you 
can convey your self-confidence to the other. It’s the same with ITR1, when 
you say he can enter all the supermarkets and make orders. Why? Because he 
has transferred his self-confidence to the customers. But if you go to the 
customer and say: Please, please, then you will get slapped in the face and 
that’s business as well. You kill to eat meat and that’s the same in business, 
you have to impress to survive. If you are weak then you will be killed, 
272 
 
meaning you will vanish into thin air. Whether that’s within a year or a 
month depends entirely on you how you behave. 
According to ITR2, only the weak will vanish. Following that line of thought, I 
assume that IDK4’s well-meant changes were interpreted by the sales personnel as 
suggesting that they were too weak to survive on their own. Most probably, the sales 
persons felt that their honor and self-confidence had been slighted. It seems that 
IDK4’s understanding of the field of ESAG differed from that of the ethnic-Turkish 
sales personnel in the subsidiaries. The question regarding the salary-structure is but 
one incident indicating that the field of ESAG may be divided into sub-fields with 
diverse logics and power structures which influence the employees’ practical sense. 
Another example is the case of the so-called MUS dialogues, which could be 
translated as ‘employee appraisal and development dialogues’. In his role as head of 
HR, IDK4 administered the MUS in the same manner with the ethnic-Turkish 
workforce as he did with the ethnic-Danish workforce. He had to realize, though, 
that he could not copy the approach used at HQ and implement it at the subsidiaries 
because he had the impression that the ethnic-Turks would not dare to tell him, their 
leader, what it was they lacked and needed in order to thrive in their jobs. IDK4 
pointed out that there was ‘a higher power distance in the Turkish culture’, which in 
his view resulted in the ethnic-Turkish sales personnel not telling him the truth 
because they might have feared repercussions. Hence, he could not assist and help 
them improve their work situation, and thus heighten their motivation and hence 
their performance (Interview/Summary IDK4; December 2012: time stamp: 
0:07:51–0:10:07). 
As a consequence, IDK4 changed the procedure and had a face-to-face dialogue, 
instead of following a clear-cut pattern of questions, with each ethnic-Turkish sales 
person in Germany and Austria. It could be questioned, however, whether this new 
approach would improve the ’quality’ of the answers given or why the changed 
mode of communication should have an influence on the ‘truthfulness’ of the 
answers provided? In other words, ESAG was in search for a method or tool with 
which they could minimize this perceived ‘power distance’. IDK4 indirectly 
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suggested that ESAG HQ must improve the communication and ‘teaching’ of its 
values and one approach he saw via the company news magazine, ESAGNews, 
which was first published in January 2014. According to IDK2, each issue would 
have a leader in which ESAG’s CEO would communicate ESAG’s values and since 
the magazine was translated into English, German, and Romanian, ESAG’s entire 
workforce could learn about the company values (Interview IDK4; June 2014: time 
stamp: 3:00:30.1-3:02:33.9).  As trust is arguably constructed in the realm of 
familiarity (Frederiksen 2012), it seems to be crucial that ESAG’s employees are 
familiar with each other and ESAG’s values and that they live these values. The 
above analysis suggests that the Danish leaders and employees at HQ live the 
company values. Thus, their practices are more predictable than if they did not align 
their practices with company values, which should enhance chances for trust 
building (Gillespie & Mann 2004). However, the employees at the subsidiaries 
seemed to follow different values, or at least appreciated values of honor and 
recognition but also family, in a fairly different way than ESAG’s HQ.  
These examples suggest that ESAG may be a divided company. In Bourdieusian 
terms, one might say that ESAG’s habitus is divided or even torn. Bourdieu 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:127) argued that “[t]he habitus is the product of the 
embodiment of the immanent necessity of a field (or of a set of intersecting fields, 
the extent of their intersection or discrepancy being at the root of a divided or even 
torn habitus).” Consequently, ESAG’s habitus may be a product of intersecting 
fields, as I will discuss in the next section. 
ESAG: A divided habitus?  
In the section above, I outlined several values that my interactants embraced as 
important to them and the company at large (e.g. fun, efficiency, kindness, and 
respect).  
On the other hand, in our informal conversations the Danish leaders and the Danish-
Turkish trainee often used the metaphor of “the machine room” when referring to 
the department of sales support in which all sales activities were registered and 
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finalized (see Interview with ITR5; time stamp 0-0:00:38.0-0-0:03:38.4). The head 
of sales support, IDK2, made clear that it has been important for the company to 
have employees who understand that they are replaceable (Interview IDK2; April 
2013, times tamp 0:07:03.1-0:07:27.4).  
Being replaceable fits well with the machine metaphor, indicating that all employees 
have to function in order for the organization to progress and become successful. 
The human being, thus, is ‘reduced’ to being a small part in the organization; 
reduced to a role which has to be played successfully and in accordance with the 
other parts and the overall function of the machine, i.e. the organization. Social 
relations seem to be of little importance when doing business in the economic field, 
as IDK1 implied when comparing Danish business practices with those he 
encountered on the ethnic market where one would have to consider that there is “a 
family and a human being and not only an employee in a certain company” 
(Interview with IDK1, June 2013 timestamp: 0:39:05.6 - 0:43:45.0). 
Thus, as mentioned earlier, ESAG is considered a family business following the 
values and visions of their founder and CEO. However, the notion or metaphor of 
the family seems to have come under pressure from the economic field with its 
illusio of profit maximization, calculation and efficiency of all costs (Bourdieu 
2005), rendering the individual as a mere replaceable part in a bigger machine. The 
economic field appears to be slowly transforming the field of ESAG and thus its 
habitus. As ESAG grows, different positions have emerged in the field of the firm 
which have gradually been taken by social agents fitting the field’s ‘new’ demand 
for employees with a certain capital portfolio. According to Bourdieu, dominant 
actors determine which capital portfolio is acknowledged in a certain field. Based on 
the quotes above and the discussion of the influence of the economic field on the 
field of ESAG, I assume that social actors higher up in ESAG’s hierarchy, especially 
the CEO, and the ‘field of power’, particularly the economic field, play a decisive 
role in influencing the demand for a certain capital portfolio and thus the habitus of 
the field of ESAG. In order to fill this demand and to further “obey the principles of 
the economy” (Bourdieu 2005:6), ESAG has to hire new personnel with certain 
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skills, experiences and competencies, i.e. personnel which better fits the habitus of 
the changed field of ESAG. It seems that the family metaphor is being challenged by 
the machine metaphor, both of which are present in the language and sense-making 
of ESAG’s interactants. Nevertheless, despite its growth, the field of ESAG still 
retains the logics of being a family business and the values and practices attached 
thereto. For example, the higher positions in ESAG are mainly taken by social actors 
who are related to or have had long lasting relationships with the CEO. ITR7, a sales 
person of Turkish origin, asserted that access to this ‘higher echelon’ appears to be 
out of reach for those who do not fit the ‘family’ criterion, even though they may 
have the right skills and educational background for such a positon: 
ESAG may be a family business but you don’t have … I don’t know, over 
time I have developed that feeling that if you do not belong to the family up 
there in Denmark, then you will not get promoted. I mean, we [subsidiary 
sales persons of Turkish origin] will not climb the career ladder. Us sales 
persons will stay sales persons, end of story (Interview with ITR7, April 
2014, time stamp: 0:21:28.2-0:23:10.1) 
 
Following ITR7’s account, even though he maintained that he had the relevant 
education and experience for climbing the career ladder, he conveyed that he did not 
expect this to happen and thus did not see a future for himself at ESAG. In fact, he 
left the company in December 2015. Hence, as anticipated by ITR7, he did not 
succeed in gaining access to a position which he considered a better fit for his skills 
and experience than his position as a sales person. In other words, he might not have 
been familiar with the rules of the game at ESAG, and thus may not have known 
how to ask for a promotion or how to signal that he considered it time for a 
promotion or at least a discussion of his career options at ESAG. On the other hand, 
following ITR7’s account, not belonging to the “Danish family” seems to equal 
“staying a sales person forever”, i.e. not having a chance for a promotion. In that 
sense, ethnicity seems to be a determining factor in career development. ITR7’s 
choice to leave the company may imply that not being of Danish ethnicity could 
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almost be enough to hinder promotion. Whether or not this is the case at ESAG 
cannot be clearly deduced from the empirical material; however, since all employees 
of Turkish origin, with the exception of ITR3, held positions which, from a Danish-
Turkish perspective, were hierarchically and status-wise perceived to be below HQ 
positions within the department of ethnic sales, might support ITR7’s notion of 
‘Turkish ethnicity as a hindrance for promotion’. 
Whereas this practice can be regarded as problematic, and was also challenged by a 
few employees with Turkish backgrounds (see e.g. section 5.4.3), other values and 
rules of the game, such as “working based on mutual trust, respect and assistance” 
(see interviews with IDK4, HoS, IDK1, and IDK2 from HQ and IDK3) could be 
regarded as rather unproblematic family-related values. These are not challenged by 
others in the field of ESAG per se. However, as I analyzed what is understood by 
‘trust’, ‘respect’ and ‘assistance’ and how these concepts are practiced in the field 
presents a major struggle in the field of ESAG. Bourdieu reminds us that fields hold 
dominant and dominated positions. In ESAG, the dominant positions are taken by 
those holding leadership positions, including the CEO yet excluding the Austro-
Turkish leader at the Austrian sales subsidiary and partly excluding the Danish 
leader at the subsidiary DE-W. Almost all Danish leaders, which initially included 
the subsidiary leader in Germany, try to explain to the other agents in the field how 
these concepts should be understood and practiced. This approach can also be 
understood as tacitly setting the rules of the game in ESAG, i.e. reproducing the 
field’s illusio, the recognition of the “value of the stakes of the game and the 
practical mastery of its rules” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:117). The leaders not 
only understand themselves as mastering the demonstration of respect and 
assistance, they are also confident of ‘knowing’ how to lead their subordinates in the 
best way, how their products should be marketed, and how their customers should 
be handled in order to make as much profit as possible and outdo their competitors. 
Since its establishment in the 1980s, ESAG has grown to become a successful player 
in the economic field and especially in the field of ethnic business. Its habitus seems 
to fit the fields it acts in; a habitus which creates schemes of action and perception, 
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which in turn influence the agents’ habitus acting in the field and vice versa. Hence, 
the employees reproduce the rules and logics of the field including its doxa, i.e. the 
alleged natural order of agents’ positions in the given field, of which tacitly 
restricting management positions (at HQ) of Turks is just one example. 
Since ESAG works internationally, the field of ESAG crosses national boundaries, 
adding to its complexity; the sales department has to be aware of different rules 
regarding taxation, safety regulations, minimum wages, and maximum working 
time, to name a few examples. Moreover, in its subsidiaries outside Denmark, 
ESAG’s workforce mainly comprises employees from Turkish ethnic minorities. 
This is also the case in the three sales subsidiaries in Germany and Austria which, 
besides the HQ, are the focus of my study. Hiring employees, especially sales 
personnel, from the Turkish ethnic minorities was a strategic choice made to connect 
with the ethnic market. To employ sales personnel of Turkish origin, the 
predominantly Danish field of ESAG invested economic capital to acquire dearly 
needed incorporated ‘Turkish’ cultural capital and social capital otherwise 
unavailable to them. This choice has proven to yield good results, economically 
speaking. However, as I will discuss in more detail in the subsequent sections, it also 
led to a variety of struggles in the game in the field of ESAG as the diverse 
distribution of capital, to some extent, explains the range of possibilities of social 
agents’ practices and their positioning within the field. The main reason for the 
struggles in the field of ESAG seems to be grounded in how the ‘dominant agents’ 
relate to the ethnic minorities’ embodied histories (their habitus), which are 
characterized by a “multiple belonging in the context of nationally designated 
cultures” as asserted by Pütz et al. (2007:501). When speaking to interactants with 
Turkish backgrounds, all of them stated that they, in general, had no problems with 
belonging to two or more ‘national cultures’. On the contrary, they all pointed out 
that they could understand and act appropriately in both national frameworks, that 
incorporated in the field of the Turkish family and that incorporated in the social and 
educational fields in Austria and Germany. While they emphasized that they were 
able to easily shift between these diverse frames of reference, which they understood 
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to be a major advantage for ESAG in the ethnic markets in Austria and Germany, 
the dominant agents at ESAG (almost all leaders I talked to at HQ) and the dominant 
actors in the broader social field (politicians and media representatives) in Austria, 
Denmark, and Germany ‘reduce’ the Turkish minorities’ self-understanding to being 
just ‘Turkish’. One powerful tool for this is what Pütz et al. (2007:501) called 
“ethnicizing discourses”. Instead of accepting the sense of ‘transculturalism’ that the 
employees of Turkish origin practice on a daily basis, almost all leaders in the field 
of ESAG portrayed them as ‘Turks’ and only utilized their incorporated ‘Turkish’ 
cultural capital in order to gain access to that part of the field of ethnic business that 
is dominated by businesses and customers of Turkish origin. I will go into more 
detail regarding these issues in the subsequent section. For now, the notion of 
‘transculturalism’ and ‘ethnicizing discourses’ are mentioned to highlight the 
complexity of the field of ESAG and to stress that the diverse agents follow different 
interests, have slightly different understandings of the illusio of the field of ESAG, 
and have thus developed diverse practical senses in order to master the game. In 
terms of valued forms of capital in the field of ESAG, for instance, all interactants 
regardless of ethnic background strive for the accumulation of economic capital. 
The employees of Turkish origin, however, also strive for recognition, acceptance 
and belonging. Thus, to them, accumulating cultural capital (further work-related 
qualifications and knowledge, and especially recognition and acknowledgment of 
their ‘transculturalism’ and institutionalized cultural capital, i.e. their education) 
seems to be at stake at shown in the analysis. 
However, while cultural capital in forms of institutionalized and incorporated 
cultural capital seem to represent symbolic capital within the group of employees 
with Turkish backgrounds, the dominant agents in the field of ESAG particularly 
value economic capital and social capital (in the form of having a relationship with 
the CEO) over cultural capital, even though they have realized that they need 
incorporated Turkish cultural capital to be successful in the ethnic market. 
However, their economic capital can be exchanged for the necessary cultural capital. 
Hence, because the dominant agents set the rules of the game, they also agree upon 
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what should be considered symbolic capital in the field and thus determine the 
field’s power structures. In the case of ESAG, the most valued capital seems to be 
economic capital which is visualized in the company’s accounting system, which 
shows each department’s volume of sales with absolute transparency. This system 
can be accessed from anywhere and it is the main tool for all employees working in 
ethnic sales. ITR10, an Austro-Turkish sales assistant, stated that for him, this 
system is what makes him feel at home, i.e. belonging to ESAG (Interview with 
ITR10 at Sub AT, May 2013; time stamp: 0:25:15.2-0:27:20.3). 
As mentioned earlier, the economic success of the company is also visualized in the 
lunch room at HQ in form of a plastic cylinder, in which the number of white and 
red balls indicate which milestones and KPI’s have been attained during that month. 
Social capital only seems important at ESAG if an employee wants to ascend the 
hierarchical ladder. As hinted at earlier, social capital appears to be expressed by 
holding a leadership position in the company and/or being related to the CEO. 
Cultural capital, on the other hand, does not seem to play an overly important role 
in ESAG’s “Danish part”, its HQ. Yet in its subsidiaries, “the multicultural part” is a 
highly valued form of capital alongside social and economic capital. 
It is primarily along these differences that the struggles in the field of ESAG unfold 
as some social agents strive to change the field’s practices and its doxa, while others 
seek to maintain it, and yet others are aware of being ‘marginalized’ but nevertheless 
adopt the field’s doxa because their main objective is receiving a salary and making 
ends meet (see interviews with ITR1, ITR8, and ITR9).  
In summary, I claim that ESAG’s habitus is predominantly influenced and shaped 
by the field of the economy and the field of ethnic business, whereby the latter is 
influenced by the family field. Since these fields have different logics, ESAG’s 
habitus comprises logics which could be challenging to combine, although this does 
not mean that they cannot be combined in some form. In fact, in order to be 
successful on the ethnic market it seems to be important to have a habitus which has 
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been developed at the intersection of the aforementioned fields because the field of 
ethnic business itself seems to represent a divided habitus. Throughout the following 
sections, I will further identify and discuss leader-employee interactions and 
practices that are considered reasonable because they appear to align with the logics 
of the intersecting fields. However, maneuvering with a divided habitus in and 
across intersecting fields pose challenges such as the aforementioned issues 
regarding HR practices. With ESAG’s apparently divided habitus, its employees 
must live with such ambiguities as leadership practices that can be interpreted in 
several ways, as mentioned above. Thus, there can be room for uncertainties 
regarding how practices are interpreted and understood by various employees, which 
in turn may influence trust building processes. Which practices are reasonable or 
unreasonable is in the eye of the beholder and his or her positioning in the field of 
ESAG, which arguably is a product of intersecting fields and thus is formed around 
contradictory logics: the logics of business is business, the logics of being a 
supportive, trusting and kind family member and the logics of honor and 
recognition. 
The intersections of the field of ESAG with other relevant fields and its location 
within these fields are broadly visualized in figure 19. This figure portrays only the 
relative connections and intersections of the fields. The size of the fields, their 
precise location, color or lining is not based on an analysis of statistical data. This 
figure is simply meant to visualize the intersecting fields mentioned throughout this 
chapter. 
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Figure 19: ESAG’s position in intersecting fields 
 
The above discussion suggests that ESAG has a divided habitus. This division seems 
to follow certain lines. Firstly, ESAG’s HQ seems to follow a logic which could be 
characterized as a combination of ‘business is business’ and embracing family 
values, i.e. being a family business. The subsidiaries seem to follow a similar logic, 
the logic of ‘being a family business’. However, they seem to furthermore add the 
logics of ‘honor and recognition’, which leads to a rationale that could be 
summarized as ‘being a hardworking, successful, self-confident, and proud Turkish 
ethnic minority sales person employed at a successful Danish family business 
focused on employee well-being and high end quality products.” These different 
logics refer to different positionings within the field of ESAG. The discussion above 
suggests that these differences follow ESAG’s structural organization, which also 
happens to mirror geographical and cultural differences as well as differences in the 
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objective distribution of power. In the field of ESAG, the positions of power are 
predominantly held by male Danish leaders in their 50s, some of who are related to 
or closely acquainted with the CEO. These positions are at HQ in Denmark. At HQ, 
about 98% of the employees are locals with Danish backgrounds. The working 
language is Danish. At the subsidiaries, which are located close to the main hubs of 
the ethnic markets in Germany and Austria, almost all employees have a Turkish 
background; they often have no business related education as they were simply hired 
for their knowledge of Turkish language and culture. As mentioned by ITR7, there 
seem to be few opportunities for employees with Turkish backgrounds to ascend 
ESAG’s career ladder and become subsidiary leaders. However, some of ESAG’s 
employees have taken positions between these two ‘sub-fields’ in the field of ESAG, 
thus crossing the relatively open boundaries of these fields.  
The divided habitus of ESAG can be visualized as follows: 
 
 
Figure 20: ESAG HQ’s and ESAG subsidiaries’ position in intersecting fields 
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The analysis showed that ESAG’s leaders and employees took different positions 
within and between the ESAG’s subfields ESAG HQ and ESAG subsidiaries. Some 
of ESAG’s employees seemed to take positions that are more in line with the logics 
of the Field of Ethnic Business (ITR7-9; ITR3, ITR10-13, IDE1, ITR6, ITR14); 
others’ positions seemed to be more in line with the logics of the Economic Field 
(HoS, IDK4, IDK2), while yet others moved across these logics and positioned 
themselves in a third way (IDK1, ITR5, IDK3, ITR4, IDK5, ITR2, IAT1, ITR1). 
The ambiguities of the field are, arguably, also expressed by IDK4 when asking 
himself: 
What kind of company are we? Are we a small business in [name of town in 
Denmark] or are we actually a big international company? And what about 
our corporate language: Should it be Danish, German, English, Turkish? 
(Interview/Summary IDK4; June 2014: time stamp: 3:02:33.9-3:12:49.1) 
Despite the struggles and ambiguities found in ESAG, the analysis indicates that 
ESAG managed to thrive economically. One reason for this success seemed to be 
ESAG’s use of ethnic Turkish embodied cultural capital at its subsidiaries. By 
employing ethnic Turkish sales persons, ESAG managed to further penetrate the 
ethnic markets in Austria and Germany. While ESAG in that sense converted parts 
of its economic capital into embodied cultural capital, the ethnic Turkish workforce 
converted its embodied cultural capital and its social capital (their family and 
customer networks) into economic capital both for themselves and the company. In 
that sense, it could be argued that the investment of economic capital resulted in the 
accruement of yet more economic capital (what goes around, comes around). Thus, 
actors in both of ESAG’s subfields were in the position to accrue needed economic 
capital which arguably mirrors a value which ESAG’s members strived for, which is 
why they “invested their energy” in the field of ESAG (Bourdieu & Wacquant 
1992:127). Besides the argument of providing economic capital, ESAG’s success 
seems also to rest on its intermediary and subsidiary leaders’ ability to ‘bridge’ the 
different logics of ESAG’s subfields. As pointed out in the analysis, these leaders 
provided their employees with the tools needed in order to fulfil their tasks. In so 
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doing, the ethnic minority Turks could also fulfill the leaders’ beliefs in their 
employees’ abilities to fulfill their tasks and their integrity towards the company and 
the subsidiaries. In addition these leaders adapted to or reflexively drew on the 
subfield subsidiaries’ valued forms of capital, which were identified to be cultural 
capital and social capital. By using Turkish customs, trying to learn to speak some 
Turkish, and incorporating parts of the private sphere into the business sphere these 
leaders managed to enhance perceived familiarity and, perhaps more important, they 
signaled to respect and value Turkish culture. This approach thus did not only 
enhance the ethnic Turkish employees’ feeling of being recognized and appreciated 
(symbolic capital) but it also fostered trust as described in the analysis. Another 
important factor for ESAG’s success is thus the company’s ability to translate HQ 
logics into a feasible approach at the subsidiary level. In light of the diverse logics of 
ESAG’s subfields, ESAG’s ability to move in small steps, having patience and being 
able to choose its internal struggles revolving around adjustment to each other and 
best practices seems to present another important success factor. In order to move in 
the right direction without having to deal with constant internal struggles, ESAG’s 
leaders drew on a leadership style which followed the notion of “freedom with 
responsibility” which in turns was found to be based on and reproduce 
institutionalized trust. 
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: THE 
INTERPLAY OF CONDITIONS, 
INTERPRETATIONS AND EXPERIENCES 
OF TRUST IN AND BEYOND ESAG 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this longitudinal case study aimed at 
enhancing the understanding of trust in the context of multicultural leadership as it 
addresses the interplay of structure and agency as underlying yet overlapping causes 
for the process of situated relational trusting between Danish leaders and their 
employees with Turkish backgrounds at a Danish Food Company’s department of 
Ethnic Sales. In the previous chapter I presented this study’s empirical findings 
which addressed the leaders’ and employees’ interpretations and experiences of 
trusting alongside their perceptions of why and how their trusting changed through 
time. In the following, these findings are discussed in light of relevant literature and 
previous research, thus demonstrating this study’s theoretical and methodological 
contributions. The chapter is structured by the following analytic categories each of 
which are associated with one of this study’s research questions: 
1. The relationship between the interactants’ conditions (habitus, position, and 
broader contextual setting) and interpretations of trust (Research question 
1) 
2. The relationship between leadership practices and experiences of trust 
(Research question 2) 
3. Perceived supports, obstacles and critical factors influencing trusting in 
leader-employee relations (Research question 3)   
The discussion is intended to enlarge the understanding of how Bourdieu’s concepts 
of field, capital and habitus assist our comprehension of when and how trust 
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emerges from multicultural leader-employee relations and its situated processes over 
time. Following the discussions on contributions is a revisit and reflection of my 
assumptions laid out in the introduction (chapter 1). The chapter concludes with a 
summary of this study’s main insights on trusting in the context of multicultural 
leadership which is followed by a set of recommendations. 
 
6.1 Discussing conditions for trust in leader-employee relations 
at ESAG 
The conditions for trust in multicultural leader-employee relations at ESAG have 
been outlined in Chapter 4 and analyzed in Chapter 5 taking a practice theoretical 
perspective inspired by Bourdieu. As argued throughout the dissertation and the 
analysis, a Bourdieusian view conceptualizes the interconnectedness of capital, 
habitus and field which is why this discussion of conditions for trust also includes 
Bourdieusian concepts which can be said to be more related to the agent, such as for 
example practical sense or a given agent’s capital portfolio.  
The analysis revealed a variety of conditional factors influencing trust, all of which 
spring from the finding that ESAG was divided into two major subfields (ESAG 
HQs and ESAG Subsidiaries) both of which – when and if recognized – were 
understood to be different in a variety of ways. Examples were that the subfields 
offered different positions (the objective more powerful positions were monopolized 
at HQs), worked according to diverse logics and valued different forms of capital. I 
pointed out that trusting was influenced by the organizational members’ struggles 
for specific capital as well as their individual capital portfolio. The employees’ and 
leaders’ different volumes of capital portfolio and their diverse positions in the field 
of ESAG highlighted their power differences as well as these elements influenced 
what they understood as reasonable practices. The analysis suggests that both 
leaders and employees would trust each other only if trusting was tacitly understood 
to be reasonable. If and to what extent this study’s interactants engaged in trusting 
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each other depended on the perceived risk (can we criticize our leader without 
having to face repercussions?) which in turn was related to the notion of familiarity 
(not knowing the rules of the game, not knowing the other). This is in line with the 
trust literature’s understanding of ‘perceived risk and uncertainty’ being core 
elements of trust (e.g., Mayer et al. 1995, Möllering 2006). Consequently, trusting 
could be understood as ‘risk taking in relationship’ (Rousseau et al., 1998; Mayer et 
al., 1995) with risk being “the perceived probability of loss as interpreted by a 
decision maker” (Rousseau et al. 1998:395).  
In that sense, trusting behavior may seem somewhat irrational: even though the 
trustor cannot predict or control the trustee’s behavior on which the trustor is 
dependent in order to achieve a certain goal, he or she risks to trust the trustee and 
thus, accepts vulnerability in the face of uncertainty concerning the outcome of trust 
which led Möllering (2006) to conceive of trust as a “leap of faith”. Frederiksen 
(2014:179) qualifies Möllering’s notion by positing that trust emerges from the 
process of situated aligning of practical sense as understood in Bourdieu’s Theory of 
Practice. According to Frederiksen (ibid.) “[a]ligning means that the practical sense 
of each of the interacting parties adapts and takes the other parties and their 
conceptions of the situation into consideration.” Hence, the process of aligning may 
support trust building as it is assumed that social actors create trust from the very 
situated relationship by “bringing into correspondence their conceptions of the 
situation, their purposes and meaningful actions” (ibid. 180). By drawing on an 
adapted version of Bourdieu’s field concept and the analytical tools of capital and 
habitus, the analysis of trust in this study’s leader-employee relations further 
illuminate what is on the inside of practical sense and the notion of a reasonable 
practice or meaningful action such as trusting. 
By employing an overall framework inspired by Bourdieu’s Practice Theory, I was 
able to conceptualize ESAG as a field in which social agents struggle for the 
accruement of specific forms of capital, especially symbolic capital. As mentioned, 
it was found that the field of ESAG was comprised by two quite different subfields, 
the subfield of ESAG HQs and the subfield of Subsidiaries. The latter was found to 
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be far more immersed and influenced by logics from the field of Ethnic Business and 
the specific social field of Ethnic Minorities than the subfield ESAG HQs which I 
argued to be heavily influenced by the Danish social field and the Economic Field. 
The different positioning of ESAG’s leaders and employees was found to coincide 
with the actors’ ethnic backgrounds and their overall volume of capital which 
rendered ESAG HQ members to be more powerful than members at ESAG’s 
subsidiaries seeing that HQ members had the tools and ability to change some rules 
of the game in the field of ESAG. In order to understand whether or not trusting was 
perceived as reasonable, the concepts of field and capital and especially symbolic 
capital were found to be useful to shed light on the agent’s tacit perception of ‘risk 
and uncertainty’ seeing that misplaced trust could lead to a reduction or loss of a 
certain species of capital. This study highlights the importance of the connection 
between agents’ specific capital portfolio, their positioning within a certain field 
(objective and subjective power), their understanding of the given field’s valued 
capital (symbolic capital) and their tacit decision to trust. Furthermore, the use of 
Bourdieu’s concepts enabled me to also describe and analyze power structures 
beyond the organizational boundaries and shed light on their influence on the 
organizational actors’ practices such as trusting.  
 
6.1.1 Overlapping fields and trusting 
The analysis pointed out that ESAG’s leaders and employees were situated in 
different subfields of ESAG. These subfields followed rather different logics; 
whereas agents in the subfield Subsidiaries struggled for symbolic capital in form of 
being recognized and acknowledged as hard working ethnic minority Turks able and 
eager to fulfill their tasks both within and outside the field of ESAG, agents in the 
subfield of HQs struggled for symbolic capital in form of being promoted and 
gaining a higher professional status within the company. The analysis showed that 
the tools employed by agents from the subfield Subsidiaries in order to accrue those 
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forms of capital they understood to have value led to irritations and episodes of 
faltering trust in relation to leaders from the subfield ESAG HQs and vice versa as 
HQs failed to meet the subfield Subsidiaries’ logic of practice. For example, leaders 
from HQs who tacitly drew predominantly on work-related species of capital (e.g., 
efficiency, professionalism) failed to see that these species of capital were valued 
less in the subfield Subsidiaries. On the other hand, ethnic Turkish employees who 
understood recognition and honor to be at stake in the subfield Subsidiaries, and 
therefore drew on a combination of work-related and person-related species of 
capital (their self-confidence, Turkish language, family network) irritated members 
of the subfield ESAG HQs. Hence, rather than the agents’ cultural backgrounds, the 
different understandings of what was valued and what would be at stake in the field 
of ESAG caused struggles which in some instances led to the erosion of trust.  
Literature on trust building across borders or research on intercultural leadership 
often suggests that culture plays a decisive role in how trust is understood and 
practiced (Lane & Bachmann, 1996; Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006). As pointed out in 
Chapter 2, the overwhelming amount of trust researchers adopt Hofstede’s concept 
of culture which leads them to claim that culture predicts actions (e.g., Doney at al., 
1998; Johnson & Cullen, 2002) and a few scholars point out that trust between 
culturally diverse actors can be understood as a choice made on the backdrop of a 
repertoire of trusting behaviors (e.g. Mizrachi et al., 2007; Perry, 2012). My analysis 
of trust in multicultural leader-employee relations at ESAG, however, shows that 
agents’ cultural background per se does not determine whether they engage in 
trusting or not.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, existing literature on trust-building across borders 
suggests that organizational members might either adapt and adjust to the other 
culture by use of code-switching (Molinsky 2007), by employing cultural sensitivity 
(Shapiro et al., 2008), or by engaging in shared meaning-negotiation (Möllering & 
Stache, 2010), thus putting the creation and communication of shared values and 
purpose (Gillespie & Mann 2004:596) center stage in order to enhance trust-based 
intercultural leadership. Not surprisingly, thus, research on intercultural trust seems 
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to predominantly focus on culture as the dominant factor influencing trust in 
multicultural settings. By employing a framework inspired by Bourdieu, the analysis 
of this study’s leader-employee relations, however, indicates that cultural 
differences per se only play a minor role in trust building; rather in the case of this 
study, trusting seems to be heavily influenced by the tools, information and power 
available to the organizational members as well as their tacit understanding of how 
to use these tools. Thus, bridging cultural differences in terms of a given workforce’ 
national, ethnic, organizational or departmental differences in regard to values and 
meaning making, as suggested by above literature, does not necessarily foster trust.  
Taking a Bourdieusian perspective therefore highlights the complexities of trust 
building. In order to switch codes or engage in shared meaning-negotiation, 
organizational members would need to decipher the code and excavate underlying 
meanings of actions. However, practice theory suggests that these are tacit and 
taken-for-granted aspects of social life which are shaped by the individuals’ life 
trajectories outside the organization (see for example Wasti et al. 2010) thus 
rendering ‘alignment’ (Frederiksen 2012) difficult. In the case of this study, a 
Bourdieusian view suggests that ESAG’s members were to immerse themselves in 
the socio-cultural and organizational (sub)fields of the other for prolonged time, in 
order to feel and embody the logics (habitus) of those fields the others have been 
shaped by and thus, get a feel for what is at stake. Yet, seeing the temporal 
dimension, even though organizational members were able to spend ample time in 
the organizations’ diverse subfields, they would not be able to grasp past 
experiences made by, for example, ethnic minority Turks in Austria or ethnic 
majority Danes in Denmark. The close interconnectedness of organizational 
members’ habitus, the field(s) they position themselves in and their practices of trust 
thus substantiates Wright & Ehnert’s (2010:109) call for more contextualized 
research on trust. 
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6.1.2 The role of structure, power and control for trusting  
Trust research primarily turns to objective structures to explain power issues within 
organizations which are understood as formal control influencing trust. Whereas the 
analysis indicates that control and trust are interrelated non-exclusive concepts, 
literature on trust and control predominantly focusses on either of the concepts. 
According to Weibel & Six (2013:59), “only a very small fraction of research is 
dedicated to the interrelationship of control and trust.” The research doing so, 
investigates the relation between hierarchical control and trust, with findings which 
are rather inconsistent. Citing Bachmann et al (2001:V), Weibel & Six (2013:62) 
state: “There are numerous examples in the literature where control chases out trust 
and situations in which trust seems to remove the necessity for control, there are 
equally as many examples of trust and control being complementary, or going hand 
in hand.” Even though trust literature dealing with the relationship between trust and 
control present contradicting findings, it seems to have in common that it assumes 
that those at the higher hierarchical position have the power to control other 
organizational members. The assumption of objective structures representing 
‘objective power relations’ is also expressed by the interactants of this study. For 
example, my research indicates that HQ leaders held sufficient objective power to 
control their subordinates by means of meetings, the use of Axapta (global 
enterprise resource planning (ERP) software product), the delegation of information, 
and by being the main decision-makers. Yet, the analysis also revealed that 
organizational agents drew on symbolic capital both from inside and outside the 
field of ESAG which empowered them to engage in struggles over the rules of the 
game in their respective subfields. For instance, some ethnic minority Turkish 
employees (ITR2, ITR3, ITR5, ITR7) drew on their perceived safety net in form of 
their extended families and social network (social capital) and their self-recognition 
as successful and self-confident ethnic Turks (symbolic capital from outside the 
field of ESAG) to challenge work logics and practices within the field of ESAG. 
Hence, the Bourdieusian perspective enabled me to understand power not only as a 
concept relating to an employee’s certain position or role within a given 
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organization but also as symbolic power which I understood to influence trusting at 
ESAG. Employing a framework inspired by Bourdieu meant to understand and 
conceptualize ESAG as an open system, a field which itself is divided into subfields 
and influenced by other fields (see Chapter 5.5). This approach opens up the insight 
of trusting within organizations as also influenced by organizational members’ 
situation outside a given organization. 
  
6.2 Discussing leadership practices and trust 
Based on the analysis and above discussion, I argued that many of this study’s 
ethnic Turkish employees were equipped with a rather different volume of capital 
portfolio than their ethnic Danish leaders and co-workers. Furthermore, as discussed 
earlier, the ethnic Turkish workforce seemed to value other species of capital than 
the ethnic Danish workforce which was explained by their positions in their 
respective subfields and the subfields positioning in the broader social fields. Seeing 
that trust literature portrays ‘perceived risk, uncertainty, and positive expectations’ 
as core elements of trust (e.g., Mayer et al. 1995, Möllering 2006), an understanding 
of ‘what is at stake’ in a certain field seems to be warranted. The analysis clearly 
points out that trusting as a situated relational practice is always connected to the 
notion of capital: Social agents are equipped with a certain volume of diverse forms 
of capital making up a specific capital portfolio which they draw from in order to 
enable reasonable actions which aim at accruing more capital representing symbolic 
capital and possibly some sort of symbolic power. My research shows that 
organizational members rather low in economic capital refused to engage in trusting 
when they perceived this action as possibly jeopardizing their employment and thus 
the accruement of economic capital which either was invested in objects 
symbolizing status (e.g., a car of high symbolic value), or it was used to support 
family members and friends (social capital). On the other hand, organizational 
members high in social capital would engage in struggles over valued symbolic 
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capital even though there would be a perceived risk to lose parts of their economic 
capital and thereto related social capital. Examples are the ethnic Turkish 
employees’ struggles for reputation at ESAG. Based on the analysis I suggest that 
trusting could be conceptualized as a reasonable practice of tacitly daring to lose a 
highly valued species of capital which presents an essential, but not yet in 
abundance, available part of a given agent’s habitus. 
This conceptualization of trust suggests that in order to nurture trust, leader-employ 
relations needed to foster the accruement of that specific species of capital which is 
valued by organizational members due to their positioning in a certain field. To be 
able to identify the species of capital in which organizational members invest their 
time and energy to accrue, one would have to understand the employees’ or leaders’ 
positioning within the specific field and, as the analysis has shown, other 
overlapping fields. Thus, multicultural leadership seems to face a complexity which 
not only would ask for reflexivity in relationship building (Möllering & Stache, 
2010), the use of a common language which fosters in-group development 
(Henderson, 2010), or interaction and communication in which shared meanings are 
negotiated (Möllering & Stache, 2007) as advocated for in the trust literature taking 
a cultural perspective. Rather, as indicated above and exemplified in the analysis, 
trust can emerge from mutually embodied experiences made over a prolonged 
period of time. In this study, the analysis shows that trust in leaders-employee 
relations is further fostered by shared experiences outside the work context. This 
finding resonates with Wasti et al.’s (2010:295) notion of “cross-cultural differences 
in relationship multiplexity
7” which according to Wasti et al. is a central aspect of 
trust-building typical to Turkish culture. The authors posit that Turks predominantly 
build trust based on signs of benevolence “related to intimacy and to experiences in 
the personal domain” (Wasti et al. 2010:296). Hence, positive experiences made in 
the personal domain play a vital role for trust in the professional domain. 
Consequently, in a Turkish business context both domains seem to intersect, with 
                                                          
7
 By referring to Morris, Podolny, & Ariel (2000), Wasti et al. (2010:295) 
understand multiplexity as referring to “affective and instrumental resources being 
exchanged in the same relationship.” 
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the personal domain being more salient than the professional in terms of trust-
building. Yet, in a Danish context, personal and business domains hardly overlap 
and, as stressed by many Danish leaders, ought not to. The aforementioned issues of 
overlapping fields with its diverse logics of practice thus seem also to resonate with 
Wasti et al.´s notion of ‘dual tensions’, i.e. “role conflicts as the expectations of 
affective closeness may contradict the role-based expectations of work associations” 
(Wasti et al. 2010:298). My research indicates that especially the intermediary 
leaders, the expatriate and the departmental leader of Sales Support had to deal with 
so-called ‘dual tensions’ and other tensions which were argued to arise from the 
employees’ and leaders’ diverse habitus. In order to align practices across the 
subfields, some leaders and employees employed the other field’s logics and 
engaged in practices which would draw on forms of cultural capital (using Turkish 
expressions and Turkish forms of greetings, highlighting one’s professionalism and 
business education) which were valued in the other’s subfields. These steps of 
aligning by learning and employing the hidden structures and logics of the other’s 
subfields and by building shared identities resulted in higher levels of trust between 
the agents as described in the analysis. Yet, by drawing on a functionalistic 
understanding of culture as predicting actions, one Danish leader was unable to 
bridge the subfields’ different logics. While the aforementioned organizational 
actors tried to achieve perceived belonging and common identity by drawing on 
similarities such as their professional background or joint hobbies, the focus on 
differences along the lines of ethnicity only seemed to heighten the actors’ 
perception of being different and thus not belonging to the field of ESAG. These 
leadership practices led to different experiences of trust, seeing that the analysis 
indicated that particularly the notions of belonging and recognition were at stake for 
agents in the subfield of Subsidiaries. 
Moreover, employing Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, i.e. embodied history, to both 
agents and organizations points us to the importance of unwritten and tacit, taken for 
granted assumptions, rules, and knowledge of a given person and/or organization 
which influences its practices. The analysis showed that especially taken for granted 
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and not communicated aspects of ESAG HQs and the subsidiaries led to irritations 
and actions from both sides which were perceived as being annoying, inefficient or 
unfair and thus influenced trust development negatively. Hence, trust research that 
explains trusting as an outcome or process of ‘objective structures and roles within 
the organization’ may overlook possibly more important other influences shaping 
trust. 
 
6.3 Summary: Supports, obstacles and critical factors 
influencing trusting in leader-employee relations 
Based on the analysis (chapter 5) and the discussion above, this study shows that 
trusting can be fostered in leader-employee relations where both agents support the 
accruement of the other’s specific species of symbolic capital. Hence, from a 
Bourdieusian perspective, the study proposes a direct connection between what 
social agents perceive as a given field’s logic of practice and thus valued form of 
capital and trusting as a reasonable practice. Following that line of thought, factors 
that may foster, hamper or critically influence trust in situated relational leader-
employee interactions are those that influence the accruement or potential loss of the 
field’s symbolic capital and related thereto symbolic power.   
It was found that embodied mutual experiences had the potential to foster trust, 
seeing that these experiences made it possible to become aware of given differences 
and to find ways to consolidate them. In that relation, the study found that 
leadership practices such as ‘translating HQ ideas’, ‘knowledge sharing’, coaching, 
subtle control and recognition were perceived as fostering trust. Perhaps even more 
important, however, the study indicated that embodied mutual experiences outside 
the work-context were understood to signal a genuine interest in the other (especially 
from the perspective of ESAG’s ethnic Turkish employees) and thus fostered trust. 
In addition, the findings suggest that institutionalized trust has a great potential to 
foster trust as leaders and employees internalized the field’s logic of ‘trusting’ into 
297 
 
their habitus which resulted in a high disposition to trust. It was suggested that this 
tendency to trust others was tacitly employed by leaders from HQs when engaging 
with their ethnic Turkish sales personnel. As pointed out in Chapter 5, 
institutionalized trust can also be understood as a subtle but efficient tool of control; 
and in combination with a lack of information sharing and recognition it can lead to 
stress.      
ESAG’s organizational structure seemed to present the main obstacle for trust. 
First, the structure meant that ESAG’s three sales subsidiaries had to work under 
different conditions. Seeing that they were treated as individual ‘internal customers’ 
they had to stay within a certain budget and their economic success was measured 
against each other. Hence, the subsidiaries and its workforces could be interpreted as 
being internal competitors fighting for status in the field of ESAG. Since they only 
officially seemed to be on equal footing (in regard to the organization chart) yet had 
unequal conditions for business, the structure was perceived as unfair which 
influenced trust negatively. Second, ESAG’s informal structure which followed a 
matrix approach was not communicated throughout the company and could only be 
experienced by those working at HQs. Consequently, many ethnic Turkish 
employees contacted co-workers or leaders at HQs who were not responsible for 
solving a certain issue or could not answer a certain question. At times these 
practices led HQ personnel to become annoyed which could influence trust in a 
negative way. 
The main critical aspects for trust in ESAG’s leader-employee relations were 
identified as perceived untrustworthy behavior, such as inconsistency of words and 
deeds, the handling of information sharing and employee inclusion in decision 
making and internal promotion, and the way culture was conceptualized. The 
findings suggest that ethnic Turkish employees wished to increase their status by 
investing their institutionalized cultural capital and their work experience in the 
field of ESAG. However, the subfield ESAG HQs which was identified to hold the 
entire organizational field’s symbolic capital hindered ethnic minority sales 
personnel to take on higher status positions in the subfield Subsidiaries. It was found 
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that ethnic minority employees reacted differently to ESAG HQs’ boundary 
protection: While those who identified themselves to be endowed with a high level 
of relevant Austrian, Danish or German cultural capital felt treated unfairly, others 
with a relative low level of aforementioned cultural capital did not consider internal 
promotion a possibility in the first place. The findings especially point to the notion 
of cultural understanding as critical for trusting. That is, if culture is understood 
along the main-stream conceptualization as a ‘stable, rather unchangeable system 
predicting perception and actions’, this study’s interactants have a tendency to 
explain struggles as outcomes of differences in culture. If culture is perceived in 
above-mentioned way it can lead to communication and collaboration shutdown as 
described in Chapter 5. A broader understanding of culture however provides this 
study’s interactants with a possibility to find communalities and to learn about the 
other’s background and situation; this might foster awareness of the other’s and the 
field’s symbolic capital which I argued to play a central role in trusting. 
   
6.4 Conclusion 
This research aimed at enhancing the understanding of trust in the context of 
multicultural leadership as it addresses the interplay of structure and agency as 
underlying yet overlapping causes for the process of situated relational trusting 
between Danish leaders and their employees with Turkish backgrounds at a Danish 
Food Company’s department of Ethnic Sales. This empirical qualitative study 
contributes to the existing literature about intra-organizational trust, in particular, 
trust in multicultural leadership in SMEs as it is one of the few taking a longitudinal 
qualitative approach in which leader-employee relations within an SME are 
investigated from the leader and the employee perspective. In applying an overall 
theoretical framework inspired by Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice, this study adds to 
the understanding of the role of overlapping fields and capital and symbolic power 
in trust building between leaders and employees with bicultural backgrounds. This 
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study revolved around the following problem formulation: How and when does trust 
emerge from multicultural leader-employee relations and its situated processes over 
time? 
This research found that the habitus and the specific capital portfolio of (Danish) 
leaders and (ethnic minority Turkish) employees were developed in different socio-
cultural fields and thereafter (re)produced in those subfields of the company they 
would be positioned in. This led to important differences between the company’s 
habitus of the subfield HQs located in Denmark and its subfield Subsidiaries located 
in Austria and Germany which had consequences for trust building across these 
units. This study’s findings indicate that trusting within and across these subfields 
was heavily influenced by the subfield’s symbolic capital and the agents’ capacity to 
convert other species of capital into symbolic capital which was found to differ 
between the subfields. The study found that struggles were important to heighten the 
awareness of the subfields’ diverse logics of practice and specific species of 
symbolic capital. The findings suggest that trusting could be fostered in leader-
employee relations where both agents would support the accruement of the other’s 
specific species of symbolic capital. While this finding proposes that trust could be 
built in similar ways across perceived differences, this study also found that the tools 
and potentials for enhancing each other’s symbolic capital differed according to the 
agents’ habitus and their position in the field of ESAG. It was found that especially 
incorporated cultural capital and symbolic power influenced how trust would and 
could emerge from multicultural leader-employee relations.  
Understanding trusting as highly interwoven with an agent’s capital portfolio, 
habitus and the logics of a given field renders trust research extremely difficult. It is 
not only the complexity in form of the above mentioned interconnectedness, but also 
Bourdieu’s notions of ‘embedded structures’ which tacitly shape actions based on 
‘taken for granted’ principles and logics of certain fields which suggest that a trust 
researcher should spend an ample time in the study field. Even though this 
dissertation is based on a longitudinal case study, which enabled me to observe 
changes in levels and modes of trust, I consider the knowledge presented in this 
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dissertation as neither relative nor objective but rather a “provisory rational 
knowledge (...) which is wavering, evasive yet at the same time at least temporarily 
valid” (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009:121). Therefore, this study’s answers as to what 
factors support, hamper or are perceived as critical for trust in multicultural 
leadership should rather be understood as being tentative, providing a new pre-
understanding of the phenomenon under study. This leads me to suggestions for 
further research. 
 
6.4.1 Recommendations for further research 
In light of this study’s limitations (see chapter 4), I suggest further research to 
generate more qualitative and quantitative material to gain a more holistic 
understanding of how and when trust emerges from multicultural leader-employee 
relations and its situated processes over time. Therefore, the following should be 
considered: 
1. A mixed-methods approach (using a range of qualitative and quantitative 
approaches) to a larger sample of leader-employee relations in SMEs 
should be taken to simultaneously discover individual and aggregated 
characteristics of trust, thus employing a full-fledged Bourdieusian field 
analysis. 
2. A further similar study employing the same criteria should be undertaken 
among leader-employee relations in a similar SME not employing 
bicultural ethnic minority employees to compare and contrast the 
experiences of leaders and employees who have to handle ‘biculturalism’ 
with those who collaborate with another ethnic majority. 
3. A longitudinal ethnographic study employing the same criteria should be 
conducted in which the researcher and an interpreter immerse themselves 
into the context to gain a better understanding of the employees’ 
experiences of trusting. 
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4. A longitudinal ethnographic study employing a gender and religious 
perspective on trust in organizational settings should be undertaken to 
compare and contrast the possible influence of diverse gender and religious 
believes on the understanding and practice of trust. 
 
6.4.2 Recommendations for Danish SMEs employing ethnic minority 
personnel 
SMEs who often lack resources and knowledge in regard to multicultural leadership 
should consider: 
1. Clear and consistent internal communication of the company’s structures, 
its ways of command, the given employee’s area of responsibility and the 
expectations connected to the employee’s role and position within the 
company.  
2. Consideration by HR of the development and implementation of HR 
practices which take the employee’s inequalities into consideration. 
3. Ongoing circulation of personnel across the diverse company units to 
heighten the level of mutual embodied experiences. 
4. Development and implementation of workshops in ‘multiethnic leadership’ 
taking a structuralist-constructivist approach.  
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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
Studies on organizational trust show that trust-based work relations lead to a variety 
of beneficial outcomes for both the employees, leaders, and the organization at large. 
At the level of leader-employee interactions, trust is said to be valuable for the 
quality of communication and problem solving, organizational commitment, and 
team performance. 
While scholarly work on trust points to the beneficial outcome of trust, the question 
as to how trust is built still occupies organizational scholars. Especially research on 
the influence of cultural factors on trust is still very scarce despite the fact that 
globalization has led to an intensification of intercultural work relations. 
Considering the relatively scarce knowledge on the relationship between leadership 
and trust processes in general and in small and medium sized companies (SMEs) in 
particular, this study aims at enhancing the understanding of micro-processes of 
situated relational trust building in the context of multicultural leadership. In order 
to do so, this research addresses the interplay of structure and agency as underlying 
yet overlapping causes for the process of situated relational trusting between Danish 
leaders and their employees with ethnic minority Turkish backgrounds in one 
Austrian and two German sales subsidiaries of a SME I called “ESAG”. 
This research takes a longitudinal interpretative case study design embedded in an 
overall hermeneutic approach to trust building between leaders and employees in the 
context of multicultural leadership.  This study aims to enhance our understanding 
of trust building in leader-employee relations situated in real organizational contexts 
(fields) and influenced by their situated interactions (practical sense and practical 
evaluation), cultural backgrounds (cultural habitus) and understandings 
(dispositions), past experiences and present sense-making (reflexivity and tacit 
maneuvers). 
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The main purpose is to discover the leaders’ and employees’ interpretations and 
experiences of trusting alongside their perceptions of why and how their trusting 
changed through time. Therefore, this research addresses the following problem 
formulation: When and how does trust emerge from multicultural leader-employee 
relations and its situated processes over time? 
Three research questions guide the examination and analysis of these relations 
which are researched from both the perspective of the leaders and the employees, 
thus empirically examining interpersonal processes of situated relational trust from 
the perspective of both interactants.  
The study is conducted as an embedded case study of situated leader-employee 
relations and their ‘practices’ of trust building in the context of multicultural 
leadership in a SME headquartered in Denmark. The main attention is on three 
Danish leaders and their relationships with various employees, most of whom have 
ethnic minority Turkish backgrounds. Hence the focus is predominantly on trust-
building between individuals (Danish leaders and their predominantly none-Danish 
bicultural employees) which however also cut across the subsidiary and 
departmental level at HQs.  
The study draws primarily on qualitative empirical material, i.e. exploratory and 
semi-structured interviews, participant observations, informal conversations and 
interactions alongside organizational texts. The qualitative hermeneutical analysis 
inspired by Bourdieu’s field analysis shows that the ethnic Danish leaders’ and the 
ethnic minority Turkish employees’ cultural habitus is developed during their 
upbringing in diverse societal fields and their employment in ESAG’s diverse 
subfields. The analysis reveals that this has an essential influence on the 
organizational actors’ understanding of what present reasonable and legitimate sales 
and work practices in the field of ESAG. Based on a hermeneutic approach to 
attribute and causation coding and resulting form a field analysis inspired by 
Bourdieu, this study shows that trusting is influenced by the organizational 
members’ struggles for specific capital as well as their individual capital portfolio. 
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Seeing the employees’ and leaders’ different volumes of capital portfolio and their 
diverse positions in the field of ESAG highlighted their power differences as well as 
these elements influence on what agents understood as reasonable practices. The 
analysis concludes that both leaders and employees would trust each other only if 
trusting was tacitly understood to be reasonable. 
In order to understand whether or not trusting was perceived as reasonable, the 
concepts of field and capital and especially symbolic capital were found to be useful 
to shed light on the agent’s tacit perception of ‘risk and uncertainty’ seeing that 
misplaced trust could lead to a reduction or loss of a certain valued species of 
capital. This study highlights the importance of the connection between agents’ 
specific capital portfolio, their positioning within a certain field (objective and 
subjective power), their understanding of the given field’s valued capital (symbolic 
capital) and their tacit decision to trust. Furthermore, the use of Bourdieu’s concepts 
enabled me to also describe and analyze power structures beyond the organizational 
boundaries and shed light on their influence on the organizational actors’ practices 
such as trusting. 
This study suggests that trusting could be fostered in leader-employee relations 
where both agents would support the accruement of the other’s specific species of 
symbolic capital. While this finding proposes that trust could be built in similar 
ways across perceived differences, this study also found that the tools and potentials 
employed for enhancing each other’s symbolic capital differed according to the 
agents’ habitus and their position in the field of ESAG. It was found that especially 
incorporated cultural capital and symbolic power influenced how trust would and 
could emerge from multicultural leader-employee relations. 
Based on this study’s findings, suggestions for further research and practical 
recommendations for trust building and maintenance in multicultural leadership are 
proposed and limitations discussed. 
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DANSK RESUMÉ 
Studier, der handler om tillid i organisationer, viser at et samarbejde bygget på tillid 
har positive effekter for både medarbejderne, lederne og organisationen som helhed. 
Hvad interaktioner mellem leder og medarbejder angår, så viser disse undersøgelser 
at tillid styrker kvaliteten af deres kommunikation og problemløsning, organisatorisk 
engagement og team-præstation.  
Mens akademiske afhandlinger påpeger de mange positive resultater af tillid, er 
spørgsmålet om hvordan tillid opbygges noget, som kontinuerligt optager 
organisationsforskerne. Forskning om kulturens indflydelse på tillid er stadigvæk ret 
begrænset, selvom globaliseringen har medført en intensivering af interkulturelle 
arbejdsrelationer. 
I lyset af den begrænsede viden omkring sammenhængen mellem ledelse og 
tillidsprocesser generelt, og med særlig henblik på små og mellemstore 
virksomheder (SME), tager denne undersøgelse sigte på, at fremme forståelsen af 
mikroprocesser af situeret relationel tillidsopbygning i multikulturelle 
ledelsessammenhæng.  
For at undersøge dette fænomen belyser dette studie sammenspillet mellem struktur 
og aktør, for såvel underliggende men også overlappende årsager til selve processen 
af situeret relationel tillid mellem danske ledere og deres medarbejdere med etnisk 
tyrkisk minoritets baggrund i én østrigsk og to tyske salgs datterselskaber af et SME 
som jeg nævner ”ESAG”. 
Denne undersøgelse anvender et longitudinal interpretativt case studie, hvilket er 
forankret i en hermeutisk tilgang til tillidsopbygning mellem ledere og medarbejdere 
i konteksten af multikulturel ledelse. Studiet sigter på at fremme vores forståelse af 
tillidsopbygning i leder-medarbejder relationer i reale organisationssammenhænge 
(felter) som en proces, der er påvirket af aktørernes situerede interaktioner (praktisk 
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sans og praktisk evaluering), kulturel baggrund (kulturel habitus) og deres 
fortolkninger på baggrund af tidligere erfaringer (dispositioner) samt endvidere 
deres nutidige meningsskabelse (refleksivitet og ubeviste handlinger). 
Det overordnede mål er at kortlægge ledernes og medarbejdernes interpretationer af 
og erfaringer med tillid, samt deres antagelser og forståelser om, hvorfor og hvordan 
deres tillid har forandret sig igennem tiden. Studiet tager derfor udgangspunkt i 
følgende problemformulering: Hvornår og hvordan opstår tillid i multikulturelle 
leder-medarbejder relationer samt deres situerede processer igennem tiden?  
Tre forskningsspørgsmål danner baggrund for undersøgelsen og analysen af disse 
relationer som udforsker tillidsfænomenet set fra både ledernes og medarbejdernes 
perspektiv, hvilket betyder at interpersonelle processer af situeret relationel tillid er 
empirisk udforsket ud fra begge interakørernes synsvinkel. 
Undersøgelsen er gennemført ved brug af et ’indlejret’ casestudie af situerede leder-
medarbejder relationer og deres ’praksisser’ i tillidsopbygning samt i en kontekst af 
multikulturel ledelse i en SME med hjemsted i Danmark. Det primære fokus ligger 
på tre danske ledere og deres relationer i forhold til forskellige medarbejdere, hvoraf 
de fleste har etnisk tyrkisk minoritetsbaggrund. Fokusset bliver derfor primært 
knyttet til tillidsopbygning mellem enkeltpersoner (danske ledere og deres primært 
ikke-danske bi-kulturelle medarbejdere); disse tillidsprocesser går dog også på tværs 
af datterselskabernes og afdelingernes grænser. 
Dette studie anvender primært kvalitativt empirisk materiale i form af 
semistrukturerede interviews, deltager observationer, uformelle samtaler, 
interaktioner samt tekster fra selve virksomheden (interne medarbejder magasin, 
hjemmeside). Den kvalitative hermeneutiske analyse, som bliver brugt i denne 
afhandling er inspireret af Bourdieus felt analyse; analysen viser at de etnisk danske 
lederes og de etnisk tyrkiske medarbejderes kulturelle habitus er dannet under deres 
opvækst i forskellige sociale felter samt i deres arbejdsliv i ESAGs forskellige sub-
felter. Analysen påpeger, at dette faktum har en enorm indflydelse på disse aktørers 
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forståelse af, hvad der repræsenterer rimelige og legitime salgs- og 
arbejdspraksisser i feltet ESAG. Baseret på en hermeneutisk tilgang til attribut og 
causation coding, og resultater fra felt analysen inspireret af Bourdieu, viser dette 
studie at tillid påvirkes af de enkelte ansattes kamp om specifik kapital såvel som 
deres individuelle kapital portfolio. Analysen af medarbejdernes og ledernes 
forskellige omfang af kapital portfolio og deres forskellige positioner i selve feltet 
ESAG fremhæver deres magt difference og foran nævnte elementers indflydelse på 
det, aktørerne forstår ved rimelige praksisser. Analysen konkluderer at der kun 
bliver skabt tillid mellem ledere og medarbejderne, hvis begge aktører forstår tillid 
som en rimelig praksis. 
I belysningen af hvornår en praksis forstås som værende rimelig viste det sig, at 
koncepterne felt og kapital og her især symbolsk kapital, var yderst brugbare. 
Brugen af disse koncepter gjorde det muligt at illuminere aktørernes implicitte 
fortolkning af ’risiko og usikkerhed’ set i lyset af at malplaceret tillid kunne 
resultere i reduktion eller tab af en påskønnet kapitalform. Denne undersøgelse 
fremhæver vigtigheden af sammenhængen mellem aktørernes specifikke kapital 
portfolio, deres positionering i et givet felt (objektiv og subjektiv magt), deres 
forståelse af det givne felts påskønnede kapital (symbolsk kapital) samt deres 
implicitte beslutning om at udvise tillid. Derudover gjorde anvendelsen af Bourdieus 
koncepter det muligt at beskrive og analysere magtstrukturer som overskridende 
virksomhedsgrænser og illuminere deres indflydelse på virksomhedsaktørernes 
praksisser; herunder tillid. 
Dette studie underbygger at tillid i leder-medarbejder relationer kan blive styrket, 
når begge aktører understøtter den andens anskaffelse/optjening af påskønnet kapital 
(symbolsk kapital). Mens denne konklusion giver udtryk for at tillid kan opbygges 
på nogenlunde samme måde på tværs af de opfattede forskelligheder, viser dette 
studie dog også at aktørerne gjorde brug af forskellige værktøjer og potentialer for at 
fremme de andres symbolske kapital.  Denne forskel var begrundet i aktørernes 
forskellige habitus og deres position i feltet ESAG. Det blev bevist at det især er det 
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inkorporerede kulturelle kapital og den symbolske magt, som påvirker hvordan tillid 
vil og kan udspringe fra multikulturelle leder-medarbejder relationer. 
På baggrund af konklusionerne i denne undersøgelse er der forslået ideer til 
yderligere forskning samt praktiske forslag til tillidsopbygning og vedligeholdelse i 
multikulturel ledelse. 
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